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QUINTILIANUS,  Marcus  Fabius  (0.35- 
c.9$  AD)  of  Calagurris  in  Spain  was 
brought  up  at  Rome,  but  was  in  Spain 
from  6 1  to  68,  when  with  the  new-made 
emperor  Galba  he  returned  to  Rome. 
There  he  became  head  of  the  most  impor- 
tant school  of  Oratory,  and  sometimes 
pleaded  in  the  law-courts.  The  emperor 
Vespasian  (69—79)  made  him  a  'Professor 
of  Latin  Rhetoric'  until  he  retired  to 
compose  a  lost  work  on  why  eloquence 
had  declined,  and  the  extant  Institutio 
Oratoria  'Training  of  an  Orator'  (in  twelve 
books).  He  was  also  teacher  to  the  em- 
peror Domitian's  two  grand-nephews. 

Quintilian  had  been  taught  by  the  famous 
Seneca  and  Domitius  of  Nimes.  He  greatly 
admired  the  long  dead  orator  Cicero, 
whom  he  saw  as  a  model  for  orators  of  his 
own  age.  His  Institutio  propounds  for  an 
orator  a  training  in  character  and  oratory 
from  birth.  He  presents  us  with  interesting 
and  important  views  on  general  education, 
deals  in  detail  with  all  oratorical  composi- 
tion and  the  devices  of  rhetoric,  and 
outlines  the  ideal  orator.  His  review  of  the 
past  literature  of  Greece  and  Rome  is 
famous  and  makes  him  a  good  literary 
critic.  The  whole  work  is  composed  in  a 
dignified  yet  pleasant  style,  and  his  judge- 
ments are  fair  and  gentle. 

1 , 








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G.  P.  GOOLD 

T.   E.    PAGE  E.   CAPPS 

W.    H.    D.    ROUSE  L.   A.    POST 



LCL  124 







First  published  1920 
Reprinted  19,3,3,  195.3,  1958,  196.3,  1969,  1980,  1989,  1996 

ISBN  0-674-99138-9 

Printed  in  Great  Britain  by  St  Edmundsbury  Press  Ltd, 

Bury  St  Edmunds,  Suffolk,  on  acid-free  paper. 
Bound  by  Hunter  i~  Foulis  Ltd,  Edinburgh,  Scotland. 





BOOK   I         4 

Preface. — Ch.  1:  Elementary  Education. — Ch.  2: 
The  merits  of  public  and  private  education  com- 
pared.— Ch.  3  :  General  reflections  on  the  capacity 
and  treatment  of  pupils. — Ch.  4:  Grammar.— 
Ch.  5  :  Correctness  ;  barbarisms  ;  pronunciation  : 
the  aspirate  ;  accents  ;  solecisms  ;  words,  foreign, 
compound,  metaphorical,  new,  etc. — Ch.  6  :  Lan- 
guage ;  analogy ;  etymology  ;  old  words  ;  au- 
thority ;  usage. — Ch.  7  :  Orthography  ;  difference 
between  spelling  and  pronunciation. — Ch.  8  :  Read 
ing ;  authors  to  be  read  ;  methods  of  teaching 
value  of  history. — Ch.  9  :  Composition.  —  Ch.  10 
Other  studies  necessary  to  rhetoric;  music,  geo 
metry,  astronomy. — Ch.  11  :  Instruction  to  be 
derived  from  the  stage  ;  delivery  ;  gesture  ;  reci- 
tation ;  gymnastic.  —  Ch.  12  :  Boys  capable  of  study- 
ing a  number  of  subjects  at  once. 

BOOK   II 203 

Ch.  1  :  Rhetoric  not  begun  early  enough  ;  relations 
between  rhetor  and  grammaticus. — Ch.  2  :  Choice 
of  a  teacher ;  mutual  duties  of  teacher  and  pupil. 
— Ch.  3  :  Necessity  of  avoiding  inferior  teachers. — 
Ch.  4  :  Elementary  rhetorical  exorcises  ;  narratives  ; 
proof  and  refutation  ;  panegyric  and  denunciation  ; 
commonplaces  ;  theses ;  reasons ;  preparations  for 
pleadings ;  praise  and  blame  of  particular  laws  ;  fic- 
titious declamations. — Ch.  5 :  Assistance  to  be  given 
to  pupils. — Ch.  6  :  Declamation. — Ch.  7 :  Ortho- 



graphy. — Ch.  8 :  Different  methods  required  for 
different  pupils. — Ch.  9  :  Pupils  to  regard  teachers  as 
in  loco  parentis. — Ch.  10 :  Themes  for  declamation  ; 
criticism  of  existing  practice. — Ch.  11:  Criticism  of 
those  who  think  instruction  in  rhetoric  unneces- 
sary ;  necessity  of  thoroughness  of  method. — Ch.  12 : 
Merits  and  defects  of  untrained  speakers. — Ch.  13 : 
No  rigid  rules  possible ;  necessity  of  adaptability ; 
value  of  rules. — Ch.  14:  The  term  rhetoric  or 
oratory  ;  heads  under  which  it  is  to  be  considered. 
Ch.  15:  What  is  oratory?  Various  definitions; 
Quintilian's  definition. — Ch.  16:  Oratory  denounced 
by  some  because  of  its  capacity  for  harm ;  its 
excellences  and  value. — Ch.  17  :  Oratory  an  art ; 
critics  of  this  view  ;  critics  of  its  morality  ;  re- 
lation to  truth. — Ch.  18 :  Arts  or  sciences  of 
three  kinds  ;  rhetoric  a  practical  art  or  science, 
though  partaking  of  the  nature  of  theoretic  and 
productive  arts. — Ch.  19  :  Nature  and  art. — Ch.  20  : 
Is  rhetoric  a  virtue  ? — Ch.  21  :  The  subject  of 
rhetoric ;  Quintilian's  view  ;  criticism  thereof ; 
relation  between  oratory  and  philosophy  ;  range 
of  the  orator's  knowledge. 

BOOK  in 369 

Ch.  1  :  Apology  for  dryness  and  detail  of  the  more 
technical  portion  of  the  work  ;  writers  on  rhe- 
toric ;  Greeks  ;  Romans. — Ch.  2  :  Origin  of  oratory. 
— Ch.  3  :  Divisions  of  the  art ;  their  order  ;  their 
nature. — Ch.  4  :  Are  there  three  sorts  of  oratory 
or  more?  Various  views. — Ch.  5:  Distinction 
between  things  and  words  ;  questions  ;  definition 
of  a  cause. — Ch.  6  :  The  status  or  basis  of  a  cause  ; 
a  highly  technical  chapter. — Ch.  7  :  Panegyric. — 
Ch.  8  :  Deliberative  oratory. — Ch.  9  :  Forensic 
oratory  ;  the  parts  of  a  forensic  speech. — Ch.  10  : 
A  cause  may  turn  on  one  controversial  point  or 
more  ;  nature  of  the  cause  to  be  first  determined. 
— Ch.  11:  Next  points  to  be  determined;  the 
question,  the  mode  of  defence,  the  point  for  decision, 
the  foundation  of  the  case  ;  various  views. 



MARCUS  FABIUS  QUINTILIANUS  was,  like  Seneca,  of 
Spanish  origin,  being  born  about  35  A.D.  at  Cala- 
gurris.  His  father  was  a  rhetorician  of  some  note 
who  practised  with  success  at  Rome.  It  is  not  sur- 
prising therefore  to  find  that  the  young  Quintilian 
was  sent  to  Rome  for  his  education.  Among  his 
teachers  were  the  famous  grammaticus  Remmius 
Palaemon,  and  the  no  less  distinguished  rhetorician 
Domitius  Afer.  On  completing  his  education  he 
seems  to  have  returned  to  his  native  land  to  teach 
rhetoric  there,  for  we  next  hear  of  him  as  being 
brought  to  Rome  in  68  A.D.  by  Galba,  then  governor 
of  Hispania  Tarraconensis.  At  Rome  he  met  with 
great  success  as  a  teacher  and  was  the  first  rhetor- 
ician to  set  up  a  genuine  public  school  and  to  receive 
a  salary  from  the  State.  He  continued  to  teach  for 
twenty  years  and  had  among  his  pupils  the  younger 
Pliny  and  the  two  sons  of  Domitilla,  the  sister  of 
Domitian.  He  was  also  a  successful  pleader  in  the 
courts  as  we  gather  from  more  than  one  passage  in 
his  works.  Late  in  life  he  married  and  had  two 
sons.  But  both  wife  and  children  predeceased  him. 



He  died  full  of  honour,  the  possessor  of  wide  lands 
and  consular  rank.  The  date  of  his  death  is  un- 
known, but  it  was  before  100  A.D.  He  left  behind 
him  a  treatise  "  On  the  causes  of  the  decadence  of 
Roman  oratory"  (De  causis  corruplae  eloquentiae},  the 
present  work,  and  a  speech  in  defence  of  a  certain 
Naevius  Arpinianus,  who  was  accused  of  murdering 
his  wife.  These  are  the  only  works  known  to  have 
been  actually  published  by  him,  though  others  of 
his  speeches  had  been  taken  down  in  shorthand  and 
circulated  against  his  will,  while  an  excess  of  zeal  on 
the  part  of  his  pupils  resulted  in  the  unauthorised 
publication  of  two  series  of  lecture  notes.  The 
present  work  alone  survives.  The  declamations 
which  have  come  down  to  us  under  his  name  are 
spurious.  Of  his  character  the  Instil  utio  Oratorio, 
gives  us  the  pleasantest  impression.  Humane, 
kindly  and  of  a  deeply  affectionate  nature,  gifted 
with  a  robust  common  sense  and  sound  literary 
judgment,  he  may  well  have  been  the  ideal  school- 
master. The  fulsome  references  to  Domitian  are 
the  only  blemishes  which  mar  this  otherwise  pleasing 
impression.  And  even  here  we  must  remember  his 
great  debt  to  the  Flavian  house  and  the  genuine 
difficulty  for  a  man  in  his  position  of  avoiding  the 
official  style  in  speaking  of  the  emperor. 

As  a  stylist,  though  he  is  often  difficult  owing 
to  compression  and  the  epigrammatic  turn  which  he 
gives  his  phrases,  he  is  never  affected  or  extravagant. 
He  is  still  under  the  influence  of  the  sound  traditions 


of  the  Ciceronian  age,  and  his  Latin  is  silver-gilt 
rather  than  silver.  His  Institutio  Oratorio,,  despite 
the  fact  that  much  of  it  is  highly  technical,  has  still 
much  that  is  of  interest  to-day,  even  for  those  who 
care  little  for  the  history  of  rhetoric.  Notably  in 
the  first  book  his  precepts  as  regards  education  have 
lasting  value  :  they  may  not  be  strikingly  original, 
but  they  are  sound,  humane  and  admirably  put.  In 
the  more  technical  portions  of  his  work  he  is  unequal ; 
the  reader  feels  that  he  cares  but  little  about  the 
minute  pedantries  of  rhetorical  technique,  and  that 
he  lacks  method  in  his  presentation  of  the  varying 
views  held  by  his  predecessors.  But  once  he  is  free  of 
such  minor  details  and  touches  on  themes  of  real 
practical  interest,  he  is  a  changed  man.  He  is  at 
times  really  eloquent,  and  always  vigorous  and 
sound,  while  throughout  the  whole  work  he  keeps 
the  same  high  ideal  unswervingly  before  him. 



Ed.  princeps,  Campano,  Rome,  1470. 
Gronov,  Leyden,  1665. 
Gibson,  Oxford,  1693. 
Obrecht,  Strassburg,  1698. 
Burmann,  Leyden,  1720. 
Capperonnier,  Paris,  1725. 
Gesner,  Gottingen,  1738. 

Spalding,  Leipzig,  1798-1816,  with  supplementary  volume 
of  notes  by  Zumpt,  1829,  and  another  by  Bonnell,  1834. 


Zumpt,  Leipzig,  1831. 

Bonnell,  Teubner  texts,  1854. 

Halm,  Leipzig,  1868. 

Meister,  Leipzig,  1886-7. 

Radermacher,  Teubner  texts,  1907  (Bks.  1-6).  Second 
edition  by  V.  Buchheit,  2  vols.,  1959. 

D.  M.  Gaunt,  M.  Fabii  Quintiliani  Institutio  Oratoria. 
Selections  with  commentary  and  summaries  of  the  intervening 
material.  London,  W.  Heinemann.  1952. 


Bk.  1,  Fierville,  Paris,  1890;  F.  Colson,  Cambridge,  1924. 

Bk.  10,  Peterson,  Oxford,  1891. 

Bk.  10  and  12,  Frieze,  New  York;  Bk.  12,  R.  G.  Austin, 
Oxford,  1948. 

Of  the  above  the  commentary  of  Spalding  and  the  texts  of 
Halm,  Meister  and  Radermacher  are  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant. Peterson's  edition  of  Bk.  10  contains  an  admirable 
introduction  dealing  with  the  life  of  Quintilian,  his  gifts  as 
a  critic,  his  style  and  language  and  the  MSS. 



In  connection  with  the  history  of  rhetorical  theory  and 
practice  at  Rome,  the  following  works  are  of  special 
importance  : — 

Cicero,  de  Oratore  (Ed.  Wilkins,  Oxford,  1892). 
Cicero,  Orator  (Ed.  Sandys,  Cambridge,  1889). 
Cicero,  Brutus  (Ed.  Kellogg,  Boston,  1889). 
Tacitus,  Dialogus  de  claris  oratoribus  (Ed.  Peterson,  Ox- 
ford, 1893). 

For  the  history  of  Latin  rhetoric  and  education  the 
following  works  may  be  consulted : — 

Norden,  Die  Antike  Knnstprosa,  Leipzig,  1898. 

Volkmann,  Die  Rhetorik  der  Griechen  und  Ro'mer,  Leipzig, 

Marquardt,  Das  Privatleben  der  Ro'mer,  pp.  80-126,  ed.  2, 
Leipzig,  1886. 

Wilkins,  Roman  Education,  Cambridge,  1905. 


Guthrie,  London,  1805. 

Watson,  in  Bohn's  series,  reprinted  1903. 


The  MSS.  of  the  Institutio  Oratorio,  fall  into  three 
groups : — 

(1)  The  Codex  Ambrosianus  (E153),  an  eleventh-century 
MS.  now  at  Milan.    Chs.  ix.  iv.  135  to  xn.  xi.  22  are  missing. 

(2)  The  Codex  Bernensis  (351)  of  the  10th  century. 
The  Codex  Bambergensis  (M.  4,  14)  of  the  10th  century. 
The   Codex   Nostradamensis    (Paris,    Lat.    1S527)   of    the 

10th  (?)  century. 

This  group  has  the  following  lacunae  :  I.  to  i.  7  ;  v.  xiv. 
12  to  vin.  iii.  64  ;  vm.  vi.  17  to  67  ;  ix.  iii.  2  to  x.  i.  Iu7  ; 
xi.  i.  71  to  ii.  23  ;  xn.  x.  43  to  end.  The  gaps  are  to  be 
supplied  from  the  Codex  Bambergensis,  in  which  they  have 
been  filled  in  by  a  later  hand  from  a  MIS.  resembling  the 

(3)  A  number  of  late  MSS    of  the   15th  century  of   the 
usual  type. 

•  • 



Occasional  assistance  may  be  obtained  from  the  Ars 
Iihttorica  of  Julius  Victor  (Halm,  fihct.  Lat.  minores,  II. 
pp.  373  sqq.),  which  is  based  on  Quintilian  and  often  tran- 
scribes whole  passages  :  the  Rhetorical  treatise  attributed 
to  Cassiodorus  (Halm,  op.  cit.  p.  501)  is  also  sometimes 

The  text  in  this  volume  is  that  of  Halm,  with  a  few  slight 
alterations  in  reading,  and  a  considerable  number  in  punctu- 
ation. The  first  family  is  indicated  by  A  in  critical  notes, 
the  second  by  B.  \Yhere  particular  MSS.  are  mentioned 
they  are  indicated  by  their  name 


Critical  edition:  ed.  M.  Winterbottom  (OCT),  2  vols, 
Oxford  1970. 

Editions  with  commentary:  Book  I,  by  F.  H.  Colson,  Cam- 
bridge 1924 

Book  III,  by  Joachim  Adamietz,  Munich  1966 

Book  XII,  by  R.  G.  Austin,  Oxford  19542. 

Studies:  Jean  Cousin,  Etudes  sur  Quintilien,  Paris  1936. 

G.  M.  A.  Grube,  The  Greek  and  Roman  Critics,  London  1965 

George  Kennedy,  Quintilian,  New  York  1969 

M.  Winterbottom,  Problems  in  Quintilian  (BICS  Suppl.  25), 
London  1970 

Lexicon:  E.  Bonnell,  Leipzig  1834  (repr.  1963:  vol.  6  of 
G.  L.  Spalding's  edition). 

Survey:   Jean   Cousin,    'Quintilien    1935-1959,'   Lustrum   1 

(1963)  289-331 


A  =  Codex  Ambrosianus  I,  llth  century. 

B  =  Agreement  of    Codex    Bernensis,    Bambergensis   and 
Nostradamensis,  10th  century. 

G  =  Codex  Bambergensis  in  those   passages    where   gaps 
have  been  supplied  by  a  later  11th-century  hand. 





EFFLAOITASTI  cotidiano  convicio,  ut  libros,  quos  ad 
Marcelluni  meum  de  Institutione  oratoria  scripseram 
iam  emittere  inciperern.  Nam  ipse  eos  nondum 
opinabar  satis  maturuisse,  quibus  componendis,  ut 
scis,  paulo  plus  quam  biennium  tot  alioqui  negotiis 
districtus  impendi ;  quod  tempus  non  tarn  stilo  quam 
inquisition!  instituti  operis  prope  infiniti  et  legendis 

2  auctoribus,  qui  sunt  innumerabiles,  datum  est.     Usus 
deinde  Horatii  consilio,  qui  in  arte  poeticasuadet,  ne 
praecipitetur    editio    nonumque    prcmatur    in    annum, 
dabam  iis  otium,  ut,  refrigerate   inventionis   amore, 
diligentius    repetitos   tanquam   lector    perpenderem. 

3  Sed    si  tanto  opere   efflagitantur  quam   tu   adfirrnas, 
permittamus    vela   ventis   et  oram    solventibus   bene 
precemur.      Multum   autem   in    tua    quoque    fide    ac 
diligentia  positum  est,  ut  in  man  us  hominum  quam 
emendatissimi  veniant. 


You  have  daily  importuned  me  with  the  request 
that  I  should  at  length  take  steps  to  publish  the 
book  on  the  Education  of  an  Orator  which  I  dedicated 
to  my  friend  Marcellus.  For  my  own  view  was  that 
it  was  not  yet  ripe  for  publication.  As  you  know  I 
have  spent  little  more  than  two  years  on  its  compo- 
sition, during  which  time  moreover  I  have  been  dis- 
tracted by  a  multitude  of  other  affairs.  These  two 
years  have  been  devoted  not  so  much  to  actual  writing 
as  to  the  research  demanded  by  a  task  to  which 
practically  no  limits  can  be  set  and  to  the  reading 
of  innumerable  authors.  Further,  following  the  pre-  2 
cept  of  Horace  who  in  his  Art  of  Poetry  deprecates 
hasty  publication  and  urges  the  would-be  author 

"  To  withhold 
His  work  till  nine  long  years  have  passed  away," 

I  proposed  to  give  them  time,  in  order  that  the 
ardour  of  creation  might  cool  and  that  I  might 
revise  them  with  all  the  consideration  of  a  dispas- 
sionate reader.  But  if  there  is  such  a  demand  for  3 
their  publication  as  you  assert,  why  then  let  us 
spread  our  canvas  to  the  gale  and  offer  up  a  fervent 
prayer  to  heaven  as  wre  put  out  to  sea.  But  re- 
member I  rely  on  your  loyal  care  to  see  that  they 
reach  the  public  in  as  correct  a  form  as  possible. 




POST  impetratam  studiis  meis  quietem,  quae  per 
viginti  annos  erudiendis  iuvenibus  impenderam,  cum 
a  me  quidam  familiariter  postularent,  ut  aliquid  de 
ratione  dicendi  componerem,  diu  sum  equidem  reluc- 
tatus,  quod  auctores  utriusque  linguae  clarissimos  non 
ignorabam  multa,  quae  ad  hoc  opus  pertinerent, 

2  diligentissime  scripta    posteris   reliquisse.     Sed    qua 
ego  ex  causa  faciliorem    mihi    veniam    meae  depre- 
cationis  arbitrabar  fore,  hac  accendebantur  illi  magis, 
quod   inter  diversas   opiniones    priorum    et  quasdam 
etiam   inter   se  contrarias  difficilis  esset   electio  ;  ut 
mihi  si  non  inveniendi  nova  at  certe    iudicandi    de 
veteribus  iniungcre  laborem  non  iniuste  viderentur. 

3  Quamvis   autem    non   tarn    me    vinceret    praestandi, 




HAVING  at  length,  after  twenty  years  devoted  to 
the  training  of  the  young,  obtained  leisure  for  study, 
I  was  asked  by  certain  of  my  friends  to  write 
something  on  the  art  of  speaking.  For  a  long  time  I 
resisted  their  entreaties,  since  I  was  well  aware  that 
some  of  the  most  distinguished  Greek  and  Roman 
writers  had  bequeathed  to  posterity  a  number  of 
works  dealing  with  this  subject,  to  the  composition 
of  which  they  had  devoted  the  utmost  care.  This 
seemed  to  me  to  be  an  admirable  excuse  for  my  re- 
fusal, but  served  merely  to  increase  their  enthusiasm. 
They  urged  that  previous  writers  on  the  subject  had 
expressed  different  and  at  times  contradictory 
opinions,  between  which  it  was  very  difficult  to 
choose.  They  thought  therefore  that  they  were 
justified  in  imposing  on  me  the  task,  if  not  of 
discovering  original  views,  at  least  of  passing  definite 
judgment  on  those  expressed  by  my  predecessors. 
I  was  moved  to  comply  not  so  much  because  I 
felt  confidence  that  I  was  equal  to  the  task,  as 


quod  exigebatur,  fiducia  quam  negandi  verecundia, 
latius  se  tamen  aperiente  materia  plus  quam  impone- 
batur  oneris  sponte  suscepi,  simul  ut  pleniore  obse- 
quio  demererer  amantissimos  mei,  simul  ne  vulgarem 
viam  ingressus  alienis  demum  vestigiis  insisterem. 

4  Namceteri  fere,  qui  artem  orandi  litteris  tradiderunt, 
ita    sunt    exorsi,    quasi    perfectis    omni    alio    genere 
doctrinae    summam  in    eloquentia   rnanum  imponer- 
ent,   sive   contemnentes    tanquam   parva,   quae   prius 
discimus,  studia,  sive  non  ad  suum  pertinere  officium 
opinati,    quando    divisae   professionum   vices    essent, 
seu,  quod  proximum  vero,  nullam  ingenii  sperantes 
gratiam  circa  res  etiamsi  necessarias  procul  tamen  ab 
ostentatione  positas ;  ut  operura  fastigia  spectantur, 

5  latent  fundamenta.      Ego,  cum   existimem  nihil  arti 
oratoriae  alienum,  sine  quo  fieri  non  posse  oratorem 
fatendum  est,  nee  ad  ullius  rei  summam  nisi  praece- 
dentibus  initiis  perveniri,  ad  minora  ilia,  sed  quae  si 
negligas,  non  sit  maioribus  locus,  demittere  me  non 
recusabo  ;  nee  aliter,  quam  si  mihi  tradatur  educan- 
dus  orator,  studia  eius  formare  ab  infantia  incipiam. 


BOOK    I.   PR.   3-5 

because  I  had  a  certain  compunction  about  refusing. 
The  subject  proved  more  extensive  than  I  had  first 
imagined  ;  but  finally  I  volunteered  to  shoulder  a 
task  which  was  on  a  far  larger  scale  than  that  which 
I  was  originally  asked  to  undertake.  I  wished  on 
the  one  hand  to  oblige  my  very  good  friends  beyond 
their  requests,  and  on  the  other  to  avoid  the  beaten 
track  and  the  necessity  of  treading  where  others 
had  gone  before.  For  almost  all  others  who  have  4 
written  on  the  art  of  oratory  have  started  with  the 
assumption  that  their  readers  were  perfect  in  all 
other  branches  of  education  and  that  their  own  task 
was  merely  to  put  the  finishing  touches  to  their 
rhetorical  training ;  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they 
either  despised  the  preliminary  stages  of  education 
or  thought  that  they  were  not  their  concern,  since 
the  duties  of  the  different  branches  of  education 
are  distinct  one  from  another,  or  else,  and  this 
is  nearer  the  truth,  because  they  had  no  hope  of 
making  a  remunerative  display  of  their  talent  in 
dealing  with  subjects,  which,  although  necessary, 
are  far  from  being  showy  :  just  as  in  architecture  it 
is  the  superstructure  and  not  the  foundations  which 
attracts  the  eye.  I  on  the  other  hand  hold  that  the  5 
art  of  oratory  includes  all  that  is  essential  for  the 
training  of  an  orator,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  reach 
the  summit  in  any  subject  unless  we  have  first  passed 
through  all  the  elementary  stages.  I  shall  not  there- 
fore refuse  to  stoop  to  the  consideration  of  those 
minor  details,  neglect  of  which  may  result  in  there 
being  no  opportunity  for  more  important  things,  and 
propose  to  mould  the  studies  of  my  orator  from  in- 
fancy, on  the  assumption  that  his  whole  education  has 
been  entrusted  to  my  charge.  This  work  1  dedicate  G 


6  Quod    opus,   Marcelle  Victori,  tibi  dicamus ;    quem, 
cum  amicissimum  nobis  turn  eximio  litterarum  amore 
flagrantem,  non  propter  haec  modo  (quamquam  sint 
magna)  dignissimum  hoc  mutuae  inter  nos  caritatis 
pignore  iudicabamus  ;  sed  quod  erudiendo  Getae  tuo, 
cuius    prima    aetas    manifestum    iam    ingenii    lumen 
ostendit,  non  inutiles  fore  libri  videbantur,  quos  ab 
ipsis    dicendi    velut    incunabulis,  per    omnes,    quae 
modo  aliquid  oratori  futuro  conferant,  artis  ad  sum- 

7  mam  eius  opens  perducere  destinabamus  ;  atque  eo 
magis,  quod  duo  iam  sub  nomine  meo  libri  fereban- 
tur  artis  rhetoricae  neque  editi  a  me  neque  in  hoc 
comparati.     Namque  alterum  sermonem  per  biduum 
habitum  pueri,  quibus  id  praestabatur,  exceperant ; 
alterum  pluribus  sane  diebus,  quantum  notando  con- 
sequi     potuerant,     interceptum    boni    iuvenes,     sed 
nimium    amantes    mei,    temerario     editionis    honore 

8  vulgaverant.    Quare  in  his  quoque  libris  erunt  eadem 
aliqua,  multa    mutata,  plurima   adiecta,  omnia    vero 
compositiora  et,  quantum  nos  poterimus,  elaborata. 

9  Oratorem  autem  instituimus  ilium  perfectum,  qui 
esse  nisi  vir  bonus  non  potest ;  ideoque  non  dicendi 

modo    eximiam    in  eo  facultatem  sed   omnes  animi 

BOOK    I.    PR.   6-9 

to  you,  Marcellus  Victorius.  You  have  been  the  truest 
of  friends  to  me  and  you  have  shown  a  passionate 
enthusiasm  for  literature.  But  good  as  these  reasons 
are,  they  are  not  the  only  reasons  that  lead  me  to 
regard  you  as  especially  worthy  of  such  a  pledge  of 
our  mutual  affection.  There  is  also  the  consideration 
that  this  book  should  prove  of  service  in  the 
education  of  your  son  Geta,  who,  young  though  he 
is,  already  shows  clear  promise  of  real  talent.  It  has 
been  my  design  to  lead  my  reader  from  the  very 
cradle  of  speech  through  all  the  stages  of  education 
which  can  be  of  any  service  to  our  budding  orator 
till  we  have  reached  the  very  summit  of  the  art.  I  7 
have  been  all  the  more  desirous  of  so  doing  because 
two  books  on  the  art  of  rhetoric  are  at  present 
circulating  under  my  name,  although  never  published 
by  me  or  composed  for  such  a  purpose.  One  is  a 
two  days'  lecture  which  was  taken  down  by  the  boys 
who  were  my  audience.  The  other  consists  of  such 
notes  as  my  good  pupils  succeeded  in  taking  down 
from  a  course  of  lectures  on  a  somewhat  more 
extensive  scale :  I  appreciate  their  kindness,  but 
they  showed  an  excess  of  enthusiasm  and  a  certain 
lack  of  discretion  in  doing  my  utterances  the  honoui 
of  publication.  Consequently  in  the  present  work  8 
although  some  passages  remain  the  same,  you  will 
find  many  alterations  and  still  more  additions,  while 
the  whole  theme  will  be  treated  with  greater  system 
and  with  as  great  perfection  as  lies  within  my 

My  aim,  then,  is   the   education   of  the    perfect  9 
orator.     The  first  essential  for  such  an  one  is  that  he 
should  be  a  good  man,  and  consequently  we  demand 
of  him   not   merely   the   possession   of  exceptional 


10  virtutes  exigimus.      Neque   enim    hoc    concesserim, 
rationem   rectae  honestaeque  vitae  (ut  quidam   pu- 
taverunt)  ad    philosophos  relegandam,  cum    vir  ille 
vere    civilis    et    publicarum    privatarumque    rerum 
administrationi   accommodatus,  qui    regere    consiliis 
urbes,    fundare    legibus,    emendare    iudiciis    possit, 

11  non  alius  sit  profecto  quam  orator.      Quare,  tametsi 
me    fateor  usurum  quibusdam,  quae  philosophorum 
libris    continentur,   tamen    ea   iure   vereque  conten- 
derim     esse     operis    nostri    proprieque     ad     artem 

12  oratoriam     pertinere.        An,    si    frequentissime    de 
iustitia,   fortitudine,    temperantia    ceterisque  simili- 
bus  disserendum  est,  adeo  ut  vix  ulla  possit  causa 
reperiri  in  quam  non  aliqua  ex  his  incidat  quaestio, 
eaque  omnia  inventione   atque  elocutione  sunt   ex- 
plicanda,  dubitabitur,  ubicunque  vis  ingenii  et  copia 
dicendi    postulatur,    ibi    partes    oratoris    esse    prae- 

13  cipuas?     Fueruntque     haec,    ut    Cicero    apertissime 
colligit,    quemadmodum    iuncta    natura    sic    officio 
quoque    copulata,    ut   iidem    sapientes    atque    elo- 
quentes    haberentur.       Scidit    deinde    se    studium, 
atque  inertia  factum  est,  ut  artes  esse  plures  vide- 
rentur.    Nam  ut  primum  lingua  esse  coepit  in  quaestu 
institutumque    eloquentiae    bonis    male    uti,    curam 

1  de  Or.  in.  15. 

BOOK    I.  PR.  9-13 

gifts  of  speech,  but  of  all  the  excellences  of  character 
as  well.  For  I  will  not  admit  that  the  principles  of  10 
upright  and  honourable  living  should,  as  some  have 
held,  be  regarded  as  the  peculiar  concern  of  philo- 
sophy. The  man  who  can  really  play  his  part  as  a 
citizen  and  is  capable  of  meeting  the  demands  both 
of  public  and  private  business,  the  man  who  can 
guide  a  state  by  his  counsels,  give  it  a  firm  basis  by 
his  legislation  and  purge  its  vices  by  his  decisions  as 
a  judge,  is  assuredly  no  other  than  the  orator  of  our 
quest.  Wherefore,  although  I  admit  I  shall  make  11 
use  of  certain  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  philo- 
sophical textbooks,  I  would  insist  that  such  principles 
have  a  just  claim  to  form  part  of  the  subject-matter 
of  this  work  and  do  actually  belong  to  the  art  of 
oratory.  I  shall  frequently  be  compelled  to  speak  of  1. 
such  virtues  as  courage,  justice,  self-control;  in  fact 
scarcely  a  case  comes  up  in  which  some  one  of  these 
virtues  is  not  involved  ;  every  one  of  them  requires 
illustration  and  consequently  makes  a  demand  on 
the  imagination  and  eloquence  of  the  pleader.  I 
ask  you  then,  can  there  be  any  doubt  that,  wherever 
imaginative  power  and  amplitude  of  diction  are  re- 
quired, the  orator  has  a  specially  important  part  to 
play?  These  two  branches  of  knowledge  w.ere,  as  13 
Cicero  has  clearly  shown,1  so  closely  united,  not 
merely  in  theory  but  in  practice,  that  the  same  men 
were  regarded  as  uniting  the  qualifications  of  orator 
and  philosopher.  Subsequently  this  single  branch 
of  study  split  up  into  its  component  parts,  and 
thanks  to  the  indolence  of  its  professors  was  re- 
garded as  consisting  of  several  distinct  subjects. 
As  soon  as  speaking  became  a  means  of  livelihood 
and  the  practice  of  making  an  evil  use  of  the 

1 1 


14  morum,    qui    diserti    habebantur,    reliquerunt.       Ea 
vero  destituta    infirmioribus   ingeniis  velut    praedae 
fuit.     Inde  quidam,  contempto  bene  dicendi  labore, 
ad    formandos    animos    statuendasque    vitae    leges 
regress!  partem   quidem  potiorem,  si  dividi  posset, 
retinuerunt ;     nomen    tamen    sibi    insolentissimum 
arrogaverunt,  ut  soli  studiosi  sapientiae  vocarentur, 
quod   neque  summi  imperatores   neque    in    consiliis 
rerum    maximarum    ac    totius    administratione     rei 
publicae    clarissime    versati    sibi    unquarn    vindicare 
sunt  ausi.      Facere   enim    optima    quam    promittere 

15  maluerunt.      Ac  veterum  quidem  sapientiae  professo- 
rum   multos  et  honesta  praecepisse  et,  ut   praece- 
perint,    etiam     vixisse,    facile    coiicesserim ;    nostris 
vero  temporibus   sub  hoc  nomine  maxima   in   pler- 
isque  vitia  latuerunt.      Non  enim  virtute  ac  studiis, 
ut  haberentur  philosophi,  laborabant,  sed  vultum  et 
tristitiam  et  dissentientem  a    ceteris    habitum  pes- 

16  simis    moribus    praetendebant.      Haec    autem,   quae 
velut  propria  philosophiae  asseruntur,  passim   trac- 
tamus   omnes.     Quis   enim  non  de   iusto,  aequo  ac 
bono,    modo    non    et    vir    pessimus,    loquitur?     quis 
non  etiam   rusticorum   aliqua    de  causis  naturalibus 
quaerit  ?     nam    verborum     proprietas    ac    differentia 
omnibus,   qui   sermonem    curae   habent,  debet    esse 


BOOK    I.  PR.   13-16 

blessings  of  eloquence  came  into  vogue,  those  who 
had  a  reputation  for  eloquence  ceased  to  study  moral 
philosophy,  and  ethics,  thus  abandoned  by  the  14 
orators,  became  the  prey  of  weaker  intellects.  As 
a  consequence  certain  persons,  disdaining  the  toil  of 
learning  to  speak  well,  returned  to  the  task  of 
forming  character  and  establishing  rules  of  life  and 
kept  to  themselves  what  is,  if  we  must  make  a 
division,  the  better  part  of  philosophy,  but  pre- 
sumptuously laid  claim  to  the  sole  possession  of  the 
title  of  philosopher,  a  distinction  which  neither  the 
greatest  generals  nor  the  most  famous  statesmen 
and  administrators  have  ever  dared  to  claim  for  them- 
selves. For  they  preferred  the  performance  to  the 
promise  of  great  deeds.  I  am  ready  to  admit  that  15 
many  of  the  old  philosophers  inculcated  the  most  ex- 
cellent principles  and  practised  what  they  preached. 
But  in  our  own  day  the  name  of  philosopher  has 
too  often  been  the  mask  for  the  worst  vices.  For 
their  attempt  has  not  been  to  win  the  name  of 
philosopher  by  virtue  and  the  earnest  search  for 
wisdom  ;  instead  they  have  sought  to  disguise  the 
depravity  of  their  characters  by  the  assumption 
of  a  stern  and  austere  mien  accompanied  by  the 
wearing  of  a  garb  differing  from  that  of  their  fellow 
men.  Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  all  of  us  frequently  16 
handle  those  themes  which  philosophy  claims  for  its 
own.  Who,  short  of  being  an  utter  villain,  does  not 
speak  of  justice,  equity  and  virtue  ?  Who  (and  even 
common  country-folk  are  no  exception)  does  not 
make  some  inquiry  into  the  causes  of  natural  phe- 
nomena ?  As  for  the  special  uses  and  distinctions  of 
words,  they  should  be  a  subject  of  study  common  to 
all  who  give  any  thought  to  the  meaning  of  language. 



17  communis.      Sed    ea    et    sciet    optime   et    eloquetur 
orator ;    qui    si    fuisset    aliquando    perfectus,    non    a 
philosophorum  scholis  virtutis  praecepta  peterentur. 
Nunc    necesse    est    ad    eos    aliquando    auctores    re- 
currere,  qui  desertarn,  ut  dixi,  partem  oratoriae  artis, 
meliorem  praesertim,  occupaverunt,  et  velut  nostrum 
reposcere ;  non  ut  nos  illorum  utamur  inventis,  sed 

18  ut   illos    alienis    usos    esse     doceamus.        Sit    igitur 
orator  vir  tails,  qualis   vere  sapiens  appellari  possit ; 
nee  moribus  inodo  perfectus  (nam   id   mea  quidem 
opinione,  quanquam  sunt  qui  dissentiant,  satis  non 
est)  sed   etiam  scientia  et  omni    facultate    dicendi, 

19  qualis   fortasse   nemo  adhuc   fuerit ;     sed    non    ideo 
minus  nobis  ad  summa  tendendum  est ;   quod  fece- 
runt  plerique  veterum,  qui,  etsi  nondum  quemquam 
sapientem     repertum     putabant,     praecepta     tamen 

20  sapientiae  tradiderunt.      Nam  est  eerte  aliquid  con- 
summata  eloquentia,  neque  ad  earn  pervenire  natura 
humani   ingenii   prohibet.      Quod   si    non    contingat, 
altius    tamen  ibunt,   qui   ad    summa   nitentur,,   quam 
qui,  praesumpta   desperatione  quo   velint  evadendi, 
protinus  circa  ima  substiterint. 

21  Quo  magis   impetranda   erit   venia,    si   ne   minora 
quidem    ilia,    verum     operi,    quod     instituimus,    ne- 
cessaria  praeteribo.     Nam  liber  primus  ea,  quae  sunt 

BOOK    I.  PR.    1 6-2 1 

But  it  is  surely  the  orator  who  will  have  the  greatest  17 
mastery  of  all  such  departments  of  knowledge  and 
the  greatest  power  to  express  it  in  words.  Arid  if  ever 
lie  had  reached  perfection,  there  would  be  no  need 
to  go  to  the  schools  of  philosophy  for  the  precepts  of 
virtue.  As  things  stand,  it  is  occasionally  necessary 
to  have  recourse  to  those  authors  who  have,  as  I 
said  above,  usurped  the  better  part  of  the  art  of 
oratory  after  its  desertion  by  the  orators  and  to 
demand  back  what  is  ours  by  right,  not  with  a  view 
to  appropriating  their  discoveries,  but  to  show  them 
that  they  have  appropriated  what  in  truth  belonged 
to  others.  Let  our  ideal  orator  then  be  such  as  to  is 
have  a  genuine  title  to  the  name  of  philosopher  :  it 
is  not  sufficient  that  he  should  be  blameless  in  point 
of  character  (for  I  cannot  agree  with  those  who  hold 
this  opinion)  :  he  must  also  be  a  thorough  master  of 
the  science  and  the  art  of  speaking,  to  an  extent 
that  perhaps  no  orator  has  yet  attained.  Still  we  iy 
must  none  the  less  follow  the  ideal,  as  was  done  by 
not  a  few  of  the  ancients,  who,  though  they  refused 
to  admit  that  the  perfect  sage  had  yet  been  found, 
none  the  less  handed  down  precepts  of  wisdom  for 
the  use  of  posterity.  Perfect  eloquence  is  assuredly  20 
a  reality,  which  is  not  beyond  the  reach  of  human 
intellect.  Even  if  we  fail  to  reach  it,  those  whose 
aspirations  are  highest,  will  attain  to  greater  heights 
than  those  who  abandon  themselves  to  premature 
despair  of  ever  reaching  the  goal  and  halt  at  the 
very  foot  of  the  ascent. 

I  have  therefore  all  the  juster  claim  to  indulgence,  21 
if  I  refuse  to  pass  by  those  minor  details  which  are 
none  the  less  essential  to  my  task.      My  first  book 
will  be  concerned  with  the  education  preliminary  to 



ante   officium    rhetoris,    continebit.      Secundo    prima 
apud  rhetorem  elementa  et  quae  de  ipsa  rhetorices 

22  substantia    quaeruntur    tractabimus.       Quinque    de- 
inceps    invention!    (nam    huic    et    dispositio  subiun- 
gitur),  quattuor  elocutioni,  in  cuius  partem  memoria 
ac  pronuntiatio    veniunt,   dabuntur.      Unus  accedet, 
in  quo  nobis  orator  ipse  informandus  est,  ubi,1  qui 
mores  eius,  quae  in  suscipiendis,  discendis,  agendis 
causis    ratio,   quod    eloquentiae   genus,    quis    agendi 
debeat  esse  finis,  quae  post  finem  studia,  quantum 

23  nostra  valebit  infirmitas,  disseremus.      His  omnibus 
admiscebitur,   ut   quisque   locus    postulabit,    docendi 
ratio,  quae  non   eorum    modo    scientia,   quibus  solis 
quidam  nomen  artis  dederunt,  studiosos  instruat  et 
(ut  sic  dixerim)   ius  ipsum   rhetorices  interpretetur, 
sed  alere  facundiam,  vires  augere  eloquentiae  possit. 

24  Nam  plerumque  nudae  illae  artes  nimia  subtilitatis 
adfectatione  frangunt  atque  concidunt  quidquid  est 
in    oratione    generosius,    et    omnem    sucum    ingenii 
bibunt  et  ossa  detegunt :  quae  ut  esse  et  adstringi 
nervis    suis    debent,     sic     corpore    operienda    sunt. 

25  Ideoque   nos  non  particulam    illam,   sicut    plerique, 
sed  quidquid  utile  ad  instituendum  oratorem  puta- 
bamus,  in  hos  duodecim   libros  contulimus  breviter 

1  ubi .  .  .  disseremus,  Spalding  :  ut.  . .  disseramus,  J\1SS. 

BOOK    I.    PR. 


the  duties  of  the  teacher  of  rhetoric.  Mj-o  the  edu- 
deal  with  the  rudiments  of  the  schools  u^  to  say 
and  with  problems  connected  with  the  esse  book 
rhetoric  itself.  The  next  five  will  be 

with   Invention,   in  which    I   include    Arrangemum_  2g 
The  four  following  will  be  assigned  to    Eloquence*. 
under  which  head   I   include   Memory  and  Delivery. 
Finally  there  will  be  one  book  in  which  our  com- 


plete  orator  will  be  delineated  ;  as  far  as  my  feeble 
powers  permit,  I  shall  discuss  his  character,  the 
rules  which  should  guide  him  in  undertaking, 
studying  and  pleading  cases,  the  style  of  his  elo- 
quence, the  time  at  which  he  should  cease  to  plead 
cases  and  the  studies  to  which  he  should  devote 
himself  after  such  cessation.  In  the  course  of  these  23 
discussions  I  shall  deal  in  its  proper  place  with 
the  method  of  teaching  by  which  students  will 
acquire  not  merely  a  knowledge  of  those  things 
to  which  the  name  of  art  is  restricted  by  certain 
theorists,  and  will  not  only  come  to  understand  the 
laws  of  rhetoric,  but  will  acquire  that  which  will 
increase  their  powers  of  speech  and  nourish  their 
eloquence.  For  as  a  rule  the  result  of  the  dry  text-  24 
books  on  the  art  of  rhetoric  is  that  by  straining 
after  excessive  subtlety  they  impair  and  cripple 
all  the  nobler  elements  of  style,  exhaust  the  life- 
blood  of  the  imagination  and  leave  but  the  bare 
bones,  which,  while  it  is  right  and  necessary  that 
they  should  exist  and  be  bound  each  to  each  by 
their  respective  ligaments,  require  a  covering  of  flesh 
as  well.  I  shall  therefore  avoid  the  precedent  set  25 
by  the  majority  and  shall  not  restrict  myself  to  this 
narrow  conception  of  my  theme,  but  shall  include  in 
my  twelve  books  a  brief  demonstration  of  everything 



omnia  demonstraturi.  Nam  si  quantum  de  quaque 
re  dici  potest  persequamur,  finis  operis  non  repe- 

26  Illud  tamen  in  primis  testandum  est,  nihil   prae- 
cepta    atque    artes    valere    nisi    adiuvante    natura. 
Quapropter  ei,  cui  deerit  ingenium,  non  magis  haec 
scripta  sint  quam  de  agrorum  cultu  sterilibus  terris. 

27  Sunt  et  alia   ingenita   cuique  adiumenta,  vox,  latus 
patiens    laboris,  valetudo,    constantia,    decor;    quae 
si  modica  obtigerunt,  possunt  ratione  ampliari,  sed 
nonnunquam     ita     desunt,    ut     bona    etiam     ingenii 
studiique     corrumpant ;     sicut    et    haec     ipsa    sine 
doctore   perito,   studio  pertinaci,   scribendi,  legendi, 
dicendi  multa  et  continua  exercitatione  per  se  nihil 

I.  Igitur  nato  filio  pater  spem  de  illo  primum 
quam  optimam  capiat,  ita  diligentior  a  principiis 
fiet.  Falsa  enim  est  querela,  paucissimis  hominibus 
vim  percipiendi,  quae  tradantur,  esse  concessam, 
plerosque  vero  laborem  ac  tempora  tarditate  ingenii 
perdere.  Nam  contra  plures  reperias  et  faciles  in 
excogitando  et  ad  discendum  promptos.  Qm'ppe 
id  est  homini  naturale  ;  ac  sicut  aves  ad  volatum, 
equi  ad  cursum,  ad  saevitiam  ferae  gignuntur ;  ita 

BOOK    I.   PR.    25-1.  i 

which  may  seem  likely  to  contribute  to  the  edu- 
cation of  an  orator.  For  if  I  were  to  attempt  to  say 
all  that  might  be  said  on  each  subject,  the  book 
would  never  be  finished. 

There  is  however  one  point  which  I  must  em-  26 
phasise  before  I  begin,  which  is  this.  Without 
natural  gifts  technical  rules  are  useless.  Conse- 
quently the  student  who  is  devoid  of  talent  will 
derive  no  more  profit  from  this  work  than  barren 
soil  from  a  treatise  on  agriculture.  There  are,  it  is  27 
true,  other  natural  aids,  such  as  the  possession  of  a 
good  voice  and  robust  lungs,  sound  health,  powers  of 
endurance  and  grace,  and  if  these  are  possessed  only 
to  a  moderate  extent,  they  may  be  improved  by 
methodical  training.  In  some  cases,  however,  these 
gifts  are  lacking  to  such  an  extent  that  their  absence 
is  fatal  to  all  such  advantages  as  talent  and  study 
can  confer,  while,  similarly,  they  are  of  no  profit  in 
themselves  unless  cultivated  by  skilful  teaching,  per- 
sistent study  and  continuous  and  extensive  practice 
in  writing,  reading  and  speaking. 

I.  I  would,  therefore,  have  a  father  conceive  the 
highest  hopes  of  his  son  from  the  moment  of  his 
birth.  If  he  does  so,  he  will  be  more  careful  about 
the  groundwork  of  his  education.  For  there  is 
absolutely  no  foundation  for  the  complaint  that  but 
few  men  have  the  power  to  take  in  the  knowledge 
that  is  imparted  to  them,  and  that  the  majority  are 
so  slow  of  understanding  that  education  is  a  waste 
of  time  and  labour.  On  the  contrary  you  will  find 
that  most  are  quick  to  reason  and  ready  to  learn. 
Reasoning  comes  as  naturally  to  man  as  flying  to 
birds,  speed  to  horses  and  ferocity  to  beasts  of  prey  : 



nobis    propria    est    mentis    agitatio    atque    sollertia, 

2  unde  origo  animi  caelestis  creditur.      Hebetes  vero 
et  indociles  non  magis  secundum  naturam  homines 
eduntur  quam    prodigiosa    corpora    et    monstris    in- 
signia,   sed     hi    pauci    admodum    fuerunt.       Argu- 
mentum    quod    in    pueris    elucet   spes    plurimorum, 
quae    cum    emoritur    aetate,    manifestum    est,    non 
naturam  defecisse  sed  curam.      Praestat    tamen    in- 

3  genio   alius  alium.     Concede  ;    sed   plus  efficiet  aut 
minus ;    nemo   reperitur,   qui    sit    studio   nihil    con- 
secutus.      Hoc  qui  perviderit,  protinus  ut  erit  parens 
factus,  acrem  quam  maxime  curam  spei  futuri  ora- 
toris  impendat. 

4  Ante  omnia  ne  sit  vitiosus  sermo  nutricibus,  quas 
si  fieri    posset    sapientes   Chrysippus    optavit,    certe 
quantum    res  pateretur    optimas    eligi    voluit.        Et 
morum  quidem  in  his  haud    dubie    prior    ratio    est, 

5  recte  tamen  etiam  loquantur.      Has  primum  audiet 
puer,  harum  verba  effingere  imitando  conabitur.      Et 
natura  tenacissimi  sumus  eorum,  quae  rudibus  animis 
percepimus  ;  ut  sapor,  quo  nova  imbuas,  durat,  nee 
lanarum  colores,  quibus  simplex  ille  candor  mutatus 
est,  elui  possunt.      Et  haec  ipsa  magis   pertinaciter 
haerent,  quo  deteriora  sunt.      Nam  bona  facile  mu- 
tantur    in    peius ;    num    quando    in    bonum    verteris 


BOOK   I.  i.  1-5 

our  minds  are  endowed  by  nature  with  such  activity 
and  sagacity  that  the  soul  is  believed  to  proceed 
from  heaven.  Those  who  are  dull  and  unteachable  2 
are  as  abnormal  as  prodigious  births  and  monstrosi- 
ties, and  are  but  few  in  number.  A  proof  of  what 
I  say  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  boys  commonly 
show  promise  of  many  accomplishments,  and  when 
such  promise  dies  away  as  they  grow  up,  this  is 
plainly  due  not  to  the  failure  of  natural  gifts,  but  to 
lack  of  the  requisite  care.  But,  it  will  be  urged, 
there  are  degrees  of  talent.  Undoubtedly,  I  reply,  3 
and  there  will  be  a  corresponding  variation  in  actual 
accomplishment:  but  that  there  are  any  who  gain 
nothing  from  education,  I  absolutely  deny.  The 
man  who  shares  this  conviction,  must,  as  soon  as  he 
becomes  a  father,  devote  the  utmost  care  to  foster- 
ing the  promise  shown  by  the  son  whom  he  destines 
to  become  an  orator. 

Above  all  see  that  the  child's  nurse  speaks  4 
correctly.  The  ideal,  according  to  Chrysippus, 
would  be  that  she  should  be  a  philosopher :  failing 
that  he  desired  that  the  best  should  be  chosen,  as 
far  as  possible.  No  doubt  the  most  important  point 
is  that  they  should  be  of  good  character :  but  they 
should  speak  correctly  as  well.  It  is  the  nurse  that  6 
the  child  first  hears,  and  her  words  that  he  will  first 
attempt  to  imitate.  And  we  are  by  nature  most 
tenacious  of  childish  impressions,  just  as  the  flavour 
first  absorbed  by  vessels  when  new  persists,  and  the 
colour  imparted  by  dyes  to  the  primitive  whiteness 
of  wool  is  indelible.  Further  it  is  the  worst 
impressions  that  are  most  durable.  For,  while  what 
is  good  readily  deteriorates,  you  will  never  turn  vice 



vitia  ?     Non  assuescat  ergo,  ne  dura  in  fans  quidem 
est,  sermoni  qui  dediscendus  sit. 

6  In  parentibus   vero    quam   plurimum   esse    erudi- 
tionis    optaverim,    nee    de    patribus    tantum   loquor. 
Nam  Gracchorum  eloquentiae  multura  contulisse  ac- 
cepimus  Corneliam  matrem,  cuius  doctissimus  sermo 
in  posteros  quoque  est  epistolis  traditus  :  et  Laelia 
C.  filia  reddidisse  in  loquendo  paternam  elegantiam 
dicitur,  et   Hortensiae  Q.   filiae    oratio  apud   Trium- 
viros  habita  legitur  non  tantum   in  sexus  honorem. 

7  Nee    tamen    ii,    quibus    discere    ipsis    non    contigit, 
minorem   curam  docendi  liberos    habeant ;  sed   sint 
pvopter  hoc  ipsum  ad   cetera  magis  diligentes. 

8  De   pueris,   inter  quos   educabitur   ille    huic    spei 
destinatus,  idem  quod  de  nutricibus  dictum  sit.     De 
paedagogis   hoc  amplius,   ut  aut  sint  eruditi  plene, 
quam   primam   esse  curam   velim,   aut  se    non    esse 
eruditos    sciant.      Nihil    est    peius    iis,    qui    paulum 
aliquid   ultra    primas    litteras    progressi    falsam    sibi 
scientiae  persuasionem  induerunt.      Nam  et   cedere 
praecipiendi    partibus    indignantur     et    velut    iure 
quodam    potestatis,    quo    fere    hoc    hominum    genus 
intumescit,  imperiosi  atque  interim  saevientes  stul- 

1  There  is  no  translation  for  paedagogus,  the  slave-tutor. 
"Tutor,"  "guardian,"  "governor,"  and  similar  terms  are 
all  misleading.  He  had  the  general  supervision  of  the  boy, 
escorted  him  to  school  and  elsewhere,  and  saw  that  he 
did  not  get  into  mischief,  but  did  not,  as  a  rule,  direct  his 


BOOK    I.  i.  5-8 

into  virtue.  Do  not  therefore  allow  the  boy  to 
become  accustomed  even  in  infancy  to  a  style  of 
speech  which  he  will  subsequently  have  to  unlearn. 

As  regards  parents,  I  should  like  to  see  them  as  6 
highly  educated  as  possible,  and  I  do  not  restrict  this 
remark  to  fathers  alone.  We  are  told  that  the 
eloquence  of  the  Gracchi  owed  much  to  their 
mother  Cornelia,  whose  letters  even  to-day  testify  to 
the  cultivation  of  her  style.  Laelia,  the  daughter 
of  Gaius  Laelius,  is  said  to  have  reproduced  the 
elegance  of  her  father's  language  in  her  own  speech, 
while  the  oration  delivered  before  the  triumvirs  by 
Hortensia,  the  daughter  of  Quintus  Hortensius,  is 
still  read  and  not  merely  as  a  compliment  to  her  sex. 
And  even  those  who  have  not  had  the  fortune  to  7 
receive  a  good  education  should  not  for  that  reason 
devote  less  care  to  their  son's  education  ;  but  should 
on  the  contrary  show  all  the  greater  diligence  in 
other  matters  where  they  can  be  of  service  to  their 

As  regards  the  boys  in  whose  company  our  budding  8 
orator  is  to  be  brought  up,  I  would  repeat  what 
I  have  said  about  nurses.  As  regards  his  paedagogi,1 
I  would  urge  that  they  should  have  had  a  thorough 
education,  or  if  they  have  not,  that  they  should  be 
aware  of  the  fact.  There  are  none  worse  than 
those,  who  as  soon  as  they  have  progressed  beyond 
a  knowledge  of  the  alphabet  delude  themselves 
into  the  belief  that  they  are  the  possessors  of  real 
knowledge.  For  they  disdain  to  stoop  to  the 
drudgery  of  teaching,  and  conceiving  that  they 
have  acquired  a  certain  title  to  authority — a  frequent 
source  of  vanity  in  such  persons — become  imperious 
or  even  brutal  in  instilling  a  thorough  dose  of  their 



9  titiam  suam  perdocent.  Nee  minus  error  eorum 
nocet  moribus  ;  siquidem  Leonides  Alexandri  paeda- 
gogus,  ut  a  Babylonio  Diogene  traditur,  quibusdam 
eum  vitiis  imbuit,  quae  robustum  quoque  et  iam 
maximum  regem  ab  ilia  institutione  puerili  sunt 

10  Si    cui    multa    videor    exigere,    cogitet    oratorem 
institui,  rem  arduam,  etiam  cum  ei  formando  nihil 
defuerit ;    praeterea  plura    ac    difficiliora    superesse. 
Nam  et  studio  perpetuo  et  praestantissimis  praecep- 

11  toribus  et  plurimis  disciplinis  opus  est.       Quapropter 
praecipienda  sunt   optima ;    quae  si  quis  gravabitur, 
non   rationi    defuerint    sed    homini.     Si   tamen  non 
continget,    quales    maxime    velim    mitrices,    pueros, 
paedagogos   habere,  at   unus    certe    sit   assiduus  lo- 
quendi    non    imperitus,    qui,    si    qua    erunt    ab    his 
praesente  alumno  dicta  vitiose,  corrigat  protinus  nee 
insidere  illi  sinat ;  dum  tamen  intelligatur,  id,  quod 
prius  dixi,  bonum  esse,  hoc  remedium. 

12  A   sermone   Graeco  puerum   incipere    malo,    quia 
Latinum,  qui  pluribus  in  usu   est,  vel  nobis  nolen- 
tibus  perbibet,  simul  quia  disciplinis  quoque  Graecis 

prius   instituendus   est,   unde    et   nostrae    fluxerunt. 

BOOK    I.  i.  8-12 

own  folly.  Their  misconduct  is  no  less  prejudicial  9 
to  morals.  We  are,  for  instance,  told  by  Diogenes 
of  Babylon,  that  Leonides,  Alexander's  paedagogus, 
infected  his  pupil  with  certain  faults,  which  as  a 
result  of  his  education  as  a  boy  clung  to  him  even  in 
his  maturer  years  when  he  had  become  the  greatest 
of  kings. 

If  any  of  my  readers  regards  me  as  somewhat  10 
exacting  in  my  demands,  I  would  ask  him  to  reflect 
that  it  is  no  easy  task  to  create  an  orator,  even 
though  his  education  be  carried  out  under  the  most 
favourable  circumstances,  and  that  further  and 
greater  difficulties  are  still  before  us.  For  con- 
tinuous application,  the  very  best  of  teachers  and 
a  variety  of  exercises  are  necessary.  Therefore  the  11 
rules  which  we  lay  down  for  the  education  of  our 
pupil  must  be  of  the  best.  If  anyone  refuses  to  be 
guided  by  them,  the  fault  will  lie  not  with  the 
method,  but  with  the  individual.  Still  if  it  should 
prove  impossible  to  secure  the  ideal  nurse,  the  ideal 
companions,  or  the  ideal  paedagogus,  I  wrould  insist 
that  there  should  be  one  person  af  any  rate  attached 
to  the  boy  who  has  some  knowledge  of  speaking 
and  who  will,  if  any  incorrect  expression  should  be 
used  by  nurse  or  paedagogus  in  the  presence  of 
the  child  under  their  charge,  at  once  correct  the 
error  and  prevent  its  becoming  a  habit.  But  it  must 
be  clearly  understood  that  this  is  only  a  remedy,  and 
that  the  ideal  course  is  that  indicated  above. 

I    prefer  that   a    boy  should    begin    with    Greek,  12 
because  Latin,  being  in  general  use,  will  be  picked 
up  by  him  whether  we  will  or  no ;  while  the  fact 
that    Latin    learning    is    derived    from    Greek    is    a 
further  reason  for  his  being  first  instructed  in  the 



13  Non  tamen  hoc  adeo  superstitiose  fieri  velim,  ut  diu 
tantum   Graece  loquatur  aut  discat,   sicut  plerisque 
moris  est.       Hoc  enim  accidunt  et  oris  plurima  vitia 
in  peregrinum  sonum  corrupt!  et  sermonis  ;    cui  cum 
Graecae     figurae    assidua    consuetudine    haeserunt, 
in  diversa    quoque    loquendi   ratione    pertinacissime 

14  durant.      Non  longe  itaque  Latina  subsequi  debent 
et   cito   pariter  ire.      Ita   fiet,  nt,   cum  aequali    cura 
linguam  utramque    tueri    coeperimus,   neutra   alteri 

15  Quidam  litteris  instituendos,  qui  minores  septem 
annis  essent,  non  putaverunt,  quod  ilia  primum  aetas 
et  intellectum  disciplinarum  capere  et  laborem  pati 
posset.     In    qua   sententia    Hesiodum    esse    plurimi 
tradunt  qui    ante  grammaticum  Aristophanen  fuer- 
unt ;  nam  is  primus  vTroOr/Kas,  in  quo  libro  scriptum 

16  hoc  invenitur,  negavit  esse  huius  poetae.     Sed   alii 
quoque    auctores,    inter    quos    Eratosthenes,    idem 
praeceperunt.      Melius    autem,    qui    nullum    tempus 
vacare  cura  volunt,  ut  Chrysippus.      Nam  is,  quamvis 
nutricibus  triennium  dederit,  tamen  ab  illis  quoque 
iam     formandam    quam    optimis    institutis     mentem 

17  infantium    iudicat.       Cur    autem    non    pertineat   ad 
litteras  aetas,  quae  ad  mores  iam  pertinet  ?     Neque 
ignore,  toto  illo,  de  quo  loquor,  tempore  vix  tantum 
effici,  quantum  conferre   unus   postea  possit  annus  ; 

1  Admonitions,   a    lost  didactic  poem.      Aristophanes  of 
Byzantium,  257-180  B.C.,  the  famous  Alexandrian  critic. 


BOOK    I.  i.  13-17 

latter.  I  do  not  however  desire  that  this  principle  13 
should  be  so  superstitiously  observed  that  he  should 
for  long  speak  and  learn  only  Greek,  as  is  done  in  the 
majority  of  cases.  Such  a  course  gives  rise  to  many 
faults  of  language  and  accent ;  the  latter  tends  to 
acquire  a  foreign  intonation,  while  the  former 
through  force  of  habit  becomes  impregnated  with 
Greek  idioms,  which  persist  with  extreme  obstinacy 
even  when  we  are  speaking  another  tongue.  The  14 
study  of  Latin  ought  therefore  to  follow  at  no  great 
distance  and  in  a  short  time  proceed  side  by  side 
with  Greek.  The  result  will  be  that,  as  soon  as  we 
begin  to  give  equal  attention  to  both  languages, 
neither  will  prove  a  hindrance  to  the  other. 

Some    hold   that    boys    should    not   be  taught  to  15 
read  till  they  are   seven  years  old,  that  being  the 
earliest   age  at  which  they  can  derive    profit    from 
instruction  and  endure  the  strain  of  learning.     Most 
of  them  attribute  this  view  to  Hesiod,  at  least  such 
as  lived  before  the  time  of  Aristophanes  the  gram- 
marian, who  was  the    first   to   deny    that   the  Hy- 
polhecae,1  in  which  this  opinion  is  expressed,  was  the 
work  of  that  poet.      But  other  authorities,  among  16 
them    Eratosthenes,  give  the   same  advice.     Those 
however  who  hold  that  a  child's  mind  should  not  be 
allowed    to    lie    fallow    for    a    moment   are    wiser. 
Chrysippus,  for  instance,  though  he  gives  the  nurses 
a    three  years'   reign,   still    holds    the  formation    of 
the  child's  mind  011  the  best  principles  to  be  a  part 
of  their   duties.        Why,   again,  since    children    are  17 
capable    of    moral    training,    should    they    not    be 
capable   of  literary   education?       I    am  well    aware 
that  during  the  whole  period  of  which  I  am  speaking 
we  can  expect  scarcely  the  same  amount  of  progress 



sed  tamen  mihi,  qui  dissenserunt,  videntur  non  tarn 
discentibus  in  hac  parte  quam  docentibus  pepercisse. 

18  Quid  melius  alioqui  facient,  ex  quo  loqui  poterunt? 
Faciant    enim    aliquid    necesse    est.     Aut   cur    hoc, 
quantulumcunque  est,  usque  ad  septern  annos  lucrum 
fastidiamus  ?      Nam    certe    quamlibet    parvura    sit, 
quod   contulerit    aetas    prior,    maiora    tamen    aliqua 
discet   puer  ipso    illo    anno,   quo    minora  didicisset. 

19  Hoc   per  singulos  prorogatum  in   summam  proficit, 
et  quantum  in  infantia  praesumptum  est  temporis, 
adolescentiae  adquiritur.      Idem    etiam    de    sequen- 
tibus    annis  praeceptum  sit,    ne,   quod   cuique    dis- 
cendum   est,   sero  discere   incipiat.      Non  ergo  per- 
damus  primum  statim  tempus,  atque  eo  minus,  quod 
initia  litterarum  sola    memoria   constant,  quae    non 
modo  iam  est  in  parvis  sed  turn   etiam  tenacissima 

20  Nee  sum  adeo  aetatum  imprudens,  ut  instandum 
protinus  teneris  acerbe  putem  exigendamque  plane 
operam.      Nam    id    in    primis    cavere    oportebit,    ne 
studia,   qui  amare   nondum  potest,  oderit  et  amari- 
tudinem  semel  perceptam  etiam  ultra   rudes  annos 
reformidet.     Lusus  hie  sit ;  et  rogetur  et  laudetur 
et  numquam  non  fecisse  se  gaudeat,  aliquando  ipso 
nolente    doceatur    alius,    cui    invideat;    contendat 


BOOK    I.  i.  17-20 

that  one  year  will  effect  afterwards.  Still  those  who 
disagree  with  me  seem  in  taking  this  line  to  spare 
the  teacher  rather  than  the  pupil.  What  better  is 
occupation  can  a  child  have  so  soon  as  he  is  able  to 
speak  ?  And  he  must  be  kept  occupied  somehow  or 
other.  Or  why  should  we  despise  the  profit  to  be 
derived  before  the  age  of  seven,  small  though  it  be  ? 
For  though  the  knowledge  absorbed  in  the  previous 
years  may  be  but  little,  yet  the  boy  will  be  learning 
something  more  advanced  during  that  year,  in  which 
he  would  otherwise  have  been  occupied  with  some- 
thing more  elementary.  Such  progress  each  sue-  19 
cessive  year  increases  the  total,  and  the  time  gained 
during  childhood  is  clear  profit  to  the  period  of 
youth.  Further  as  regards  the  years  which  follow 
I  must  emphasise  the  importance  of  learning  what 
has  to  be  learnt  in  good  time.  Let  us  not  therefore 
waste  the  earliest  years  :  there  is  all  the  less  excuse 
for  this,  since  the  elements  of  literary  training  are 
solely  a  question  of  memory,  which  not  only  exists 
even  in  small  children,  but  is  specially  retentive  at 
that  age. 

I  am  not  however  so  blind  to  differences  of  age  20 
as  to  think  that  the  very  young  should  be  forced  on 
prematurely  or  given  real  work  to  do.  Above  all 
things  we  must  take  care  that  the  child,  who  is  not 
yet  old  enough  to  love  his  studies,  does  not  come  to 
hate  them  and  dread  the  bitterness  which  he  has 
once  tasted,  even  when  the  years  of  infancy  are 
left  behind.  His  studies  must  be  made  an  amuse- 
ment :  he  must  be  questioned  and  praised  and 
taught  to  rejoice  when  he  has  done  well ;  sometimes 
too,  when  he  refuses  instruction,  it  should  be  given 
to  some  other  to  excite  his  envy,  at  times  also  he 



interim  et  saepius  vincere  se  putet ;    praemiis  etiam, 
quae  capit  ilia  aetas,  evocetur. 

21  Parva    docemus    oratorem    instituendum    professi, 
sed  est  sua  etiam  studiis  infantia ;   et  ut  corporum 
mox  fortissimorum  educatio  a  lacte  cunisque  initium 
ducit,  ita   futurus    eloquentissimus  edidit  aliquando 
vagitum    et   loqui    primum    incerta    voce    temptavit 
et   haesit   circa   formas    litterarum.       Nee    si    quid 

22  discere  satis  non  est,  ideo  nee  necesse  est.     Quodsi 
nemo  reprehendit  patrem,  qui  haec  non  negligenda 
in  suo  filio  putet,  cur  improbetur,  si  quis  ea,   quae 
domi  suae  recte  faceret,  in  publicum  promit  ?    Atque 
eo     magis,    quod    minora    etiam     facilius    minores 
percipiunt,   et   ut  corpora  ad   quosdam  membrorum 
flexus    formari  nisi  tenera  non   possunt,  sic    animos 

23  quoque  ad  pleraque  duriores  robur  ipsum  facit.     An 
Philippus  Macedonum  rex  Alexandro  filio  suo  prima 
litterarum  elementa  tradi  ab  Aristotele,  summo  eius 
aetatis  philosopho,  voluisset,  aut  ille  suscepisset  hoc 
officium,  si  non  studiorum   initia  et  a  perfectissimo 
quoque    optime    tractari    et    pertinere    ad    summam 


BOOK    I.  i.  20-23 

must  be  engaged  in  competition  and  should  be 
allowed  to  believe  himself  successful  more  often  than 
not,  while  he  should  be  encouraged  to  do  his  best  by 
such  rewards  as  may  appeal  to  his  tender  years. 

These   instructions   may  seem    but   trivialities   in  21 
view  of  the  fact  that  I  am  professing  to  describe  the 
education  of  an  orator.      But  studies,  like  men,  have 
their  infancy,  and  as  the  training  of  the  body  which 
is  destined  to  grow  to  the  fulness  of  strength  begins 
while  the  child  is  in  his  cradle  and  at  his  mother's 
breast,  so  even  the  man  who  is  destined  to  rise  to 
the  heights  of  eloquence  was  once  a  squalling  babe, 
tried    to   speak    in    stammering    accents    and    was 
puzzled   by  the  shapes  of  letters.      Nor  does   the 
fact  that  capacity  for  learning  is  inadequate,  prove 
that   it    is    not    necessary   to   learn    anything.      No  22 
one  blames  a  father  because    he   thinks   that    such 
details  should   on  no  account  be  neglected  in    the 
case  of  his  own  son.     Why  then  should  he  be  crit- 
icised who  sets  down  for  the  benefit  of  the  public 
what  he  would  be  right  to  put  into  practice  in  his 
own  house  ?     There  is  this  further  reason  why  he 
should  not  be  blamed.     Small  children  are    better 
adapted  for  taking  in  small  things,  and  just  as  the 
body  can  only  be  trained  to  certain  flexions  of  the 
limbs  while  it  is  young  and  supple,  so  the  acquisition 
of  strength  makes  the  mind  offer  greater  resistance 
to  the   acquisition   of  most  subjects   of  knowledge. 
Would  Philip  of  Macedon  have  wished  that  his  son  23 
Alexander  should  be  taught  the  rudiments  of  letters 
by  Aristotle,  the  greatest  philosopher  of  that  age,  or 
would  the  latter  have  undertaken  the  task,  if  he  had 
not  thought  that  even  the  earliest  instruction  is  best 
given    by    the    most    perfect   teacher   and    has  real 



24  credidisset?       Fingamus    igitur     Alexandrum    dari 
nobis    impositum    gremio,    dignum    tanta    cura    in- 
fantem    (quanquam    suus    cuique    dignus    est) :    pu- 
deatne  me  in  ipsis   statim    elementis    etiara   brevia 
docendi  monstrare  compendia? 

Neque  enim  mihi  illud  saltern  placet,  quod   fieri 
in  plurimis  video,  ut  litterarum  nomina  et  contextum 

25  prius    quam    formas   parvuli    discant.        Obstat    hoc 
agnitioni  earum  non  intendentibus  mox  animum  ad 
ipsos    ductus,    dum    antecedentem    memoriam    se- 
quuntur.     Quae  causa  est  praecipientibus,  ut  etiam, 
cum  satis  adfixisse  eas  pueris  recto  illo  quo  primum 
scribi  solent  contextu  videntur,  retro  agant  rursus  et 
varia  permutatione   turbent,   donee  litteras   qui   in- 
stituuntur    facie    norint    non    ordine.     Quapropter 
optime  sicut  hominum  pariter  et  habitus  et  nomina 

26  edocebuntur.     Sed  quod  in  litteris  obest,  in  syllabis 
non  nocebit.      Non  excludo  autem,  id  quod  est  in- 
ventum l  irritandae    ad   discendum    infantiae   gratia 
eburneas  etiam  litterarum  formas  in  lusum  offerre ; 
vel    si    quid    aliud,    quo    magis    ilia    aetas    gaudeat, 
inveniri    potest,    quod    tractare,    intueri,    nominare 
iucundum  sit. 

27  Cum  vero  iam  ductus  sequi  coeperit,  non  inutile 
erit  eas  tabellae  quam  optime  insculpi,  ut  per  illos 

1  inventum,  Hcindorf :  notura,  MSS. 

BOOK    I.  i.  23-27 

reference  to  the  whole  of  education  ?  Let  us  assume  24 
therefore  that  Alexander  has  been  confided  to  our 
charge  and  that  the  infant  placed  in  our  lap  deserves 
no  less  attention  than  he — though  for  that  matter 
every  man's  child  deserves  equal  attention.  Would 
you  be  ashamed  even  in  teaching  him  the  alphabet 
to  point  out  some  brief  rules  for  his  education  ? 

At  any  rate  I  am  not  satisfied  with  the  course 
(which  I  note  is  usually  adopted)  of  teaching  small 
children  the  names  and  order  of  the  letters  before 
their  shapes.  Such  a  practice  makes  them  slow  25 
to  recognise  the  letters,  since  they  do  not  pay 
attention  to  their  actual  shape,  preferring  to  be 
guided  by  what  they  have  already  learned  by 
rote.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  teachers,  when 
they  think  they  have  sufficiently  familiarised  their 
young  pupils  with  the  letters  written  in  their 
usual  order,  reverse  that  order  or  rearrange  it  in 
every  kind  of  combination,  until  they  learn  to  know 
the  letters  from  their  appearance  and  not  from 
the  order  in  which  they  occur.  It  will  be  best 
therefore  for  children  to  begin  by  learning  their 
appearance  and  names  just  as  they  do  with  men. 
The  method,  however,  to  which  we  have  objected  in  26 
teaching  the  alphabet,  is  unobjectionable  when 
applied  to  syllables.  1  quite  approve  on  the  other 
hand  of  a  practice  which  has  been  devised  to 
stimulate  children  to  learn  by  giving  them  ivory 
letters  to  play  with,  as  I  do  of  anything  else  that 
may  be  discovered  to  delight  the  very  young,  the 
sight,  handling  and  naming  of  which  is  a  pleasure. 

As    soon    as    the  child    has    begun  to    know    the  27 
shapes  of  the  various  letters,  it  will  be  no  bad  thing 
to  have  them  cut  as  accurately  as  possible  upon  a 



velut  sulcos  ducatur  stilus.  Nam  neque  errabit, 
quemadmodum  in  ceris  (continebitur  enim  utrinque 
marginibus  neque  extra  praescriptum  egredi  poterit) 
et  celerius  ac  saepius  sequendo  certa  vestigia  fir- 
mabit  articulos,  neque  egebit  adiutorio  manum  suam 

28  manu   superimposita  regentis.      Non  est  aliena  res, 
quae   fere  ab  honestis   negligi  solet,  cura    bene    ac 
velociter   scribendi.      Nam   cum   sit   in  studiis  prae- 
cipuum,    quoque    solo    verus    ille    profectus    et  altis 
radicibus  nixus  paretur,  scribere  ipsum,  tardior  stilus 
cogitationem  moratur,   rudis   et  confusus    intellectu 
caret;    unde    sequitur    alter    dictandi,    quae    trans- 

29  ferenda  sunt,   labor.     Quare  cum  semper  et  ubique 
turn   praecipue   in    epistolis    secretis   et    familiaribus 
delectabit  ne  hoc  quidem  neglectum  reliquisse. 

30  Syllabis   nullum    compendium    est;     perdiscendae 
omnes    nee,    ut    fit    plerumque,   difficillima   quaeque 
earum  differenda,  ut  in  nominibus  scribendis  depre- 

31  hendantur.    Quin  immo  ne  primae  quidem  memoriae 
temere  credendum  ;    repetere  et  diu  inculcare  fuerit 
utilius,  et  in  lectione  quoque  non  properare  ad  con- 
tinuandam  earn  vel  accelerandanr,  nisi  cum  inoffensa 
atque     indubitata     litterarum     inter     se     coniunctio 
suppeditare  sine  ulla  cogitandi  saltern  mora  poterit. 


BOOK    I.  i.  27-31 

board,  so  that  the  pen  may  be  guided  along  the 
grooves.  Thus  mistakes  such  as  occur  with  wax 
tablets  will  be  rendered  impossible ;  for  the  pen 
will  be  confined  between  the  edges  of  the  letters 
and  will  be  prevented  from  going  astray.  Further 
by  increasing  the  frequency  and  speed  with  which 
they  follow  these  fixed  outlines  we  shall  give  steadi- 
ness to  the  fingers,  and  there  will  be  no  need  to 
guide  the  child's  hand  with  our  own.  The  art  of  28 
writing  well  and  quickly  is  not  unimportant  for  our 
purpose,  though  it  is  generally  disregarded  by  persons 
of  quality.  Writing  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
in  the  study  which  we  have  under  consideration  and 
by  its  means  alone  can  true  and  deeply  rooted 
proficiency  be  obtained.  But  a  sluggish  pen  delays 
our  thoughts,  while  an  unformed  and  illiterate  hand 
cannot  be  deciphered,  a  circumstance  which  ne- 
cessitates another  wearisome  task,  namely  the  dic- 
tation of  what  we  have  written  to  a  copyist.  We  shall  29 
therefore  at  all  times  and  in  all  places,  and  above  all 
when  we  are  writing  private  letters  to  our  friends, 
find  a  gratification  in  the  thought  that  we  have  not 
neglected  even  this  accomplishment. 

As  regards  syllables,  no  short  cut  is  possible  :  they  30 
must  all  be  learnt,  and  there  is  no  good  in  putting 
off  learning  the  most  difficult ;  this  is  the  general 
practice,  but  the  sole  result  is  bad  spelling.  Further  31 
we  must  beware  of  placing  a  blind  confidence  in  a 
child's  memory.  It  is  better  to  repeat  syllables  and 
impress  them  on  the  memory  and,  when  he  is 
reading,  not  to  press  him  to  read  continuously  or 
with  greater  speed,  unless  indeed  the  clear  and 
obvious  sequence  of  letters  can  suggest  itself  without 
its  being  necessary  for  the  child  to  stop  to  think. 



Tune  ipsis  syllabis  verba  complecti  et  his  sermonem 

32  connectere  incipiat.     Incredibile  est,  quantum  morae 
lectioni  festinatione   adiiciatur.      Hinc  enim  accidit 
dubitatio,   intermissio,   repetitio   plus  quam  possunt 
audentibus,  deinde,  cum  errarunt,  etiam  iis  quae  iam 

33  sciunt  diffidentibus.      Certa  sit  ergo  in  primis  lectio, 
deinde  coniuncta  et  diu  lentior,  donee  exercitatione 

34  contingat  emendata  velocitas.       Nam  prospicere  in 
dextrum  (quod  omnes  praecipiunt)  et  providere,  non 
rationis    modo    sed    usus    quoque    est ;  quoniam    se- 
quentia  intuenti  priora  dicenda  sunt,  et,  quod  diffi- 
cillimum    est,    dividenda     intentio    animi,    ut    aliud 
voce    aliud    oculis    agatur.      Illud     non     poenitebit 
curasse,  cum  scribere  nomina  puer  (quemadmodum 
moris  est)   coeperit,   ne   hanc   operam    in    vocabulis 

35  vulgaribus  et  forte  occurrentibus  perdat.      Protinus 
enim    potest    interpretationem     linguae    secretions, 
quas     Graeci     yA.ujcro-as     vocant,     dum    aliud    agitur, 
ediscere    et    inter    prima    elementa     consequi     rem 
postea  proprium  tempus  desideraturam.    Et  quoniam 
circa  res   adhuc   tenues  moramur,  ii  quoque  versus, 
qui     ad     imitationem     scribendi     proponentur,     non 
otiosas  velim  sententias  habeant  sed  honestum  ali- 

36  quid    monentes.        Prosequitur    haec    memoria     in 
senectutem  et  impressa  animo  rudi  usque  ad  mores 
proficiet.     Etiam  dicta  clarorum  virorum  et  electos 


BOOK   I.  i.  31-36 

The  syllables  once  learnt,  let  him  begin  to  construct 
words  with  them  and  sentences  with  the  words. 
You  will  hardly  believe  how  much  reading  is  delayed  32 
by  undue  haste.  If  the  child  attempts  more  than 
his  powers  allow,  the  inevitable  result  is  hesitation, 
interruption  and  repetition,  and  the  mistakes  which 
he  makes  merely  lead  him  to  lose  confidence  in  what 
he  already  knows.  Reading  must  therefore  first  be  33 
sure,  then  connected,  while  it  must  be  kept  slow  for 
a  considerable  time,  until  practice  brings  speed 
unaccompanied  by  error.  For  to  look  to  the  right,  34 
which  is  regularly  taught,  and  to  look  ahead  de- 
pends not  so  much  on  precept  as  on  practice  ;  since 
it  is  necessary  to  keep  the  eyes  on  what  follows 
while  reading  out  what  precedes,  with  the  result- 
ing difficulty  that  the  attention  of  the  mind  must 
be  divided,  the  eyes  and  voice  being  differently  en- 
gaged. It  will  be  found  worth  while,  when  the  boy 
begins  to  write  out  words  in  accordance  with  the 
usual  practice,  to  see  that  he  does  not  waste  his 
labour  in  writing  out  common  words  of  everyday 
occurrence.  He  can  readily  learn  the  explanations  35 
or  glosses,  as  the  Greeks  call  them,  of  the  more 
obscure  words  by  the  way  and,  while  he  is  still  en- 
gaged on  the  first  rudiments,  acquire  what  would 
otherwise  demand  special  time  to  be  devoted  to  it. 
And  as  we  are  still  discussing  minor  details,  I  would 
urge  that  the  lines,  which  he  is  set  to  copy,  should 
not  express  thoughts  of  no  significance,  but  convey 
some  sound  moral  lesson.  He  will  remember  such  36 
aphorisms  even  when  he  is  an  old  man,  and  the  im- 
pression made  upon  his  unformed  mind  will  contribute 
to  the  formation  of  his  character.  He  may  also  be 
entertained  by  learning  the  sayings  of  famous  men 



ex  poetis  maxime  (namque  eorum  cognitio  parvis 
gratior  est)  locos  ediscere  inter  lusum  licet.  Nam 
et  maxime  necessaria  est  oratori  (sicut  suo  loco 
dicam)  memoria,  et  ea  praecipue  firmatur  atque 
alitur  exercitatione,  et  in  his,  de  quibus  mine 
loquimur,  aetatibus,  quae  nihildum  ipsae  generare 
ex  se  queunt,  prope  sola  est,  quae  iuvari  cura  do- 
37  centium  possit.  Non  alienum  fuerit  exigere  ab  his 
aetatibus,  quo  sit  absolutius  os  et  expressior  sermo, 
ut  nomina  quaedam  versusque  adfectatae  difficultatis 
ex  pluribus  et  asperrime  coeuntibus  inter  se  syllabis 
catenates  et  velut  confragosos  quain  citatissime 
volvant ;  ^a\ivol  Graece  vocantur.  Res  modica 
dictu,  qua  tamen  omissa  multa  linguae  vitia,  nisi 
primis  eximuntur  annis,  inemendabili  in  posterum 
pravitate  durantur. 

II.  Sed  nobis  iam  paulatim  adcrescere  puer  et 
exire  de  gremio  et  discere  serio  incipiat.  Hoc  igitur 
potissimum  loco  tractanda  quaestio  est,  utiliusne 
sit  domi  atque  intra  privates  parietes  studentem 
continere  an  frequentiae  scholarum  et  velut  public-is 
2  praeceptoribus  tradere.  Quod  quidem  cum  iis,  a 
quibus  clarissimarum  civitatium  mores  sunt  instituti, 
turn  eminentissimis  auctoribus  video  placuisse.  Non 
est  tamen  dissimulandum,  esse  nonnullos,  qui  ab  hoc 
prope  publico  more  privata  quadam  persuasione 
dissentiant.  Hi  duas  praecipue  rationes  sequi  vi- 
dentur :  unam,  quod  moribus  magis  consulant  fu- 
giendo  turbam  hominum  eius  aetatis,  quae  sit  ad 


BOOK    I.  i.  36-11.  2 

and  above  all  selections  from  the  poets,  poetry  being 
more  attractive  to  children.  For  memory  is  most  ne- 
cessary to  an  orator,  as  I  shall  point  out  in  its  proper 
place,  and  there  is  nothing  like  practice  for  strength- 
ening and  developing  it.  And  at  the  tender  age 
of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  when  originality  is 
impossible,  memory  is  almost  the  only  faculty  which 
can  be  developed  by  the  teacher.  It  will  be  worth  37 
while,  by  way  of  improving  the  child's  pronunciation 
and  distinctness  of  utterance,  to  make  him  rattle 
off  a  selection  of  names  and  lines  of  studied  difficulty: 
they  should  be  formed  of  a  number  of  syllables 
which  go  ill  together  and  should  be  harsh  and 
rugged  in  sound :  the  Greeks  call  them  "  gags." 
This  sounds  a  trifling  matter,  but  its  omission  will 
result  in  numerous  faults  of  pronunciation,  which, 
unless  removed  in  early  years,  will  become  a  perverse 
and  incurable  habit  and  persist  through  life. 

II.  But  the  time  has  come  for  the  boy  to  grow  up 
little  by  little,  to  leave  the  nursery  and  tackle  his 
studies  in  good  earnest.  This  therefore  is  the  place 
to  discuss  the  question  as  to  whether  it  is  better  to 
have  him  educated  privately  at  home  or  hand  him 
over  to  some  large  school  and  those  whom  I  may 
call  public  instructors.  The  latter  course  has,  I  2 
know,  won  the  approval  of  most  eminent  authorities 
and  of  those  who  have  formed  the  national  character 
of  the  most  famous  states.  It  would,  however,  be  folly 
to  shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  there  are  some  who 
disagree  with  this  preference  for  public  education 
owing  to  a  certain  prejudice  in  favour  of  private 
tuition.  These  persons  seem  to  be  guided  in  the 
main  by  two  principles.  In  the  interests  of  morality 
they  would  avoid  the  society  of  a  number  of  human 



vitia  maxima  prona,  unde  causas  turpium  factorum 
saepe  extitisse  utinam  falso  iactaretur ;  alteram, 
quod,  quisquis  futurus  est  ille  praeceptor,  liberalius 
tempora  sua  impensurus  uni  videtur,  quam  si  eadem 

3  in    plures    partiatur.      Prior    causa    prorsus    gravis. 
Nam   si    studiis    quidem    scholas    prodesse,  moribus 
autem   nocere  constaret,   potior   mihi    ratio    vivendi 
honeste  quam    vel   optima    dicendi    videretur.     Sed 
mea    quidem  sententia   iuncta  ista  atque  indiscreta 
sunt.       Neque  enim  esse  oratorem  nisi  bonum  virum 
iudico,    et    fieri    etiamsi    potest    nolo.       De    hac    re 
igitur  prius. 

4  Corrumpi   mores   in   scholis  putant  ;  nam   et  cor- 
rumpuntur  interim,  sed  domi  quoque,  et  sunt  multa 
eius    rei    exempla    tarn    hercule    quam    conservatae 
sanctissime    utrobique    opinionis.      Natura    cuiusque 
totum    curaque    distat.      Da    mentem   ad   peiora  fa- 
cilein,  da  negligentiam  formandi  custodiendique   in 
aetate    prima    pudoris  :  non    minorem   flagitiis  occa- 
sionem  secreta  praebuerint.      Nam  et  potest  turpis 
esse    domesticus    ille    praeceptor,    nee    tutior    inter 
servos   malos   quam   ingenues  parum  modestos  con- 

5  versatio  est.      At  si  bona  ipsius  indoles,  si  non  caeca 
ac   sopita   parentum    socordia  est,  et    praeceptorem 
eligere  sanctissimum  quemque  (cuius   rei  praecipua 


BOOK    I.  ii.  2-5 

beings  at  an  age  that  is  specially  liable  to  acquire 
serious  faults  :  I  only  wish  I  could  deny  the  truth  of 
the  view  that  such  education  has  often  been  the 
cause  of  the  most  discreditable  actions.  Secondly 
they  hold  that  whoever  is  to  be  the  boy's  teacher,  he 
will  devote  his  time  more  generously  to  one  pupil 
than  if  he  has  to  divide  it  among  several.  The  first  3 
reason  certainly  deserves  serious  consideration.  If 
it  were  proved  that  schools,  while  advantageous 
to  study,  are  prejudicial  to  morality,  I  should  give 
my  vote  for  virtuous  living  in  preference  to  even 
supreme  excellence  of  speaking.  But  in  my  opinion 
the  two  are  inseparable.  I  hold  that  no  one  can  be 
a  true  orator  unless  he  is  also  a  good  man  and, 
even  if  he  could  be,  I  would  not  have  it  so.  I  will 
therefore  deal  with  this  point  first. 

It  is  held  that  schools  corrupt  the  morals.  It  is  4 
true  that  this  is  sometimes  the  case.  But  morals 
may  be  corrupted  at  home  as  well.  There  are 
numerous  instances  of  both,  as  there  are  also  of 
the  preservation  of  a  good  reputation  under  either 
circumstance.  The  nature  of  the  individual  boy 
and  the  care  devoted  to  his  education  make  all  the 
difference.  Given  a  natural  bent  toward  evil  or 
negligence  in  developing  and  watching  over  modest 
behaviour  in  early  years,  privacy  will  provide  equal 
opportunity  for  sin.  The  teacher  employed  at 
home  may  be  of  bad  character,  and  there  is  just  as 
much  danger  in  associating  with  bad  slaves  as  there 
is  with  immodest  companions  of  good  birth.  On  the  5 
other  hand  if  the  natural  bent  be  towards  virtue, 
and  parents  are  not  afflicted  with  a  blind  and  torpid 
indifference,  it  is  possible  to  choose  a  teacher  of  the 
highest  character  (and  those  who  are  wise  will  make 


prudentibus  cura  est)  et  disciplinary  quae  maxima 
severa  fuerit,  licet,  et  nihilominus  amicum  gravem 
virum  aut  fidelem  libertum  lateri  filii  sui  adiungere, 
cuius  assiduus  comitatus  etiam  illos  meliores  faciat, 
qui  timebantur. 

6  Facile    erat    huius    metus    remedium.        Utinam 
liberorum    nostrorum    mores    non    ipsi    perderemus. 
Infantiam    statim    deliciis     solvimus.        Mollis     ilia 
educatio,  quam  indulgentiam  vocamus,  nervos  omnes 
mentis  et  corporis  frangit.      Quid  non  adultus  con- 
cupiscet,    qui    in    purpuris   repit?       Nondum   prima 
verba    exprimit,    iam    coccum    intelligit,    iam    con- 
chylium    poscit       Ante    palatum    eorum    quam    os 

7  instituimus.       In     lecticis   crescunt ;     si    terram    at- 
tigerint,  e  manibus  utrinque  sustinentium  pendent. 
Gaudemus,    si    quid    licentius    dixerint:     verba    ne 
Alexandrinis    quidem    permittenda    deliciis    risu    et 
osculo  excipimus.       Nee  mirum  :    nos  docuimus,  ex 

8  nobis  audiunt.      Nostras  arnicas,  nostros  concubinos 
vident,    omne    convivium    obscenis    canticis    strepit, 
pudenda   dictu   spectantur.    Fit   ex    his  consuetudo, 
inde  natura.      Discunt  haec  miseri,  antequam  sciant 
vitia  esse  ;  inde  soluti  ac  fluentes  non  accipiunt  ex 
scholis  mala  ista  sed  in  scholas  adferunt. 

9  Verum  in  studiis  magis  vacabit  unus  uni.      Ante 
omnia  nihil  prohibet  esse  ilium  nescio  quern  unum 


BOOK    I.  ii.  5-9 

this  their  first  object),  to  adopt  a  method  of  edu- 
cation of  the  strictest  kind  and  at  the  same  time  to 
attach  some  respectable  man  or  faithful  freed  man  to 
their  son  as  his  friend  and  guardian,  that  his  un- 
failing companionship  may  improve  the  character 
even  of  those  who  gave  rise  to  apprehension. 

Yet  how  easy  were  the  remedy  for  such  fears.  6 
Would  that  we  did  not  too  often  ruin  our  children's 
character  ourselves !  We  spoil  them  from  the 
cradle.  That  soft  upbringing,  which  we  call  kind- 
ness, saps  all  the  sinews  both  of  mind  and  body.  If 
the  child  crawls  on  purple,  what  will  he  not  desire 
when  he  comes  to  manhood  ?  Before  he  can  talk  he 
can  distinguish  scarlet  and  cries  for  the  very  best 
brand  of  purple.  We  train  their  palates  before  we 
teach  their  lips  to  speak.  They  grow  up  in  litters  :  7 
if  they  set  foot  to  earth,  they  are  supported  by  the 
hands  of  attendants  on  either  side.  We  rejoice  if 
they  say  something  over-free,  and  words  which  we 
should  not  tolerate  from  the  lips  even  of  an  Alexan- 
drian page  are  greeted  with  laughter  and  a  kiss. 
We  have  no  right  to  be  surprised.  It  was  we  that 
taught  them  :  they  hear  us  use  such  words,  they  see  8 
our  mistresses  and  minions  ;  every  dinner  party  is 
loud  with  foul  songs,  and  things  are  presented  to 
their  eyes  of  which  we  should  blush  to  speak. 
Hence  springs  habit,  and  habit  in  time  becomes 
second  nature.  The  poor  children  learn  these  things 
before  they  know  them  to  be  wrong.  They  become 
luxurious  and  effeminate,  and  far  from  acquiring 
such  vices  at  schools,  introduce  them  themselves. 

I  now  turn  to  the  objection  that  one  master  can    9 
give  more  attention  to  one  pupil.      In  the  first  place 
there  is   nothing  to  prevent  the  principle  of  "  one 



etiam  cum  eo,  qui  in  scholis  eruditur.  Sed  etiamsi 
iungi  utrumque  non  posset,  lumen  tamen  illud 
conventus  honestissimi  tenebris  ac  solitudini  praetu- 
lissem.  Nam  optimus  quisque  praeceptor  frequentia 

10  gaudet    ac    maiore    se    theatre    dignum    putat.      At 
fere  minores  ex  conscientia  suae  infirmitatis  haerere 
singulis  et  officio  fungi  quodammodo  paedagogorum 
non  indignantur. 

11  Sed   praestat    alicui    vel    gratia    vel    pecunia    vel 
amicitia,     ut     doctissimum     atque     incomparabilem 
magistrum    domi    habeat :     num    tamen    ille    totum 
in    uno    diem   consumpturus    est?      aut  potest    esse 
ulla    tarn    perpetua    discentis     intentio,    quae    non 
ut  visus  oculorum  obtutu  continuo  fatigetur  ?     cum 
praesertim     multo     plus     secreti     temporis     studia 

12  desiderent.      Neque   enim  scribenti,  ediscenti,  cogi- 
tanti    praeceptor    adsistit,    quorum    aliquid    agenti- 
bus     cuiuscunque     interventus     impedimento      est. 
Lectio    quoque    non    omnis    nee   semper    praeeunte 
vel    interpretante    eget.       Quando    enim     tot     auc- 
torum  notitia  contingeret?      Modicum  ergo  tempus 
est,     quo    in    totum     diem     velut     opus    ordinetur, 
ideoque  per  plures  ire  possunt  etiam  quae  singulis 

13  tradenda  sunt.       Pleraque    vero    hanc    condicionem 
habent,  ut  eadem   voce  ad  omnes  simul  perferantur. 
Taceo  de  partitionibus  et  declamationibus  rhetorum, 


BOOK    I.  11.  9-13 

teacher,  one  boy "  being  combined  with  school 
education.  And  even  if  such  a  combination  should 
prove  impossible,  I  should  still  prefer  the  broad 
daylight  of  a  respectable  school  to  the  solitude  and 
obscurity  of  a  private  education.  For  all  the  best 
teachers  pride  themselves  on  having  a  large  number 
of  pupils  and  think  themselves  worthy  of  a  bigger 
audience.  On  the  other  hand  in  the  case  of  in-  10 
ferior  teachers  a  consciousness  of  their  own  defects 
not  seldom  reconciles  them  to  being  attached  to  a 
single  pupil  and  playing  the  part — for  it  amounts  to 
little  more — of  a  mere  paedagogus, 

But  let  us  assume  that  influence,  money  or  friend-  11 
ship  succeed  in  securing  a  paragon  of  learning  to 
teach  the  boy  at  home.  Will  he  be  able  to  devote 
the  whole  day  to  one  pupil  ?  Or  can  we  demand 
such  continuous  attention  on  the  part  of  the  learner  ? 
The  mind  is  as  easily  tired  as  the  eye,  if  given  no 
relaxation.  Moreover  by  far  the  larger  proportion 
of  the  learner's  time  ought  to  be  devoted  to  private 
study.  The  teacher  does  not  stand  over  him  while  12 
he  is  writing  or  thinking  or  learning  by  heart.  While 
he  is  so  occupied  the  intervention  of  anyone,  be  he 
who  he  may,  is  a  hindrance.  Further,  not  all  read- 
ing requires  to  be  first  read  aloud  or  interpreted  by 
a  master.  If  it  did,  how  would  the  boy  ever  become 
acquainted  with  all  the  authors  required  of  him  ?  A 
small  time  only  is  required  to  give  purpose  and 
direction  to  the  day's  work,  and  consequently 
individual  instruction  can  be  given  to  more  than  one 
pupil.  There  are  moreover  a  large  number  of  13 
subjects  in  which  it  is  desirable  that  instruction 
should  be  given  to  all  the  pupils  simultaneously. 
I  say  nothing  of  the  analyses  and  declamations  of 



quibus    certe    quantuscunque    numerus    adhibeatur, 

14  tamen    unusquisque    tot  inn    feret.      Non    enim    vox 
ilia  praeceptoris  ut  cena  minus  pluribus  sufficit,  sed 
ut  sol  universis  idem  lucis  calorisque  largitur.   Gram- 
maticus   quoque   si    de   loquendi   ratione  disserat,   si 
quaestiones    explicet,     historias     exponat,     poemata 

15  enarret,    tot    ilia    discent    quot    audient.     At    enim 
emendationi  praelectionique   numerus    obstat.       Sit 
incommodum,  (nam  quid  fere  undique  placet  ?)   mox 
illud  comparabimus  commodis. 

Nee  ego  tamen  eo  mitti  puerum  volo,  ubi  negli- 
gatur.  Sed  neque  praeceptor  bonus  maiore  se  turba, 
quam  ut  sustinere  earn  possit,  oneraverit ;  et  in 
primis  ea  habenda  cura  est,  ut  is  omni  modo  fiat  nobis 
familiariter  amicus,  nee  officium  in  docendo  spectet 

16  sed  adfectum.      Ita  nunquam  erimus  in  turba.     Nee 
sane  quisquam  litteris  saltern  leviter  imbutus  eum, 
in    quo    studium    ingeniumque    perspexerit,  non    in 
suam    quoque    gloriam  peculiariter  fovebit.      Sed  ut 
fugiendae  sint  magnae  scholae   (cui  ne  ipsi  quidem 
rei  adsentior,  si  ad  aliquem  merito  concurritur),  non 
tamen    hoc    eo     valet,     ut    fugiendae    sint    ornnino 
scholae.      Aliud  est  enim  vitare  eas,  aliud  eligere. 

17  Et    si    refutavimus    quae     contra    dicuntur,    iam 


BOOK    I.  n.  13-17 

the  professors  of  rhetoric  :  in  such  cases  there  is  no 
limit  to  the  number  of  the  audience,  as  each  in- 
dividual pupil  will  in  any  case  receive  full  value. 
The  voice  of  a  lecturer  is  not  like  a  dinner  which  14 
will  only  suffice  for  a  limited  number  ;  it  is  like  the 
sun  which  distributes  the  same  quantity  of  light  and 
heat  to  all  of  us.  So  too  with  the  teacher  of 
literature.  Whether  he  speak  of  style  or  expound 
disputed  passages,  explain  stories  or  paraphrase 
poems,  everyone  who  hears  him  will  profit  by  his 
teaching.  But,  it  will  be  urged,  a  large  class  is  15 
unsuitable  for  the  correction  of  faults  or  for  explana- 
tion. It  may  be  inconvenient :  one  cannot  hope  for 
absolute  perfection  ;  but  1  shall  shortly  contrast  the 
inconvenience  with  the  obvious  advantages. 

Still  I  do  not  wish  a  boy  to  be  sent  where  he  will 
be  neglected.  But  a  good  teacher  will  not  burden 
himself  with  a  larger  number  of  pupils  than  he  can 
manage,  and  it  is  further  of  the  very  first  im- 
portance that  he  should  be  on  friendly  and  intimate 
terms  with  us  and  make  his  teaching  not  a  duty 
but  a  labour  of  love.  Then  there  will  never  be 
any  question  of  being  swamped  by  the  number  of 
our  fellow-learners.  Moreover  any  teacher  who  has  16 
the  least  tincture  of  literary  culture  will  devote 
special  attention  to  any  boy  who  shows  signs  of 
industry  and  talent;  for  such  a  pupil  will  redound 
to  his  own  credit.  But  even  if  large  schools  are  to 
be  avoided,  a  proposition  from  which  I  must  dissent 
if  the  size  be  due  to  the  excellence  of  the  teacher, 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  schools  are  to  be  avoided. 
It  is  one  thing  to  avoid  them,  another  to  select  the 

Having    refuted   these    objections,    let    me    now  17 



18  explicemus,    quid     ipsi    sequamur.         Ante    omnia 
futurus  orator,  cui  in  maxima  celebritate  et  in  media 
rei    publicae    luce    vivendum    est,    adsuescat  iam    a 
tenero  non  reformidare  homines  neque  ilia  solitaria 
et  velut  umbratica  vita  pallescere.       Excitanda  mens 
et  adtollenda  semper  est,  quae  in  eiusmodi  secretis 
aut    languescit    et    quendam    velut    in    opaco  situm 
ducit,  aut  contra  tumescit  inani  persuasione  ;  necesse 
est   enim   nimium   tribuat  sibi,   qui   se  nemini  com- 

19  parat.      Deinde   cum  proferenda  sunt  studia,  caligat 
in  sole  et  omnia  nova  offendit,  ut  qui  solus  didicerit 

20  quod  inter  multos  faciendum  ebt.      Mitto  amicitias, 
quae  ad  senectutem  usque  firmissime  durant  religiosa 
quadam    necessitudine    imbutae.      Neque    enim    est 
sanctius  sacris  iisdem  quam  studiis  initiari.      Sensum 
ipsum,  qui   communis  dicitur,   ubi    discet,  cum  se  a 
congressu,    qui    non    hominibus    solum    sed    mutis 

21  quoque  animalibus  naturalis  est,  segregarit  ?       Adde 
quod  domi  ea  sola  discere  potest,  quae  ipsi  praeci- 
pientur,  in   schola  etiam  quae  aliis.      Audiet  multa 
cotidie    probari,     multa     corrigi ;     proderit     alicuius 
obiurgata     desidia,    proderit    laudata    industria,   ex- 

22  citabitur  laude  aemulatio,  turpe  ducet  cedere  pari, 


BOOK    I.  ii.  17-22 

explain  my  own  views.      It  is  above  all  things  ne-  18 
cessary  that  our  future  orator,  who  will  have  to  live 
in  the  utmost  publicity  and  in  the  broad  daylight  of 
public    life,    should    become     accustomed    from     his 
childhood    to     move    in     societv     without    fear    and 


habituated  to  a  life  far  removed  from  that  of  the 
pale  student,  the  solitary  and  recluse.  His  mind 
requires  constant  stimulus  and  excitement,  whereas 
retirement  such  as  has  just  been  mentioned  induces 
languor  and  the  mind  becomes  mildewed  like  things 
that  are  left  in  the  dark,  or  else  flies  to  the  opposite 
extreme  and  becomes  puffed  up  with  empty  conceit ; 
for  he  who  has  no  standard  of  comparison  by  which 
to  judge  his  own  powers  will  necessarily  rate  them 
too  high.  Again  when  the  fruits  of  his  study  have  19 
to  be  displayed  to  the  public  gaze,  our  recluse  is 
blinded  by  the  sun's  glare,  and  finds  everything  new 
and  unfamiliar,  for  though  he  has  learnt  what  is  re- 
quired to  be  done  in  public,  his  learning  is  but  the 
theory  of  a  hermit.  I  say  nothing  of  friendships  20 
which  endure  unbroken  to  old  age  having  acquired 
the  binding  force  of  a  sacred  duty  :  for  initiation 
in  the  same  studies  has  all  the  sanctity  of  initiation 
in  the  same  mysteries  of  religion.  And  where  shall 
he  acquire  that  instinct  which  we  call  common 
feeling,  if  he  secludes  himself  from  that  intercourse 

c*  * 

which  is  natural  not  merely  to  mankind  but  even  to 
dumb  animals?  Further,  at  home  he  can  only  learn  21 
what  is  taught  to  himself,  while  at  school  he  will 
learn  what  is  taught  others  as  well.  He  will  hear 
many  merits  praised  and  many  faults  corrected  every 
day  :  he  will  derive  equal  profit  from  hearing  the 
indolence  of  a  comrade  rebuked  or  his  industry 
commended.  Such  praise  will  incite  him  to  emu-  22 



pulchrum     superasse    maiores.       Accendunt    oinnia 
haec  animoSj  et  licet  ipsa  vitium  sit  ambitio,  frequen- 

23  ter  tamen  causa  virtutum   est.      Non  inutilem   scio 
servatum    esse    a    praeceptoribus    meis  morem,  qui, 
cum  pueros  in  classes  distribuerant,  ordinem  dicendi 
secundum  vires  ingenii  dabant ;  et  ita  superiore  loco 
quisque  declamabat,  ut  praecedere  profectu  videbatur. 

24  Huius    rei    iudicia    praebebantur ;   ea    nobis    ingens 
palma,   ducere    vero    classem    multo    pulcherrimum. 
Nee   de  hoc  semel   decretum   erat  ;  tricesimus  dies 
reddebat     victo    certaminis     potestatem.       Ita    nee 
superior  successu  curam  remittebat  et  dolor  victum 

25  ad  depellendam  ignominiam    concitabat.      Id  nobis 
acriores  ad  studia  dicendi  faces  subdidisse  quara  ex- 
hortationem    docentium,    paedagogoram    custodiam,, 
vota  parentunij  quantum  animi  mei  coniectura  colli- 

26  gere  possum,  contenderim.  Sed  sicut  firmiores  in  lit- 
teris  profectus  alit  aemulatio,  ita  incipientibus  atque 
adhuc    teneris    condiscipulorum    quam    praeceptoris 
iucundior   hoc   ipso   quod    facilior   imitatio  est.     Vix 
enim  se  prima  elementa  ad  spem  tollere  effingendae, 
quam  summam  putant,  eloquentiae  audebunt ;  prox- 
ima  amplectentur  magis,  ut  vites  arboribus  applicitae 
inferiores  prius  apprehendendo   ramos   in  cacumina 


BOOK    I.  i     22-26 

lation,  he  will  think  it  a  disgrace  to  be  outdone  by 
his  contemporaries  and  a  distinction  to  surpass  his 
seniors.  All  such  incentives  provide  a  valuable 
stimulus,  and  though  ambition  may  be  a  fault  in 
itself,  it  is  often  the  mother  of  virtues.  I  remember  23 
that  my  own  masters  had  a  practice  which  was  not 
without  advantages.  Having  distributed  the  boys 
in  classes,  they  made  the  order  in  which  they  were 
to  speak  depend  on  their  ability,  so  that  the  boy 
who  had  made  most  progress  in  his  studies  had  the 
privilege  of  declaiming  first.  The  performances  24 
on  these  occasions  wrere  criticised.  To  win  com- 
mendation was  a  tremendous  honour,  but  the  prize 
most  eagerly  coveted  was  to  be  the  leader  of  the 
class.  Such  a  position  was  not  permanent.  Once  a 
month  the  defeated  competitors  were  given  a  fresh 
opportunity  of  competing  for  the  prize.  Conse- 
quently success  did  not  lead  the  victor  to  relax  his 
efforts,  while  the  vexation  caused  by  defeat  served 
as  an  incentive  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace.  I  will  25 
venture  to  assert  that  to  the  best  of  my  memory 
this  practice  did  more  to  kindle  our  oratorical  am- 
bitions than  all  the  exhortations  of  our  instructors, 
the  watchfulness  of  our  paedagogi  and  the  prayers  of 
our  parents.  Further  while  emulation  promotes  26 
progress  in  the  more  advanced  pupils,  beginners  who 
are  still  of  tender  years  derive  greater  pleasure  from 
imitating  their  comrades  than  their  masters,  just 
because  it  is  easier.  For  children  still  in  the  ele- 
mentary stages  of  education  can  scarce  dare  hope  to 
reach  that  complete  eloquence  which  they  under- 
stand to  be  their  o;oal  :  their  ambition  will  not  soar 


so  high,  but  they  will  imitate  the  vine  which  has  to 
grasp  the  lower  branches  of  the  tree  on  which  it  is 


27  evadunt.      Quod   acleo    verum    est,   ut   ipsius    etiam 
magistri,   si   tamen    anibitiosis    utilia    praeferet,  hoc 
opus   sit,    cum    adliuc    rudia    tractabit    ingenia,    non 
statim  onerare  infirmitatem    discentium,    sed    tem- 
perare    vires     suas     et    ad     intellectum     audientis 

28  descendere.      Nam    ut    vascula    oris    angusti    super- 
fusam     humoris     copiam     respuunt,     sensim     autem 
influentibus    vel     etiam    instillatis     complentur,    sic 
animi  puerorum  quantum  excipere  possint  videndum 
est.      Nam    maiora  intellectu    velut    parum    apertos 

29  ad  percipiendum  animos  non  subibunt.      Utile  igitur 
habere,  quos  imitari  primum,  mox  vincere  velis.      Ita 
paulatim  et  superiorum  spes  erit.      His  adiicio,  prae- 
ceptores   ipsos    non    idem   mentis    ac   spiritus   in  di- 
cendo  posse  concipere  singulis  tantum  praesentibus 
quod  ilia  celebritate  audientium  instinctos. 

30  Maxima    enim    pars    eloquentiae    constat    anirno. 
Hunc  adfici,  hunc  concipere  imagines  rerum  et  trans- 
formari  quodammodo  ad  naturam   eorum,  de  quibus 
loquimur,    necesse    est.       Is    porro,    quo    generosior 
celsiorque    est,    hoc    maioribus    velut    organis    com- 
movetur  ;  ideoque  et  laude  crescit  et  impetu  augetur 

31  et    aliquid    magnum    agere    gaudet.      Est    quaedam 
tacita    dedignatio,    vim    dicendi    tantis    comparatam 


BOOK    I.  ii.  26-31 

trained  before  it  can  reach  the  topmost  boughs.  So  27 
true  is  this  that  it  is  the  master's  duty  as  well,  if  he 
is  engaged  on  the  task  of  training  unformed  minds 
and  prefers  practical  utility  to  a  more  ambitious 
programme,  not  to  burden  his  pupils  at  once  with 
tasks  to  which  their  strength  is  unequal,  but  to  curb 
his  energies  and  refrain  from  talking  over  the  heads 
of  his  audience.  Vessels  with  narrow  mouths  will  28 
not  receive  liquids  if  too  much  be  poured  into  them 
at  a  time,  but  are  easily  filled  if  the  liquid  is  ad- 
mitted in  a  gentle  stream  or,  it  may  be,  drop  by 
drop ;  similarly  you  must  consider  how  much  a 
child's  mind  is  capable  of  receiving  :  the  things 
which  are  beyond  their  grasp  will  not  enter  their 
minds,  which  have  not  opened  out  sufficiently  to 
take  them  in.  It  is  a  good  thing  therefore  that  a  29 
boy  should  have  companions  whom  he  will  desire 
first  to  imitate  and  then  to  surpass  :  thus  he  will  be 
led  to  aspire  to  higher  achievement.  I  would  add 
that  the  instructors  themselves  cannot  develop  the 
same  intelligence  and  energy  before  a  single  listener 
as  they  can  when  inspired  by  the  presence  of  a 
numerous  audience. 

For  eloquence  depends  in  the  main  on  the  state  30 
of  the  mind,  which  must  be  moved,  conceive  images 
and  adapt  itself  to  suit  the  nature  of  the  subject 
which  is  the  theme  of  speech.  Further  the  loftier 
and  the  more  elevated  the  mind,  the  more  powerful 
will  be  the  forces  which  move  it :  consequently 
praise  gives  it  growth  and  effort  increase,  and  the 
thought  that  it  is  doing  something  great  fills  it  with 
joy.  The  duty  of  stooping  to  expend  that  power  of  31 
speaking  which  has  been  acquired  at  the  cost  of  such 
effort  upon  an  audience  of  one  gives  rise  to  a  silent 



laboribus  ad  unum  auditorem  demittere :  pudet 
supra  modum  sermonis  attolli.  Et  sane  concipita 
quis  mente  vel  declamantis  habitum  vel  orantis 
vocem,  incessum,  proimntiationem,  ilium  denique 
animi  et  corporis  motum,  sudorem,  ut  alia  prae- 
teream,  et  fatigationem,  audiente  uno :  nonne 
quiddam  pati  furori  simile  videatur  ?  Non  esset  in 
rebus  humanis  eloquentia,  si  tanturn  cum  singulis 

III.  Tradito  sibi  puero  docendi  peritus  ingenium 
eius  in  primis  naturamque  perspiciet.  Ingenii  signum 
in  parvis  praecipuum  memoria  est.  Eius  duplex 
virtus,  facile  percipere  et  fideliter  continere.  Proxi- 
mum  imitatio  ;  nam  id  quoque  est  docilis  naturae, 
sic  tamen,  ut  ea  quae  discit  effingat,  non  habitum 
forte  et  ingressum  et  si  quid  in  peius  notabile  est. 

2  Non   dabit  mi  hi   spem   bonae   indolis,   qui   hoc   imi- 
tandi  studio  petet,  ut  rideatur.     Nam  probus  quoque 
in  primis  erit  ille  vere  ingeniosus  ;  alioqui  non  peius 
duxerim    tardi    esse     ingenii    quam     mali.        Probus 
autem    ab    illo    segni    et    iacente    plurimum    aberit. 

3  Hie  meus   quae   tradentur   non    difficulter  accipiet, 
quaedam   etiam  interrogabit,  sequetur  tamen  magis 
quam  praecurret.      Illud  ingeniorum  velut    praecox 
genus    non    temere    unquam    pervenit    ad     frugem. 

4  Hi  sunt,  qui  parva  facile  faciunt  et  audacia  provecti, 


BOOK    I.  ii.  31-111.  4 

feeling  of  disdain,  and  the  teacher  is  ashamed  to 
raise  his  voice  above  the  ordinary  conversational 
level.  Imagine  the  air  of  a  declaimer,  or  the  voice 
of  an  orator,  his  gait,  his  delivery,  the  movements  of 
his  body,  the  emotions  of  his  mind,  and,  to  go  no 
further,  the  fatigue  of  his  exertions,  all  for  the  sake 
of  one  listener  !  Would  he  not  seem  little  less  than 
a  lunatic?  No,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as 
eloquence,  if  we  spoke  only  with  one  person  at 
a  time. 

III.  The  skilful  teacher  will  make  it  his  first  care, 
as  soon  as  a  boy  is  entrusted  to  him,  to  ascertain  his 
ability  and  character.  The  surest  indication  in 
a  child  is  his  power  of  memory.  The  character- 
istics of  a  good  memory  are  twofold  :  it  must  be 
quick  to  take  in  and  faithful  to  retain  impressions 
of  what  it  receives.  The  indication  of  next  im- 
portance is  the  power  of  imitation  :  for  this  is  a 
sign  that  the  child  is  teachable  :  but  he  must  imitate 


merely  what  he  is  taught,  and  must  not,  for 
example,  mimic  someone's  gait  or  bearing  or  de- 
fects. For  I  have  no  hope  that  a  child  will  turn 
out  well  who  loves  imitation  merely  for  the  purpose 
of  raising  a  laugh.  He  who  is  really  gifted  will  also 
above  all  else  be  good.  For  the  rest,  I  regard 
slowness  of  intellect  as  preferable  to  actual  bad- 
ness. But  a  good  boy  will  be  quite  unlike  the 
dullard  and  the  sloth.  My  ideal  pupil  will  absorb 
instruction  with  ease  and  will  even  ask  some 
questions  ;  but  he  will  follow  rather  than  anticipate 
his  teacher.  Precocious  intellects  rarely  produce 
sound  fruit.  By  the  precocious  I  mean  those  who 
perform  small  tasks  with  ease  and,  thus  emboldened, 
proceed  to  display  all  their  little  accomplishments 



quidquid  illud  possunt,  statim  ostendunt.  Possunt 
autem  id  demum,  quod  in  proximo  est ;  verba 
continuant,  haec  vultu  interrito,  nulla  tardati 
verecundia  proferunt.  Non  multum  praestant  sed 

5  cito.        Non    subest   vera  vis    nee    penitus  immissis 
radicibus  nititur ;  ut,  quae  summo  solo  sparsa  sunt 
semina,    celerius    se    effundunt,    et    imitatae    spicas 
herbulae   inanibus    aristis    ante    messem    flavescunt. 
Placent    haec    annis    comparata  ;     deinde    stat    pro- 
fectus,  admiratio  decrescit. 

6  Haec    cum    animadverterit,    perspiciat    deinceps, 
quonam  modo  tractaridus  sit  discentis  animus.     Sunt 
quidam,   nisi  institeris,  remissi,  quidam   imperia  in- 
dignantur,    quosdam    continet    metus,  quosdam    de- 
bilitat,  alios  continuatio   extundit,   in   aliis   plus   im- 

7  petus  facit.     Mihi  ille  detur  puer,  quern  laus  excitet, 
quern  gloria  iuvet,  qui  victus  fleat.     Hie  erit  alendus 
ambitu,     hunc     mordebit    obiurgatio,     hunc    honor 
excitabit,  in  hoc  desidiam  nunquam  verebor. 

8  Danda  est  tamen  omnibus  aliqua  remissio  ;    non 
solum  quia  nulla  res  est,  quae  perferre  possit   con- 
tinuum  laborem,  atque   ea    quoque,    quae  sensu   et 
anima    carent,  ut    servare    vim  suam    possint,  velut 
quiete  alterna  retenduntur ;    sed  quod  studium  dis- 

9  cendi  voluntate,  quae  cogi  non  potest,  constat.   Itaque 


BOOK    I.  in.  4-9 

without  being  asked  :  but  their  accomplishments  are 
only  of  the  most  obvious  kind  :  they  string  words  to- 
gether and  trot  them  out  boldly  and  undeterred  by 
the  slightest  sense  of  modesty.  Their  actual  achieve- 
ment is  small,  but  what  they  can  do  they  perform  with 
ease.  They  have  no  real  power  and  what  they  have  5 
is  but  of  shallow  growth :  it  is  as  when  we  cast 
seed  on  the  surface  of  the  soil :  it  springs  up  too 
rapidly,  the  blade  apes  the  loaded  ear,  and  yellows 
ere  harvest  time,  but  bears  no  grain.  Such  tricks 
please  us  when  we  contrast  them  with  the  per- 
former's age,  but  progress  soon  stops  and  our  ad- 
miration withers  away. 

Such  indications  once  noted,  the  teacher  must  next  6 
consider  what  treatment  is  to  be  applied  to  the  mind 
of  his  pupil.  There  are  some  boys  who  are  slack, 
unless  pressed  on ;  others  again  are  impatient  of 
control :  some  are  amenable  to  fear,  while  others  are 
paralysed  by  it  :  in  some  cases  the  mind  requires 
continued  application  to  form  it,  in  others  this  result 
is  best  obtained  by  rapid  concentration.  Give  me 
the  boy  who  is  spurred  on  by  praise,  delighted  by 
success  and  ready  to  weep  over  failure.  Such  an  7 
one  must  be  encouraged  by  appeals  to  his  ambition  ; 
rebuke  will  bite  him  to  the  quick  ;  honour  will  be  a 
spur,  and  there  is  no  fear  of  his  proving  indolent. 

Still,  all  our  pupils  will  require  some  relaxation,  8 
not  merely  because  there  is  nothing  in  this  world 
that  can  stand  continued  strain  and  even  unthinking 
and  inanimate  objects  are  unable  to  maintain  their 
strength,  unless  given  intervals  of  rest,  but  because 
study  depends  on  the  good  will  of  the  student,  a 
quality  that  cannot  be  secured  by  compulsion. 
Consequently  if  restored  and  refreshed  by  a  holiday  9 



et  virium  plus   adferunt  ad  discendum    renovati  ac 
recentes  et  acriorem  animum,  qui  fere  necessitatibus 

10  repugnat.      Nee  me  offenderit  lusus  in  pueris  ;    est 
et    hoc    signum     alacritatis ;     neque    ilium    tristem 
semperque  demissum   sperare  possim  erectae    circa 
studia    mentis    fore,    cum    in    hoc    quoque    maxime 

1 1  naturali  aetatibus  illis  impetu  iaceat.     Modus  tamen 
sit   remissionibus,   ne   aut    odium    studiorum  faciant 
negatae     aut    otii     consuetudinem     nimiae.       Sunt 
etiam    nonnulli    acuendis    puerorum    ingeniis    non 
inutiles  lusus,,  cum  positis  invicem  cuiusque  generis 

12  quaestiunculis  aemulantur.      Mores  quoque  se  inter 
ludendum  simplicius  detegunt ;  modo  nulla  videatur 
aetas  tarn  infirma,  quae   non   protinus   quid   rectum 
pravumque   sit  discat,  turn    vel    maxime    formanda, 
cum  simulandi  nescia  est  et  praecipientibus  facillime 
cedit.       Frangas  enim  citius  quam  corrigas,  quae  in 

13  pravum  induruerunt.    Protinus  ergo,  ne  quid  cupide, 
ne    quid    improbe,  ne  quid  impotenter    faciat,    mo- 
nendus   est  puer ;    habendumque    in    animo  semper 
illud  Vergilianum  : 

Adeo  in  teneris  consuescere  multum  est. 

Caedi   vero  discentes,  quamlibet  et   receptum   sit 
et  Chrysippus  non  improbet,  minime  velim.   Primum, 

14  quia  deforme  atque  servile  est  et  certe,  (quod  con- 

BOOK    I.  in.  9-14 

they  will  bring  greater  energy  to  their  learning  and 
approach  their  work  with  greater  spirit  of  a  kind 
that  will  not  submit  to  be  driven.  1  approve  of  play  10 
in  the  young  ;  it  is  a  sign  of  a  lively  disposition  ;  nor 
will  you  ever  lead  me  to  believe  that  a  boy  who  is 
gloomy  and  in  a  continual  state  of  depression  is  ever 
likely  to  show  alertness  of  mind  in  his  work,  lacking 
as  he  does  the  impulse  most  natural  to  boys  of  his 
age.  Such  relaxation  must  not  however  be  un-  1 1 
limited :  otherwise  the  refusal  to  give  a  holiday  will 
make  boys  hate  their  work,  while  excessive  indul- 
gence will  accustom  them  to  idleness.  There  are 
moreover  certain  games  which  have  an  educational 
value  for  boys,  as  for  instance  when  they  compete 
in  posing  each  other  with  all  kinds  of  questions 
which  they  ask  turn  and  turn  about.  Games  12 
too  reveal  character  in  the  most  natural  way,  at 
least  that  is  so  if  the  teacher  will  bear  in  mind 
that  there  is  no  child  so  young  as  to  be  unable  to 
learn  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong,  and 
that  the  character  is  best  moulded,  when  it  is  still 
guiltless  of  deceit  and  most  susceptible  to  instruc- 
tion :  for  once  a  bad  habit  has  become  engrained, 
it  is  easier  to  break  than  bend.  There  must  be  no  13 
delay,  then,  in  warning  a  boy  that  his  actions  must 
be  unselfish,  honest,  self-controlled,  and  we  must 
never  forget  the  words  of  Virgil, 

"  So  strong  is  custom  formed  in  early  years."  1 

1  disapprove  of  flogging,  although  it  is  the  regular 
custom  and  meets  with  the  acquiescence  of  Chry- 
sippus,  because  in  the  first  place  it  is  a  disgraceful 
form  of  punishment  and  fit  only  for  slaves,  and  is  in  14 

1  Georg.  ii.  272. 



venitj  si  aetatem  mutes),  iniuria  est ;  deinde,  quod, 
si  cui  tarn  est  mens  illiberalis,  ut  obiurgatione  non 
corrigatur,  is  etiam  ad  plagas  ut  pessima  quaeque 
mancipia  durabitur  :  postremo,  quod  ne  opus  erit 
quidem  hac  castigatione,  si  assiduus  studiorum 

15  exactor    astiterit.       Nunc    fere    negligentia    paeda- 
gogorum  sic  emendari  videtur,  ut  pueri  non  facere, 
quae    recta    sunt,    cogantur    sed    cur    non    fecerint 
puniantur.        Denique     cum     parvulum     verberibus 
coegeris,  quid  iuveni  facias,  cui  nee  adhiberi  potest 

16  hie  metus   et   maiora   discenda  sunt  ?     Adde,  quod 
multa    vapulantibus    dictu    deformia    et    mox    vere- 
cundiae    futura    saepe    dolore    vel  metu  acciderunt, 
qui   pudor   frangit  animum   et    abiicit    atque    ipsius 

17  lucis  fugam    et    taedium    dictat.      lam   si  minor   in 
eligendis   custodum  vel  praeceptorum  moribus   fuit 
cura,  pudet  dicere,  in  quae  probra  nefandi  homines 
isto  caedendi  Jure  abutantur,  quam  det  aliis  quoque 
nonnunquam  occasionem  hie  miserorum  metus.    Non 
morabor  in  parte  hac  ;   nimium  est  quod  intelligitur. 
Quare  hoc  dixisse  satis  est  ;  in  aetatem  infirmam  et 
iniuriae    obnoxiam     nemini    debet    nimium     licere. 

18  Nunc  quibus  instituendus  sit  artibus,  qui  sic  forma- 
bitur,  ut  fieri  possit  orator,  et  quae  in  quaque  aetate 
inchoanda,  dicere  ingrediar. 

IV.    Primus     in     eo,    qui     scribendi     legendique 


BOOK    I.   in.  i4-iv.  i 

any  case  an  insult,  as  you  will  realise  if  you  imagine 
its  infliction  at  a  later  age.  Secondly  if  a  boy  is  so 
insensible  to  instruction  that  reproof  is  useless,  he 
will,  like  the  worst  type  of  slave,  merely  become 
hardened  to  blows.  Finally  there  will  be  absolutely  no 
need  of  such  punishment  if  the  master  is  a  thorough 
disciplinarian.  As  it  is,  we  try  to  make  amends  for  If> 
the  negligence  of  the  boy's  paedagogus,  not  by 
forcing  him  to  do  what  is  right,  but  by  punishing 
him  for  not  doing  what  is  right.  And  though  you 
may  compel  a  child  with  blows,  what  are  you 
to  do  with  him  when  he  is  a  young  man  no  longer 
amenable  to  such  threats  and  confronted  with  tasks 
of  far  greater  difficulty?  Moreover  when  children  iG 
are  beaten,  pain  or  fear  frequently  have  results  of 
which  it  is  not  pleasant  to  speak  and  which  are 
likely  subsequently  to  be  a  source  of  shame,  a  shame 
which  unnerves  and  depresses  the  mind  and  leads 
the  child  to  shun  and  loathe  the  light.  Further  if  in-  17 
adequate  care  is  taken  in  the  choices  of  respectable 
governors  and  instructors,  I  blush  to  mention  the 
shameful  abuse  which  scoundrels  sometimes  make 
of  their  right  to  administer  corporal  punishment  or 
the  opportunity  not  infrequently  offered  to  others 
by  the  fear  thus  caused  in  the  victims.  I  will  not 
linger  on  this  subject ;  it  is  more  than  enough  if  I 
have  made  my  meaning  clear.  I  will  content  myself 
with  saying  that  children  are  helpless  and  easily 
victimised,  and  that  therefore  no  one  should  be  given 
unlimited  power  over  them.  I  will  now  proceed  to  18 
describe  the  subjects  in  which  the  boy  must  be 
trained,  if  he  is  to  become  an  orator,  and  to  indicate 
the  age  at  which  each  should  be  commenced. 

IV.  As  soon  as  the  boy  has  learned  to  read  and 



adeptus  erit  facultatem,  grammatici  est  locus.      Nee 
refert,  de   Graeco   an  de   Latino  loquar,  quanquam 

2  Graecum  esse  priorem  placet.      Utrique  eadem  via 
est.     Haec  igitur  professio,  cum  brevissime  in  duas 
partes  dividatur,  recte   loquendi  scientiam   et    poe- 
tarum    enarrationem,    plus    habet    in   recessu   quam 

3  fronte    promittit.        Nam   et    scribendi    ratio    con- 
iuncta  cum  loquendo  est,  et  enarrationem  praecedit 
emendata  lectio,   et  mixtum  his   omnibus    iudicium 
est ;  quo  quidem  ita  severe  sunt  usi  veteres  gram- 
matici, ut  non  versus  modo  censoria  quadam  virgula 
notare  et  libros,  qui   falso  viderentur  inscripti,  tan- 
quam   subditos  summovere  familia  permiserint  sibi, 
sed    auctores    alios    in    ordinem    redegerint,    alios 

4  omnino    exemerint    numero.       Nee    poetas    legisse 
satis    est :     excutiendum    omne     scriptorum    genus 
non    propter    historias    modo    sed    verba,   quae    fre- 
quenter   ius    ab    auctoribus    sumunt.       Turn    neque 
citra  musicen  grammatice  potest  esse  perfecta,  cum 
ei    de    metris    rhythmisque    dicendum    sit,    nee,    si 
rationem  siderum  ignoret,  poetas  intelligat,  qui  (ut 
alia    omittam)   totiens  ortu  occasuque   signorum   in 
declarandis  temporibus   utantur ;  nee   ignara  philo- 
sophiae,    cum    propter    plurimos     in    omnibus     fere 
carminibus  locos  ex    intima  naturalium  quaestionum 
subtilitate  repetitos,   turn  vel    propter    Empedoclea 
in  Graecis,  Varronem  ac  Lucretium  in   Latinis,  qui 

1  grammaticus  is  the  teacher  of  literature  and  languages  ; 
at  times  it  is  necessary  to  restrict  its  meaning  to  "grammar." 


BOOK    I.   iv.  1-4 

write  without  difficulty,  it  is  the  turn  for  the  teacher1 
of  literature.  My  words  apply  equally  to  Greek  and 
Latin  masters,  though  I  prefer  that  a  start  should 
be  made  with  a  Greek  :  in  either  case  the  method  2 
is  the  same.  This  profession  may  be  most  briefly 
considered  under  two  heads,  the  art  of  speaking 
correctly  and  the  interpretation  of  the  poets  ;  but 
there  is  more  beneath  the  surface  than  meets  the 
eye.  For  the  art  of  writing  is  combined  with  that  of  3 
speaking,  and  correct  reading  precedes  interpre- 
tation, while  in  each  of  these  cases  criticism  has  its 
work  to  perform.  The  old  school  of  teachers  indeed 
carried  their  criticism  so  far  that  they  were  not 
content  with  obelising  lines  or  rejecting  books  whose 
titles  they  regarded  as  spurious,  as  though  they 
were  expelling  a  supposititious  child  from  the  family 
circle,  but  also  drew  up  a  canon  of  authors,  from 
which  some  were  omitted  altogether.  Nor  is  it  4 
sufficient  to  have  read  the  poets  only ;  every  kind  of 
writer  must  be  carefully  studied,  not  merely  for  the 
subject  matter,  but  for  the  vocabulary  ;  for  words 
often  acquire  authority  from  their  use  by  a  particular 
author.  Nor  can  such  training  be  regarded  as  com- 
plete if  it  stop  short  of  music,  for  the  teacher  of 
literature  has  to  speak  of  metre  and  rhythm  :  nor 
again  if  he  be  ignorant  of  astronomy,  can  he  under- 
stand the  poets ;  for  they, to  mention  no  further  points, 
frequently  give  their  indications  of  time  by  reference 
to  the  rising  and  setting  of  the  stars.  Ignorance  of 

o  o  o 

philosophy  is  an  equal  drawback,  since  there  are 
numerous  passages  in  almost  every  poem  based  on 
the  most  intricate  questions  of  natural  philosophy, 
while  among  the  Greeks  we  have  Empedocles  and 
among  our  own  poets  Varro  and  Lucretius,  all  of 



5  praecepta    sapientiae    versibus     tradiderunt.        Elo- 
quentia  quoque  non  mediocri  est  opus,  ut  de  una- 
quaque    earum,    quas   demonstravimus,   rerum    dicat 
proprie   et  copiose.      Quo    minus    sunt    ferendi,  qui 
hanc    artern   ut  tenuem   atque   ieiunam   cavillantur, 
quae  nisi  oratoris  futuri  fundamenta  fideliter   iecit, 
quidquid  superstruxeris,   corruet ;  iiecessaria  pueris, 
iucunda   senibus,   dulcis   secretorum   comes  et  quae 
vel    sola    in    omni    studiorum    genere    plus     habeat 
operis  quam  ostentationis. 

6  Ne  quis   igitur  tanquam  parva  fastidiat  gramma- 
tices    elementa,    non    quia    magnae   sit  operae  con- 
sonantes    a    vocalibus    discernere    ipsasque     eas     in 
semivocalium     numerum    mutarumque    partiri,    sed 
quia  interiora  velut  sacri  huius  adeuntibus  apparebit 
multa  rerum  subtilitas,  quae  non   modo    acuere  in- 
genia    puerilia     sed     exercere    altissimam     quoque 

7  eruditicnem    ac    scientiam    possit.        An     cuiuslibet 
auris    est   exigere    litterarum    sonos?    non    hercule 
magis     quam     nervorum.       At     grammatici     saltern 
omnes    in     hanc     descendent     rerum     tenuitatem, 
desintne  aliquae    nobis    necessariae   litterarum,    non 
cum    Graeca    scribimus    (turn    enim  ab   iisdem  duas 

8  mutuamur)  sed  propriae,  in  Latinis,  ut  in  his  seruus 
et     uulgus    Aeolicum     digammon     desideratur,     et 

1  Y  and  Z. 

BOOK    I.  iv  4-8 

whom  have  expounded  their  philosophies  in  verse. 
No  small  powers  of  eloquence  also  are  required  to  5 
enable  the  teacher  to  speak  appropriately  and 
fluently  on  the  various  points  which  have  just  been 
mentioned.  For  this  reason  those  who  criticise  the 
art  of  teaching  literature  as  trivial  and  lacking  in 
substance  put  themselves  out  of  court.  Unless  the 
foundations  of  oratory  are  well  and  truly  laid  by 
the  teaching  of  literature,  the  superstructure  will 
collapse.  The  study  of  literature  is  a  necessity  for 
boys  and  the  delight  of  old  age,  the  sweet  com- 
panion of  our  privacy  and  the  sole  branch  of  study 
which  has  more  solid  substance  than  display. 

The  elementary  stages  of  the  teaching  of  litera-  6 
ture  must  not  therefore  be  despised  as  trivial.  It  is 
of  course  an  easy  task  to  point  out  the  difference 
between  vowels  and  consonants,  and  to  subdivide  the 
latter  into  semivowels  and  mutes.  But  as  the  pupil 
gradually  approaches  the  inner  shrine  of  the  sacred 
place,  he  will  come  to  realise  the  intricacy  of  the  sub- 
ject, an  intricacy  calculated  not  merely  to  sharpen  the 
wits  of  a  boy,  but  to  exercise  even  the  most  profound 
knowledge  and  erudition.  It  is  not  every  ear  that  7 
can  appreciate  the  correct  sound  of  the  different 
letters.  It  is  fully  as  hard  as  to  distinguish  the 
different  notes  in  music.  But  all  teachers  of  litera- 
ture will  condescend  to  such  minutiae  :  they 
will  discuss  for  instance  whether  certain  necessary 
letters  are  absent  from  the  alphabet,  not  indeed 
when  we  are  writing  Greek  words  (for  then  we 
borrow  two  letters  l  from  them),  but  in  the  case  of 
genuine  Latin  words  :  for  example  in  words  such  as  8 
seruus  and  uidgus  we  feel  the  lack  of  the  Aeolic 
digamma  ;  there  is  also  a  sound  intermediate  between 



medius  est  quidam  V  et  I  litterae  sonus  ;  non  enim 
sic  optimum  dicimus  ut  opimum,  et  in  here  neque  E 
9  plane  neque  I  auditur ;  an  rursus  aliae  redundent, 
praeter  notam  aspirationis,  (quae  si  necessaria  est, 
etiam  contrariam  sibi  poscit)  ut  K,  quae  et  ipsa 
quoruiidam  nominum  nota  est,  et  Q,  cuius  similis 
effectu  specieque,  nisi  quod  paulum  a  nostris  obli- 
quatur,  Coppa  apud  Graecos  nunc  tantum  in  numero 
manet,  et  nostrarum  ultima,  qua  tarn  carere  po- 

10  tuimus    quam   <//    non   quaerimus  ?      Atque   etiam    in 
ipsis  vocalibus  grammatici  est  videre,  an  aliquas  pro 
consonantibus    usus    acceperit,   quia   iam   sicut  etiam 
scribitur  et   uos  ut  tuos.1     At  quae   ut  vocales  iun- 
guntur  aut  unam  longam  faciunt,  ut  veteres  scrip- 
serunt  qui  geminatione  earum  velut  apice  utebantur, 
autduas;  nisi  quis  putat  etiam  ex   tribus  vocalibus 
syllabam    fieri,  si   non   aliquae   officio    consonantium 

11  fungantur.      Quaeret    hoc    etiam,    quomodo  duabus 
demum  vocalibus  in  se  ipsas  coeundi  natura  sit,  cum 
consonantium     nulla    nisi     alteram    f ran  gat.      Atqui 
littera  I  sibi  insidit,  coniicit  enim  est  ab  illo  tacit,  et 
VT,  quomodo  nunc   scribitur  uulgus   et  scruus.      Sciat 
etiam  Ciceroni  placuisse  aiio  Maiiamque  geminata  I 
scribere  ;  quod  si  est,  etiam  iungetur  ut  consonans. 

1  etiam  .  .  .  uos  .  .  .  tuos,  Ritschl :    tarn  .  .  .  quos  .  .  .  cos, 

1  K  —  Kaeso,  Kalendae/Kartliago,  Kaput,  Kalumnia,  etc. 
The  <?-sound  cau  be  expressed  by  c.  Koppa  (^)  as  a  numeral 


BOOK    I.  iv.  8-u 

u  and  i}  for  we  do  not  pronounce  optimum  as  we  do  opi- 
mum,  while  in  here  the  sound  is  neither  exactly  e  or  i. 
Again  there  is  the  question  whether  certain  letters  9 
are  not  superfluous,  not  to  mention  the  mark  of  the 
aspirate,  to  which,  if  it  is  required  at  all,  there 
should  be  a  corresponding  symbol  to  indicate  the 
opposite  :  for  instance  /-,  which  is  also  used  as  an 
abbreviation  for  certain  nouns,  and  q,  which,  though 
slanted  slightly  more  by  us,  resembles  both  in  sound 
and  shape  the  Greek  koppa,  now  used  by  the  Greeks 
solely  as  a  numerical  sign  1 :  there  is  also  x,  the  last 
letter  of  our  own  alphabet,  which  we  could  dispense 
with  as  easily  as  with  psi.  Again  the  teacher  of  10 
literature  will  have  to  determine  whether  certain 
vowels  have  not  been  consonantalised.  For  instance 
iam  and  etiam  are  both  spelt  with  an  i,  uos  and  tuos 
both  with  a  u.  Vowels,  however,  when  joined  as 
vowels,  either  make  one  long  vowel  (compare  the 
obsolete  method  of  indicating  a  long  vowel  by 
doubling  it  as  the  equivalent  of  the  circumflex), 
or  a  diphthong,  though  some  hold  that  even  three 
vowels  can  form  a  single  syllable  ;  this  however  is 
only  possible  if  one  or  more  assume  the  role  of 
consonants.  He  will  also  inquire  why  it  is  that  11 
there  are  two  vowels  which  may  be  repeated,  while 
a  consonant  can  only  be  followed  and  modified  by 
a  different  consonant.2  But  z  can  follow  i  (for 
coniicit  is  derived  from  tacit 3)  :  so  too  does  u,  wit- 
ness the  modern  spelling  of  seruus  and  uulgus.  He 
should  also  know  that  Cicero  preferred  to  write 
aiio  and  Maiiam  with  a  double  z ;  in  that  case  one 

2  The  two  vowels  are  i  and   u.     A  consonant  cannot  be 
duplicated  within  one  syllable. 

3  The  derivation  is  mentioned  to  show  that  two  z's,  not 
one,  are  found  in  the  second  syllable  of  coniicit. 



12  Quare   discat   puer,   quid   in  litteris  proprium,  quid 
commune,  quae  cum  quibus  cognatio  ;    nee  miretur, 
cur  ex   scamno   fiat   scabillum  aut  a   pinno  (quod  est 
acutum)  securis  utrinque  habens  aciem  bipennis  ;     ne 
illorum  sequatur  errorem,  qui,  quia  a  pennis  duabus 
hoc  esse  nomen  existimant,  pennas  avium  dici  volunt. 

13  Neque    has    modo    noverit   mutationes,   quas    ad- 
ferunt  declinatio  aut  praepositio,  ut  secat  secuif,  cadit 
excidit,  caedit  excidit,  calcal  exculcat  (et  fit  a  lavando 
lotus  et  inde  rursus  inlotus  et  mille  talia),  sed  quae 
rectis  quoque  casibus  aetate    transierunt.      Nam  ut 
Valesii    Fusil    in    Valerias    Fu?*iosque    venerunt :    ita 
arbos,  labos,  vapos  etiam  et  clamos  ac  loses  fuerunt. 

14  Atque  haec  ipsa  S  littera  ab  his  nominibus  exclusa  in 
quibusdam  ipsa  alteri  successit,   nam  mertare  atque 
pultare    dicebant,    quin    fordeum  faedosque    pro  as- 
piratione  F  velut  simili  littera  utentes  ;    nam  contra 
Graeci    aspirare    F    ut    <£    solent,    ut    pro   Fundanio 
Cicero  testem,  qui  primam  eius  litteram  dicere   non 

15  possit,   irridet.       Sed   B    quoque   in    locum    aliarum 
dedimus  aliquando,  unde  Burrus  et  Bruges  et  Belena. 
Nee  non  eadem  fecit  ex  duello  bellum,  unde  Duelios 

16  quidam  dicere   Belios  ausi.      Quid  stlocum  stlitesque  ? 
Quid  T  litterae  cum  D  quaedam   cognatio  ?     Quare 

1  i.e.  of  lar<s.         a  For  mersare  and  pulsare. 
*  i.e.  Pyrrus,  Phryges,  Helena. 


BOOK    I.  iv.  12-16 

of  them  is  consonantalised.  A  boy  therefore  must  12 
learn  both  the  peculiarities  and  the  common  charac- 
teristics of  letters  and  must  know  how  they  are 
related  to  each  other.  Nor  must  he  be  surprised 
that  scabillum  is  formed  from  scamnus  or  that  a 
double-edged  axe  should  be  called  bipen?iis  from 
pinrius,  "  sharp"  :  for  I  would  not  have  him  fall  into 
the  same  error  as  those  who,  supposing  this  word  to 
be  derived  from  bis  and  pennae,  think  that  it  is  a 
metaphor  from  the  wings  of  birds. 

He  must  not  be  content  with  knowing  only  those  13 
changes  introduced  by  conjugation  and  prefixes, 
such  as  secat  secuit,  cadit  excldit,  caedit  excidit,  calcat 
exculcat,  to  which  might  be  added  lotus  from  lauare 
and  again  inlotus  with  a  thousand  others.  He  must 
learn  as  well  the  changes  that  time  has  brought 
about  even  in  nominatives.  For  just  as  names  like 
Valesius  and  Fusius  have  become  Valerius  and  Furius, 
so  arbos,  labos,  vapos  and  even  clamos  and  lases l 
were  the  original  forms.  And  this  same  letter  s,  14 
which  has  disappeared  from  these  words,  has  itself 
in  some  cases  taken  the  place  of  another  letter.  For 
our  ancestors  used  to  say  mertare  and  puttare.*  They 
also  said  fordeum  and  faedi,  using  f  instead  of  the 
aspirate  as  being  a  kindred  letter.  For  the  Greeks 
unlike  us  aspirate  f  like  their  own  phi,  as  Cicero 
bears  witness  in  the  pro  Fundanio,  where  he  laughs  at 
a  witness  who  is  unable  to  pronounce  the  first  letter 
of  that  name.  In  some  cases  again  we  have  substi-  15 
tuted  b  for  other  letters,  as  with  Burrus,  Bruges, 
and  Belena.3  The  same  letter  too  has  turned  duellum 
into  helium,  and  as  a  result  some  have  ventured  to 
call  the  Duelii  Belli.  What  of  stlocus  and  stliies*  16 
What  of  the  connexion  between  t  and  d,  a  connexion 



minus  mirum,  si  in  vetustis  operibus  urbis  nostrae  et 
celebribus  tempi  is  legantur  Alexanter  et  Cassanlra. 
Quid  O  atque  V  permutatae  invicem,  ut  Hccoba  et 
notrix,  Culcides  et  Pulixena  scriberentur,  ac,  ne  in 
Graecis  id  tantum  notetur,  dederont  ac  probaveront  ? 
Sic  'OSuoxreu's,  quern  'YAuoWo.  fecerant  Aeolis,  ad 

17  Ulixen  deductus  est.      Quid?  non  E  quoque  I  loco 
fuit?     Menerva  et  lebcr  et  magesler  et  Diove  Victore 
non  Diovi  Victori  ?     Sed  mihi  locum  signare  satis  est, 
non    enim    doceo,  sed  admoneo  docturos.      Inde  in 
syllabas  cura   transibit,   de    quibus  in    orthographia 
pauca  adnotabo. 

Turn  videbit,  ad  quern  hoc  pertinet,  quot  et  quae 
partes     orationis ;     quanquam    de     numero    parum 

18  convenit.     Veteres  enim,  quorum  fuerunt  Aristoteles 
quoque  atque  Theodectes,  verba  niodo  et  nomina  et 
convinctiones  tradiderunt ;  videlicet  quod  in  verbis 
vim  sermonis,  in  nominibus  materiam  (quia  alterum 
est  quod  loquimur,  alterum    de  quo    loquimur),    in 
convinctionibus  autem  complexus  eorum   esse  iudi- 
caverunt :  quas  coniunctiones  a  plerisque  dici  scio,, 
sed  haec  videtur  ex  0wSeV/xa>  magis  propria  trans- 

19  latio.      Paulatim    a    philosophis    ac    maxime    Stoicis 
auctus    est    numerus,    ac    primum    convinctionibus 
articuli   adiecti,  post   praepositiones,  nominibus   ap- 


BOOK    I.  iv.  16-19 

which  makes  it  less  surprising  that  on  some  of 
the  older  buildings  of  Rome  and  certain  famous 
temples  \ve  should  find  the  names  Alexanier  and 
Cassantra  ?  What  again  of  the  interchange  of  o 
and  u,  of  which  examples  may  be  found  in  Hecoba, 
notrix,  Culcides  and  Pulixena,  or  to  take  purely  Latin 
words  dederont  and  probaueront  ?  So  too  Odysseus, 
which  the  Aeolian  dialect  turned  into  Ulysseus,  has 
been  transformed  by  us  into  Ulixes.  Similarly  e  in  17 
certain  cases  held  the  place  that  is  now  occupied 
by  i,  as  in  Menerua,  leber,  magester,  and  Dioue  victore 
in  place  of  Dioui  viclori.  It  is  sufficient  for  me  to 
give  a  mere  indication  as  regards  these  points,  for  I 
am  not  teaching,  but  merely  advising  those  who 
have  got  to  teach.  The  next  subject  to  which  atten- 
tion must  be  given  is  that  of  syllables,  of  which  I  will 
speak  briefly,  when  I  come  to  deal  with  orthography. 
Following  this  the  teacher  concerned  will  note 
the  number  and  nature  of  the  parts  of  speech, 
although  there  is  some  dispute  as  to  their  number. 
Earlier  writers,  among  them  Aristotle  himself  and  18 
Theodectes,  hold  that  there  are  but  three,  verbs, 
nouns  and  convinctions.  Their  view  was  that  the 
force  of  language  resided  in  the  verbs,  and  the 
matter  in  the  nouns  (for  the  one  is  what  we  speak, 
the  other  that  which  we  speak  about),  while  the 
duty  of  the  convinctions  was  to  provide  a  link 
between  the  nouns  and  the  verbs.  I  know  that 
conjunction  is  the  term  in  general  use.  But  convinclion 
seems  to  me  to  be  the  more  accurate  translation  of 
the  Greek  o-wSecr/xoV  Gradually  the  number  was  19 
increased  by  the  philosophers,  more  especially  by 
the  Stoics  :  articles  were  first  added  to  the  convinc- 
tions, then  prepositions :  to  nouns  appellations  were 


pellatio,  deinde  pronomen,  deinde  mixtum  verbo 
participium,  ipsis  verbis  adverbia.  Xoster  sermo 
articulos  non  desiderat,  ideoque  in  alias  partes 

20  orationis  sparguntur.    Sed  accedit  superioribus  inter- 
iectio.     Alii   tamen  ex  idoneis  dumtaxat  auctoribus 
octo    partes    secuti    stint    ut    Aristarchus    et    aetate 
nostra  Palaemon,  qui  vocabulum  sive  appellationem 
nomini   subiecerunt  tanquam   speciem   eius.      At  ii, 
qui  aliud  nomen   aliud   vocabulum    faciunt,   novem. 
Nihilominus    fuerunt,    qui    ipsum   adhuc   vocabulum 
ab    appellatione    deducerent,,    ut    esset    vocabulum 
corpus     visu     tactuque    manifestum^     damns,     lectus, 
appellatio,  cui   vel    alterum  deesset    vel    utrumque, 
ventus,  caelum,  deus,  virtus.     Adiiciebant  et  assevera- 
tionem   ut  eheu,  et   tractationem  ut  fascialim  ;   quae 

21  mihi  non  approbantur.       \'ocabulum    an    appellatio 
dicenda  sit  —poa-qyopia.  et  subiicienda  nomini  necne, 
quia  parvi  refert,  liberum  opinaturis  relinquo. 

22  Nomina  declinare   et  verba  in  primis  pueri  sciant, 
neque   enim  aliter  pervenire  ad  intellectum  sequen- 
tium    possunt ;     quod     etiam    monere    supervacuum 
eratj  nisi   ambitiosa  festinatione  plerique   a  posteri- 
oribus  inciperent  et,  dum  ostentare  discipulos  circa 

]  Generally  interpreted  collective  :  but  see  Colson,  Class. 
Quart,  x.  1,  p.  17  ;  fa-sciatim  =  in  bundles  (from  fastis). 


BOOK    I.  iv.  19-22 

added,  then  the  pronoun  and  finally  the  participle, 
which  holds  a  middle  position  between  the  verb 
and  the  noun.  To  the  verb  itself  was  added  the 
adverb.  Our  own  language  dispenses  with  the 
articles,  which  are  therefore  distributed  among  the 

'  O 

other  parts  of  speech.  But  interjections  must  be  20 
added  to  those  already  mentioned.  Others  how- 
ever follow  good  authority  in  asserting  that  there 
are  eight  parts  of  speech.  Among  these  I  may 
mention  Aristarchus  and  in  our  own  day  Palaemon, 
who  classified  the  vocable  or  appellation  as  a  species 
of  the  genus  noun.  Those  on  the  other  hand  who 
distinguish  between  the  noun  and  the  vocable,  make 
nine  parts  of  speech.  But  yet  again  there  are 
some  who  differentiate  between  the  vocable  and  the 
appellation,  saying  that  the  vocable  indicates  concrete 
objects  which  can  be  seen  and  touched,  such  as  a 
"  house  "  or  "  bed,"  while  an  appellation  is  something 
imperceptible  either  to  sight  or  touch  or  to  both, 
such  as  the  "wind/'  "heaven,"  or  "virtue."  They 
added  also  the  asseveration,  such  as  "alas'  and  the 
derivative1  such  asfasdatim.  But  of  these  classifica- 
tions I  do  not  approve.  Whether  we  should  trans-  21 
late  -rrpocrriyopia.  by  vocable  or  appellation,  and  whether 
it  should  be  regarded  as  a  species  of  noun,  I  leave 
to  the  decision  of  such  as  desire  to  express  their 
opinion  :  it  is  a  matter  of  no  importance. 

Bovs  should  begin    bv  learning  to  decline  nouns  22 

*  J  O 

and  conjugate  verbs  :  otherwise  they  will  never  be 
able  to  understand  the  next  subject  of  study.  This 
admonition  would  be  superfluous  but  for  the  fact 
that  most  teachers,  misled  by  a  desire  to  show  rapid 
progress,  begin  with  what  should  really  come  at  the 
end:  their  passion  for  displaying  their  pupils'  talents 



23  speciosiora  malunt,  compendio  morarentur.    Atqui  si 
quis  et    didicerit   satis  et  (quod  non   minus  deesse 
interim  solet)  voluerit  docere  quae  didicit,  non  erit 
contentus  traders  in  nominibus  tria  genera  et  quae 

24  sunt    duobus    omnibusve    communia.      Nee     statim 
diligeiitem    putabo,    qui    promiscua,    quae     t-rriKoiva. 
dicuntur,  ostenderit,    in  quibus  sexus    uterque    per 
alterum  apparet ;  aut  quae  feminina  positione  mares 
aut  neutrali  feminas  significant,  qualia   sunt  Murena 

25  et  Gly  cerium.     Scrutabitur  ille  praeceptor  acer  atque 
subtilis  origines   nominum,  quae  ex  habitu  corporis 
Rufos  Longos(\ue.  fecerunt  ;  ubi  erit  aliud  secretius, 
Sullae,  Burn,  Galbae,  Plauti,  Pansae,  8cauri  taliaque  ; 
et  ex   casu   nascentium ;    hie    Agrippa  et    Opiter  et 
Cordus  et  Postumus  erunt ;  et  ex  iis,  quae  post  natos 
eveniunt,    unde     Vopiscus.      lam     Cotlae,    Scipiones, 

26  Laenates,  Serani  sunt  ex  variis  causis.     Gentes  quo- 
que  ac  loca  et   alia   multa  reperias  inter  nominum 
causas.     In  servis  iam  intercidit  illud   genus,   quod 
ducebatur  a  domino,  unde  Marcipores  Publiporesque. 
Quaerat    etiam,    sitne    apud    Graecos    vis    quaedam 

1  Sulla  =  ?  spindleshanks  (surula).  Burrus  =  red.  Galba 
=  caterpillar.  Plautua  =  flat-footed.  Pansa  =  splay-footed. 
Scaurus  =  with  swollen  ankles.  Agrippa  =  born  feet  fore- 
most. Opiter  =  one  whose  father  died  while  his  grandfather 
still  lived.  Cordus  =  late-born.  Postumus  =  last-born,  or 
born  after  the  father's  death.  Vopiscus  =  a  twin  born  alive 


BOOK    I.  iv.  22-26 

in  connexion  with  the  more  imposing  aspects  of 
their  work  serves  but  to  delay  progress  and  their 
short  cut  to  knowledge  merely  lengthens  the 
journey.  And  yet  a  teacher  who  has  acquired  23 
sufficient  knowledge  himself  and  is  ready  to  teach 
what  he  has  learned — and  such  readiness  is  all  too 
rare — will  not  be  content  with  stating  that  nouns 
have  three  genders  or  with  mentioning  those  which 
are  common  to  two  or  all  three  together.  Nor  24 
again  shall  I  be  in  a  hurry  to  regard  it  as  a  proof  of 
real  diligence,,  if  he  points  out  that  there  are  irregu- 
lar nouns  of  the  kind  called  epicene  by  the  Greeks, 
in  which  one  gender  implies  both,  or  which  in  spite 
of  being  feminine  or  neuter  in  form  indicate  males 
or  females  respectively,  as  for  instance  Muraena 
and  Glycerium  A  really  keen  and  intelligent  teacher  25 
will  inquire  into  the  origin  of  names  derived  from 
physical  characteristics,  such  as  Kufns  or  Longus, 
whenever  their  meaning  is  obscure,  as  in  the  case  of 
8ulla,  Burrus,  Galba,  Plautus,  Pansa,  Scaurus  and  the 
like  ;  of  names  derived  from  accidents  of  birth  such 
as  Agrippa,  Opiter,  Cordus  and  Postumus,  and  again  of 
names  given  after  birth  such  as  Vopiscus.  Then  there 
are  names  such  as  Cotta,  Scipio,  Laenas  or  Seranus,1 
which  originated  in  various  ways.  It  will  also  be  found  26 

^7  J 

that  names  are  frequently  derived  from  races,  places 
and  many  other  causes.  Further  there  are  obsolete 
slave-names  such  as  Marcipor  or  Publipor*  derived 
from  the  names  of  their  owners.  The  teacher  must 
also  inquire  whether  there  is  not  room  for  a  sixth 

after  the  premature  birth  and  death  of  the  other.  Scipio  = 
staff.  Laenas  from  laena  (cloak).  Seranus  =  the  sower. 
Cotta  uncertain. 

2  i.e.  Marcipuer,  Pullipuer. 



sexti  casus  et  apud  nos  quoque  septimi.      Nam  cum 
dico  hasta  percussi,  non  utor  ablativi  natura ;  nee,  si 

27  idem    Graece  dicam,   dativi.     Sed  in  verbis   quoque 
quis    est    adeo    imperitus,    ut    ignoret    genera    et 
qualitates  et  personas  et  numeros  ?     Litterarii  paene 
ista  sunt  ludi  et  trivialis  scientiae.    lam  quosdam  ilia 
turbabunt,  quae  declinationibus  non  tenentur.     Nam 
et    quaedam    participia    an    verba    an    appellationes 
sint,  dubitari  potest,  quia  aliud   alio  loco  valent,  ut 

28  lectum   et  sapiens  et  quaedam  verba  appellationibus 
similia,  ut  fraudator,  nutritor.      lam   itur  in   antiquam 
silvam  nonne  propriae  cuiusdam   rationis   est?    nam 
quod  initium  eius  invenias  ?   cui  simile  fletur.      Acci- 
pimus   aliter,   ut  panditur   interea  domus    ornnipotentis 
Olympij  aliter  ut  totis  usque  adeo  turbatur  agris.      Est 
etiam  quidam   tertius  modus,  ut  urbs  habitatur,  unde 

29  et  campus  curritur,  mare  Jiavigatur.      Pransus  quoque 
ac  potus  diversum  valet  quam  indicat.      Quid  ?   quod 
multa  verba  non  totum  declinationis  ordinem  ferunt? 
Quaedam    etiam    mutantur     ut    fero    in     praeterito, 
quaedam  tertiae  demum  personae  figura  dicuntur  ut 

1  lectum  maybe  ace.  of  lectus,  "bed,"  or  supine  or  past 
part.  pass,  of  legere,  "  to  read  "  ;  sapiens  may  be  pres.  part, 
of  sapere,  "  to  know,"  or  an  adj.  =  "  wise  "  ;  jraudator  and 
nutritor  are  2nd  and  3rd    pers.    sing.   fut.    imper.   pass,   of 
fraudo   and  tnitrio. 

2  Aen.  vi.  179:  "They  go  into  the  ancient  wood." 


BOOK    I.  iv.  26-29 

case  in  Greek  and  a  seventh  in  Latin.  For  when  I 
say  "wounded  by  a  spear/'  the  case  is  not  a  true 
ablative  in  Latin  nor  a  true  dative  in  Greek.  Again  27 
if  we  turn  to  verbs,  who  is  so  ill-educated  as  not  to 
be  familiar  with  their  various  kinds  and  qualities, 
their  different  persons  and  numbers.  Such  sub- 
jects belong  to  the  elementary  school  and  the 
rudiments  of  knowledge.  Some,  however,  will 
find  points  undetermined  by  inflexion  somewhat 
perplexing.  For  there  are  certain  participles,  about 
which  there  may  be  doubts  as  to  whether  they  are 
really  nouns  or  verbs,  since  their  meaning  varies 
with  their  use,  as  for  example  lectum  and  sapiens, 
while  there  are  other  verbs  which  resemble  nouns,  28 
such  Rsjraifdalor  and  nutritor.1  Again  itur  in  antiqitam 
silvam2  is  a  peculiar  usage.  For  there  is  no  subject 
to  serve  as  a  starting  point :  fletur  is  a  similar  example. 
The  passive  may  be  used  in  different  ways  as  for 
instance  in 

panditur  interea  domus  omnipote?itis  Olympi 3 
and  in 

'toils  usque  adeo  turbatur  agris.* 

Yet  a  third  usage  is  found  in  urbs  habitatur,  whence 
we  get  phrases  such  as  campus  curritur  and  mare  navi- 
gatur.  Pransus  and  potus5  have  a  meaning  which  does  29 
not  correspond  to  their  form.  And  what  of  those 
verbs  which  are  only  partially  conjugated?  Some 
(as  for  instance  fero)  even  suffer  an  entire  change  in 
the  perfect.  Others  are  used  only  in  the  third 

3  Acn.  x.  1  :   "Meanwhile  the  house  of  almighty  Olj'mpus 
is  opened." 

4  Ed.  i.  11  :  "  There  is  such  confusion  in  all  the  fields." 

6  "Having  dined,"   "having    drunk."     Active   in  sense, 
passive  in  form. 



licet,  pigct,  quaedam  simile  quiddam  patiuntur 
vocabulis  quae  in  adverbium  transcunt  ?  Nam  ut 
noctu  et  diu  ita  dictu  facluque.  Sunt  enim  haec 
quoque  verba  participialia  quidem,  non  tamen  qualia 
dido  facto<\u.e. 

V.  lam  cum  omnis  oratio  tris  liabeat  virtutes,  ut 
emendata,  ut  dilucida,  ut  ornata  sit  (quia  dicere 
apte,  quod  est  praecipuum,  plerique  ornatui  subii- 
ciunt),  totidem  vitia,  quae  sunt  supra  dictis  con- 
traria,  emendate  loquendi  regulam,  quae  gram- 

2  malices   prior  pars    est^   examinel.       Haec    exi^itur 
verbis   aut    singulis   aut  pluribus.      Verba  nunc    ge- 
neraliter  accipi  volo,  nam  duplex   eorurn  intellectus 
est ;  alter,    qui    omnia    per    quae    sermo    iiectitur 
significat,  ut  apud   Horatium  :  verbaque  provisam  rein 
non    invita    scqiicnlur ;  alter,    in     quo    est    una    pars 
orationis,  lego,  scribo.       Quam  vitantes  ambigu-itatem 
quidam  dicere  maluerunl  voces,    locutiones,  dictiones. 

3  Singula  sunt  aut  nostra  aut  peregrina,  aut  simplicia 
aut  composita,  aul  propria  aut  translata,  aut  usitata 
aut  ncta. 

Uni  verbo  vitium  saepius  quam  virtus  inest. 
Licet  enim  dicamus  aliquod  proprium,  speciosum, 
sublime  :  nihil  tamen  horum  nisi  in  complexu  lo- 
quendi serieque  contingit ;  laudamus  enim  verba 

4  rebus    bene    accommodata.      Sola    est,  quae    notari 


BOOK    I.  iv.  29-v.  4 

person,  such  as  licet  and  pi  get,  while  some  resemble 
nouns  tending  to  acquire  an  adverbial  meaning ;  for 
\ve  say  dictu  and  fact ul  as  we  say  noclu  and  din, 
since  these  words  are  participial  though  quite  different 
from  dicto  and  facto. 

V.  Style  has  three  kinds  of  excellence,  correct- 
ness, lucidity  and  elegance  (for  many  include  the 
all-important  quality  of  appropriateness  under  the 
heading  of  elegance).  Its  faults  are  likewise  three- 
fold, namely  the  opposites  of  these  excellences.  The 
teacher  of  literature  therefore  must  study  the  rules 
for  correctness  of  speech,  these  constituting  the 
first  part  of  his  art.  The  observance  of  these  rules  2 
is  concerned  with  either  one  or  more  words.  I  must 
now  be  understood  to  use  verbinn  in  its  most  general 
sense.  It  has  of  course  two  meanings  ;  the  one  covers 
all  the  parts  of  which  language  is  composed,  as  in 
the  line  of  Horace  : 

"Once  supply  the  thought, 

And  words  will  follow  swift  as  soon  as  sought '  ;2 


the  other  restricts  it  to  a  part  of  speech  such  as 
lego  and  scribo.  To  avoid  this  ambiguity,  some 
authorities  prefer  the  terms  voces,  locutiojies,  dictiones. 
Individual  words  will  either  be  native  or  imported,  3 
simple  or  compound,  literal  or  metaphorical,  in 
current  use  or  newly-coined. 

A  single  word  is  more  likely  to  be  faulty  than 
to  possess  any  intrinsic  merit.  For  though  we 
may  speak  of  a  word  as  appropriate,  distinguished 
or  sublime,  it  can  possess  none  of  these  properties 
save  in  relation  to  connected  and  consecutive  speech  ; 
since  when  we  praise  words,  we  do  so  because  they 
suit  the  matter.  There  is  only  one  excellence  that  4 

1  Supines.  a  Ars  Poetica,  311. 



possit  velut  vocalitas,  quae  eu^iorta  dicitur ;  cuius 
in  eo  delectus  est,  ut  inter  duo,  quae  idem  signi- 
ficant ac  tantundem  valent,  quod  melius  sonet  malis. 

5  Prima  barbarismi  ac  soloecismi  foeditas  absit.   Sed 
qtiia  interim  excusantur  haec  vitia  aut  consuetudine 
aut  auctoritate  aut  vetustate  aut  denique   vicinitate 
virtutum  (nam  saepe  a   figuris    ea   separare  difficile 
est),  ne  qua  tarn  lubrica  observatio  fallat,  acriter  se 
in  illud  tenue  discrimen  grammaticus  intendat,  de 
quo  nos  latius  ibi   loquemur,  ubi  de  figuris  orationis 

6  tractandum   erit.      Interim    vitium,  quod    fit   in  sin- 
gulis  verbis,  sit  barbarismus.      Occurrat  mihi  forsan 
nliquis,  quid  hie  promisso  tanti  operis  dignum  ?  aut 
quis    hoc    nescit,    alios    barbarismos    scribendo    fieri 
alios    loquendo ; — quia,    quod    male    scribitur,    male 
etiam   dici   necesse   est  ;    quae    vitiose    dixeris,    non 
utique   et    scripto    peccant — illud    prius    adiectione, 
detractione,  immutatione,    transmutationCj    hoc   se- 
cundum    divisione,    complexione,    aspiratione,    sono 

7  contineri  ?     Sed  ut  parva  sint  haec,  pueri  docentur 
adhuc,  et  grammaticos  officii  sui   commonemus.      Ex 
quibus  si  quis    erit    plane   impolitus    et    vestibulum 
modo    artis    huius    ingressus,  intra  haec,   quae    pro- 

1  cp.  §  10. 

BOOK    I.  v.  4-7 

can  be  isolated  for  consideration,  namely  euphony, 
the  Greek  term  for  our  uocalitas  :  that  is  to  say  that, 
when  we  are  confronted  with  making  a  choice 
between  two  exact  synonyms,  we  must  select  that 
which  sounds  best. 

In  the  first  place  barbarisms  and  solecisms  must  not  6 
be  allowed  to  intrude  their  offensive  presence.  These 
blemishes  are  however  pardoned  at  times,  because 
we  have  become  accustomed  to  them  or  because  they 
have  age  or  authority  in  their  favour  or  are  near  akin 
to  positive  excellences,  since  it  is  often  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish such  blemishes  from  figures  of  speech.1  The 
teacher  therefore,  that  such  slippery  customers  may 
not  elude  detection,  must  seek  to  acquire  a  delicate 
discrimination;  but  of  this  I  will  speak  later  when 
I  come  to  discuss  figures  of  speech.  For  the  present  6 
I  will  define  barbaris?n  as  an  offence  occurring  in 
connexion  with  single  words.  Some  of  my  readers 
may  object  that  such  a  topic  is  beneath  the  dignity 
of  so  ambitious  a  work.  But  who  does  not  know 
that  some  barbarisms  occur  in  writing,  others  in 
speaking  ?  For  although  what  is  incorrect  in 
writing  will  also  be  incorrect  in  speech,  the  converse 
is  not  necessarily  true,  inasmuch  as  mistakes  in 


writing  are  caused  by  addition  or  omission,  substitu- 
tion or  transposition,  while  mistakes  in  speaking  are 
due  to  separation  or  combination  of  syllables,  to 
aspiration  or  other  errors  of  sound.  Trivial  as  these  7 
points  may  seem,  our  bovs  are  still  at  school  and  I 
am  reminding  their  instructors  of  their  duty.  And 
if  one  of  our  teachers  is  lacking  in  education  and 
has  done  no  more  than  set  foot  in  the  outer  courts 
of  his  art,  he  will  have  to  confine  himself  to  the 
rules  published  in  the  elementary  text-books  :  the 



fitentium    commentariolis    vulgata    sunt,    consistet, 
doctiores    multa    adiicient,    vel    hoc    primum,    quod 

8  barbarismum     pluribus     modis     accipimus.        Unum 
gente,   quale    est,    si     quis    Afrum     vel     Hispanum 
Latinae    oration!    nomen    inserat,    ut    ferrum,     quo 
rotae     vinciimtur,    dici    solet    cant  us,    quanquam     eo 
tanquam    recepto     utitur     Persius ;     sicut    Catullus 
ploxenum  circa    Padum    invenit,   et  in    oratione    La- 
bieni    (sive    ilia    Cornelii    Galli    est)    in     Pollionem 
casamo   adsectator   e   Gallia  ductuin   est;  nam  inas- 
trucam,    quod    Sardum    est,    irridens    Cicero    ex    in- 

9  dustria  dixit.      Alterum  genus  barbarismi  accipimus, 
quod   fit  animi  natura,  ut  is,  a  quo  insolenter  quid 
aut    minaciter    aut    crudeliter     dictum    sit,    barbare 

10  locutus  existimatur.    Tertium  est  illud  vitium  barba- 
rismi, cuius  exempla  vulgo  sunt  plurima,  sibi  etiam 
quisque  fingere  potest,  ut  verbo,  cui  libebit,  adiiciat 
litteram  syllabamve  vel  detrahat,  aut  aliam  pro  alia 

11  aut  eandem  alio  quam  rectum  est  loco  ponat.      Sed 
quidam  fere  in  iactationem  eruditionis  sumere  ilia  ex 
poetis  solent  et  auctores  quos  praelegunt  criminan- 
tur.     Scire  autem  debet  puer,  haec  apud  scriptores 
carminum    aut    venia    digna    aut   etiam   laude  duci, 

12  potiusque  ilia  docendi   erunt  minus  vulgata.      Nam 
duos    in    uno    nomine    faciebat     barbarismos    Tinga 
Placentinus   (si    reprehendenti   Hortensio  credimus) 
preculam    pro   pergula    dicens,    et   immutatione  cum 
c   pro   g    uteretur,   et    transmutatione  cum   r  prae- 
poneret  e  antecedent!.     At  in  eiusdem  vitii  gemina- 

BOOK    I.  v.  7-12 

more  learned  teacher  on  the  other  hand  will  be  in  a 
position  to  go  much  further :  first  of  all,  for  example, 
he  will  point  out  that  there  are  many  different  kinds 
of  barbarism.  One  kind  is  due  to  race,  such  as  the  8 
insertion  of  a  Spanish  or  African  term  ;  for  instance 
the  iron  tire  of  a  wheel  is  called  cantus,1  though 
Persius  uses  it  as  established  in  the  Latin  language  ; 

^j          ^>        * 

Catullus  picked  up  ploxenum2  (a  box)  in  the  valley 
of  the  Po,  while  the  author  of  the  in  Pollionem,  be 
he  Labienus  or  Cornelius  Gallus,  imported  casamo 
from  Gaul  in  the  sense  of  "follower."  As  for 
mastruca?  which  is  Sardinian  fora  "rough  coat,"  it 
is  introduced  by  Cicero  merely  as  an  object  of  deri- 
sion. Another  kind  of  barbarism  proceeds  from  the  9 
speaker's  temper  :  for  instance,  we  regard  it  as  bar- 
barous if  a  speaker  use  cruel  or  brutal  language. 
A  third  and  very  common  kind,  of  which  anyone  10 
may  fashion  examples  for  himself,  consists  in  the 
addition  or  omission  of  a  letter  or  syllable,  or  in  the 
substitution  of  one  for  another  or  in  placing  one 
where  it  has  no  right  to  be.  Some  teachers  however,  11 
to  display  their  learning,  are  in  the  habit  of  picking 
out  examples  of  barbarism  from  the  poets  and  attack- 
ing the  authors  whom  they  are  expounding  for 
using  such  words.  A  boy  should  however  realize 
that  in  poets  such  peculiarities  are  pardonable  or 
even  praiseworthy,  and  should  therefore  be  taught 
less  common  instances.  For  Tinga  of  Placentia,  if  12 
we  may  believe  Hortensius  who  takes  him  to  task  for 
it,  committed  two  barbarisms  in  one  word  by  saying 
precula  for  pergula :  that  is  to  say  he  substituted  c 
for  g,  and  transposed  r  and  e.  On  the  other  hand 

1  Pers.  v.  71.     Usually,  though  wrongly,  spelt  oanthus. 

2  Cat.  xcvii.  6.  *  In  Or.  pro  Scauro. 


tione    Meltoeoque  Fufetioeo T   dicens   Ennius    poetico 

13  iure  defenditur.       Sed  in  prosa  quoque  est  quaedam 
iam    recepta    immutatio.      Nam   Cicero    Canopitarum 
exercitum    dicit,    ipsi    Canobon    vocant ;     et     Trasu- 
mennum  pro   Tarsumenno  multi  auctores,  etiamsi  est 
in  eo   transmutatio,    vindicaverunt.      Similiter    alia; 
nam   sive    est   adsentior,   Sisenna   dixit   adsentio  mul- 
tique   et  hunc  et  analogian  secuti,  sive  illud  verum 

14  est,  haec  quoque  pars  consensu  defenditur.       At  ille 
pexus  pinguisque  doctor  aut   illic   detractionem  aut 
hie  adiectionem  putabit.      Quid  quod  quaedam,  quae 
singula  procul  dubio  vitiosa  sunt,  iuncta  sine  repre- 

15  hensione    dicuntur  ?       Nam  et  dua  et  ire  [et  pondo\ 
diversorum    generum  sunt  barbarismi ;  at   duapondo 
et  trepondo  usque  ad   nostram   aetatem   ab  omnibus 

16  dictum   est,   et   recte  dici    Messala   confirmat.      Ab- 
surdum  forsitan   videatur  dicere,  barbarismum,  quod 
est  unius  vcrbi  vitium,  fieri  per  numeros  aut  genera 
sicut  soloecismum  :  scala  tamen   et  scopa  contraque 
hordea  et  mulsd,  licet  litterarum  mutationem,  detrac- 
tionem^ adiectionem   habeant,  non  alio  vitiosa  sunt, 
quam  quod   pluralia  singulariter  et    singularia   plu- 

1  Mettoeoque  Fufetioeo,  Skutsch  :  mettioeo  et  furetioeo,  At 
the  other  M&S.  giving  similar  corruptions. 

1  Tlie  barbarism  lies  in  the  use  of  the  old  Greek  termina- 
tion -oeo  in  the  genitive. 

a  Two  and  three  pounds  in  weight. 


BOOK    I.  v.  12-16 

when  Ennius  writes  Mettoeoque  Fufetioeo,1  where 
the  barbarism  is  twice  repeated,,  he  is  defended  on 
the  plea  of  poetic  licence.  Substitution  is  however  1H 
sometimes  admitted  even  in  prose,  as  for  instance 
when  Cicero  speaks  of  the  army  of  Canopus  which  is 
locally  styled  Canobus,  while  the  number  of  authors 
who  have  been  guilty  of  transposition  in  writing 
Trasumennus  for  Tarsumcnmis  has  succeeded  in  stan- 
dardising the  error.  Similar  instances  may  be  quoted. 
If  adsentior  be  regarded  as  the  correct  form,  we  must 
remember  that  Sisenna  said  adsentio,  and  that  many 
have  followed  him  on  the  ground  of  analogy :  on 
the  other  hand,  if  adsentio  is  the  correct  form,  we 
must  remember  that  adsentior  has  the  support  of 
current  usage.  And  yet  our  fat  fool,  the  fashionable  14 
schoolmaster,  will  regard  one  of  these  forms  as  an 
example  of  omission  or  the  other  as  an  instance 
of  addition.  Again  there  are  words  which  when 
used  separately  are  undoubtedly  incorrect,  but 
when  used  in  conjunction  excite  no  unfavourable 
comment.  For  instance  dua  and  ire  are  barbarisms  15 
and  differ  in  gender,  but  the  words  duapondo 
and  trepondo 2  have  persisted  in  common  parlance 
down  to  our  own  day,  and  Messala  shows  that  the 
practice  is  correct.  It  may  perhaps  seem  absurd  to  16 
say  that  a  barbarism,  which  is  an  error  in  a  single 
word,  may  be  made,  like  a  solecism,  by  errors  in 
connexion  with  number  or  gender.  But  take  on  the 
one  hand  scala  (stairs)  and  scopa  (which  literally 
means  a  twig,  but  is  used  in  the  sense  of  broom) 
and  on  the  other  hand  hordea  (barley)  and  mulsa 
(mead) :  here  we  have  substitution,  omission  and 
addition  of  letters,  but  the  blemish  consists  in  the 
former  case  merely  in  the  use  of  singular  for  plural, 



raliter  effenmtur  ;    et  gladia    qui  dixerunt,    genere 

17  exciderunt.      Sed  hoc  quoque  notare  contentus  sum, 
ne    arti    culpa    quorundam    pervicacium    perplexae 
videar  et  ipse  quaestionem  addidisse. 

Plus  exigunt  subtilitatis  quae  accidunt  in  dicendo 
vitia,  quia  exempla  eorum  tradi  scripto  non  possunt, 
nisi  cum  in  versus  inciderunt,  ut  divisio  Europai 
Asidi,  et  ei  contrarium  vitium,  quod  crvvaipeo-iv  et 
crvvaXoLffrrjv  Graeci  vocant,  nos  complexionem  di- 
camus,  qualis  est  apud  P.  Varronem  turn  le  flagrant' 

18  dcicctum    fidmme    Phaethon.       Nam     si     esset    prosa 
oratio,     easdem    litteras     enuntiare     veris     syllabis 
licebat.      Praeterea  quae  fiunt  spatio,  sive  cum  svl- 
laba  correpta  producitur,   ut   Ilaliam    faio   profugns, 
sen    longa    corripitur,   ut   unius    ob   noxam   et  furias, 
extra  carmen  non  depreliendas  ;     sed  nee  in  carmine 

19  vitia  dicenda   sunt.          Ilia   vero    nonnisi    aure   exi- 
guntur,  quae  fiunt  per  sonos  ;  quanquam  per  aspira- 
tionem,  sive  adiicitur  vitiose   sive    detrahitur,  apud 
nos    potest    quaeri    an    in    scripto    sit    vitium^    si    h 
littera  est,   non  nota.       Cuius  quidem   ratio   mutata 

20  cum  temporibus  est  saepius.      Parcissime  ea  veteres 
usi  etiam  in  vocalibus,,  cum  acdos  z'/ro.vque  dicebant  ; 
diu  deinde   servatum,    ne   consonaiitibus  aspirarent, 

1  Tlie  archaic  genitive  as  used  by  epic  poets. 

1  Phaithon  for  Phaethon.         '  Aen.  i.  6.         *  Aen.  i.  45. 


BOOK    I.   v.  16-20 

in  the  latter  of  plural  for  singular.  Those  on  the 
other  hand  who  have  used  the  word  gladia  are  guilty 
of  a  mistake  in  gender.  I  merely  mention  these  as  17 
instances :  I  do  not  wish  anyone  to  think  that  I 
have  added  a  fresh  problem  to  a  subject  into  which 
the  obstinacy  of  pedants  has  already  introduced 

The  faults  which  arise  in  the  course  of  actual 
speaking  require  greater  penetration  on  the  part 
of  the  critic,  since  it  is  impossible  to  cite  examples 
from  writing,  except  in  cases  where  they  occur 
in  poetry,  as  when  the  diphthong  is  divided  into 
two  syllables  in  Europai  and  Asiai l  ;  or  when  the 
opposite  fault  occurs,  called  synaeresis  or  synaloephe 
by  the  Greeks  and  by  ourselves  :  as  an 
example  I  may  quote  the  line  of  Publius  Varro  : 

turn  te  flagranti  deieclum  fulmine  Phaet/ion.2 

If  this  were  prose,  it  would  be  possible  to  give  1£ 
the  letters  their  true  syllabic  value.  I  may  mention 
as  further  anomalies  peculiar  to  poetry  the  lengthen- 
ing of  a  short  syllable  as  in  Italiam  fato  proj'ugus,3 
or  the  shortening  of  a  long  such  as  unius  ob  noxam 
et  furias  ; 4  but  in  poetry  we  cannot  label  these  as 
actual  faults.  Errors  in  sound  on  the  other  hand  19 
can  be  detected  by  the  ear  alone  ;  although  in  Latin, 
as  regards  the  addition  or  omission  of  the  aspirate, 
the  question  may  be  raised  whether  this  is  an  error 
when  it  occurs  in  writing  ;  for  there  is  some  doubt 
whether  A  is  a  letter  or  merely  a  breathing,  practice 
having  frequently  varied  in  different  ages.  Older  20 
authors  used  it  but  rarely  even  before  vowels,  saying 
aedus  or  irtus,  while  its  conjunction  with  consonants 
was  for  a  long  time  avoided,  as  in  words  such  as 



ut  in  Graecis  et  in  triumpis  ;  erupit  brevi  tempore 
nimius  usus,  ut  ckoronae,  chenturiones,  praechones 
adhuc  quibusdam  in  inscriptionibus  maneant,  qua 

21  de   re   Catulli  nobile    epigramma   est.       Inde   durat 
ad   nos   usque    rehemenlcr  et   comprehendcre    et    inihi, 
nammehe  quoque  pro  me  apud  antiques  Iragoediarum 
praecipue  scriptores  in  veteribus  libris  invenimus. 

22  Adhuc  difficilior  observatio  est  per  tenores  (quos 
quidem  ab  antiquis  dictos  lonores  comperi  videlicet 
declinato   a   Graecis   verbo,   qui    TOJ/OVS    dicunt),   vel 
accentus,  quas   Graeci  Trpoo-woYas  vacant,   cum  acuta 
et  gravis  alia  pro  alia  ponuntur,  ut  in  hoc  Camillus, 

23  si  acuitur  prima  :  aut  gravis  pro  flexa,  ut  Cethegus, 
et  hie   prima  acuta   (nara   sic   media   mutatur) ;  aut 
flexa  pro  gravl,  ut  Appi l  circumducta  sequenti,  quam 
ex    duabus    syllabis    in    unam    cogentes    et    deinde 

24  flectentes    dupliciter    peccant.       Sed    id    saepius    in 
Graecis    nominibus    accidit,    ut    Atrei,    quern    nobis 
iuvenibus  doctissimi  senes  acuta  prima  dicere  sole- 
bant,  ut  necessario  secunda  gravis  esset,  item  Nerei 
TVraque.      Haec  de  accentibus  tradita. 

1  aut  Appi,  Spalding  :  aut  apice,  A  :  ut,  B. 

1  Cat.  Ixxxi. 

2  The  Roman  accent  was  a  stress,  while  the  Greek  was  a 
pitch  accent,  though  by  the  Christian  era  tending  to  change 
into  stress.     Roman  grammarians  borrow  the  Greek  termin- 
ology and  speak  of  accents  in  terms  of  pitch.     The  explana- 
tion of  this  is  probably  that  the  Roman  stress  accent  was 


BOOK    I.  v.  20-24 

Graccus  or  triumpus.    Then  for  a  short  time  it  broke 
out  into  excessive  use,  witness  such  spelling  as  chorona, 
chenturia  or  praecho,  which  may  still  be  read  in  certain 
inscriptions  :  the  well-known  epigram  of  Catullus  l 
will  be  remembered  in  this  connexion.   The  spellings  2) 
vehementer,  comprehendere  and  mihi  have  lasted  to  our 
own   day :    and    among    early  writers,  especially  of 
tragedy, we  actually  find  mehe  for  me  in  the  older  MSS. 

It  is  still  more  difficult  to  detect  errors  of  tenor  or  22 
tone  (I  note  that  old  writers  spell  the  word  tonor, 
as  derived  from  the  Greek  roVos),  or  of  accent,  styled 
prosody  by  the  Greeks,  such  as  the  substitution  of 
the  acute  accent  for  the  grave  or  the  grave  for  the 
acute  :  such  an  example  would  be  the  placing  of  the 
acute  accent  on  the  first  syllable  of  Camillas,  or  the  23 
substitution  of  the  grave  for  the  circumflex  in  Cetkegus, 
an  error  which  results  in  the  alteration  of  the 
quantity  of  the  middle  syllable,  since  it  means 
making  the  first  syllable  acute  ;  or  again  the  sub- 

O  mt 

stitution  of  the  circumflex  for  the  grave  on  the 
second  syllable  of  Appi,  where  the  contraction  of 
two  syllables  into  one  circumflexed  syllable  involves 
a  double  error.  This,  however,  occurs  far  more  fre-  24 
quently  in  Greek  words  such  as  Atrei,  which  in  our 
young  days  was  pronounced  by  the  most  learned  of 
our  elders  with  an  acute  accent  on  the  first  syllable, 
necessitating  a  grave  accent  on  the  second  ;  the 
same  remark  applies  to  Nerei  and  Terei.  Such  has 
been  the  tradition  as  regards  accents.2 


accompanied  by  an  elevation  of  the  pitch.  Here  the  acute 
accent  certainly  implies  stress  ;  the  grave  implies  a  drop  in 
pitch  and  the  absence  of  stress.  The  circumflex  means  that 
the  voice  rises  slightly  and  then  falls  slightly,  but  implies 
stress.  See  Lindsay,  Latin  Language,  pp.  148-153. 



25  Ceterum   scio    iarn    quosdam    erudites,    nonnullos 
etiam  grammaticos  sic  docere  ac   loqui,   ut  propter 
quaedam   vocum   discrimina    verbum    interim    acuto 

26  sono    finiant,   ut    in    illis    quae    circum    lillara,   circum 
piscosos  scopulos,  ne,  si  gravem  posuerint  secundam, 
circus  dici    videatur    non     circuitus.       Itemque     cum 
quale  interrogantes  gravi_,  comparantes  acuto  tenore 
concludunt ;  quod  tamen  in  adverbiis  fere    solis  ac 
pronominibus    vindicant,   in    ceteris   veterem  legem 

27  sequuntur.      Mihi  videtur  condicionem  mutare,  quod 
his  locis  verba  coniungimus.      ?^am  cum  dico  circum 
litora,   tanquam   unum    enuntio    dissimulata  distinc- 
tione,  itaque  tanquam  in  una  voce    una    est    acuta,, 
quod  idem  accidit  in  illo    Troiae  qui  primus  ab  oris. 

28  Evenit,  ut  metri  quoque  condicio  mutet  accentum, 
ut   Pecudes  pictaeque  volucres ;    nam   volucres   media 
acuta  legaro,    quia.,   etsi   natura   brevis,   tamen  posi- 
tione  longa  &st,  ne  faciat  iambum,  quern  non   recipit 

29  versus  herous.      Separata  vero  haec  a  praecepto  non 
recedent,     aut     si    consuetude    vicerit,     vetus    lex 

1  Aen.  iv.  254. 

2  i.e.  that  circum  is  the  ace.  of  circus,  and  not  the  adverb 
indicating  circuit. 

3  A  en.  i.  1 :  qui  coalesces  with  primus,  ab  with  oris. 
*  Georg.  iii.  243. 


BOOK    I.  v.  25-29 

Still  I  am  well  aware  that  certain  learned  men  25 
and  some  professed  teachers  of  literature,  to  ensure 
that  certain  words  may  be  kept  distinct,  sometimes 
place  an  acute  accent  on  the  last  syllable,  both  when 
they  are  teaching  and  in  ordinary  speech  :  as,  for 
instance,  in  the  following  passage  : 

quae  circum  litora,  circum 
piscosos  scop  ul  os,1 

where  they  make  the  last  syllable  of  circum  acute  on  26 
the  ground  that,  if  that  syllable  were  given  the  grave 
accent,  it  might  be  thought  that  they  meant  circus 
not  circuilus."  Similarly  when  quale  is  interrogative, 
they  give  the  final  syllable  a  grave  accent,  but  when 
using  it  in  a  comparison,  make  it  acute.  This  practice, 
however,  they  restrict  almost  entirely  to  adverbs 
and  pronouns  ;  in  other  cases  they  follow  the  old 
usage.  Personally  I  think  that  in  such  phrases  27 
as  these  the  circumstances  are  almost  entirely  altered 
by  the  fact  that  we  join  two  words  together.  For 
when  I  say  circum  litora  I  pronounce  the  phrase  as 
one  word,  concealing  the  fact  that  it  is  composed  of 
two,  consequently  it  contains  but  one  acute  accent, 
as  though  it  were  a  single  wrord.  The  same  thing 
occurs  in  the  phrase  Troiae  qui  primus  ab  oris?  It  28 
sometimes  happens  that  the  accent  is  altered  by 
the  metre  as  in  pecudes  pictaeque  volucres  4 ;  for  I  shall 
read  volucres  with  the  acute  on  the  middle  syllable, 
because,  although  that  syllable  is  short  by  nature,  it 
is  long  by  position  :  else  the  last  two  syllables 
would  form  an  iambus,  which  its  position  in  the 
hexameter  does  not  allow.  But  these  same  words,  29 
if  separated,  will  form  no  exception  to  the  rule  :  or 
if  the  custom  under  discussion  prevails,  the  old  law 


sermonis  abolebitur  ;  cuius  difficilior  apud  Graecos 
observatio  est,  quia  plura  illis  loquendi  genera,  quas 
SiaA.€KTous  vacant,  et  quod  alia  vitiosum  interim  alia 
rectum  est ;  apud  nos  vero  brevissima  ratio. 

30  Namque   in  omni   voce  acuta  intra  numerum  trium 
syllabarum  continetur,  sive  eae  sunt  in  verbo  solae 
sive   ultimae,  et  in  iis  aut  proxima  extremae  aut  ab 
ea  tertia.       Trium  porro,   de   quibus   loquor,    media 
longa  aut  acuta  aut   flexa  erit ;  eodem  loco    brevis 
utique  gravem  habebit  sonum,  ideoque  positam  ante 

31  se   id   est  ab   ultima  tertiam   acuet.     Est   autem  in 
omni    voce    utique    acuta    sed    nunquam    plus    una 
nee     unquam    ultima    ideoque    in    dissyllabis    prior. 
Praeterea     nunquam     in     eadem     flexa     et     acuta, 
quoniam    est    in     flexa     et     acuta,     itaque     neutra 
claudet     vocem     Latinam.       Ea     vero,     quae     sunt 
syllabae   unius,  erunt  acuta  aut  flexa,  ne   sit  aliqua 

32  vox   sine  acuta.     Et   ilia    per    sonos   accidunt,   quae 
demonstrari  scripto  non  possunt,  vitia  oris  et  linguae  : 
tojraKt(r/xovs      et      /Xa/x^Sa/ctcr^xoi'?     et      icr^i  or^ras       et 
TrAaraacr/xovs    feliciores   fingendis    nominibus    Graeci 
vocant,  sicut  KotA.oo-ro/u'av,  cum  vox  quasi  in  recessu 

33  oris  auditur.      Sunt   etiam   proprii   quidam   et    inen- 
arrabiles  soni,  quibus  nonnunquam  nationes  reprehen- 
dimus.      Remotis   igitur    omnibus,   de    quibus    supra 

1  lotacism  =  doubling  the  i  sound,   e.g.  Troiia  for  Troia  ; 
lambdacism  =  doubling  the  I. 


BOOK    I.  v.  29-33 

of  the  language  will  disappear.  (This  law  is  more 
difficult  for  the  Greeks  to  observe,  because  they 
have  several  dialects,  as  they  call  them,  and  what  is 
wrong  in  one  may  be  right  in  another.)  But  with  us 

O  mf  O  / 

the  rule  is  simplicity  itself.  For  in  every  word  30 
the  acute  accent  is  restricted  to  three  syllables, 
whether  these  be  the  only  syllables  in  the  word  or 
the  three  last,  and  will  fall  either  on  the  penultimate 
or  the  antepenultimate.  The  middle  of  the  three 
syllables  of  which  I  speak  will  be  acute  or  circum- 
flexed,  if  long,  while  if  it  be  short,  it  will  have  a 
grave  accent  and  the  acute  will  be  thrown  back  to 
the  preceding  syllable,  that  is  to  say  the  ante- 
penultimate. Every  word  has  an  acute  accent,  but  31 
never  more  than  one.  Further  the  acute  never  falls 
on  the  last  syllable  and  therefore  in  dissyllabic  words 
marks  the  first  syllable.  Moreover  the  acute  accent 
and  the  circumflex  are  never  found  in  one  and  the 
same  word,  since  the  circumflex  itself  contains  an 
acute  accent.  Neither  the  circumflex  nor  the  acute, 
therefore,  will  ever  be  found  in  the  last  syllable  of 
a  Latin  word,  with  this  exception,  that  monosyllables 
must  either  be  acute  or  circumflexed  ;  otherwise  we 
should  find  words  without  an  acute  accent  at  all. 
There  are  also  faults  of  sound,  which  we  cannot  repro-  32 
duce  in  writing,  as  they  spring  from  defects  of  the 
voice  and  tongue.  The  Greeks  who  are  happier  in 
inventing  names  than  we  are  call  them  iotacisms, 
lambdacisms,1  lo-^oT^Te?  (attenuations)  and  TrAareia- 
o7/.of  (broadenings) ;  they  also  use  the  term  KoiXoo-ro/xta, 
when  the  voice  seems  to  proceed  from  the  depths  of 
the  mouth.  There  are  also  certain  peculiar  and  33 
indescribable  sounds  for  which  we  sometimes  take 
whole  nations  to  fault.  To  sum  up  then,  if  all  the 
faults  of  which  we  have  just  spoken  be  avoided, 



dixi,  vitiis  erit  ilia  quae  vocatur  op^oeVeta,  id  est 
emendata  cum  suavitate  vocum  explanatio  :  nam  sic 
accipi  potest  recta. 

34  Cetera    vitia    omnia    ex    pluribus    vocibus     sunt, 
quorum  est  soloecismus,  quanquam  circa  hoc  quoque 
disputatum  est.      Nam  etiam  qui  complexu  orationis 
accidere  eum  confitentur,  quia  tamen  unius  emencla- 
tione  verbi  corrigi  possit,  in  verbo  esse  vitium  non  in 

35  sermone  contendunt ;   cum,   sive   amarae  cortids  seu 
medio   corlice  per  genus  facit   soloecismum    (quorum 
neutrum  quidem  reprehendo,  cum  sit  utriusque  Ver- 
gilius    auctor ;    sed    fingamus    utrumlibet   non    recte 
dictum),  mutatio    vocis  alterius,  in   qua  vitium   erat, 
rectam    loquendi    rationem    sit    redditura,    ut    aman 
cortids    fiat    vel    media    cortice.      Quod     manifestae 
calumniae  est ;   neutrum    enim  vitiosum  est  separa- 
tum, sed  compositione  peccatur,  quae  iam  sermonis 

36  est.      Illud  eruditius  quaeritur,  an  in  singulis  quoque 
verbis  possit  fieri  soloecismus,  uti  si  unum  quis  ad  se 
vocans   dicat   vcnite,   aut  si  phi  res  a  se  dimittens  ita 
loquatur  abi  aut  discede.      Nee  non   cum  responsum 
ab  interrogante  dissentit,  ut  si  dicenti  Quern  video  ? 
ita   occurras   Ego.      In  gestu   etiam  nonnulli   putant 
idem  vitium   inesse,  cum  aliud   voce  aliud  nutu   vel 

37  manu  demonstratur.      Huic  opinioni   neque   omnino 

1  Ed.  vi.  G2.  3  Gcorg.  ii.  74. 


BOOK    I.  v.  33-37 

we  shall  be  in  possession  of  the  Greek  op 
that  is  to  say,  an  exact  and  pleasing  articulation  ;  for 
that  is  what  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  correct 

All  other  faults  in  speaking  are  concerned  with  34 
more  words  than  one  ;  among  this  class  of  faults  is 
the  solecism,  although  there  have  been  controversies 
about  this  as  well.  For  even  those  who  acknowledge 
that  it  occurs  in  connected  speech,  argue  that,  since 
it  can  be  corrected  by  the  alteration  of  one  word, 
the  fault  lies  in  the  word  and  not  in  the  phrase  or 
sentence.  For  example  whether  amarae  corticis  l  or  35 
medio  cortice2  contains  a  solecism  in  gender  (and 
personally  I  object  to  neither,  as  Vergil  is  the 
author  of  both  ;  however,  for  the  sake  of  argument 
let  us  assume  that  one  of  the  two  is  incorrect),  still 
whichever  phrase  is  incorrect,  it  can  be  set  right  by 
the  alteration  of  the  word  in  which  the  fault  lies : 
that  is  to  say  we  can  emend  either  to  amari  corticis 
or  media  cortice.  But  it  is  obvious  that  these  critics 
misrepresent  the  case.  For  neither  word  is  faulty 
in  itself ;  the  error  arises  from  its  association  with 
another  word.  The  fault  therefore  lies  in  the 
phrase.  Those  who  raise  the  question  as  to  whether  36 
a  solecism  can  arise  in  a  single  word  show  greater 
intelligence.  Is  it  for  instance  a  solecism  if  a  man 


when  calling  a  single  person  to  him  says  uenite, 
or  in  dismissing  several  persons  says  obi  or  discede  ? 
Or  again  if  the  answer  does  not  correspond  to  the 
question  :  suppose,  for  example,  when  someone  said 
to  you  "  Whom  do  I  see  ?  ",  you  were  to  reply  "  I." 
Some  too  think  it  a  solecism  if  the  spoken  word  is 
contradicted  by  the  motion  of  hand  or  head.  I  do  37 
not  entirely  concur  with  this  view  nor  yet  do  I 



accedo  neque  plane  dissentio.  Nam  id  fateor 
accidere  voce  una  non  tamen  aliter,  quam  si  sit 
aliquid,  quod  vim  alterius  vocis  obtineat,  ad  quod 
vox  ilia  referatur,  ut  soloeci.smus  ex  complexu  fiat 
eorurn,  quibus  res  si^riificantur  et  voluntas  osten- 

38  ditur.      Atque  ut  omnein  effu^iam  cavillationem,  sit 
aliquando    in    uno    verbo    nunquam    in    solo    verbo. 
Per  quot  autem  et  per  quas  accidat  species,,  non  satis 
convenit.       Qui    plenissime,    quadripertitam    volunt 
esse    rationern    nee    aliam    quam    barbarism!,,    ut   fiat 
adiectione    nam    enim,    de    susum,    in    Alexandriam ; 

39  detractione  ambulo  r'unn,  Acpyplo  venio,  ne  hoc  fecit  ; 
transmutatione,  qua  ordo  turbatur,  (juoque  ego,  enim 
hoc  voluit,  autem  non   hadn't.      Kx    quo    rr':riere  an  sit 
i'jitur  initio  sermonis   po-Jturn,   dubitari   potest;   quia 
maxirnos  auctores   in   diversa   fuiv-.f:    opinione  video, 
cum     apud     alios    sit     etiam    frequens,    apud     alios 

40  nunquarn    rc-periatur.        Haec     tria     genera    quidam 
deducunt  a  soloecismo,  et  adiectionis  vitiurn  TrAeova. 
v/j.ov,    detractionis    lAAeii//i^    iriversionis     avacrrpotjnjv 
vocant,  quae  si  in  spe<-if-rn  solo<-<-i  mi  cadat,  v7rfpfia.T(jv 

i\  quoque  eodem  appellari  rnodo  p'<sse.  Jrnmutatio 
sirie  controversia  est,  curn  aliud  j)ro  alio  j>onitur. 
Id  per  omnes  orationis  [;artes  deprehendimus^  frf- 
queritissime  in  verbo;  quia  plurirna  huic  accidurit ; 

1  i.e.  nam  cannot  \>".  co  \\>\<-A  with  enim;  de  V;eing  a  pre- 
po'-;ition  cannot  r/ovorn  an  :i']-.-<;fb  ("from  above");  in  is 
not  required  with  Alexandriam,  which  is  the  name  of  a 


BOOK    I.  v.  37-41 
\vhollv  dissent.      1   admit  that  a  solecism  may  occur 

*  » 

in  a  single  word,  but  with  this  proviso  :  there  must 
be  something  else  equivalent  to  another  word,  to 
which  the  word,  in  which  the  error  lies,  can  be 
referred,  so  that  the  solecism  arises  from  the  faulty 
connexion  of  those  symbols  by  which  facts  are  ex- 
pressed and  purpose  indicated.  To  avoid  all  sus-  3S 
picion  of  quibbling,  I  will  say  that  a  solecism  may 
occur  in  one  word,  but  never  in  a  word  in  isolation. 
There  is,  however,  some  controversy  as  to  the 
number  and  nature  of  the  different  kinds  of  solecism. 
Those  who  have  dealt  with  the  subject  most  fully 
make  a  fourfold  division,  identical  with  that  which 
is  made  in  the  case  of  barbarisms  :  solecisms  are 
brought  about  by  addition,  for  instance  in  phrases 
such  as  nam  enim,  de  susitm,  in  Alexandnam  ;  by  39 
omission,  in  phrases  such  as  ambulo  viam,  Ae^npio 
venio,  or  ne  hoc  fecit :  and  by  transposition  as  in 
qitoqne  ego,  enim  hoc  voluit,  aulcm  non  habuit.1  L'mler 
this  last  head  comes  the  question  whether  igitur  can 
be  placed  first  in  a  sentence  :  for  I  note  that  authors 
of  the  first  rank  disagree  on  this  point,  some  of 
them  frequently  placing  it  in  that  position,  others 
never.  Some  distinguish  these  three  classes  of  40 
error  from  the  solecism,  styling  addition  a  pleonasm, 
omission  an  ellipse.,  and  transposition  anastrophe:  and 
they  assert  that  if  anastrophe  is  a  solecism,  hi/perbaton 
mMit  also  be  so  called.  About  substitution,  that  is  41 

t?  * 

when  one  word  is  used  instead  of  another,  there  is 
no  dispute.  It  is  an  error  which  we  may  detect  in 
connexion  with  all  the  parts  of  speech,  but  most 
frequently  in  the  verb,  because  it  has  greater  variety 

town.  Quoque,  enim  and  autcrn  cannot  come  first  in  a 
sentence  Ambulo  per  viam,  ab  Aegypto  venio,  nc  hoc 
quidem  fecit  would  be  the  correct  Latin. 



ideoque  in  eo  fiunt  soloecismi  per  genera,  tempora, 
personas,  modos,  sive  cui  status  eos  dici  sen  qualitates 
placet,  vel  sex  vel,  ut  alii  volunt,  octo  ; — nam  toti- 
dem  vitiorum  erunt  formae,  in  quot  species  eorum 
quidque,  de  quibus  supra  dictum  est,  diviseris— 

42  praeterea    numeros,    in    quibus     nos    singularem    ac 
pluralem     habemus     Graeci    et    SIHKOJ/.       Quanquain 
fuerunt,  qui  nobis  quoque  adiicerent  dualem  scripsere, 
legere ;    quod    evitandae   asperitatis    gratia   mollitum 
est,  ut   apud  veteres   pro  male  mereris,   male  merere. 
Ideoque  quod  vocant  dualem,  in  illo  solo  genere  con- 
sistit,  cum  apud  Graecos  et  in  verbi  tota  fere  ratione 
et  in  nominibus  deprehendatur,  et  sic  quoque  raris- 

43  simus  eius  sit  usus,  apud  nostrorum  vero  nerninem 
haec  observatio  reperiatur,  quin  e  contrario  dcvenere 
locos  et  conticuere  omnes  et  consedere  duces  aperte  nos 
doceant,    nihil    horum    ad    duos    pertinere ;    dixere 
quoque,    quamquam   id    Antonius    Rufus   ex    diverse 
ponit  exemplum,  de   pluribus   patronis   praeco   pro- 

44  nuntiet.      Quid  ?  non  Livius  circa  initia  statim  primi 
libri,    Tenuere,    inquit,    arcem    Sabini  ?    et     mox,    in 
adversum    RomaJii    subiere  ?       Sed    quern    potius    ego 
quam    M.    Tullium    sequar  ?    qui    in    Oratore,    Non 

1  Aen.  i.  369  :   "They  came  to  the  places." 
a  Acn.  ii.  1  :   "  All  were  silent." 

3  Ovid,  Met.  xiii.  1  :   "  The  chiefs  sat  them  down." 

4  Dixere,  "they  have  spoken,"  was  said  when  the  advo- 
cates had  finished  their  pleading. 


BOOK    I.  v.  41-44 

than  any  other  :  consequently  in  connexion  with  the 
verb  we  get  solecisms  of  gender,  tense,  person  and 
mood  (or  "states"  or  "qualities"  if  you  prefer  either 
of  these  terms),  be  these  types  of  error  six  in  number, 
as  some  assert,  or  eight  as  is  insisted  by  others  (for 
the  number  of  the  forms  of  solecism  will  depend  on 
the  number  of  subdivisions  which  you  assign  to  the 
parts  of  speech  of  which  we  have  just  spoken). 
Further  there  are  solecisms  of  number ;  now  Latin  42 
has  two  numbers,  singular  and  plural,  while  Greek 
possesses  a  third,  namely  the  dual.  There  have 
however  been  some  who  have  given  us  a  dual  as 
well  in  words  such  as  scripsere  and  Icgere,  in  which 
as  a  matter  of  fact  the  final  syllable  has  been 
softened  to  avoid  harshness,  just  as  in  old  writers 
we  find  male  merere  for  male  mereris.  Consequently 
what  they  assert  to  be  a  dual  is  concerned  solely 
with  this  one  class  of  termination,  whereas  in  Greek 
it  is  found  throughout  the  whole  structure  of  the 
verb  and  in  nouns  as  well,  though  even  then  it  is 
but  rarely  used.  But  we  find  not  a  trace  of  such  a  43 
usage  in  any  Latin  author.  On  the  contrary  phrases 
such  as  devenere  locos,1  con  lieu  ere  omnes,2  and 
consedere  duces b  clearly  prove  that  they  have  no- 
thing to  do  with  the  dual.  Moreover  dixeref  al- 
though Antonius  Kufus  cites  it  as  proof  to  the 
contrary,  is  often  used  by  the  usher  in  the  courts  to 
denote  more  than  two  advocates.  Again,  does  not  44 
Livy  near  the  beginning  of  his  first  book  write 
leniiere  arcem  Sabini 5  and  later  in  adversum  JRomani 
subiere  ?  But  I  can  produce  still  better  authority. 
For  Cicero  in  his  Orator  says,  "  I  have  no  objection 

6  Liv.    i.  xii.:    "The  Sabines   held   the   citadel."     "The 
Romans  marched  up  the  slope  against  them." 



reprehcndo,    inquit,    scripsere ;    scripserunt    esse    verius 

45  sentio.      Similiter  in  vocabulis  et  nominibus  fit  soloe- 
cismus    genere,    numero,    proprie     autem     casibus, 
quidquid  horum  alteri  succedet.      Huic  parti  subiun- 
gatur     licet     per    comparationes    et     superlationes, 
itemque  in  quibus  patrium  pro  possessive  dicitur  vel 

46  contra.      Nam   vitium,  quod   fit   per  quantitatem  lit 
magnum  peculioliim,    erunt    qui    soloecismum    putent 
quia    pro    nomine    integro    positum   sit   deminutum. 
Ego  dubito,  an  id  improprium  potius  appellem,  sig- 
nificatione  enim  deerrat ;  soloecismi  porro  vitium  non 

47  est    in   sensu    sed    in   complexu.       In   participio   per 
genus  et  casum,  ut  in  vocabulo,  per  tempora,  ut  in 
verbo,  per  numerum,  ut  in  utroque,  peccatur.      Pro- 
nomen  quoque  genus,  numerum,  casus  habet,  quae 

48  omnia  recipiunt  huiusmodi   errorem.      Fiunt    soloe- 
cismi et  quidem  plurimi   per   partes   orationis ;    sed 
id  tradere  satis  non  est,  ne  ita  demmn  vitium  esse 
credat  puer,  si  pro  alia  ponatur  alia,  ut  verbum,  ubi 
nomen  esse  debuerit,  vel  adverbium,  ubi  pronomen, 

49  et  similia.      Nam  sunt  quaedam  cognata,  ut  dicunt, 
id    est    eiusdem  generis,  in  quibus,  qui   alia   specie 
quam  oportet  utetur,  non  minus  quam  ipso  genere 

60  permutato  deliquerit.       Nam  et   an  et   ant  coniunc- 
tiones  sunt,  male  tamen  interroges,  hie  aut  ille  sit; 

1  Oral,  xlvii.  157. 

2  Lit.  "  A  great  little  fortune." 

8  e.g.  intus  for  intro,  the  genus  being  adverbs  of  place. 


BOOK    I.  v.  44-50 

to  the  form  scripsere,  though  I  regard  scripserunt  as 
the    more    correct."  l       Similarly   in    vocables    and  45 
nouns   solecisms   occur    in    connexion    with     gender, 
number  and    more    especially  case,  by   substitution 
of    one     for    another.      To    these    may    be    added 
solecisms  in  the  u?,e  of  comparatives  and  superlatives, 
or    the    employment    of     patronymics    instead    of 
possessives  and  vice  versa.     As  for  solecisms  connected  46 
with   expressions  of  quantity,  there   are  some   who 
will  regard  phrases  such  as  magnum  peculiolum2  as  a 
solecism,  because  the  diminutive  is  used  instead  of 
the  ordinary  noun,  which  implies  no  diminution.       I 
think  I  should  call  it  a  misuse  of  the  diminutive  rather 
than  a  solecism  ;  for  it  is  an  error  of  sense,  whereas 
solecisms  are  not  errors  of  sense,  but  rather  faulty 
combinations    of    words.        As    regards    participles,  47 
solecisms  occur  in  case  and  gender  as  with  nouns,  in 
tense   as    with    verbs,  and    in   number    as    in    both. 
The  pronoun  admits  of  solecisms  in  gender,  number 
and    case.       Solecisms    also    occur    with    great    fre-  48 
quency    in    connexion    with    parts  of  speech  :    but 
a    bare    statement    on  this    point   is    not   sufficient, 
as    it   may    lead    a    boy    to    think    that    such    error 
consists    only    in    the    substitution    of  one    part    of 
speech    for    another,    as    for    instance    if  a    verb   is 
placed  where  we  require  a  noun,  or  an  adverb  takes 
the  place  of  a  pronoun  and  so  on.     For  there  are  49 
some  nouns  which  are  cognate,  that  is  to  say  of  the 
same  genus,  and  he  who  uses  the  wrong  species  3  in 
connexion   with  one  of  these  will  be  guilty  of  the 
same    offence    as  if  he  were   to    change   the   genus. 
Thus  an  and  aid  are  conjunctions,  but  it  would  be  50 
bad  Latin  to  say  in  a  question  hie  aut  ille  sit*;  ne  and 

4  For  hie  an  illc  sit  ? 



et  ne  ac  non  adverbia ;  qui  tamen  dicat  pro  illo  "  ne 
feceris"  " non  feceris"  in  idem  incidat  vitium,  quia 
alterum  negandi  est  alterum  vetandi.  Hoc  amplius 
intro  et  intus  loci  adverbia,  eo  tamen  intus  et  intro 

51  sum  soloecismi  sunt.     Eadem  in   diversitate   prono- 
minum,    interiectionum,     praepositionum    accident; 
est  etiam   soloecismus    in   oratione    comprehensionis 
unius  sequentium  ac  priorum  inter  se  inconveniens 

52  positio.       Quaedam     tamen     et     faciem     soloecismi 
habent    et    dici    vitiosa    non    possunt,    ut    Iragocdia 
Thyesles    et    ludi   Floralia  ac    Megalensia,  quanquam 
haec  sequenti  tempore  interciderunt  nunquam  aliter 
a   veteribus  dicta.      Schemata   igitur    nominabuntur, 
frequentiora    quidem    apud    poetas    sed    oratoribus 

53  quoque     permissa.       Verum     schema     fere     habebit 
aliquam    rationem,    ut    docebimus    eo,    quern    paulo 
ante     promisimus,    loco.       Sed     id     quoque,     quod 
schema    vocatur,    si     ab    aliquo     per    imprudentiam 

54  factum  erit,  soloecismi  vitio  non  carebit.     In  eadem 
specie    sunt    sed    schemate    carent,    ut    supra    dixi, 
nomina  feminina,  quibus  mares  utuntur,  et  neutralia, 
quibus   feminae.     Hactenus  de   soloecismo.      Neque 
enim  artem  grammaticam  componere  aggressi  sumus, 
sed  cum  in  ordinem  incurreret,  inhonoratam  transire 

55  Hoc  amplius,  ut  institutum  ordinem  sequar,  verba 

1  The    meaning    of   this    passage    is    uncertain,    but    the 
solecism  in  question  is  probably  an  anacoluthon. 


BOOK    I.  v.  50-55 

non  are  adverbs  :  but  he  who  says  non  feceris  in  lieu 
of  ne  feceris,  is  guilty  of  a  similar  mistake,  since  one 
negative   denies,  while  the  other  forbids.      Further 
intro  and  intus  are  adverbs  of  place,  but  eo  intus  and 
i7itro    sum    are    solecisms.      Similar    errors    may    be   51 
committed  in  connexion   with  the   various  kinds  of 
pronouns,  interjections  and  prepositions.      It  is  also 
a  solecism  l  if  there  is  a  disagreement  between  what 
precedes  and  what  follows  within   the  limits  of   a 
single  clause.    Some  phrases  have  all  the  appearance  52 
of  a  solecism  and  yet  cannot  be  called  faulty ;  take 
for  instance   phrases   such    as  tragoedia    Thyestes   or 
ludi  Floralia  and  Mcgalensia2:    although   these  are 
never  found   in  later  times,  they    are    the    rule   in 
ancient  writers.    We  will  therefore  style  them  figures 
and,  though  their  use  is  more  frequent  in  poets,  will 
not  deny  their  employment  even  to  orators.    Figures 
however    will    generally    have    some    justification,  53 
as  I  shall  show  in  a  later  portion  of  this  work,  which 
I  promised  you  a  little  while  back.3     I  must  how- 
ever point  out  that   a   figure,  if  used    unwittingly, 
will  be  a  solecism.      In  the  same  class,  though  they  54 
cannot  be  called  ficnires.  come  errors  such  as  the  use 


of  masculine  names  with  a  female  termination  and 
feminine  names  with  a  neuter  termination.  I  have 
said  enough  about  solecisms  ;  for  I  did  not  set  out  to 
write  a  treatise  on  grammar,  but  was  unwilling  to 
slight  the  science  by  passing  it  by  without  salutation, 
when  it  met  me  in  the  course  of  my  journey. 

I   therefore  resume  the  path  which   I   prescribed  55 
for   myself   and    point    out    that    words    are    either 

2  Where  strict  grammar  would  require  tragoedia  Thyestis, 
ludi   Florales,   Megalenses.      The  normal   usage  would   be 
simply  to  say  Thyestes,  Floralia,  Megalensia. 

3  i.  iv.  24.     The  promise  is  fulfilled  in  Book  IX. 



aut  Latina  aut  peregrina  sunt.      Peregrina  porro  ex 
omnibus  prope  dixerira  gentibus  ut  homines,  ut  in- 

56  stituta  etiam  multa  venerunt.     Taceo  de  Tuscis  et 
Sabinis  et  Praenestinis  quoque  ;  nam  ut  eorum  ser- 
mone  utentem  Vettium  Lucilius  insectatur,  quemad- 
modum    Pollio   reprehendit  in   Livio   Patavinitatem, 

57  licet  omnia  Italica  pro  Romanis    habeam.      Plurima 
Gallica   evaluerunt   ut    raeda    ac    petorritum,  quorum 
altero    tamen    Cicero    altero    Horatius    utitur.      Et 
tnappam  circo  quoque  usitatum  nomen  Poeni  sibi  vin- 
dicant,  et  gurdos,  quos  pro  stolidis  accipit  vulgus,  ex 

58  Hispania  duxisse  originem  audivi.      Sed  haec  divisio 
mea  ad  Graecum  sermonem  praecipue  pertinet,  nam 
et  maxima  ex  parte  Romanus  inde  conversus  est  et 
confessis  quoque  Graecis    utimur    verbis,  ubi  nostra 
desunt,   sicut   illi   a   nobis    nonnunquam    mutuantur. 
Inde   ilia  quaestio  exoritur,   an   eadem    ratione    per 

59  casus    duci    externa   qua    nostra    conveniat.       Ac    si 
reperias    grammaticum     veterum     amatorem,    neget 
quidquam  ex  Latina  ratione  mutandurn,   quia,  cum 
sit  apud  nos  casus  ablativus,  quern  illi   non  habent, 
parum   conveniat  uno  casu    nostro  quinque   Graecis 

60  uti ;  quin  etiam  laudet  virtutem  eorum,  qui   poten- 
tiorem     facere     linguam     Latinam     studebant,     nee 
alienis    egere    institutis   fatebantur.       Inde    Castorcm 
media     syllaba    producta     pronuntiarunt,    quia     hoc 
omnibus  nostris  nominibus  accidebat,  quorum  prima 


BOOK    I.  v.  55-60 

native  or  foreign.      Foreign  words,  like  our  population 
and  our  institutions,  have  come  to  us  from  practically 
every  nation  upon  earth.      I  pass  by  words  of  Tuscan,   56 
Sabine  and   Praenestine  origin  ;  for  though   Lucilius 
attacks  Vettius  for  using  them,  and    Pollio  reproves 
Livy  for  his  lapses  into  the  dialect  of  Padua,  I  may  be 
allowed  to  regard  all  such  words  as  of  native  origin. 
Many  Gallic  words  have  become  current    coin,  such   57 
as     raeda     (chariot)     and    pctorritum     (four-wheeled 
wao-on)  of  which  Cicero  uses  the  former  and   Horace 

C™1  / 

the  latter.  Mappa  (napkin)  again,  a  word  familiar 
in  connexion  with  the  circus,  is  claimed  by  the 
Carthaginians,  while  I  have  heard  that  gurdus,  which 
is  colloquially  used  in  the  sense  of  "stupid,"  is 
derived  from  Spain.  But  this  distinction  between  58 
native  and  foreign  words  has  reference  chiefly  to 
Greek.  For  Latin  is  largely  derived  from  that 
language,  and  we  use  words  which  are  admittedly 

o  ~      ^  * 

Greek  to  express  things  for  which  we  have  no  Latin 
equivalent.  Similiarly  they  at  times  borrow  words 
from  us.  In  this  connexion  the  problem  arises 
whether  foreign  words  should  be  declined  according 

O  *-* 

to  their  language  or  our  own.      If  you    come  across   59 

O  O  • 

an  archaistic  grammarian,  he  will  insist  on  absolute 


conformity  to  Latin  practice,  because,  since  we  have 
an  ablative  and  the  Greeks  have  not,  it  would  be 
absurd  in  declining  a  word  to  use  rive  Greek 
cases  and  one  Latin.  He  will  also  praise  the  60 
patriotism  of  those  who  aimed  at  strengthening  the 
Latin  language  and  asserted  that  we  had  no  need 
of  foreign  practices.  They,  therefore,  pronounced 
Castorem  with  the  second  syllable  long  to  bring  it 
into  conformity  with  all  those  Latin  nouns  which 
have  the  same  termination  in  the  nominative  as 


positio  in  easdem  quas  Castor  litteras  exit ;  et  ut 
Palaemo  ac  Telamo  et  Plato  (nam  sic  eum  Cicero 
quoque  appellat)  dicerentur,  retinuerunt,  quia 
Latin um,  quod  o  et  n  litteris  finiretur,  non  reperie- 

61  bant.      Ne  in  a  quidem  atque  s  litteras  exire  temere 
masculina    Graeca    nomina    recto    casu    patiebantur, 
ideoque  et  apud  Caelium  legimus  Pelia  cincinnatus  et 
apud   Messalam  bene  fecit  Euthia  et  apud  Ciceronem 
Hermagora,  ne  miremur,  quod  ab  antiquorum  pleris- 

62  que  Aenea  ut  Anchisa  sit  dictus.     Nam  si  ut  Maecenas, 
Sufenas,    Asprenas   dicerentur,   genitive    casu    non    e 
littera,  sed  lis  syllaba  terminarentur.      Inde   Olympo 
et  tyranno  acutam  syllabam  mediam  dederunt,  quia 
duabus    longis    insequentibus    primam    brevem    acui 

63  noster    sermo    non    patitur.      Sic   genitivus    Ulixi   et 
A  chilli    fecit,    sic    alia    plurima.      Nunc    recentiores 
instituerunt  Graecis  nominibus  Graecas  declinationes 
potius    dare,    quod    tamen    ipsum   non    semper    fieri 
potest.      Mihi  autem  placet  Latinam  rationem  sequi, 
quousque   patitur  decor.      Neque    enim   iam    Calyp- 
sonem  dixerim  ut  lunonem,  quanquam  secutus  antiquos 

64  C.     Caesar     utitur     hac     ratione     declinandi.       Sed 
auctoritatem     consuetudo     superavit.        In     ceteris, 
quae  poterunt  utroque  modo  non  indecenter  efferri, 
qui  Graecam  figuram  sequi  malet^  non  Latine  quidem 
sed  tamen  citra  reprehensionem  loquetur. 

65  Simplices  voces  prima  positione  id  est  natura  sua 


BOOK    I.  v.  60-65 

Castor.  They  also  insisted  on  the  forms  Palaemo, 
Telamo,  and  Plato  (the  last  being  adopted  by  Cicero), 
because  they  could  not  find  any  Latin  nouns  ending 
in  -on.  They  were  reluctant  even  to  permit  61 
masculine  Greek  nouns  to  end  in  -as  in  the  nomin- 
ative case,  and  consequently  in  Caelius  \ve  find  Pdia 
cincinnatus  and  in  Messala  bene  fecit  Euthia,  and  in 
Cicero  Hermagora.1  So  we  need  not  be  surprised 
that  the  majority  of  early  writers  said  Aenea  and 
Anchisa.  For,  it  was  urged,  if  such  words  are  spelt  62 
like  Maecenas,  Sufenas  and  Asprenas,  the  genitive 
should  terminate  in  -tis  not  in  -e.  On  the  same 
principle  they  placed  an  acute  accent  on  the  middle 
syllable  of  Olympus  and  tyrannus,  because  Latin  does 
not  allow  an  acute  accent  on  the  first  syllable  if  it  is 
short  and  is  followed  by  two  long  syllables.  So  too  Q'3 
we  get  the  Latinised  genitives  Ulixi  and  Achilli  to- 
gether with  many  other  analogous  forms.  More  recent 
scholars  have  instituted  the  practice  of  giving  Greek 
nouns  their  Greek  declension,  although  this  is  not 
always  possible.  Personally  I  prefer  to  follow  the 
Latin  method,  so  far  as  grace  of  diction  will  permit. 
For  I  should  not  like  to  say  Cahjpsonem  on  the  analogy 
of  lunonem,  although  Gaius  Caesar  in  deference  to 
antiquity  does  adopt  this  way  of  declining  it.  Current 
practice  has  however  prevailed  over  his  authority.  In  64 
other  words  which  can  be  declined  in  either  way 
without  impropriety,  those  who  prefer  it  can  employ 
the  Greek  form  :  they  will  not  be  speaking  Latin, 
but  will  not  on  the  other  hand  deserve  censure. 

Simple  words  are  what   they  are  in   the   nomin-   65 
ative,    that    is,    their    essential    nature.      Compound 

1  This   form   does    not    actually    occur   in    Cicero,  MSS. 
evidently  wrongly  giving  Hermagoras. 



constant,  compositae  aut  praepositionibus  subiun- 
guntur  ut  innocens  (dura  ne  pugnantibus  inter  se 
duabus,  quale  est  imperterrilus ;  alioqui  possunt 
aliquando  continuari  duae  ut  incompositus,  reconditus 
et  quo  Cicero  utitur  subabsurduni),  aut  e  duobus  quasi 

66  corporibus  coalescunt,  ut  maleficus.     Nam  ex  tribus 
nostrae    utique    linguae    non   concesserim ;    quamvis 
capsis  Cicero  dicat  compositum  esse  ex  cape  si  vis,  et 
inveniantur  qui  Lupercalia  aeque  tres  partes  orationis 

67  esse  contendant,  quasi   lucre  per  caprum ;  nam  Soli- 
taurilia  iam  persuasum  est  esse  Suovetaurilia,  et  sane 
ita  se  habet  sacrum,  quale  apud  Homerum  quoque 
est.     Sed  haec  non  tarn  ex  tribus  quam  ex  particulis 
trium  coeunt.      Ceterum  etiam   ex  praepositione  et 
duobus    vocabulis    dure    videtur    struxisse    Pacuvius 

68  Nerei     repandirostrum,     incurvicervicum     pecus.       lun- 
guntur   autem    aut    ex    duobus    Latinis    integris    ut 
superfuif  svbterfugi  (quanquam   ex   integris  an   com- 
posita  sint  quaeritur),  aut  ex  integro  et  corrupto  ut 

1  Quintilian  regards  the  negative  in  as  a  preposition.  His 
objection  to  imperterritus  (which  is  used  by  Vergil)  seems 
to  lie  in  the  fact  that  while  inierritus  is  a  natural  way  of 
expressing  "  unterrified,"  it  is  unreasonable  to  negative  per- 
territus,  which  means  "  thoroughly  terrified."  The  presence 
of  the  intensifying  per  conflicts  with  the  force  of  the 
negative  in.  2  Orat.  xlv.  154. 

3  As  in  Od.  xi.  130.     The  word  means  sacrifices  of  a  pig, 
sheep  and  bull. 

BOOK    I.  v.  65-68 

words  are  formed  by  the  prefix  of  a  preposition  as 
in  innocens,  though  care  must  be  taken  that  two 
conflicting  prepositions  are  not  prefixed  as  in 
imperteriitus1 :  if  this  be  avoided  they  may  in  certain 
cases  have  a  double  prefix  as  in  incompositus  or 
reconditus  or  the  Ciceronian  subabsurdum.  They  may 
also  be  formed  by  what  I  might  term  the  com- 
bination of  two  independent  units,  as  in  male/icus. 
For  I  will  not  admit  that  the  combination  of  three  66 
is  possible  at  any  rate  in  Latin,  although  Cicero 
asserts  that  capsis  2  is  compounded  of  cape  si  vis,  and 
there  are  to  be  found  scholars  who  contend  that 
Lupercalia  likewise  is  a  compound  of  three  parts  of 
speech,  namely  lucre  per  caprum.  As  for  Solitaurilia  67 
it  is  by  now  universally  believed  to  stand  for 
Suovetaurilia,  a  derivation  which  corresponds  to  the 
actual  sacrifice,  which  has  its  counterpart  in  Homer3 
as  well.  But  these  compounds  are  formed  not  so 
much  from  three  words  as  from  the  fragments  of 
three.  On  the  other  hand  Pacuvius  seems  to  have 
formed  compounds  of  a  preposition  and  two  vocables 
(i.e.  nouns)  as  in 

Nerei  repandirostrum  incurvicervicum  pecus  : 

"The  flock 
Of  Nereus  snout-uplifted,  neck-inarched  "  : 

the  effect  is  unpleasing.  Compounds  are  however  68 
formed  from  two  complete  Latin  words,  as  for  in- 
stance super fui  and  subterfugi ;  though  in  this  case 
there  is  some  question  as  to  whether  the  words  from 
which  they  are  formed  are  complete.4  They  may 
also  be  formed  of  one  complete  and  one  incomplete 

4  i.e.  if  both   elements  are  complete  in  themselves  is  the 
word  a  true  compound  ? 



malevolttSj  aut  ex  corrupto  et  integro  ut  noctivagus, 
aut  ex  duobus  corruptis  ut  pedisecus,  aut  ex  nostro 
et  peregrino  ut  bidinium,  aut  contra  ut  epilogium  et 
Anticato,  aliquando  et  ex  duobus  peregrinis  ut  epi- 
rac'diiim.  Nam  cum  sit  praepositio  Graeca,  raeda 
Gallicum  :  neque  Graecus  tamcn  neque  Callus  utitur 
composite  ;  Romani  suum  ex  alieno  utroque  fecerunt. 
59  Frequenter  autem  praepositiones  quoque  compositio 
ista  corrumpit :  inde  abstulit,  aufugit,  amisit,  cum 
praepositio  sit  ab  sola ;  et  coil,  cum  sit  praepositio 

70  con  ;  sic  ignavi  et  erepublica  et  similia.      Sed  res  tota 
magis  Graecos  decet,  nobis  minus  succedit,  nee  id 
fieri  natura  puto,  sed  alienis  favemus  ;  ideoque  cum 
Kvprai'x^o.    mirati    simus,    incurvicervicum    vix    a    risu 

71  Propria   sunt   verba,  cum   id    significant,   in    quod 
primo  denominata  sunt ;  translata,  cum  alium  natura 
intellectum    alium    loco    praebent.       Usitatis    tutius 
utimur,  nova    non    sine    quodam    periculo    fingimus. 
Nam    si    recepta    sunt,    modicam    laudem    adferimt 

72  orationi,  repudiata   etiam  in   iocos  exeunt.     Audeu- 
dum    tamen ;    namque,    ut    Cicero    ait,    etiam    quae 
primo  dura  visa  sunt,  usu  molliuntur.      Sed  minime 
nobis  concessa  est  ovo/j-aro-oua  ',  quis  enim   ferat,  si 

1  Sometimes  \vritten  as  one  word. 

2  de  Nat.  dcorum,  I.  xxxiv.  95. 

I  IO 

BOOK    I.  v.  68-72 

word,  as  in  the  case  of  malevolus,  or  of  one  incom- 
plete   and    one    complete,  such   as    noctivagus,  or  of 

two  incomplete  words  as  in  pedisecus  (footman),  or 
from  one  Latin  and  one  foreign  word  as  in  biclinium 
(a  dining-couch  for  two),  or  in  the  reverse  order 
as  in  epitogium  (an  upper  garment)  or  Anticato,  and 
sometimes  even  from  two  foreign  words  as  in 
epiraedium  (a  thong  attaching  the  horse  to  the  raeda). 
For  in  this  last  case  the  preposition  is  Greek,  while 
raeda  is  Gallic,  while  the  compound  is  employed 
neither  by  Greek  nor  Gaul,  but  has  been  appro- 
priated by  Rome  from  the  two  foreign  tongues.  In  69 
the  case  of  prepositions  they  are  frequently  changed 
by  the  act  of  compounding:  as  a  result  we  get 
abslulit,  aufiigit,  amisit,  though  the  preposition  is  ab, 
and  coil,  though  the  preposition  is  con.  The  same  is 
true  of  ignauus  and  erepublica.1  But  compounds  are  70 
better  suited  to  Greek  than  to  Latin,  though  I  do 
not  think  that  this  is  due  to  the  nature  of  our 
language :  the  reason  rather  is  that  we  have  a 
preference  for  foreign  goods,  and  therefore  receive 
Kvpravx^v  with  applause,  whereas  we  can  scarce 
defend  incurvicervicus  from  derisive  laughter. 

Words  are  proper  when  they  bear  their  original  71 
meaning ;  metaphorical,  when  they  are  used  in  a 
sense  different  from  their  natural  meaning.  Current 
words  are  safest  to  use  :  there  is  a  spice  of  danger  in 
coining  new.  For  if  they  are  adopted,  our  style 
wins  but  small  "-lorv  from  them  ;  while  if  they  are 

•>  » 

rejected,  they  become  a  subject  for  jest.     Still  we  72 
must  make  the   venture;   for    as    Cicero2   says,  use 
softens  even  these  words  which  at  first  seemed  harsh. 
On  the  other  hand  the  power  of  onomatopoeia  is  denied 
us.     Who    would    tolerate    an    attempt     to    imitate 



quid  simile  illis  merito  laudatis  Aty£«  /?io?  et  crt^ev 
6(f>0a\[j.6$  fingere  audeamus?  Nam  ne  balare  quidem 
aut  hinnire  fortiter  diceremus,  nisi  iudicio  vetustatis 

VI.  Est  etiam  sua  loquentibus  observatio,  sua 
scribentibus.  Sermo  constat  ratione  vel  vetustate, 
auctoritate,  consuetudine.  Rationem  praestat  prae- 
cipue  analogia,  nonnunquam  et  etymologia.  Vetera 
maiestas  quaedam  et,  ut  sic  dixerim,  religio  com- 

2  mendat.     Auctoritas  ab  oratoribus  vel  historicis  peti 
solet ;    nam    poetas    metri    necessitas    excusat,    nisi 
si  quando  nihil  impediente  in  utroque  modulatione 
pedum  alterum    malunt,   qualia    sunt,   imo  de   stirpe 
rccisum,  et  aeriae  quo  congessere  palumbes  et  silice  in 
nuda    et    similia ;     cum    summorum    in    eloquentia 
virorum  indicium  pro  ratione,  et  velut  error  honestus 

3  est    magnos    duces    sequentibus.      Consuetudo  vero 
certissima    loquendi    magistra,    utendumque    plane 
serrnone  ut  nummo,  cui  publica  forma  est.      Omnia 
tameii  haec  exigunt  acre  iudiciurn,  analogia  praeci- 
pue,     quam     proxime     ex     Graeco    transferentes    in 

4  Latinum   proportionem   vocaverunt.      Eius   haec   vis 
est,  ut  id  quod  dubium  est  ad  aliquid  simile,  de  quo 
non    quaeritur,    referat    et    incerta    certis    probet. 
Quod    efficitur    duplici   via :    comparatione    similium 
in  extremis  maxima  syllabis,  propter  quod  ea  quae 

1  Homer,  II.  iv.  125.  J  Od.  ix.  394. 

8  Aen.  xii.  208  :  "cut  away  from  the  lowest  root."  Eel.  iii. 
69:  "  where  airy  doves  have  made  their  nest."  Eel.  i.  15: 
"  on  the  naked  rock."  Stirps,  palumbes  and  silex  are  usually 


BOOK    1.  v.  72-vi.  4 

phrases  like  the  much  praised  Aiy£e  /^.o's,1  "  the 
bow  twanged,"  and  cri£ej/  6<f>8a\/ji6<;,z  "  the  eye 
hissed  "  ?  We  should  even  feel  some  qualms  about 
using  balare  "to  baa,"  and  hinmre,  "  to  whinny/'  if 
we  had  not  the  sanction  of  antiquity  to  support  us. 

VI.  There  are  special  rules  which  must  be  ob- 
served both  by  speakers  and  writers.  Language  is 
based  on  reason,  antiquity,  authority  and  usage. 
Reason  finds  its  chief  support  in  analogy  and  some- 
times in  etymology.  As  for  antiquity,  it  is  commen- 
ded to  us  by  the  possession  of  a  certain  majesty,  I 
might  almost  say  sanctity.  Authority  as  a  rule  we  2 
derive  from  orators  and  historians.  For  poets,  owing 
to  the  necessities  of  metre,  are  allowed  a  certain 
licence  except  in  cases  where  they  deliberately 
choose  one  of  two  expressions,  when  both  are  metri- 
cally possible,  as  for  instance  in  imo  de  stirpe  red  sum 
and  aeriae  quo  congessere  palumbes  or  silice  in  nuda  a 
and  the  like.  The  judgment  of  a  supreme  orator 
is  placed  on  the  same  level  as  reason,  and  even  error 
brings  no  disgrace,  if  it  result  from  treading  in  the 
footsteps  of  such  distinguished  guides.  Usage  3 
however  is  the  surest  pilot  in  speaking,  and  we 
should  treat  language  as  currency  minted  with 
the  public  stamp.  But  in  all  these  cases  we  have 
need  of  a  critical  judgment,  especially  as  regards 
analogy  (a  Greek  term  for  which  a  Latin  equivalent 
has  been  found  in  proportion}.  The  essence  of  analogy  4 
is  the  testing  of  all  subjects  of  doubt  by  the  applica- 
tion of  some  standard  of  comparison  about  which 
there  is  no  question,  the  proof  that  is  to  say  of  the 
uncertain  by  reference  to  the  certain.  This  can  be 
done  in  two  different  ways  :  by  comparing  similar 
words,  paying  special  attention  to  their  final  syllables 


Runt  e  singulis  negantur  debere  rationem,  et  demi- 

5  nutione.       Comparatio      in      nominibus     aut     genus 
deprehendit  aut  declinationem  ;   genus,  ut  si  quae- 
ra,tur}ifunis  masculinum  sit  an  femininum,  simile  illi 
sit   panis ;    declinationem,    ut    si    veniat   in   dubium, 
hac  domu  dicendum  sit  an   hac  domo  et  domuum  an 

6  domorum  :  similia  sint  [domus]  anus,  mamis.      Demi- 
nutio  genus  modo  detegit,  et,  ne  ab  eodem  exemplo 
recedam,  funem  masculinum  esse  funiculus  ostendit. 

7  Eadem  in  verbis  quoque  ratio  comparationis,   ut,  si 
quis    antiques    secutus  fervere    brevi    media    syllaba 
dicat,  deprehendatur  vitiose  loqui,  quod  omnia,  quae 
e  et  o  litteris  fatendi  modo  terminantur,  eadem,  si 
infinitis  e  litteram  media  syllaba  acceperunt,  utique 
productam  habent :  prandeo  pendeo  spondeo,  prandere 

8  pendere  spondere.      At  quae  o  solam  habent,  dummodo 
per  eandem  litteram  in  infinito  exeant,  brevia  fiunt : 
lego  dico  curro,  legere  dicere  currere ;  etiamsi  est  apud 
Lucilium  Fervit   aqua  et    fervet,  fervit  niuic,  fervet  ad 

9  annum.      Sed,  pace  dicere  hominis  eruditissimi  liceat, 
si  fervit  putat  illi  simile  currit  et  legit,  fervo  dicetur 
ut  lego  et  curro,  quod  nobis  inauditum  est.      Sed  non 
est  haec  vera  comparatio ;  nam  fervit  est  illi  simile 

1  sc.   because  two  monosyllables,  unless  identical,  cannot 
have  the  same  £n%l  syllable.  2  In  Book  IX. 


BOOK    I.  vi.  4-9 

(hence  monosyllables  are  asserted  to  lie  outside  the 
domain  of  analogy1}  and  by  the  study  of  diminutives. 
Comparison  of  nouns  will  reveal  either  their  gender  5 
or  their  declension  :  in  the  first  case,  supposing  the 
question  is  raised  as  to  whether  Junis  be  masculine 
or  feminine,  panis  will. supply  a  standard  of  compari- 
son :  in  the  second  case,  supposing  we  are  in  doubt 
as  to  whether  we  should  say  hac  dornu  or  hac  domo, 
dommim  or  domorum,  the  standard  of  comparison  will 
be  found  in  words  such  as  anus  or  manus.  Diminutives  6 
merely  reveal  the  gender  :  for  instance,  to  return  to 
a  word  previously  used  as  an  illustration,  fitniculus 
proves  that  funis  is  masculine.  The  same  standard  7 
may  be  applied  in  the  case  of  verbs.  For  instance 
if  it  should  be  asserted  that  the  middle  syllable  of 
fervere  is  short,  we  can  prove  this  to  be  an  error, 
because  all  verbs  which  in  the  indicative  terminate 
in  -eoy  make  the  middle  syllable  of  the  infinitive 
long,  if  that  syllable  contain  an  e :  take  as  examples 
such  verbs  as  prandeo3pendeo,  spondeo  with  infinitives 
prandere,  pendcre,  spondere.  Those  verbs,  however,  8 
which  terminate  in  -o  alone,  if  they  form  the  infini- 
tive in  e,  have  the  e  short ;  compare  lego,  dico,  curro, 
with  the  infinitives,  legere,  diccre,  currere.  I  admit 
that  in  Lucilius  we  find— 

fervit  aqua  et  fervet  :  fervit  nuncfervet  ad  annum.  2 

"  The  water  boils  and  boil  it  will ;  it  boils  and  for  a 
year  will  boil." 

But  with  all  due  respect  to  so  learned  a  man,  if  he 
regards  fervit  as  on  the  same  footing  as  currit   and 
Legit,  we  shall  say  fervo  as  we  say  lego  and  curro  :  9 
but  such   a   form  has  never   yet  come  to  my  ears. 
But  this   is  not  a   true   comparison  :    for  fervit    re- 



servit,  quam  proportionem  sequenti  dicere  necesse  est 

10  fervire  ut  servire.      Prima  quoque  aliquando  positio  ex 
obliquis  invenitur,  ut  memoria  repeto  convictos  a  me, 
qui    reprehenderant,    quod    hoc    verbo    usus    essem, 
pepigi ;  nam  id  quidem  dixisse  summos  auctores  con- 
fitebantur,    rationem    tamen     negabant    permittere, 
quia    prima    positio    paciscor,   cum    haberet    naturam 
patiendi,    faceret    tempore     praeterito    pactus    sum. 

11  Nos    praeter    auctoritatem    oratorum    atque    histori- 
corum  analogia  quoque  dictum  hoc  tuebamur.      Nam 
cum  legeremus  in  XII  tabulis  ni  ita  pacunt,  invenie- 
bamus  simile  huic  cadunt,  inde  prima  positio,  etiamsi 
vetustate   exoleverat,  apparebat  paco  ut  cado,  unde 

12  non  erat  dubium  sic  pepigi  nos  dicere  ut  cecidi.     Sed 
meminerimus   non   per  omnia   duci  analogiae    posse 
rationem,  cum  et  sibi  ipsa  plurimis  in  locis  repugnet. 
Quaedam  sine  dubio  conantur  eruditi  defendere,  ut, 
cum  deprehensum  est,  lepns  et  lupus  similia  positione 
quantum    casibus    numerisque    dissentiant :    ista  re- 
spondent non   esse   paria,  quia   lepus   epicoenon   sit, 
lupus  masculinum  ;  quanquam  Varro  in  eo  libro,  quo 
initia   Romanae   urbis    enarrat,    lupum  feminam   dicit 

13  Ennium    Pictoremque   Fabium  secutus.       Illi   autem 
iidem,  cum  interrogantur,  cur  aper  apri  et  pater  patris 
faciat,    illud    nomen    positum,    hoc    ad    aliquid    esse 
contendunt.      Praeterea  quoniam  utrumque  a  Graeco 


BOOK    I.  vi.  9-13 

sembles  servit,  and  on  this  analogy  we  should  say 
fervire  like  servire.  It  is  also  possible  in  certain  10 
cases  to  discover  the  present  indicative  of  a  verb  from 
the  study  of  its  other  tenses.  I  remember,  for  in- 
stance, refuting  certain  scholars  who  criticised  me  for 
using  the  word  pepigi :  for,  although  they  admitted 
that  it  had  been  used  by  some  of  the  best  authors, 
they  asserted  that  it  was  an  irrational  form  because 
the  present  indicative  paciscor,  being  passive  in 
form,  made  pactus  sum  as  its  perfect.  I  in  addition  1 1 
to  quoting  the  authority  of  orators  and  historians 
maintained  that  I  was  also  supported  by  analogy. 
For  when  I  found  ni  ita  pacunt  in  the  Twelve  Tables, 
I  noted  that  cadunt  provided  a  parallel  :  it  was  clear 
therefore  that  the  present  indicative,  though  now 
obsolete,  was  paco  on  the  analogy  of  cado,  and  it 
was  further  obvious  that  we  say  pepigi  for  just  the 
same  reason  that  we  say  cecidi.  But  we  must  12 
remember  that  analogy  cannot  be  universally  applied, 
as  it  is  often  inconsistent  with  itself.  It  is  true 
indeed  that  scholars  have  attempted  to  justify  certain 
apparent  anomalies  :  for  example,  when  it  is  noted 
to  what  an  extent  lepus  and  lupus,  which  resemble 
each  other  closely  in  the  nominative,  differ  in  the 
plural  and  in  the  other  cases,  they  reply  that  they 
are  not  true  parallels,  since  lepus  is  epicene,  while 
lupus  is  masculine,  although  Varro  in  the  book  in 
which  he  narrates  the  origins  of  Rome,  writes  lupus 
femina,  following  the  precedent  of  Ennius  and 
Fabius  Pictor.  The  same  scholars,  however,  when  13 
asked  why  aper  became  apri  in  the  genitive,  but  pater 
patris,  asserted  that  aper  was  an  absolute,  pater 
a  relative  noun.  Further  since  both  words  derive 
from  the  Greek,  they  took  refuge  in  the  fact 



ductum   sit,  ad   earn   rationem  recurrunt,  ut  Trarpo? 

14  patris,     Ka-rrpov    apri    faciat.       Ilia    tamen     quomodo 
effugient,    ut,    nomina    quamvis    feminina    singular! 
nominativo  us  litteris   finita  nunquam  genitivo  casu 
ris  syllaba  terminentur,  faciat  tamen  Venus  Veneris  ? 
item  cum  es  litteris  finita  per  varies  exeant  genitives, 
nunquam  tamen  eadem  ris  syllaba  terminates,  Ceres 

15  cogat  dici  Cereris  ?     Quid  vero  ?  quod  tota  positionis 
eiusdem   in   diversos    flexus   eunt?    cum  Alba  faciat 
Albanos  et  Albenses,  volo  volui  et  volavi.     Nam  prae- 
terito   quidem    tempore   varie    formari   verba    prima 
persona  o  littera  terminata,  ipsa  analogia  confiteatur ; 
siquidem  facit  cado  cecidi,  spondeo  spopondi,  pin  go  pinxi, 

16  lego  legi,  pono  posui,  frango  fregi,  laudo  laudavi.     Non 
enim,   cum    primum    fingerentur    homines,    analogia 
demissa  caelo   formam   loquendi  dedit,   sed  inventa 
est  postquam   loquebantur,   et  notatum    in   sermone 
quid  quomodo  caderet.      Itaque  non  ratione  nititur 
sed  exemplo,  nee  lex  est  loquendi  sed  observatio,  ut 
ipsamanalogiamnulla  res  alia  feceritquam  consuetude. 

17  Inhaerent  tamen  ei  quidam  molestissima  diligentiae 
perversitate,  ut  audaciter  potius  dicant  quam  audader, 
licet  omnes  oratores  aliud  sequantur,  et  emicavit  non 
emicuit    et    conire    non    coire.      His    permittamus    et 
audhisse  et   scivisse   et  trilmnale    et  faciliter  dicere ; 
frugnlis  quoque  sit  apud  illos  nonjrugi.  nam  quo  alio 

18  modo  fiet  frugalifas?     lidem  centum  milia  minimum  et 
tid em   Deum  ostendant  duplices   quoque   soloecismos 

1  i.e.  minimum  and   deum   should,   strictly  speaking,  be 
accus.  singular. 


BOOK    I.  vi.  13-18 

that  TraTpds  provides  a  parallel  to  patris  and 
to  apri.  But  how  will  they  evade  the  difficulty  14 
that  feminine  nouns  whose  nominative  singular 
ends  in  -us  never  make  the  genitive  end  in  -ris, 
and  yet  the  genitive  of  Venus  is  Vcneris :  again 
nouns  ending  in  -es  have  various  genitive  ter- 
minations, but  never  end  in  -ris,  but  yet  we  have 
no  choice  but  to  make  the  genitive  of  Ceres  Cereris? 
Again  what  of  those  words  which,  although  identi-  15 
cal  in  the  form  of  the  nominative  or  present  indica- 
tive, develop  the  utmost  variety  in  their  inflections. 
Thus  from  Alba  we  get  both  Albanus  and  Albensis, 
from  volo  both  volui  and  volavi.  Analogy  itself 
admits  that  verbs  whose  present  indicative  ends  in 
-o  have  a  great  variety  of  perfect  formations,  as 
for  instance  cado  cecidi,  spondco  spopondi,  pingo  pinxi, 
lego  legi,  pono  posui,frangofregi}  laudo  laudavi.  For  16 
analogy  was  not  sent  down  from  heaven  at  the 
creation  of  mankind  to  frame  the  rules  of  language, 
but  was  discovered  after  they  began  to  speak  and  to 
note  the  terminations  of  words  used  in  speech.  It 
is  therefore  based  not  on  reason  but  on  example, 
nor  is  it  a  law  of  language,  but  rather  a  practice 
which  is  observed,  being  in  fact  the  offspring  of 
usage.  Some  scholars,  however,  are  so  perverse  and  17 
obstinate  in  their  passion  for  analogy,  that  they  say 
audaciter  in  preference  to  audacter,,  the  form  preferred 
by  all  orators,  and  emicaiit  for  emicuit,  and  conire 
for  coire.  We  may  permit  them  to  say  audivisse, 
scivisse,  tribunale  and  faclliter,  nor  will  we  deprive 
them  of  frugally  as  an  alternative  for  frugl  :  for 
from  what  else  can frngalitas  be  formed?  They  may  18 
also  be  allowed  to  point  out  that  phrases  such  as 
centum  milia  nummum  and  Jidem  deum l  involve  a 



esse,  quando  et  casum  mutant  et  numerum ;  nescie- 
bamus  enim  ac  non  consuetudini  et  decori  servie- 
bamus,  sicut  in  plurimis,  quae  M.  Tullius  in  Oratore 

19  divine   ut  omnia   exequitur.      Sed  Augustus  quoque 
in  epistulis  ad  C.  Caesarem  scriptis  emendat,  quod  is 
caUduni  dicere  quam  caldum  malit,  non  quia  id  non 
sit   Latinum  sed  quia  sit  odiosum  et,  ut  ipse  Graeco 

20  verbo    significavit,    Trept'epyor.       Atqui    hanc    quidam 
opOoeTreiav  solam  putant,  quam  ego  minima  excludo. 
Quid    enim    tarn    necessarium    quam   recta    locutio? 
Immo  inhaerendum  ei  iudico,  quoad  licet,  diu  etiam 
mutantibus  repugnandum  ;  sed  abolita  atque  abrogata 
retinere  insolentiae  cuiusdam  est  et  frivolae  in  parvis 

21  iactantiae.      Multum  enim  litteratus,  qui  sine  aspira- 
tione  et  producta  secunda  syllaba  salutarit  (avere  est 
enim)  et  calefacere  dixerit  potius,  quam  quod  dicimus, 
et    conservavisse,  his   adiiciat  face  et  dice  et  similia. 

22  Recta    est    liaec    via;    quis    negat  ?    sed    adiacet    et 
mollior  et  magis  trita.      Ego  tamen  non  alio  magis 
angor,  quam  quod  obliquis  casibus  ducti  etiam  primas 
sibi  positiones  non  invenire  sed  mutare  permittunt : 
ut  cum   ebur   et   robur,   ita   dicta    ac   scripta   summis 
auctoribus,   in   o   litteram    secundae    svllabae    trans- 

'  v 

ferunt,   quia    sit    roboris   et    eboris,    sulpur    autem    et 
guttur  u  litteram  in  genitive  servent ;  ideoque  iecur 

23  etiam  et  femur  controversiam  fecerunt.      Quod  non 

1  xlvi.   155. 

8  For  hact,  calfacere,  conservasse. 


BOOK    I.  vi.  18-23 

double  solecism,   since  they  change  both  case  and 
number.     Of    course  we   were    in  blank    ignorance 
of  the  fact  and  were  not  simply  conforming  to  usage 
and  the  demands  of  elegance,  as  in  the  numerous 
cases,    with    which    Cicero    deals    magnificently,  as 
always,  in  his  Orator.1    Augustus  again  in  his  letters  19 
to  (.laius  Caesar   corrects   him  for  preferring  calidus 
to  caldns,  riot  on  the  ground  that  the  former  is  not 
Latin,  but  because  it  is  unpleasing  and  as  he  himself 
puts  it  in  Greek  Treptepyov    (affected).       Some    hold  20 
that  this  is  just  a  question  of  op#oeVeta  or  correctness 
of  speech,  a  subject  to   which   I  am  far  from  being 
indifferent.      For  what  can   be  more  necessary  than 


that  we  should  speak  correctly  ?  Nay,  I  even  think 
that,  as  far  as  possible,  we  should  cling  to  correct 
forms  and  resist  all  tendencies  to  change.  But  to 
attempt  to  retain  forms  long  obsolete  and  extinct 
is  sheer  impertinence  and  ostentatious  pedantry. 
I  would  suggest  that  the  ripe  scholar,  who  says  "ave"  21 
without  the  aspirate  and  with  a  long  e  (for  it  comes 
from  arere),  and  uses  calefacere  and  conservavisse  in 
preference  to  the  usual  forms,2  should  also  add  face, 
dice  and  the  like  to  his  vocabulary.  His  way  is  the  22 
right  way.  Who  doubts  it  ?  But  there  is  an  easier 
and  more  frequented  path  close  by.  There  is, 
however,  nothing  which  annoys  me  more  than  their 
habit  not  merely  of  inferring  the  nominative  from 
the  oblique  cases,  but  of  actually  altering  it.  For 
instance  in  ebur  and  robur,  the  forms  regularly  used 
both  in  writing  and  speech  by  the  best  authors, 
these  gentlemen  change  their  second  syllable  to  o, 
because  their  genitives  are  roboris  and  eboris,  and  be- 
cause sulpur  and  gidtur  keep  the  u  in  the  genitive.  So 
too  femur  and  iecur  give  rise  to  similar  controversy. 



minus  est  licentiosum,  quam  si  sulpuri  et  gutturi 
subiicerent  in  genitive  litteram  o  mediam,  quia  esset 
ebons  et  roboris  ;  sicut  Antonius  Gnipho,  qui  robur 
quidem  et  ebur  atque  etiarn  marmur  faletur  esse, 
verum  fieri  vult  ex  liis  robnra,  ebur  a,  marmur  a. 

24  Quodsi       animadverterent     litterarum     adfinitatem, 
scirent   sic  ab  eo,  quod   est  robur,   roboris  fieri,  quo- 
modo  ab  eo,  quod  est  miles  limes,  militis  limitis,  index 
vindex,    iudicis     lindicis,    et     quae     supra    iam    attigi. 

25  Quid  vero  quod,    ut    dicebam,   similes  positiones  in 
longe  diversas  figuras  per  obliquos  casus  exeunt,  ut 
virgo  luno,  fusus   lusus,   cuspis  puppis   et    mille   alia  ? 
cum  illud   etiam  accidat,  ut  quaedam   pluraliter  non 
dicantur,  quaedam  contra  singular!  numero,  quaedam 
casibus  careant,  quaedam  a  primis;  statim  positionibus 

26  tota    mutentur,    ut     luppiter.       Quod     verbis     etiam 
accidit  ut  illi  fero,  cuius  praeteritum  perfectum  et 
ulterius  non  invenitur.      Nee  plurimum  refert,  nulla 
haec  an  praedura  sint.      Nam  quid  progenies  genitivo 
singular],  quid  plurali  spes  faciet  ?      Quomodo  autem 
quire  et  mere  vel  in  praeterita  patiendi  modo  vel  in 

27  participia    transibunt?      Quid   de    aliis    dicam,    cum 
senatus  senati  an  senaius  facial,  incertum  sit  ?     Quare 
mihi  non  invenuste   dici  videtur,  aliud   esse  Latine 
aliud  grammatice  loqui.      Ac  de  analogia  nimium. 

28  Etvmologia,   quae   verborum    originem  inquirit,  a 


BOOK    I.  vi.  23-28 

Their  proceedings  are  just  as  arbitrary  as  if  they  23 
were  to  substitute  an  o  in  the  genitives  of  sulpur 
and  gutlur  on  the  analogy  of  eboris  and  roboris. 
Thus  Antonius  Gnipho  while  admitting  robur,  ebur 
and  even  marmur  to  be  correct,  would  have  their 
plurals  to  be  ebura,  robura  and  mannura.  If  they  24 
would  only  pay  attention  to  the  affinities  existing 
between  letters,  they  would  realize  that  robur  makes 
its  genitive  roboris  in  precisely  the  same  way  that 
Limes,  miles,  index  and  uindcx  make  their  genitives 
militis,  limitis,  iudicis  and  uindicis,  not  to  mention  other 
words  to  which  I  have  already  referred.  Do  not  nouns  25 


which  are  similar  in  the  nominative  show,  as  I  have 
already  observed,  quite  different  terminations  in  the 
oblique  cases  ?  Compare  uirgo  and  Juno,  lusus  and 
fusns,  cu&pis  and  puppis  and  a  thousand  others. 
Again  some  nouns  are  not  used  in  the  plural,  while 
others  are  not  used  in  the  singular,  some  are  inde- 
clinable, while  others,  like  Jupiter,  in  the  oblique 
cases  entirely  abandon  the  form  of  the  nominative.  26 
The  same  is  true  of  verbs  :  for  instance  fero  dis- 


appears  in  the  perfect  and  subsequent  tenses.  Nor 
does  it  matter  greatly  whether  such  forms  are  non- 
existent or  too  harsh  to  use.  For  what  is  the  geni- 
tive singular  of  progenies  or  the  genitive  plural  ofspes? 
Or  how  will  quire  and  mere  form  a  perfect  passive  or 
passive  participles.  Why  should  I  mention  other  27 
words  when  it  is  even  doubtful  whether  the  genitive 
of  senatus  is  senati  or  senatus  ?  In  view  of  what  I 
have  said,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  remark,  that  it 
is  one  thing  to  speak  Latin  and  another  to  speak 
grammar,  was  far  from  unhappy.  So  much  for 
analogy,  of  which  I  have  said  more  than  enough. 
Etymology  inquires  into  the  origin  of  words,  and  28 



Cicerone  dicta  est  notatio,  quia  nomen  eius  apud 
Aristotelem  invenitur  avfiftoXov,  quod  est  nota ;  nam 
verbum  ex  verbo  ductum,  id  est  veriloquium,  ipse 
Cicero,  qui  finxit,  reformidat.  Sunt  qui  vim  potius 

29  intuiti  originationem  vocent.      Haec  habet  aliquando 
usum  necessarium,  quotiens   interpretatione  res,  de 
qua  quaeritur,  eget,  ut  M.  Caelius  se  esse  hominem 
frugi    vult    probare,    non    quia    abstinens    sit    (nam 
id    ne    ementiri    quidem    poterat),    sed    quia    utilis 
multis,  id   est  fructuosus,  unde   sit  ducta  frugalitas. 
Ideoque    in    definitionibus    assignatur    etymologiae 

30  locus.       Nonnunquam   etiam    barbara    ab   emendatis 
conatur  discernere,  ut  cum,  Triqnelram  dici  Sicilian! 
an  Triquedram,  meridiem  an  medidiem  oporteat  quae- 

31  ritur,  aliaque  quae  consuetudini  serviunt.     Continet 
autem  in  se   multam   eruditionem,  sive   ex    Graecis 
orta    tractemus,    quae    sunt    plurima,    praecipueque 
Aeolica    ratione    (cui    est    sermo    noster    simillimus) 
declinata,  sive  ex  historiarum  veterum  notitia  nomina 
hominum,    locorum,    gentium,    urbium     requiramus, 
unde   Bruti,   Publicolae,   Pythici  ?    cur    Latiinn,   Italia, 
Beneventum?  quae  Capitolium  et  collem  Quirinalem  et 
Argiletum  appellandi  ratio? 

32  lam  ilia  minora,  in  quibus   maxime   studiosi    eius 

1  Top.  viii.  35.  !  ircpi  c-p/z.  2. 

8  For  derivations  see  Index  of  Names  at  end. 


BOOK   I.  vi.  28-32 

was  called  notation  by  Cicero,1  on  the  ground  that 
the  term  used  by  Aristotle2  is  cru/xftoAov,  which  may 
be  translated  by  nota.  A  literal  rendering  of  eYu//oA.oyia 
would  be  ueritoquium,  a  form  which  even  Cicero,  its 
inventor,  shrinks  from  using.  Some  again,  with  an 
eye  to  the  meaning  of  the  word,  call  it  origination. 
Etymology  is  sometimes  of  the  utmost  use,  when-  29 
ever  the  word  under  discussion  needs  interpretation. 
For  instance  Marcus  Caelius  wishes  to  prove  that  he 
is  homo  frugi,  not  because  he  is  abstemious  (for  he 
could  not  even  pretend  to  be  that),  but  because  he 
is  useful  to  many,  that  is  frucluosus,  from  which 
frugalitas  is  derived.  Consequently  we  find  room 
for  etymology  when  we  are  concerned  with  de- 
finitions. Sometimes  again  this  science  attempts  to  30 
distinguish  between  correct  forms  and  barbarisms,  as 
for  instance  when  we  are  discussing  whether  we 
should  call  Sicily  Triquetra  or  Triqutdra,  or  say 
meridies  or  medidies,  not  to  mention  other  words 
which  depend  on  current  usage.  Such  a  science  31 
demands  profound  erudition,  whether  we  are  deal- 
ing with  the  large  number  of  words  which  are 

O  O 

derived  from  the  Greek,  more  especially  those 
inflected  according  to  the  practice  of  the  Aeolic 
dialect,  the  form  of  Greek  which  most  nearly 
resembles  Latin  ;  or  are  using  ancient  historians  as 
a  basis  for  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  names  of  men, 
places,  nations  and  cities.  For  instance  what  is  the 
origin  of  names  such  as  Brutus,  Publicola,  or  Pythicus  ? 
Why  do  we  speak  of  Latium,  Italia  or  Beneventum  ? 
What  is  the  reason  for  employing  such  names  as 
Capitolium,  collis  Quirmalis  or  Argiletum  ?  3 

1    now   turn    to    minor    points    concerning  which   32 
enthusiasts     for     etymology    give     themselves     an 



rei  fatigantur,  qui  verba  paulum  declinata  varie  et 
multipliciter  ad  veritatem  reducunt  aut  correptis  aut 
porrectis,  aut  adiectis  aut  detractis,  aut  permutatis 
litteris  syllabisve.  Inde  pravis  ingeniis  ad  foedissima 
usque  ludibria  labuntur.  Sit  enim  Consul  a  consu- 
lendo  vel  a  iudicando ;  nam  et  hoc  consulere  veteres 
vocaverunt,  unde  adhuc  remanet  illud  rogat  boni 

33  consulas,    id     est    bonum     iudices.      Senatui    nomen 
dederit  aetas  (nam  iidem  Patres  sunt),  et  rex  rector 
et   alia    plurima    indubitata ;    nee    abnuerim    tcgulae 
regulaeque   et    similium    his    rationem.      lam   sit    et 
classis  a   calando   et   lepus    levipes  et   vu/pes    volipes  : 

34  etiamne  a  contrariis  aliqua  sinemus  trahi,  ut   Incus, 
quia  umbra  opacus  parum   luceat,  et  ludus,  quia  sit 
longissime    a    lusu^    et     Ditis,    quia    minime    dives'? 
etiamne  hominem  appellari,  quia  sit  humo  natus  (quasi 
vero  non  omnibus  animalibus  eadem   origo,  aut  illi 
primi  mortales  ante  nomen  imposuerint  terrae  quam 

35  sibi),   et    verba    ab    acre    verberato  ?       Pergamus  :    sic 
perveniemus  eo  usque,  ut  stella  luminis  stilla  credatur, 


BOOK    I.  vi.  32-35 

infinity  of  trouble,  restoring  to  their  true  form  words 
which  have  become  slightly  altered  :  the  methods 
which  they  employ  are  varied  and  manifold  :  they 
shorten  them  or  lengthen  them,  add,  remove,  or 
interchange  letters  and  syllables  as  the  case  may  be. 
As  a  result  perverseness  of  judgment  leads  to  the 
most  hideous  absurdities.  I  am  ready  to  admit  that 
consul  may  be  derived  from  considere  in  the  sense  of 
consulting  or  judging;  for  the  ancients  used  con- 
sulere  in  the  latter  sense,  and  it  still  survives  in  the 
phrase  rogal  boni  consulas,  that  is  honum  indices,  "judge 
fit."  Again  senatus  may  well  be  derived  from  old  33 
age  (for  the  senators  are  called  "the  fathers"): 
I  concur  in  the  derivations  assigned  to  rex  rector 
to  say  nothing  of  many  other  words  where  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  and  do  not  refuse  to  accept  those 
suggested  for  tegula,  regula  and  the  like  :  let  classis 
be  from  calare  (call  out,  summon),  lepus  be  a  con- 
traction of  levipes  and  vulpes  of  volipes.  But  are  we  34 
also  to  admit  the  derivation  of  certain  words  from 
their  opposites,  and  accept  lucus  a  non  lucendo,  since 
a  grove  is  dark  with  shade,  Indus  in  the  sense  of 
school  as  being  so  called  because  it  is  quite  the 
reverse  of  "  play  "  and  Dis,  Ditis  from  diues,  because 
Pluto  is  far  from  being  rich  ?  Are  we  to  assent  to 
the  view  that  homo  is  derived  from  humus,  because 
man  sprang  from  the  earth,  as  though  all  other 
living  things  had  not  the  same  origin  or  as  if 
primitive  man  gave  the  earth  a  name  before  giving 
one  to  himself?  Or  again  can  verbum  be  derived 
from  aer  verberatus,  "beaten  air"?  Let  us  go  a  35 
little  further  and  we  shall  find  that  stella  is  believed 
to  be  still  a  luminis  "a  drop  of  light,"  a  derivation 
whose  author  is  so  famous  in  literature  that  it  would 



cuius  etymologiae  auctorem  clarum   sane  in  litteris 
nominari  in  ea  parte,  qua  a  me  reprehenditur,  inhu- 

36  manum    est.       Qui   vero    talia    libris  complex!   sunt, 
nomina    sua    ipsi    inscripserunt ;    ingenioseque   visus 
est  Gavius  caelibes  dicere  veluti  caelites,  quod  onere 
gravissimo   vacent,   idque    Graeco    argumento    iuvit, 
ffiOeovs  enim  eadem  de  causa  dici  arlirmat.      Nee  ei 
cedit  Modestus  inventione,  nam,  quia  Caelo  Saturnus 
genitalia    absciderit,     hoc     nomine     appellatos,     qui 
uxore  careant,  ait ;   Aelius  pituitam,  quia  pelat  vilam. 

37  Sed  cui  non  post  Varronem  sit  venia,  qui  agrum,  quia 
in  eo  agatur  aliquid,  et  graculos,  quia  gregalim  volent, 
dictos    Ciceroni    persuadere    voluit    (ad    eum    enim 
scribit),  cum  alterum  ex  Graeco  sit  manifestum  duci, 

38  alterum    ex    vocibus    avium  ?       Sed    hoc    tanti    fuit 
vertere,  ut  merula,  quia  sola  volat,  quasi  mera  volans 
nominaretur.      Quidam  non  dubitaverunt  etymologiae 
subiicere    omnem    nominis    causam :    ut    ex    habitu^ 
quemadmodum  dixi^  Longos  et  Rufos,  ex  sono  strepere, 
murmurare ;     etiam    derivata,   ut    a  velocilate  dicitur 
velox,  et  composita  pluraque   his   similia,  quae   sine 
dubio     aliunde     origin  em    ducunt,     sed     arte     non 

1  de  Lingua  Lat.  \.  34  and  76. 

2  The  above  makes  Quintilian  derive  velox  from  velocitas, 
as  Varro    (L.L.   viii.    15)    derives  prudens  from  prudentia. 
Those    who    regard    this    as    incredible   must    with    Colson 
transpose  ut  .  .  .  velox  to  follow  Rufos  making  Velox  a  cog- 
nomen, or  with  Meister  read  velo  for  velocitate,  or  velo  citato 


BOOK    I.  vi.  35-38 

be  unkind  to  mention  his  name  in  connexion  with  a 
point  where  he  comes  in  for  censure.  But  those  36 
who  collected  such  derivations  in  book  form,  put 
their  names  on  the  title  page ;  and  Gavius  thought 
himself  a  perfect  genius  when  he  identified  caelibes, 
"bachelors/'  with  caelites,  "gods/'  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  free  from  a  heavy  load  of  care,  and 
supported  this  opinion  by  a  Greek  analogy:  for  he 
asserted  that  ^Weoi,  "  young  men/'  had  a  precisely 
similar  origin.  Modestus  is  not  his  inferior  in 
inventive  power :  for  he  asserts  that  caelibes,  that  is 
to  say  unmarried  men,  are  so  called  because  Saturn 
cut  off  the  genital  organs  of  Caelus.  Aelius  asserts 
that  pituita,  "phlegm/'  is  so  called  quia  petal  mtam, 
because  it  attacks  life.  But  we  may  pardon  anyone  37 
after  the  example  set  by  Varro.1  For  he  tried  to 
persuade  Cicero,  to  whom  he  dedicated  his  work, 
that  a  field  was  called  agcr  because  something  is 
done  in  it  (agitur},  and  jackdaws  graculos  because 
they  fly  in  flocks  (gregafini),  in  spite  of  the  obvious 
fact  that  the  first  word  is  derived  from  the  Greek, 
the  latter  from  the  cry  of  the  bird  in  question. 
But  Varro  had  such  a  passion  for  derivations  that  he  38 
derived  the  name  merula  "a  blackbird'  from  mera 
uolans  on  the  ground  that  it  flies  alone !  Some 
scholars  do  not  hesitate  to  have  recourse  to  etymology 
for  the  origin  of  every  word,  deriving  names  such  as 
Rufus  or  Longus  from  the  appearance  of  their 
possessor,  verbs  such  as  strepere  or  munnurare  from 
the  sounds  which  they  represent,  and  even  ex- 
tending this  practice  to  certain  derivatives,  making 
uelox  for  instance  find  its  origin  in  uelocitas,2  as  well 
as  to  compounds  and  the  like  :  now  although  such 
words  doubtless  have  an  origin,  no  special  science  is 



egent,    cuius    in    hoc    opere    non    est    usus    nisi    in 

39  Verba    a    vetustate    repetita    non    sol um    magnos 
assertores  habent  sed  etiam  adferunt  orationi  inaies- 
tatem  aliquam  non  sine  delectatione  ;  nam  et  auc- 
toritatem    antiquitatis     habent    et,    quia    intermissa 

40  sunt,   gratiam  novitati    similem    parant.      Sed    opus 
est  modo,  ut  neque  crebra  sint  haec   neque   mani- 
festa,  quia  nihil  est  odiosius  adfectatione,  nee  utique 
ab  ultimis   et  iam   oblitteratis    repetita   temporibus, 
qualia  sunt  topper  et  antegerio  et  exanclare  et  prosapia 
et     Saliorum     carmina    vix    sacerdotibus    suis     satis 

41  intellecta.      Sed  ilia  mutari   vetat  religio   et  conse- 
cratis  utendum  est ;     oratio  vero,  cuius  summa  virtus 
est  perspicuitas,  quam  sit  vitiosa,  si  egeat  interprete  ? 
Ergo,  ut  novorum  optima  erunt  maxime  vetera,  ita 
veterum  maxime  nova. 

42  Similis    circa    auctoritatem    ratio.       Nam    etiamsi 
potest    videri    nihil    peccare,    qui    utitur    iis    verbis, 
quae    summi    auctores    tradiderunt,    multum    tamen 
refert    non    solum,    quid    dixerint,    sed    etiam    quid 
persuaserint.        Neque     enim     tuburchinabundum    et 
lurchinabundurn  iam    in   nobis    quisquam    ferat,    licet 
Cato  sit  auctor,  nee  hos  lodices,  quanquam  id  Pollioni 
placet,  nee  gladiola,  atqui   Messala  dixit,   nee   par- 


BOOK    I.  vi.  38-42 

required  to  detect  it,  since  it  is  only  doubtful  cases 
that  demand  the  intervention  of  the  etymologist. 

Archaic  words  not  only  enjoy  the  patronage  of  39 
distinguished  authors,  but  also  give  style  a  certain 
majesty  and  charm.  For  they  have  the  authority  of 
age  behind  them,  and  for  the  very  reason  that  they 
have  fallen  into  desuetude,  produce  an  attractive 
effect  not  unlike  that  of  novelty.  But  such  words  40 
must  be  used  sparingly  and  must  not  thrust  them- 
selves upon  our  notice,  since  there  is  nothing  more 
tiresome  than  affectation,  nor  above  all  must  thev  be 
drawn  from  remote  and  forgotten  ages  :  I  refer  to 
words  such  as  topper,  "  quite,"  antegerio,  "  exceed- 
ingly," exanclare,  "to  exhaust,"  prosapia,  "a  race" 
and  the  language  of  the  Salian  Hymns  now  scarcely 
understood  by  its  own  priests.  Religion,  it  is  true,  41 
forbids  us  to  alter  the  words  of  these  hymns  and 
we  must  treat  them  as  sacred  things.  But  what  a 
faulty  thing  is  speech,  whose  prime  virtue  is  clear- 
ness, if  it  requires  an  interpreter  to  make  its  meaning 
plain  !  Consequently  in  the  case  of  old  words  the 
best  will  be  those  that  are  newest,  just  as  in  the 
case  of  new  words  the  best  will  be  the  oldest. 

The  same  arguments  apply  to  authority.  For  42 
although  the  use  of  words  transmitted  to  us  by  the 
best  authors  may  seem  to  preclude  the  possibility 
of  error,  it  is  important  to  notice  not  merely  what 
they  said,  but  what  words  they  succeeded  in  sanction- 
ing. For  no  one  to-day  would  introduce  words  such 
as  tuburchinabundus,  "  voracious,"  or  lurchinabundus, 
"guzzling,"  although  they  have  the  authority  of 
Cato ;  nor  make  lodices,  "blankets,"  masculine, 
though  Pollio  preferred  that  gender;  nor  say  gladi- 
ola,  "small  swords,"  though  Messalaused  this  plural, 


ricidatum,  quod  in  Caelio  vix  tolerabile  videtur,  nee 
collos  mihi  Calvus  persuaserit ;  quae  nee  ipsi  iam 

43  Superest    igitur    consuetude ;     nam    fuerit    paene 
ridiculum  malle  sermonem,  quo  locuti  sint  homines, 
quam  quo  loquantur.      Et  sane  quid  est  aliud  vetus 
sermo  quam  vetus  loquendi  consuetude?       Sed  huic 
ipsi  necessarium  est  iudicium,  constituendumque  in 
primis    id    ipsum    quid     sit,    quod     consuetudinem 

44  vocemus.     Quae     si     ex     eo,    quod     plures    faciunt, 
nomen  accipiat,  periculosissimum  dabit  praeceptum, 
non    orationi    modo     sed     (quod    mains    est)    vitae. 
Unde   enim   tantum    boni,   ut    pluribus    quae    recta 
sunt  placeant?     Igitur  ut  velli  et  comam  in  gradus 
frangere   et    in    balneis   perpotare,    quamlibet    haec 
invaserint    civitatem,     non    erit     consuetude,     quia 
nihil    horum    caret    reprehensione ;    at    lavamur    et 
tondemur   et   convivimus    ex    consuetudine  :    sic    in 
loquendo,  non  si  quid  vitiose   multis   insederit,  pro 

45  regula  sermonis  accipiendum   erit.      Nam,  ut  trans- 
earn,     quemadmodum     vulgo     imperiti     loquantur, 
tota  saepe  theatra  et  omnem  circi  turbam  exclam- 
asse  barbare  scimus.      Ergo  consuetudinem  sermonis 
vocabo  consensum  eruditorum,  sicut  vivendi  consen- 
sum  bonorum. 


BOOK    I.  vi.  42-45 

nor  parricidatus  for  parricide,  a  form  which  can 
scarcely  be  tolerated  even  in  Caelius,  nor  will  Calvus 
persuade  me  to  speak  of  collos,  "  necks."  Indeed, 
were  these  authors  alive  to-day,  they  would  never 
use  such  words. 

Usage  remains  to  be  discussed.  For  it  would  be  43 
almost  laughable  to  prefer  the  language  of  the 
past  to  that  of  the  present  day,  and  what  is  ancient 
speech  but  ancient  usage  of  speaking  ?  But  even 
here  the  critical  faculty  is  necessary,  and  we  must 
make  up  our  minds  what  we  mean  by  usage.  If  it  44 
be  defined  merely  as  the  practice  of  the  majority, 
we  shall  have  a  very  dangerous  rule  affecting  not 
merely  style  but  life  as  well,  a  far  more  serious 
matter.  For  where  is  so  much  good  to  be  found  that 
what  is  right  should  please  the  majority  ?  The 
practices  of  depilation,  of  dressing  the  hair  in 
tiers,  or  of  drinking  to  excess  at  the  baths,  although 
they  may  have  thrust  their  way  into  society,  can- 
not claim  the  support  of  usage,  since  there  is  some- 
thing to  blame  in  all  of  them  (although  we  have 
usage  on  our  side  when  we  bathe  or  have  our 
hair  cut  or  take  our  meals  together).  So  too  in 
speech  we  must  not  accept  as  a  rule  of  language 
words  and  phrases  that  have  become  a  vicious  habit 
with  a  number  of  persons.  To  say  nothing  of  the  45 
language  of  the  uneducated,  we  are  all  of  us  well 
aware  that  whole  theatres  and  the  entire  crowd  of 
spectators  will  often  commit  barbarisms  in  the  cries 
which  they  utter  as  one  man.  I  will  therefore  define 
usage  in  speech  as  the  agreed  practice  of  educated 
men,  just  as  where  our  way  of  life  is  concerned  I 
should  define  it  as  the  agreed  practice  of  all  good 



VII.  Nunc,  quoniam  diximus,  quae  sit  loquendi 
regula,  dicendum,  quae  scribentibus  custodienda, 
quod  Graeci  6p6oypa<f>Lav  vocant  ;  hoc  nos  recte  scri- 
bendi  scientiam  nominemus.  Cuius  ars  non  in  hoc 
posita  est,  ut  ncverimus,quibus  quaeque  syllaba  litteris 
constet  (nani  id  quidem  infra  grammatici  officium 
est),  sed  totam,  ut  mea  fert  opinio,  subtilitatem  in 

2  dubiis  habet.      Ut  longis  syllabis  omnibus  apponere 
apicem  ineptissimum  est,  quia  plurimae  natura  ipsa 
verbi  quod  scribitur  patent,  sed  interim  necessarium, 
cum  eadem   littera  alium   atque  alium    intellectum, 
prout    correpta    vel    producta    est,    facit  ;    ut    mains 
arborem    significat    an    hominem   non    bonum   apice 

3  distinguitur,  palus  aliud   priore  syllaba   longa  aliud 
sequenti  significat,  et  cum  eadem  littera  nominative 
casu    brevis,    ablative    longa    est,    utrum    sequamur, 

4  plerumque    hac    nota    monendi     sumus.        Similiter 
putaverunt   ilia   quoque   servanda   discrimina,   ut    ex 
praepositionem,  si  verbum  sequeretur  specto,  adiecta 
secundae  syllabae  s  littera,  si  pecto,  remota  scribere- 

5  mus.      Ilia   quoque  servata  est  a  multis  differentia, 
ut  ad,  cum  esset  praepositio,  d  litteram,  cum  autem 
coniunctio,  t  acciperet,  itemque  cum,  si  tempus  signi- 
ficaret,  per  qu,  si  comitem,  per  c  ac  duas  sequentes 

6  scriberetur.        Frigidiora  his  alia,  ut  quidquid  c  quar- 
tam    haberet,    ne     interrogare     bis    videremur ;     et 


BOOK    I.  vn.  1-6 

VII.  Having  stated  the  rules  which  we  must 
follow  in  speaking,  I  will  now  proceed  to  lay  down 
the  rules  which  must  be  observed  when  we  write. 
Such  rules  are  called  orthography  by  the  Greeks  ;  let 
us  style  it  the  science  of  writing  correctly.  This 
science  does  not  consist  merely  in  the  knowledge  of 
the  letters  composing  each  syllable  (such  a  study 
is  beneath  the  dignity  of  a  teacher  of  grammar), 
but,  in  my  opinion,  develops  all  its  subtlety  in  con- 
nexion with  doubtful  points.  For  instance,  while  it  2 
is  absurd  to  place  a  circumflex  over  all  long  syllables 
since  the  quantity  of  most  syllables  is  obvious  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  word  which  is  written,  it  is 
all  the  same  occasionally  necessary,  since  the  same 
letter  involves  a  different  meaning  according  as  it  is 
long  or  short.  For  example  we  determine  whether 
mains  is  to  mean  an  "apple  tree"  or  a  "bad  man"  by 
the  use  of  the  circumflex  ;  palus  means  a  "stake/'  if  3 
the  first  syllable  is  long,  a  "marsh,"  if  it  be  short ; 
again  when  the  same  letter  is  short  in  the  nominative 
and  long  in  the  ablative,  we  generally  require  the 
circumflex  to  make  it  clear  which  quantity  to  under- 
stand. Similarly  it  has  been  held  that  we  should  4 
observe  distinctions  such  as  the  following  :  if  the 
preposition  ex  is  compounded  with  specto,  there  will 
be  an  s  in  the  second  syllable,  while  there  will  be  no 
s  if  it  is  compounded  with  pecto.  Again  the  follow-  5 
ing  distinction  has  frequently  been  observed  :  ad  is 
spelt  with  a  d  when  it  is  a  preposition,  but  with  a  t 
when  it  is  a  conjunction,  while  cum  is  spelt  quvm 
when  it  denotes  time,  but  cum  when  it  denotes 
accompaniment.  Still  more  pedantic  are  the  practices  6 
of  making  the  fourth  letter  of  quidquid  a  c  to  avoid 
the  appearance  of  repeating  a  question,  and  of  writing 



quotidie  non  cotidie,  ut  sit  quot  diebus.      Verum  haec 
iam  etiam  inter  ipsas  ineptias  evanuerunt. 

7  Quaeri   solet,   in  scribendo  praepositiones  sonum 
quern  iunctae  efficiunt,  an  quern  separatae,  observare 
conveniat  •   ut,  cum  dico  optinuit  (secundam  enim  6 

8  litteram    ratio   poscit,    aures    magis    audiunt   p)    et 
immunis,  illud  enim,   quod   veritas  exigit,    sequentis 

9  syllabae  sono  victum  m  gemina    commutatur.      Est 
et  in  dividendis  verbis  observatio,  mediam  litteram 
consonantem   priori  an  sequent!  syllabae   adiungas  : 
haruspex  enim,  quia  pars  eius  posterior  a  spectando 
est,    s    litteram    tertiae    dabit;     abstemius,    quia    ex 
abstinentia    temeti    composita    vox    est,   primae    re- 

10  linquet.       Nam  k  quidem  in  nullis  verbis  utendum 
puto,   nisi    quae   signirtcat,    etiam    ut    sola    ponatur. 
Hoc    eo    non    omisi,    quod    quidam     earn,    quotiens 
a   sequatur,   necessariam  credunt,  cum  sit  c  littera, 
quae  ad  omnes  vocal  es  vim  suam  perferat. 

11  Verum   orthographia  quoque   consuetudini   servit, 
ideoque   saepe   mutata   est.      Nam   ilia   vetustissima 
transeo    tempora,   quibus   et    pauciores    litterae    nee 
similes     his     nostris     earum    formae    fuerunt    et    vis 
quoque  diversa,  sicut  a  pud   Graecos  o  litterae,  quae 
interim   longa   ac    brevis    ut   apud   nos,   interim    pro 

1  K  may  stand  for  Kalendae,  Kaeso,  Karthago,  Kalumnia, 

1  The  original  alphabet  consisted  of  twenty-one  letters, 
and  was  increased  to  twenty-three  by  the  addition  of  y 
and  z. 


BOOK    I.  vn.  6-1 1 

quotidie  instead  of  colidie  to  show  that  it  stands  for 
quot  diebus.  But  such  practices  have  disappeared 
into  the  limbo  of  absurdities. 

It  is  often  debated  whether  in  our  spelling  of  7 
prepositions  we  should  be  guided  by  their  sound 
when  compounded,  or  separate.  For  instance  when 
I  say  optinuit,  logic  demands  that  the  second 
letter  should  be  a  6,  while  to  the  ear  the  sound  is 
rather  that  of  p  :  or  again  take  the  case  of  immunis  :  8 
the  letter  n,  which  is  required  by  strict  adherence  to 
fact,  is  forced  by  the  sound  of  the  m  which  follows 
to  change  into  another  m.  We  must  also  note  when  9 
analysing  compound  words,  whether  the  middle 
consonant  adheres  to  the  preceding  syllable  or  to 
that  which  follows.  For  example  since  the  latter 
part  of  haruspex  is  from  speclare,  the  s  must  be 
assigned  to  the  third  syllable.  In  abstrmius  on  the 
other  hand  it  will  go  with  the  first  syllable  since  the 
word  is  derived  from  abstinentia  temeti,  "  abstention 
from  wine."  As  for  k  my  view  is  that  it  should  not  10 
be  used  at  all  except  in  such  words  as  may  be  indi- 
cated by  the  letter  standing  alone  as  an  abbreviation.1 
I  mention  the  fact  because  some  hold  that  k  should 
be  used  whenever  the  next  letter  is  an  a,  despite 
the  existence  of  the  letter  c  which  maintains  its 
force  in  conjunction  with  all  the  vowels. 

Orthography,  however,  is  also  the  servant  of  usage  1 1 
and  therefore  undergoes  frequent  change.  I  make 
no  mention  of  the  earliest  times  when  our  alphabet 
contained  fewer  letters  2  and  their  shapes  differed 
from  those  which  we  now  use,  while  their  values  also 
were  different.  For  instance  in  Greek  the  letter  o 
was  sometimes  long  and  short,  as  it  is  with  us,  and 
again  was  sometimes  used  to  express  the  syllable 



12  syllaba   quam    nomine  suo  exprimit  posita  est ;    uta 
Latinis    veteribus    d    plurimis     in     verbis    adiectam 
ultimam,   quod   manifestum    est    etiam    ex    columna 
rostrata,  quae  est  Duilio  in  foro  posita  ;    interim  g 
quoque,  ut  in  pulvinari  Solis,  qui  colitur  iuxta  aedem 

13  Quirini,  resperug,  quod  vesperugincm  accipimus.      De 
mutatione  etiam  litterarum,  de  qua  supra  dixi,  nihil 
repetere  hie  necesse  est,  fortasse  enim  sicut  scribe- 

14  bant  etiam  loquebantur.     Semivocales  geminare  diu 
non  fuit  usitatissimi  moris,  atque  e  contrario  usque 
ad   Accium   et  ultra    porrectas   syllabas   geminis,    ut 

15  dixi,  vocalibus  scripserunt.     Diutius  duravit,  ut  e  et 
i  iungendis  eadem  ratione   qua  Graeci  ct  uterentur; 
ea  casibus  nurnerisque  discreta  est,,  ut  Lucilius  prae- 
cipit :    lam  puerei  venere,   e  poslremum   facito  atque  i, 
Ut  pueri  plures  fiant ;    ac    deinceps    idem  :    Mendaci 

16  furique  addes  e,  cum  dare  furi  lusseris.      Quod  quidem 
cum  supervacuum  est,  quia  i  tarn  longae  quam  brevis 
naturam  habet,  turn  incommodum  aliquando.     Nam 
in  iis,  quae  proximam  ub  ultima  litteram  e  habebunt 
et  i  longa  terminabuntur,  illam  rationem  sequentes 
utemur  e  gemina,  qualia  sunt  haec  aurei,  argentei  et 

17  his    similia.      Idque  iis  praecipue,  qui  ad  lectionem 
instituentur,     etiam     impedimento     erit ;     sicut     in 

1  i.e.  the  interjection  0  ! 

2  The  ablative  originally  terminated  in  d  ;  e.g.  pugnandod, 
marid,  navaled,  pracdad,  etc.,  on  the  base  of  the  column  of 

3  i.  iv.  12-17.  *  e.g.  iusi  was  written  for  iussi. 


BOOK    I.  vii.  11-17 

which    is   identical  with    its   name.1      And  in    Latin  12 
ancient  writers  ended  a  number  of  words  with  d,  as 
may  be  seen  on  the  column  adorned  with  the  beaks 
of  ships,  which  was  set  up  in  the  forum  in  honour 
of   Duilius.2     Sometimes    again  they   gave   words  a 
final  g,  as  we  may  still  see  in   the  shrine  of  the  Sun, 
close  to  the  temple  of  Quirinus,  where  we  find  the 
word    uesperug,   which  we  write  uesperugo    (evening 
star).      I    have    already   spoken   of   the  interchange  13 
of  letters  3  and  need   not  repeat  my  remarks  here: 
perhaps  their  pronunciation  corresponded  with  their 
spelling.      For    a    long    time  the   doubling  of  semi-   14 
vowels    was    avoided,4    while    down    to  the  time  of 
Accius  and  beyond,  long  syllables  were  indicated  by 
repetition  of  the  vowel.      The  practice  of  joining  e  15 
and  i  as  in  the  Greek  diphthong  a  lasted  longer  :  it 
served  to  distinguish  cases  and  numbers,  for  which 
we  may  compare  the  instructions  of  Lucilius : 

The  boys  are  come :  why  then,  their  names  must 

With  e  and  t  to  make  them  more  than  one  ; 

and  later — 

If  to  a  thief  and  liar  (mendaci  furique)  you  would 

In  e  and  i  your  thief  must  terminate. 


But  this  addition  of  e  is  quite  superfluous,  since  i  16 
can  be  long  no  less  than  short :   it  is  also  at  times 
inconvenient.      For  in   those  words  which   end   in  i 
and  have  e  as  their  last  letter  but  one,  we  shall  on 
this  principle  have  to  write  e  twice  :   I  refer  to  words 
such  as  aurei  or  argentei  and  the  like.      Now  such  a  17 
practice  will  be  an  actual  hindrance  to  those  who  are 
learning  to  read.      This  difficulty  occurs  in  Greek  as 


Graecis  accidit  adiectione  t  litterae,  quam  non  solum 
dativis  casibus  in  parte  ultima  ascribunt  sed  qui- 
busdam  etiam  interponunt,  ut  in  AHI2THI,  quia 
etymologia  ex  div'isione  in  tris  syllabas  facta  desideret 

18  earn  litteram.     Ae  syllabam,  cuius  secundam  nunc  e 
litteram  ponimus,  varie  per  a  et  i  efferebant ;  quidam 
semper  ut  Graeci,  quidam  singulariter  tantum,  cum 
in   dativum    vel    genitivum   casum   incidissent,   unde 
pictai  vestis  et  aquai  Vergilius  amantissimus  vettistatis 

19  carminibus     inseruit.       In   iisdem    plurali   numero   e 
utebantur,    hi    Syllae,    Galbae.      Est    in    hac   quoque 
parte   Lucilii  praeceptum,  quod  quia  pluribus  expli- 
catur  versibus,  si  quis  parum  credet,  apud  ipsum  in 

20  nono    requirat.      Quid    quod    Ciceronis    temporibus 
paulumque     infra,     fere     quotiens     s    littera    media 
vocalium  longarum  vel  subiecta  longis  esset,  gemina- 
batur,    ut    caussae,    cassus,    divissiones  ?    quomodo    et 
ipsum  et  Vergilium  quoque  scripsisse  manus  eorum 

21  docent.      Atqui  paulum  superiores  etiam  illud,  quod 
nos  gemina  dicimus  iussi,  una  dixerunt.      lam  optimus 
maximus,   ut    mediam    i    litteram,    quae    veteribus   u 
fuerat,  acciperent,  Gai  primum  Caesaris  inscriptione 

22  traditur  factum.      Here  nunc  e  littera  terminamus,  at 
veterum  comicorum  adhuc  libris  invenio  Heri  ad  me 
venit ;  quod  idem  in  epistolis  Augusti,  quas  sua  manu 

23  scripsit  aut  emendavit,  deprehenditur.     Quid?   non 
Cato  Censorius  dicam  t&faciam  dicem  et  faciem  scrip- 

1  The  noun  being  formed  from  \-n't£<a.  AHI2THI  in  the  text 
is  dative  after  in.  The  trisyllable  to  which  Q.  refers  is  the 
nominative.  2  Aen.  ix.  26  and  vii.  464. 


BOOK    I.  vn.  17-23 

well  in  connexion  with  the  addition  of  an  iota,  which 
is  employed  not  merely  in  the  termination  of  the 
dative,  but  is  sometimes  found  in  the  middle  of 
words  as  in  ATJ'CTTT;?,  for  the  reason  that  the  analysis 
applied  by  etymology  shows  the  word  to  be  a  tri- 
syllable l  and  requires  the  addition  of  that  letter. 
The  diphthong  ae  now  written  with  an  e,  was  pro-  IS 
nounced  in  old  days  as  ai ;  some  wrote  ai  in  all  cases, 
as  in  Greek,  others  confined  its  use  to  the  dative  and 
genitive  singular  ;  whence  it  comes  that  Vergil,2 
always  a  passionate  lover  of  antiquity,  inserted  pictai 
uestis  and  aquai  in  his  poems.  But  in  the  plural  they  19 
used  e  and  wrote  Syllae,  Galbae.  Lucilius  has  given 
instructions  on  this  point  also ;  his  instructions 
occupy  quite  a  number  of  verses,  for  which  the 
incredulous  may  consult  his  ninth  book.  Again  in  20 
Cicero's  days  and  a  little  later,  it  was  the  almost 
universal  practice  to  write  a  double  s,  whenever  that 
letter  occurred  between  two  long  vowels  or  after  a 
long  vowel,  as  for  example  in  caussae,  cassus,  diuissiones. 
That  he  and  Vergil  both  used  this  spelling  is  shown 
by  their  own  autograph  manuscripts.  And  yet  at  21 
a  slightly  earlier  date  iussi  which  we  write  with  a 
double  s  was  spelt  with  only  one.  Further  optimus 
maximus,  which  older  writers  spelt  with  a  u,  ap- 
pear for  the  first  time  with  an  i  (such  at  any  rate 
is  the  tradition)  in  an  inscription  of  Gaius  Caesar.3 
We  now  write  here,  but  I  still  find  in  manuscripts  of  22 
the  old  comic  poets  phrases  such  as  heri  ad  me  uenitf 
and  the  same  spelling  is  found  in  letters  of  Augustus 
written  or  corrected  by  his  own  hand.  Again  did  23 
not  Cato  the  censor  spell  dicam  and  faciam  as  dicem 

3  Caligula,  the  first  of  the  Caesars  to  adopt  this  title. 

4  Ter.  Phorm.  36. 



sit,  eundemque  in  ceteris,  quae  similiter  cadunt, 
moduni  teiiuit,  quod  et  ex  veteribus  eius  libris  maiii- 
festum  est  et  a  Messala  in  libro  de  s  littera  posituni  ? 

24  Sibe  et  quase  scri])tum  in  multorum  libris  est,  sed  an 
hoc  voluerint    auctores,  nescio ;    T.    Livium    ita    his 
usum   ex   Pediano  comperi,  qui  et  ipse  eum  seque- 

25  batur ;     liaec    nos    i    littera    finimus.        Quid    dicam 
vortices  et  vorsus  ceteraque  ad  eundem  modum,  quae 
primus     Scipio    Africanus     in    e    litteram    secundam 

26  vertisse  dicitur  ?      Nostri   praeceptores   seruum  ceru- 
Mwque  u  et  o  litteris  scripserunt,  quia  subiecta  sibi 
vocalis    in    uiium    sonum     coalescere     et    confundi 
nequiret ;     nunc    u    gemma    scribuntur    ea     ratione, 
quam    reddidi ;    neutro   sane   modo   vox,    quam    sen- 
timus,  efficitur.      Nee  inutiliter    Claudius   Aeolicam 

27  illam   ad    hos  usus   litteram   adieeerat.       Illud   nunc 
melius,     quod    cui    tribus,    quas     praeposui,    litteris 
enotamus;    in    quo    pueris    nobis    ad   pinguem    sane 
sonum    qu    et   oi   utebantur,   tantum    ut    ab   illo   qui 

28  Quid?  quae  scribuntur  aliter  quam  enuntiantur? 
Nam    et   Gains    C   littera    significatur,   quae    inversa 
mulierem   declarat ;    quia   tarn    Galas    esse   vocitatas 
quam    Gaios    etiam    ex    nuptialibus    sacris    apparet. 

29  Nee  Gnaeus  earn  litteram  in  praenomiiiis  nota  accipit, 
quae  sonat;    et  colunmam  et  consules  exempta  n  littera 

1  cp.  i.  iv.  8. 

2  The  bride  used  the  formula  ubi  tu  Gains,  ibi  ego  Gaia. 


BOOK    I.  vir.  23-29 

and  Jaciem  and  observe  the  same  practice  in  words  of 
similar  termination  ?  This  is  clear  from  old  manu- 
scripts of  his  works  and  is  recorded  by  Mes.sala  in 
his  treatise  on  the  letter  s.  Sibe  and  quase  are  found  24 
in  many  books,  but  I  cannot  say  whether  the 
authors  wished  them  to  be  spelt  thus  :  I  learn  from 
Pedianus  that  Livy,  whose  precedent  he  himself 
adopted,  used  this  spelling  :  to-day  we  make  these 
words  end  with  an  i.  What  shall  I  say  of  uorttces,  25 
uorsus  and  the  like,  which  Scipio  Africanus  is  said 
to  have  been  the  first  to  spell  with  an  e?  My  own  26 
teachers  spelt  sennit  and  ceruus  with  a  uo,  in  order 
that  the  repetition  of  the  vowel  might  not  lead  to 
the  coalescence  and  confusion  of  the  two  sounds : 
to-day  however  we  write  these  words  with  a  double 
u  on  the  principle  which  I  have  already  stated : 
neither  spelling  however  exactly  expresses  the  pro- 
nunciation. It  was  not  without  reason  that  Claudius 
introduced  the  Aeolic  digamma  to  represent  this 
sound.1  It  is  a  distinct  improvement  that  to-day  we  27 
spell  cui  as  I  have  written  it  :  when  I  was  a  boy  it 
used  to  be  spelt  quoi,  giving  it  a  very  full  sound, 
merely  to  distinguish  it  from  qui. 

Again,  what  of  words  whose  spelling  is  at  variance  28 
with  their  pronunciation  ?     For  instance  C  is  used  as 
an  abbreviation  for  Gaius,  and  when  inverted  stands 
for  a  woman,  for  as  we  know  from  the  words  of  the 
marriage   service   women    used  to  be    called   Gaiae, 
just  as   men   were   called  Gaii.2     Gnaeus  too  in  the  29 
abbreviation  indicating  the  praenomen  is  spelt  in  a 
manner  which  does  not  agree  with  its  pronunciation. 
We  also  find  columna  3  and  consul  spelt  without  an  n, 

3  columa  is  mentioned  by  the  grammarian  Pompeius  as  a 
barbarism  in  the  fifth  century,  cp.  dimin.  columella.  Con- 
sul is  abbreviated  cos. 



legimus ;  et  Subura,  cum  tribus  litteris  notatur,  c 
tertiam  ostendit.  Multa  sunt  generis  huius ;  sed 
haec  quoque  vereor  ne  modum  tarn  parvae  quaestionis 

30  ludicium  autem  suum  grammaticus  interponat  his 
omnibus;    nam    hoc    valere    plurimum   debet.      Ego 
(nisi    quod    consuetude    obtinuerit)    sic    scribendum 

31  quidque  iudico,  quomodo  sonat.     Hie  enim  est  usus 
litterarum,  ut   custodiant  voces    et  velut  depositum 
reddant  legentibus,  itaque  id  exprimere  debent  quod 

32  dicturi   sumus.      Hae  fere   sunt   emendate    loquendi 
scribendique      partes ;     duas     reliquas     significanter 
ornateque  dicendi  non  equidem   grammaticis  aufero, 
sed  cum  mihi  officia  rhetoris  supersint,  maiori  operi 

33  Redit  autem  ilia  cogitatio,  quosdam  fore,  qui  haec 
quae  diximus  parva  nimium  et  impedimenta  quoque 
maius  aliquid   agentibus  putent.       Nee  ipse    ad    ex- 
tremam    usque   anxietatem    et    ineptas    cavillationes 
descendendum  atque  iis  ingenia  concidi  et  comminui 

34  credo.      Sed  nihil  ex  grammatice  nocuerit,  nisi  quod 
supervacuum    est.       An   ideo    minor   est    M.    Tullius 
orator,  quod  idem  artis  huius  diligentissimus  fuit  et 
in   filio   (ut   epistolis    apparet)   recte    loquendi   asper 
quoque  exactor?  aut  vim  C.  Caesaris  fregerunt  editi 

35  de   analogia   libri  ?  aut  ideo  minus   Messala  nitidus, 

1  The  original  name  was  Sucusa. 

BOOK    I.  vn.  29-35 

while  Subura  when  indicated  by  three  letters  is  spelt 
Sue.1  I  could  quote  many  other  examples  of  this, 
but  I  fear  that  I  have  already  said  too  much  on  so 


trivial  a  theme. 

On  all  such  subjects  the  teacher  must  use  his  own  30 
judgment;  for  in  such  matters  it  should  be  the 
supreme  authority.  For  my  own  part,  I  think  that, 
within  the  limits  prescribed  by  usage,  words  should 
be  spelt  as  they  are  pronounced.  For  the  use  of  31 
letters  is  to  preserve  the  sound  of  words  and  to 
deliver  them  to  readers  as  a  sacred  trust :  conse- 
quently they  ought  to  represent  the  pronunciation 
which  we  are  to  use.  These  are  the  more  important  32 
points  in  connexion  with  writing  and  speaking 
correctly.  I  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  deny  to  the 
teacher  of  literature  all  part  in  the  two  remain- 
ing departments  of  speaking  and  writing  with 
elegance  and  significance,  but  I  reserve  these  for  a 
more  important  portion  of  this  work,  as  I  have  still 
to  deal  with  the  duties  of  the  teacher  of  rhetoric. 

I  am  however  haunted  by  the  thought  that  some  33 
readers  will  regard  what  I  have  said  as  trivial  details 
which  are  only  likely  to  prove  a  hindrance  to  those 
who  are  intent  upon  a  greater  task  ;  and  I  myself 
do  not  think  that  we  should  go  so  far  as  to  lose  our 
sleep  of  nights  or  quibble  like  fools  over  such 
minutiae  ;  for  such  studies  make  mincemeat  of  the 
mind.  But  it  is  only  the  superfluities  of  grammar  34 
that  do  any  harm.  I  ask  you,  is  Cicero  a  less  great 
orator  for  having  given  this  science  his  diligent 
attention  or  for  having,  as  his  letters  show,  demanded 
rigid  correctness  of  speech  from  his  son  ?  Or  was  the 
vigour  of  Gaius  Caesar's  eloquence  impaired  by  the 
publication  of  a  treatise  on  Analogy  ?  Or  the  polish  35 


quia  quosdam  totos  libellos  non  verbis  modo  sin- 
gulis  sed  etiam  litteris  dedit?  Non  obstant  hae 
disciplinae  per  illas  euntibus  sed  circa  illas 

VIII.  Superest  lectio,  in  qua  puer  ut  sciat,  ubi 
suspendere  spiritum  debeat,  quo  loco  versum  dis- 
tinguere,  ubi  claudatur  sensus,  unde  incipiat,  quando 
attollenda  vel  summittenda  sit  vox,  quo  quidque  flexu, 
quid  lentius,  celerius,  concitatius,  lenius  dicendum, 

2  demonstrari  nisi    in   opere  ipso  non  potest.      Unum 
est  igitur,  quod  in  hac  parte   praecipiam  :   ut  omnia 
ista  facere   possit,  intelligat.      Sit   autem   in   primis 
lectio  virilis  et  cum  suavitate  quadam  gravis  et  non 
quidem    prosae    similis,    quia    et    carmen    est    et   se 
poetae    canere    testantur ;    non   tamen    in    canticum 
dissoluta    nee     plasmate    (ut    nunc    a    plerisque    fit) 
effeminata ;    de    quo    genere     optime    C.    Caesarern 
praetextatum    adhuc    accepimus    dixisse :    Si  cantos, 

3  male  cantas ;  si  legis,  cantas.      Nee  prosopopoeias,  ut 
quibusdam   placet,   ad    comicum   morem    pronuntiari 
velim ;    esse  tamen  flexum   quendam,   quo   distingu- 
antur  ab    iis,  in  quibus    poeta  persona    sua    utetur. 

4  Cetera    admonitione    magna     egent,    in    primis,    ut 
tenerae  mentes  tracturaeque  altius,  quid  quid  rudibus 


BOOK    I.  vn.  35-vm.  4 

of  Messala  dimmed  by  the  fact  that  he  devoted 
whole  books  to  the  discussion  not  merely  of 
single  words,  but  of  single  letters  ?  Such  studies  do 
no  harm  to  those  who  but  pass  through  them  :  it  is 
only  the  pedantic  stickler  who  suffers. 

VIII.  Reading  remains  for  consideration.  In 
this  connexion  there  is  much  that  can  only  be 
taught  in  actual  practice,  as  for  instance  when  the 
boy  should  take  breath,  at  what  point  he  should 
introduce  a  pause  into  a  line,  where  the  sense  ends 
or  begins,  when  the  voice  should  be  raised  or 
lowered,  what  modulation  should  be  given  to  each 
phrase,  and  when  he  should  increase  or  slacken 
speed,  or  speak  with  greater  or  less  energy.  In  2 
this  portion  of  my  work  I  will  give  but  one  golden 
rule  :  to  do  all  these  things,  he  must  understand 
what  he  reads.  But  above  all  his  reading  must  be 
manly,  combining  dignity  and  charm  ;  it  must  be 
different  from  the  reading  of  prose,  for  poetry  is 
song  and  poets  claim  to  be  singers.  But  this  fact 
does  not  justify  degeneration  into  sing-song  or  the 
effeminate  modulations  now  in  vogue  :  there  is  an 
excellent  saying  on  this  point  attributed  to  Gaius 
Caesar  while  he  was  still  a  boy  :  "If  you  are  singing, 
you  sing  badly :  if  you  are  reading,  you  sing." 
Again  I  do  not,  like  some  teachers,  wish  character  3 
as  revealed  by  speeches  to  be  indicated  as  it  is  by 
the  comic  actor,  though  I  think  that  there  should 
be  some  modulation  of  the  voice  to  distinguish  such 
passages  from  those  where  the  poet  is  speaking  in 
person.  There  are  other  points  where  there  is  much  4 
need  of  instruction  :  above  all,  unformed  minds 
which  are  liable  to  be  all  the  more  deeply  impressed 
by  what  they  learn  in  their  days  of  childish 



et  omnium  ignaris  insederit,  non  modo  quae  diserta 
sed  vel  magis  quae  honesta  sunt,  discant. 

5  Ideoque    optime    institutum    est,    ut   ab    Homero 
atque  Vergilio  lectio  inciperet,  quanquam  ad  intelli- 
gendas  eorum  virtutes  firmiore  iudicio  opus  est ;  sed 
huic  rei  superest  tempus,  neque  enim  semel  legentur. 
Interim  et  sublimitate  heroi  carminis  animus  adsurgat 
et  ex  magnitudine  rerum  spiritum  ducat  et  optimis 

6  imbuatur.       Utiles    tragoediae,    alunt    et    lyrici ;    si 
tamen   in  his  non   auctores  modo  sed  etiam  partes 
operis    elegeris,    nam    et    Graeci    licenter   multa    et 
Horatium  nolim  in  quibusdam  interpretari.     Elegia 
vero,   utique  quae  amat,  et  hendecasyllabi,  qui  sunt 
commata  Sotad  eorum  (nam   de  Sotadeis   ne   praeci- 
piendum    quidem    est)  amoveantur,   si   fieri    potest, 
si  minus,,  certe  ad  firmius  aetatis  robur  reserventur. 

7  Comoediae,  quae  plurimum  conferre  ad  eloquentiam 
potest,  cum  per  omnes  et  personas  et  adfectus  eat, 
quern  usum   in   pueris   putem,   paulo    post   suo   loco 
dicam  ;  nam  cum  mores  in  tuto  fuerint,  inter  prae- 
cipua  legenda  erit.      De  Menandro  loquor,  nee  tamen 

8  excluserim     alios.      Nam     Latini     quoque     auctores 
adferent  utilitatis  aliquid.     Sed  pueris,  quae  maxime 

1  One  form  of    Sotadean  is   _  w  _  w ^  w  . 

The   Hendecasyllable    runs      ~ ^  ^  _  ^  _  v. 

Sotadean  minus  the  first  three  syllables.     Both  metres  were 
frequently  used  for  indecent   lampoons.      For   Sotades   see 

2  sc.  ch.  xL 


BOOK    I.  vni.  4-8 

ignorance,  must  learn  not  merely  what  is  eloquent  ; 
it  is  even  more  important  that  they  should  study 
what  is  morally  excellent. 

It  is  therefore  an  admirable  practice  which  now  0 
prevails,  to  begin  by  reading  Homer  and  Vergil, 
although  the  intelligence  needs  to  be  further  devel- 
oped for  the  full  appreciation  of  their  merits  :  but 
there  is  plenty  of  time  for  that  since  the  boy  will 
read  them  more  than  once.  In  the  meantime  let  his 
mind  be  lifted  by  the  sublimity  of  heroic  verse, 
inspired  by  the  greatness  of  its  theme  and  imbued 
with  the  loftiest  sentiments.  The  reading  of  tragedy  0 
also  is  useful,  and  lyric  poets  will  provide  nourish- 
ment for  the  mind,  provided  not  merely  the  authors 
be  carefully  selected,  but  also  the  passages  from 
their  works  which  are  to  be  read.  For  the  Greek  lyric 
poets  are  often  licentious  and  even  in  Horace  there 
are  passages  which  I  should  be  unwilling  to  explain 
to  a  class.  Elegiacs,  however,  more  especially  erotic 
elegy,  and  hendecasyllables,  which  are  merely  sections 
of  Sotadean  verse  1  (concerning  which  latter  I  need 
give  no  admonitions),  should  be  entirely  banished,  if 
possible  ;  if  not  absolutely  banished,  they  should  be 
reserved  for  pupils  of  a  less  impressionable  age.  As  to 
comedy,  whose  contribution  to  eloquence  may  be  of  7 
no  small  importance,  since  it  is  concerned  with  every 
kind  of  character  and  emotion,  I  will  shortly  point 
out  in  its  due  place2  what  use  can  in  my  opinion 
be  made  of  it  in  the  education  of  boys.  As  soon  as 
we  have  no  fear  of  contaminating  their  morals,  it 
should  take  its  place  among  the  subjects  which  it  is 
specially  desirable  to  read.  I  speak  of  Menander, 
though  I  would  not  exclude  others.  For  Latin  8 
authors  will  also  be  of  some  service.  But  the 



ingenium  alant  atque  animum  augeant,  praelegenda ; 
ceteris,  quae  ad  eruditionem  modo  pertinent,  longa 
aetas  spatium  dabit.  Multuni  autem  veteres  etiam 
Latini  conferunt,  (quanquam  plerique  plus  ingenio 
quani  arte  valuerunt)  in  primis  copiam  verborum, 
quorum  in  tragoediis  gravitas,  in  comoediis  elegantia 
9  et  quidam  velut  drTtKtcr/xos  inveniri  potest.  Oeco- 
nomia  quoque  in  iis  diligentior  quani  in  plerisque 
novorum  erit,  qui  omnium  operum  solam  virtutem 
sententias  putaverunt.  Sanctitas  certe  et,  ut  sic 
dicam,  virilitas  ab  iis  petenda  est,  quando  nos  in 
omnia  deliciarum  vitia  dicendi  quoque  ratione  de- 

10  fluximus.       Denique    credamus     summis    oratoribus, 
qui  veterum    poemata    vel    ad    fidem    causarum  vel 
ad   ornamentum  eloquentiae  adsumunt.      Nam  prae- 

1 1  cipue  quidem  apud  Ciceronem  frequenter  tamen  apud 
Asinium  etiam  et  ceteros,  qui  sunt  proximi,  videmus 
Enni,  Acci,  Pacuvi,  Lucili,  Terenti,  Caecili  et  aliorum 
inseri  versus  summa  non  eruditionis  modo  gratia  sed 
etiam  iucunditatis,  cum  poeticis  voluptatibus  aures  a 

12  forensi    asperitate    respirent.      Quibus    accedit    non 
mediocris  utilitas,  cum  sententiis  eorum  velut  quibus- 
dam  testimoniis  quae  proposuere  confirment.    Verum 
priora  ilia  ad  pueros  magis,  haec  sequentia  ad  robusti- 

BOOK    I.  viii.  8-12 

subjects  selected  for  lectures  to  boys  should  be  those 
which  will  enlarge  the  mind  and  provide  the  great- 
est nourishment  to  the  intellect.  Life  is  quite  long 
enough  for  the  subsequent  study  of  those  other  sub- 
jects which  are  concerned  with  matters  of  interest 
solely  to  learned  men.  But  even  the  old  Latin  poets 
may  be  of  great  value, in  spite  of  the  fact  that  their 
strength  lies  in  their  natural  talent  rather  than  in 
their  art :  above  all  they  will  contribute  richness 
of  vocabulary  :  for  the  vocabulary  of  the  tragedians 
is  full  of  dignity,  while  in  that  of  the  comedians 
there  is  a  certain  elegance  and  Attic  grace.  They  9 
are,  too,  more  careful  about  dramatic  structure  than 
the  majority  of  moderns,  who  regard  epigram  as  the 
sole  merit  of  every  kind  of  literary  work.  For 
purity  at  any  rate  and  manliness,  if  I  may  say  so, 
we  must  certainly  go  to  these  writers,  since  to-day 
even  our  style  of  speaking  is  infected  with  all  the 
faults  of  modern  decadence.  Finally  we  may  derive  10 
confidence  from  the  practice  of  the  greatest  orators 
of  drawing  upon  the  early  poets  to  support  their 
arguments  or  adorn  their  eloquence.  For  we  find,  11 
more  especially  in  the  pages  of  Cicero,  but  frequent- 
ly in  Asinius  and  other  orators  of  that  period,  quota- 
tions from  Ennius,  Accius,  Pacuvius,  Lucilius, Terence, 
Caecilius  and  others,  inserted  not  merely  to  show 
the  speaker's  learning,  but  to  please  his  hearers 
as  well,  since  the  charms  of  poetry  provide  a  plea- 
sant relief  from  the  severity  of  forensic  eloquence. 
Such  quotations  have  the  additional  advantage  of  12 
helping  the  speaker's  case,  for  the  orator  makes  use 
of  the  sentiments  expressed  by  the  poet  as  evidence 
in  support  of  his  own  statements.  But  while  my 
earlier  remarks  have  special  application  to  the 
education  of  boys,  those  which  I  have  just  made 


ores  pertinebunt,  cum  grammatices  amor  et  usus 
lectionis  non  scholarum  temporibuSj  sed  vitae  spatio 

13  In  praelegendo  grammaticus  et  ilia  quidem  minora 
praestare  debebit,  ut  partes  orationis  reddi  sibi  soluto 
versu   desideret   et  pedum   proprietates,   quae    adeo 
debent  esse  notae  in  carminibus,  ut  etiam  in  oratoria 
compositione     desiderentur.      Deprehendat,       quae 
barbara,  quae  impropria,  quae  contra  leges  loquendi 

14  sint    posita ;     non     ut     ex     iis     utique     improbentur 
poetae     (quibus,     quia     plerumque     servire     metro 
coguntur,  adeo  ignoscitur,  ut  vitia  ipsa  aliis  in  car- 
mine     appellationibus      nominentur ;     metaplasmos 
enim  et  schematismos  et  schemata,  ut  dixi,  vocamus, 
et  laudem   virtutis  necessitati  damus),  sed  ut  com- 

15  moneat  artificialium  et  memoriam  agitet.      Id  quoque 
inter     prima     rudimenta     non    inutile    demonstrare, 
quot  quaeque  verba  modis   intelligenda  sint.      Circa 
glossemata  etiam,   id   est  voces  minus  usitatas,  non 

16  ultima    eius    professionis  diligentia    est.       Enimvero 
iam  maiore  cura  doceat  tropos  omnes,  quibus  prae- 
cipue   non   poema  modo   sed    etiam    oratio    ornatur ; 
schemata    utraque,    id    est    figuras,    quaeque    A.e£eo>s 
quaeque    otai'otas    vocantur,   quorum    ego    sicut    tro- 

1  The  formation  of  cases  of  nouns  and  tenses  of  verbs  from 
a  n<-,n-existent  nom.   or  pres. :  or  more  generally  any  change 
in  the  forms  of  a  word. 

2  schematismus  and  schemata  botli  seem  to  mean  the  same, 
sc.  figures.  3  See  Book  VIII.  chap.  vi. 

BOOK    I.   vin.  12-16 

apply  rather  to  persons  of  riper  years  ;  for  the  love  of 
letters  and  the  value  of  reading  are  not  confined  to 
one's  schooldays,  but  end  only  with  life. 

In  lecturing  the  teacher  of  literature  must  give  13 
attention  to  minor  points  as  well  :  he  will  ask  his 
class  after  analysing  a  verse  to  give  him  the  parts  of 
speech  and  the  peculiar  features  of  the  feet  which 
it  contains  :  these  latter  should  be  so  familiar  in 
poetry  as  to  make  their  presence  desired  even  in 
the  prose  of  oratory.  He  will  point  out  what  words 
are  barbarous,  what  improperly  used,  and  what  are 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  language.  He  will  not  do  14 
this  by  way  of  censuring  the  poets  for  such  pecu- 
liarities, for  poets  are  usually  the  servants  of  their 
metres  and  are  allowed  such  licence  that  faults 
are  given  ether  names  when  they  occur  in  poetry  : 
for  wre  style  them  metaplasms,1  schematisms  and 
schemata?  as  I  have  said,  and  make  a  virtue  of 
necessity.  Their  aim  will  rather  be  to  familiarise  the 
pupil  with  the  artifices  of  style  and  to  stimulate  his 
memory.  Further  in  the  elementary  stages  of  such  15 
instruction  it  will  not  be  unprofitable  to  show  the 
different  meanings  which  may  be  given  to  each  word. 
With  regard  to  glossemata,  that  is  to  say  words  not 
in  common  use,  the  teacher  must  exercise  no  ordi- 
nary diligence,  while  still  greater  care  is  required  in  16 
teaching  all  the  tropes3  which  are  employed  for  the 
adornment  more  especially  of  poetry,  but  of  oratory 
as  well,  and  in  making  his  class  acquainted  with  the 
two  sorts  of  schemata  or  figures  known  as  ^figures  of 
speech  and  ^figures  of  thought*  I  shall  however  post- 

4  vSee  Book  IX.  chaps,  i.  and  ii.  A  trope  is  an  expression 
used  in  a  sense  which  it  cannot  strictly  bear.  A  figure  is  a 
form  of  speech  differing  from  the  ordinary  method  of  expres- 
sion ;  see  ix  i.  4. 



porum  tractatum  in  eum  locum  differo,  quo  mi  hi  de 

17  ornatu  orationis  dicendum  erit.      Praecipue  vero  ilia 
inngat    animis,   quae    in    oeconomia   virtus,   quae    in 
decore  rerum,  quid  personae  cuique  convenerit,  quid 
in    sensibus    laudandurn,   quid    in    verbis,  ubi    copia 
probabilis,  ubi  modus. 

18  His  accedet  enarratio  historiaruin,  diligens  quidem 
Ula  non  tamen  usque  ad  supervacuum  laborem  oc- 
cupata.      Nam   receptas   aut    certe    claris  auctoribus 
memoratas  exj)osuisse    satis  est.       Persequi  quidem, 
quid  quis  unquam  vel  contemptissimorum   hominum 
dixerit,  aut  nimiae  miseriae  aut  inanis  iactantiae  est 
et  detinet  atque  obruit  ingenia  melius  aliis  vacatura. 

19  Nam  qui  omnes  etiam  indignas  lection e  scidas  ex- 
cutit,  anilibus  quoque  fabulis  accommodare  operam 
potest.      Atqui    pleni  sunt  huiusmodi  impedimentis 
grammaticorum   commentarii,   vix    ipsis  qui    compo- 

20  suerunt  satis  noti.      Nam   Didymo,  quo  nemo  plura 
scripsit,  accidisse  compertum  est,  ut,  cum  historiae 
cuidam  tanquam  vanae  repugnaret,  ipsius  proferretur 

21  liber^  qui  earn  continebat.      Quod  evenit  praecipue 
in  fabulosis  usque  ad   deridicula  quaedam,  quaedam 
etiam  pudenda ;  unde  improbissimo  cuique  pleraque 
fingendi  licentia  est,  adeo  ut  de  libris  totis  et  aucto- 


BOOK    I.  vni.  16-21 

pone  discussion  of  tropes  and  figures  till  I  come  to 
deal  with  the  various  ornaments  of  style.  Above  17 
all  he  will  impress  upon  their  minds  the  value  of 
proper  arrangement,  and  of  graceful  treatment  of 
the  matter  in  hand  :  he  will  show  what  is  appropriate 
to  the  various  characters,  what  is  praiseworthy  in  the 
thoughts  or  words,  where  copious  diction  is  to  be 
commended  and  where  restraint. 

In  addition  to  this  he  will  explain  the  various  18 
stories  that  occur :  this  must  be  done  with  care, 
but  should  not  be  encumbered  with  superfluous 
detail.  For  it  is  sufficient  to  set  forth  the  version 
which  is  generally  received  or  at  any  rate  rests  upon 
good  authority.  But  to  ferret  out  everything  that 
has  ever  been  said  on  the  subject  even  by  the  most 
worthless  of  writers  is  a  sign  of  tiresome  pedantry 
or  empty  ostentation,  and  results  in  delaying  and 
swamping  the  mind  when  it  would  be  better 
employed  on  other  themes.  The  man  who  pores  19 
over  every  page  even  though  it  be  wholly  unworthy 
of  reading,  is  capable  of  devoting  his  attention 
to  the  investigation  of  old  wives'  tales.  And  yet 
the  commentaries  of  teachers  of  literature  are  full 
of  such  encumbrances  to  learning  and  strangely 
unfamiliar  to  their  own  authors.  It  is,  for  instance,  20 
recorded  that  Didymus,  who  was  unsurpassed  for 
the  number  of  books  which  he  wrote,  on  one  occasion 
objected  to  some  story  as  being  absurd,  whereupon 
one  of  his  own  books  was  produced  which  contained 
the  story  in  question.  Such  abuses  occur  chiefly  in  21 
connexion  with  fabulous  stories  and  are  sometimes 
carried  to  ludicrous  or  even  scandalous  extremes : 
for  in  such  cases  the  more  unscrupulous  commentator 
has  such  full  scope  for  invention,  that  he  can  tell  lies 



ribus,  ut  succurrit,  mentiantur  tuto,  quia  inveniri  qui 
nunquam  fuere  non  possunt :  nam  in  notioribus 
frequentissime  deprehenduntur  a  curiosis.  Ex  quo 
mihi  inter  virtutes  grammatici  habebitur  aliqua 

IX.  Et  finitae  quidem  sunt  partes  duae,  quas  haec 
professio  pollicetur,  id  est  ratio  loquendi  et  enarratio 
auctorum,  quarum  illam  melhodicen  hanc  kistoricen 
vocant.  Adiiciamus  tamen  eorum  curae  quaedam 
dicendi  primordia,  quibus  aetates  nondum  rhetorem 

2  capientes  instituant.  Igitur  Aesopi  fabellas,  quae 
fabulis  nutricularum  proxime  succedunt,  narrare  ser- 
mone  puro  et  nihil  se  supra  raodum  extollente, 
deinde  eandem  gracilitatem  stilo  exigere  condiscant ; 
versus  primo  solvere,  mox  mutatis  verbis  interpretari, 
tum  paraphrasi  audacius  vertere,  qua  et  breviare 
quaedam  et  exornare  salvo  modo  poetae  sensu 

3  permittitur.  Quod  opus  etiam  consummatis  pro- 
fessoribus  difficile  qui  commode  tractaverit,  cuicun- 
que  discendo  sufficiet.  Sententiae  quoque  et  chriae 
et  ethologiae  subiectis  dictorum  rationibus  apud 
grammaticos  scribantur,  quia  initium  ex  lectione 
ducunt ;  quorum  omnium  similis  est  ratio,  forma 
diversa,  quia  sententia  universalis  est  vox,  ethologia 

1  The  meaning  of  ethologia  is  doubtful,  but  probably  means 
a  simple  character-sketch  of  some  famous  man. 


BOOK    I.  vin.  2i-ix.  3 

to  his  heart's  content  about  whole  books  and  authors 
without  fear  of  detection  :  for  what  never  existed 
can  obviously  never  be  found,  whereas  if  the  subject 
is  familiar  the  careful  investigator  will  often  detect 
the  fraud.  Consequently  I  shall  count  it  a  merit  in 
a  teacher  of  literature  that  there  should  be  some 
things  which  he  does  not  know. 

IX.  I  have  now  finished  with  two  of  the 
departments,  with  which  teachers  of  literature  pro- 
fess to  deal,  namely  the  art  of  speaking  correctly 
and  the  interpretation  of  authors  ;  the  former  they 
call  metkodice,  the  latter  historice.  We  must  however 
add  to  their  activities  instruction  in  certain  rudiments 
of  oratory  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  are  not  yet 
ripe  for  the  schools  of  rhetoric.  Their  pupils  should  2 
learn  to  paraphrase  Aesop's  fables,  the  natural  suc- 
cessors of  the  fairy  stories  of  the  nursery,  in  simple 
and  restrained  language  and  subsequently  to  set 
down  this  paraphrase  in  writing  with  the  same  sim- 
plicity of  style :  they  should  begin  by  analysing 
each  verse,  then  give  its  meaning  in  different 
language,  and  finally  proceed  to  a  freer  paraphrase  in 
which  they  will  be  permitted  now  to  abridge  and 
now  to  embellish  the  original,  so  far  as  this  may  be 
done  without  losing  the  poet's  meaning.  This  is  no  3 
easy  task  even  for  the  expert  instructor,  and  the 
pupil  who  handles  it  successfully  will  be  capable  of 
learning  everything.  He  should  also  be  set  to  write 
aphorisms,  moral  essays  (chriae)  and  delineations  of  char- 
acter (ethologiae\}  of  which  the  teacher  will  first  give 
the  general  scheme,  since  such  themes  will  be  drawn 
from  their  reading.  In  all  of  these  exercises  the 
general  idea  is  the  same,  but  the  form  differs  : 
aphorisms  are  general  propositions,  while  elhologiae 



4  personis  continetur.  Chriarum  plura  genera  tra- 
duntur :  unum  simile  sententiae,,  quod  est  positum 
in  voce  simplici,  Dixit  ille,  aut,  Dicere  solebat ; 
alterum,  quod  est  in  respondendo,  hiterrogatus  ille, 
vel,  cum  hoc  ei  dictum  esset,  respondit ;  tertium  huic 
non  dissimile,  cum  quis  dirissct  all  quid,  vel  fecisset. 

6  Etiam  in  ipsorum  factis  esse  chriam  putant,  ut 
Crates,  cum  indoctum  puerum  vidisset,  paedagogum  eius 
percussit ;  et  aliud  paene  par  ei,  quod  tamen  eodem 
nomine  appellare  non  audent  sed  dicunt  xpetuiSes,  ut 
Milo,  quern  vitulum  assueverat  ferre,  taurum  ferebat. 
In  his  omnibus  et  declinatio  per  eosdem  ducitur 
casus,  et  tarn  factorum  quam  dictorum  ratio  est. 

6  Narratiunculas  a  poetis  celebratas  notitiae  causa  non 
eloquentiae  tractandas  puto.  Cetera  maioris  operis 
ac  spiritus  Latini  rhetores  relinquendo  necessaria 
grammaticis  fecerunt ;  Graeci  magis  operum  suorum 
et  onera  et  modum  norunt. 

X.  Haec  de  Grammatice,  quam  brevissime  potui, 
non  ut  omnia  dicerem  sectatus,  quod  infmitum  erat, 
sed  ut  maxime  necessaria ;  nunc  de  ceteris  artibus, 
quibus  instituendos,  priusquam  rlietori  tradantur, 

1  The  sense  is  not  clear  :  it  appears  to  refer  to  the  stereo- 
typed form  in  which  the  chria  was  couched. 


BOOK    I.  ix.  3-x.  i 

are  concerned  with  persons.  Of  moral  essays  there  4 
are  various  forms  :  some  are  akin  to  aphorisms  and 
commence  with  a  simple  statement  "  he  said"  or  "he 
used  to  say  "  :  others  give  the  answer  to  a  question 
and  begin  "on  being  asked"  or  "in  answer  to  this 
he  replied/'  while  a  third  and  not  dissimilar  type 
begins,  "  when  someone  has  said  or  done  something." 
Some  hold  that  a  moral  essay  may  take  some  action  6 
as  its  text;  take  for  example  the  statement  "Crates 
on  seeing  an  ill-educated  boy,  beat  \\ispaedagogits,"  or 
a  very  similar  example  which  they  do  not  venture 
actually  to  propose  as  a  theme  for  a  moral  essay,  but 
content  themselves  with  saying  that  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  such  a  theme,  namely  "  Milo,  having 
accustomed  himself  to  carrying  a  calf  every  day, 
ended  by  carrying  it  when  grown  to  a  bull."  All 
these  instances  are  couched  in  the  same  gram- 
matical form  l  and  deeds  no  less  than  sayings  may 
be  presented  for  treatment.  Short  stories  from  the  6 
poets  should  in  my  opinion  be  handled  not  with 
a  view  to  style  but  as  a  means  of  increasing  know- 
ledge. Other  more  serious  and  ambitious  tasks 
have  been  also  imposed  on  teachers  of  literature  by 
the  fact  that  Latin  rhetoricians  will  have  nothing  to 
do  with  them  :  Greek  rhetoricians  have  a  better 
comprehension  of  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  tasks 
placed  on  their  shoulders. 

X.  I  have  made  my  remarks  011  this  stage  of 
education  as  brief  as  possible,  making  no  attempt  to 
say  everything,  (for  the  theme  is  infinite),  but  con- 
fining myself  to  the  most  necessary  points.  I  will 
now  proceed  briefly  to  discuss  the  remaining  arts  in 
which  I  think  boys  ought  to  be  instructed  before 
being  handed  over  to  the  teacher  of  rhetoric  :  for  it 



pueros  existimo,  strictim  subiungam,  ut  efficiatur 
orbis  ille  doctrinae,  quern  Graeci  tyKi'K\Lov  TrcuSet'av 

2  Nam    iisdem    fere    annis    aliarum    quoque    discip- 
linarum  studia  ingredienda  sunt,  quae,  quia  et  ipsae 
artes    sunt    et    esse    perfectae    sine    orandi    scientia 
possunt    nee    rursus    ad   efficiendum    oratorera    satis 
valent  solae,   an   sint  huic  operi   necessariae    quae- 

3  ritur.      Nam    quid,    inquiunt,    ad    agendam    causam 
dicendamve  sententiam   pertinet,  scire,  quemadmo- 
dum  data   linea  constitui  triangula  aequis  lateribus 
possint  ?      Aut   quo   melius   vel   defendet    reum   vel 
reget  consilia,  qui  citharae  sonos  nominibus  et  spatiis 

4  distinxerit?       Enumerent      etiam     fortasse     multos 
quamlibet  utiles  foro,  qui  nee  geometren  audierint 
nee    musicos    nisi    hac    communi    voluptate    aurium 
intelligant.       Quibus    ego    primum    hoc    respondeo, 
quod   M.  Cicero  scripto  ad  Brutum  libro  frequentius 
testatur,  non  eum  a  nobis  institui  oratorem,  qui  sit 
aut   fuerit,  sed    imaginem    quandam    concepisse   nos 

5  animo  perfect!  illius  et  nulla  parte  cessantis.     Nam 
et  sapientem   formantes   eum,   qui    sit    futurus    con- 
summatus   undique    et,  ut    dicunt,    mortalis  quidam 
deus,  non  modo  cognitione  caelestium  vel  mortalmm 
putant   instruendum,  sed  per  quaedam  parva  sane, 
si    ipsa    demum    aestimes,    ducunt    sicut    exquisitas 
interim  ambiguitates ;   non  quia  ceratinae  aut  croco- 


BOOK   I.  x.  1-5 

is  by  such  studies  that  the  course  of  education  de- 
scribed by  the  Greeks  as  ey/cuVA-ios  TraiSeia  or  general 
education  will  be  brought  to  its  full  completion. 

For  there  are  other  subjects  of  education  which  2 
must  be  studied  simultaneously  with  literature. 
These  being  independent  studies  are  capable  of  com- 
pletion without  a  knowledge  of  oratory,  while  on  the 
other  hand  they  cannot  by  themselves  produce  an 
orator.  The  question  has  consequently  been  raised 
as  to  whether  they  are  necessary  for  this  purpose. 
What,  say  some,  has  the  knowledge  of  the  way  to  3 
describe  an  equilateral  triangle  on  a  given  straight 
line  got  to  do  with  pleading  in  the  law-courts  or 
speaking  in  the  senate  ?  Will  an  acquaintance  with 
the  names  and  intervals  of  the  notes  of  the  lyre  help 
an  orator  to  defend  a  criminal  or  direct  the  policy 
of  his  country?  They  will  perhaps  produce  a  long  4 
list  of  orators  who  are  most  effective  in  the  courts 
but  have  never  sat  under  a  geometrician  and  whose 
understanding  of  music  is  confined  to  the  pleasure 
which  their  ears,  like  those  of  other  men,  derive 
from  it.  To  such  critics  I  reply,  and  Cicero  frequently 
makes  the  same  remark  in  his  Orator,  that  I  am 
not  describing  any  orator  who  actually  exists  or  has 
existed,  but  have  in  my  mind's  eye  an  ideal  orator, 
perfect  down  to  the  smallest  detail.  For  when  the  5 
philosophers  describe  the  ideal  sage  who  is  to  be 
consummate  in  all  knowledge  and  a  very  god  incar- 
nate, as  they  say,  they  would  have  him  receive 
instruction  not  merely  in  the  knowledge  of  things 
human  and  divine,  but  would  also  lead  him  through 
a  course  of  subjects,  which  in  themselves  are  com- 
paratively trivial,  as  for  instance  the  elaborate 
subtleties  of  formal  logic  :  not  that  acquaintance 



dilinae  possint  facere  sapientem,  sed  quia  ilium  ne 
G  in  minimis  quidem  oporteat  falli.  Similiter  ora- 
torem, qui  debet  esse  sapiens,  non  geometres  faciet 
aut  musicus  quaeque  his  alia  subiungam,  sed  hae 
quoque  artes,  ut  sit  consummatus,  iuvabunt.  Nisi 
forte  antidotes  quidem  atque  alia,,  quae  oculis  aut 
vulneribus  medentur,  ex  multis  atque  interim  con- 
trariis  quoque  inter  se  eiFectibus  eomponi  videmus, 
quorum  ex  diversis  fit  una  ilia  mixtura,  quae  nulli 
earum  similis  est,  ex  quibus  constat,  sed  proprias  vires 

7  ex   omnibus    sumit ;    et   muta   animalia   mellis    ilium 
inimitabilem  humanae  rationi   saporem  vario  riorum 
ac    sucorum    genere    perficiunt:    nos    mirabimur,    si 
oratio,   qua    nibil    praestantius    homini    dedit    provi- 
dentia,  pluribus  artibus  egeat,  quae,    etiam   cum  se 
non  ostendunt  in  dicendo  nee  proferunt,  vim  tamen 
occultam    suggerunt   et   tacitae   quoque  sentiuntur? 

8  "  Fuit  aliquis   sine   iis   disertus":    sed  ego  oratorem 
volo.       "Non    multum    adiiciunt "  :    sed    aeque    non 
erit    totum,    cui    vel    parva    deerunt ;     et    optimum 
quidem  hoc  esse  conveniet ;  cuius  etiamsi   in  arduo 
spes  est,  nos  tamen  praecipiamus  omnia,  ut  saltern 
plura  fiant.      Sed  cur  deficiat  animus?     Natura  enim 
perfectum  oratorem   esse  non   prohibet,  turpiterque 
clesperatur  quidquid  fieri  potest. 

1  You    have   what  you  have  not  lost :  you  have  not  lost 
horns  :  therefore  you  have  horns. 

2  A  crocodile,  having  seized  a  woman's  son,  said  that  he 
would   restore  him,  if  she  would  tell  him   the  truth.     She 
replied,  "  You  will  not  restore  him."     \Yas  it  the  crocodile's 
duty  to  give  him  up  ? 


BOOK    I.  x.  5-8 

with  the  so  called  "  horn  "  l  or  "  crocodile  "  2  problems 
can  make  a  man  wise,  but  because  it  is  im- 
portant that  he  should  never  trip  even  in  the 
smallest  trifles.  So  too  the  teacher  of  geometry,  6 
music  or  other  subjects  which  I  would  class  with 
these,  will  not  be  able  to  create  the  perfect  orator 
(who  like  the  philosopher  ought  to  be  a  wise  man), 
but  none  the  less  these  arts  will  assist  in  his  perfec- 
tion. I  may  draw  a  parallel  from  the  use  of  antidotes 
and  other  remedies  applied  to  the  eyes  or  to  wounds. 
We  know  that  these  are  composed  of  ingredients 
which  produce  many  and  sometimes  contrary  effects, 
but  mixed  together  they  make  a  single  compound 
resembling  no  one  of  its  component  parts,  but 
deriving  its  peculiar  properties  from  all :  so  too  dumb  7 
insects  produce  honey,  whose  taste  is  beyond  the 
skill  of  man  to  imitate,  from  different  kinds  of  flowers 
and  juices.  Shall  we  marvel  then,  if  oratory,  the 
highest  gift  of  providence  to  man,  needs  the  assistance 
of  many  arts,  which,  although  they  do  not  reveal  or 
intrude  themselves  in  actual  speaking,  supply  hidden 
forces  and  make  their  silent  presence  felt  ?  "  But  '  8 
it  will  be  urged  "  men  have  proved  fluent  without 
their  aid."  Granted,  but  I  am  in  quest  of  an  orator. 
"•  Their  contribution  is  but  small."  Yes,  but  we  shall 
never  attain  completeness,  if  minor  details  be 
lacking.  And  it  will  be  agreed  that  though  our 
ideal  of  perfection  may  dwell  on  a  height  that  is  hard 
to  gain,  it  is  our  duty  to  teach  all  we  know,  that 
achievement  may  at  least  come  somewhat  nearer 
the  goal.  But  why  should  our  courage  fail  ?  The 
perfect  orator  is  not  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
and  it  is  cowardly  to  despair  of  anything  that  is 
within  the  bounds  of  possibility. 



9  Atque  ego  vel  iudicio  veterum  poteram  esse 
contentus.  Nam  quis  ignorat  musicen  (ut  de  hac 
primum  loquar)  tantum  iam  illis  antiquis  temporibus 
non  studii  modo  verum  etiam  venerationis  habuisse, 
ut  iidem  musici  et  vates  et  sapientes  iudicarentur 
(mittam  alios)  Orpheus  et  Linus  ;  quorum  utrumque 
dis  genitum,  alterum  vero,  quia  rudes  quoque  atque 
agrestes  animos  admiratione  mulceret,  non  feras 
modo  sed  saxa  etiam  silvasque  duxisse  posteritatis 

10  memoriae  traditum  est.     Itaque  et  Timagenes  auctor 
est,    omnium    in    litteris    studiorum    antiquissimam 
musicen     extitisse,     et     testimonio    sunt    clarissimi 
poetae,    apud    quos    inter    regalia    convivia    laudes 
heroum  ac  deorum  ad  citharam  canebantur.      lopas 
vero  ille  Vergilii  nonne  canit  crrantem  lunam  solisque 
labores  et   cetera  ?      Quibus    certe    palam   confirmat 
auctor     eminentissimus,     musicen     cum     divinarum 

11  etiam  rerum  cognitione  esse  coniunctam.     Quod  si 
datur,  erit    etiam    oratori    necessaria,    siquidem    (ut 
diximus)  haec  quoque  pars,  quae  ab  oratoribus  relicta 
a  philosophis  est  occupata,  nostri  operis  fuit,  ac  sine 
omnium   talium    scientia   non    potest   esse    perfecta 

12  eloquentia.     Atque  claros   nomine   sapientiae    viros, 
nemo    dubitaverit,    studiosos    musices    fuisse,    cum 
Pythagoras  atque  eum   secuti  acceptam  sine   dubio 
antiquitus    opinionem    vulgaverint,   mundum    ipsum 
ratione    esse    compositum,    quam    postea    sit    lyra 

1  Acn.  i.  742. 

BOOK    I.  x.  9-12 

For  myself  I  should  be  ready  to  accept  the  verdict  9 
of  antiquity.  Who  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
music,  of  which  I  will  speak  first,  was  in  ancient 
times  the  object  not  merely  of  intense  study  but  of 
veneration  :  in  fact  Orpheus  and  Linus,  to  mention 
no  others,  were  regarded  as  uniting  the  roles  of  musi- 
cian, poet  and  philosopher.  Both  were  of  divine 
origin,  while  the  former,  because  by  the  marvel  of 
his  music  he  soothed  the  savage  breast,  is  recorded 
to  have  drawn  after  him  not  merely  beasts  of  the 
wild,  but  rocks  and  trees.  So  too  Timagenes  10 
asserts  that  music  is  the  oldest  of  the  arts  related  to 
literature,  a  statement  which  is  confirmed  by  the  testi- 
mony of  the  greatest  of  poets  in  whose  songs  we  read 
that  the  praise  of  heroes  and  of  gods  were  sung  to 
the  music  of  the  lyre  at  the  feasts  of  kings.  Does  not 
lopas,  the  Vergilian  bard,  sing 

"  The  wandering  moon  and  labours  of  the  Sun  "  l 

and  the  like  ?  whereby  the  supreme  poet  mani- 
fests most  clearly  that  music  is  united  with  the 
knowledge  even  of  things  divine.  If  this  be  admit-  11 
ted,  music  will  be  a  necessity  even  for  an  orator, 
since  those  fields  of  knowledge,  which  were  annexed 
by  philosophy  on  their  abandonment  by  oratory, 
once  were  ours  and  without  the  knowledge  of  all 
such  things  there  can  be  no  perfect  eloquence. 
There  can  in  any  case  be  no  doubt  that  some  of  12 
those  men  whose  wisdom  is  a  household  word  have 
been  earnest  students  of  music :  Pythagoras  for 
instance  and  his  followers  popularised  the  belief, 
which  they  no  doubt  had  received  from  earlier 
teachers,  that  the  universe  is  constructed  on  the 
same  principles  which  were  afterwards  imitated  in 



imitata,    nee    ilia    modo    content!     dissimilium    con- 
cordia,    quam    vocant     ap/jiovLav,    sonum    quoque    iis 

13  motibus    dederint.       Nam    Plato,,   cum    in   aliis    qui- 
busdam    turn    praecipue     in    Timaeo,    ne    intelligi 
quidem    nisi    ab    iis,  qui    hanc   quoque   partem    dis- 
ciplinae   diligenter    perceperint,  potest.      De  philo- 
sophis  loquor,  quorum  fons  ipse  Socrates  iam  senex 

14  institui  lyra  non  erubescebat  ?     Duces   maximos  et 
fidibus    et    tibiis    cecinisse    traditum    et    exercitus 
Lacedaemoniorum    musicis    accensos    modis.       Quid 
autem   aliud   in   nostris  legionibus    cornua   ac   tubae 
faciunt  ?  quorum  concentus  quanto  est  vehementior, 
tantum    Romana    in    bellis    gloria    ceteris     praestat. 

15  Non  igitur  frustra    Plato  civili   viro,   quern  TTO\ITLKOV 
vocat,    necessarian!     musicen     credidit.        Et     eius 
sectae,  quae  aliis  severissima  aliis  asperrirna  videtur, 
principes    in    hac    fuere    sententia.,    ut    existimarent 
sapientium     aliquos    nonnullam    operam    his    studiis 
accommodaturos.      Et  Lycurgus,  durissimarum  Lace- 
daemoniis    legum    auctor,  musices    disciplinam   pro- 

16  bavit.      Atque  earn  natura  ipsa  videtur  ad  tolerandos 
facilius  labores  velut  muneri  nobis  dedisse,  si  quidem 
et    remigem     cantus     hortatur ;     nee    sol um    in    iis 
operibus,  in  quibus  plurium  conatus  praeeunte  aliqua 
iucunda  voce  conspirat,  sed   etiam  singulorum  fati- 
gatio     quamlibet     se     rudi     modulatione      solatur. 

17  Laudem    adhuc    dicere    artis    pulcherrimae    videor, 

1  The  music  of  the  spheres  :  cp.  the  vision  of  Er  in  Plato 
(Rep.  10)  and  the  Somnium  Scipionis  of  Cicero.  The 
Bounds  produced  by  the  heavenly  bodies  correspond  to  the 
notes  of  the  heptachord. 


BOOK    I.  x.  12-17 

the  construction  of  the  lyre,  and  not  content  merely 
with  emphasising  that  concord  of  discordant  elements 
which  they  style  harmony  attributed  a  sound  to  the 
motions  of  the  celestial  bodies.1  As  for  Plato,  there  13 
are  certain  passages  in  his  works,  more  especially  in 
the  Timaeus?  which  are  quite  unintelligible  to  those 
who  have  not  studied  the  theory  of  music.  But 
why  speak  only  of  the  philosophers,  whose  master, 
Socrates,  did  not  blush  to  receive  instruction  in  play- 
in";  the  lyre  even  when  far  advanced  in  vears  ?  It  is  14 

o  J  J 

recorded  that  the  greatest  generals  played  on  the 
lyre  and  the  pipe,  and  that  the  armies  of  Sparta  were 
fired  to  martial  ardour  by  the  strains  of  music.  And 
what  else  is  the  function  of  the  horns  and  trumpets 
attached  to  our  legions  ?  The  louder  the  concert  of 
their  notes,  the  greater  is  the  glorious  supremacy  of 
our  arms  over  all  the  nations  of  the  earth.  It  was  15 
not  therefore  without  reason  that  Plato  regarded  the 
knowledge  of  music  as  necessary  to  his  ideal  states- 
man or  politician,  as  he  calls  him  ;  while  the  leaders 
even  of  that  school,  which  in  other  respects  is  the 
strictest  and  most  severe  of  all  schools  of  philosophy,3 
held  that  the  wise  man  might  well  devote  some  of 
his  attention  to  such  studies.  Lycurgus  himself,  the 
founder  of  the  stern  laws  of  Sparta,  approved  of  the 
training  supplied  by  music.  Indeed  nature  itself  16 
seems  to  have  given  music  as  a  boon  to  men  to  lighten 
the  strain  of  labour  :  even  the  rower  in  the  galleys 
is  cheered  to  effort  by  song.  Nor  is  this  function  of 
music  confined  to  cases  where  the  efforts  of  a  number 
are  given  union  by  the  sound  of  some  sweet  voice 
that  sets  the  tune,  but  even  solitary  workers  find 
solace  at  their  toil  in  artless  song.  So  far  I  have  17 
attempted  merely  to  sound  the  praises  of  the  noblest 

2  Tim.  p.  47.  3  sc.  the  Stoics. 



noiidura  earn  tamen  oratori  coniungere.  Transe- 
amus  igitur  id  quoque,  quod  grammatice  quondam 
ac  musice  iunctae  fuerunt ;  siquidem  Archytas  atque 
Euenus  etiam  subiectam  grammaticen  musicae  puta- 
verunt,  et  eosdem  utriusque  rei  praeceptores  fuisse 
cum  Sophron  ostendit,  mimorum  quidem  scriptor 
sed  quern  Plato  adeo  probavit,  ut  suppositos  capiti 

18  libros  eius,  cum  moreretur,  habuisse  credatur,  turn 
Eupolis,  apud  quern  Prodamus  et  musicen  et  litteras 
docet,  et  Maricas,  qui   est   Hyperbolus,  nihil  se  ex 
musice   scire   nisi   litteras    confitetur.     Aristophanes 
quoque  non  uno  libro  sic  institui  pueros  antiquitus 
solitos    esse    demonstrat,    et    apud     Menandrum    in 
Hypobolimaeo    senex,    qui    reposcenti    filium    patri 
velut  rationem   impendiorum,  quae   in  educationem 
contulerit,  exponens,  psaltis  se  et  geometris   multa 

19  dicit  dedisse.      Unde  etiam  ille  mos,  ut  in  conviviis 
post    cenam    circumferretur    lyra ;     cuius    cum    se 
imperitum   Themistocles   confessus    esset,   ut   verbis 

20  Ciceronis   utar,    est    habitus   indoctior.     Sed    veterum 
quoque   Romanorum   epulis    fides  ac  tibias  adhibere 
moris  fuit.     Versus  quoque  Saliorum  habent  carmen. 
Quae  cum  omnia  sint  a  Numa  rege  instituta,  faciunt 
manifestum,  ne  illis  quidem,  qui  rudes  ac  bellicosi 
videntur,  cura  musices,  quantum  ilia  recipiebat  aetas, 

21  defuisse.      Denique  in  proverbium  usque  Graecorum 

1  Knights,  188. 

2  Tusc.  Disp.  i.  ii.  4. 


BOOK   I.  x.  17-21 

of  arts  without  bringing  it  into  connexion  with  the 
education  of  an  orator.  1  will  therefore  pass  by  the 
fact  that  the  art  of  letters  and  that  of  music  were 
once  united  :  indeed  Archytas  and  Euenus  held 
that  the  former  was  subordinate  to  the  latter,  while 
we  know  that  the  same  instructors  were  employed 
for  the  teaching  of  both  from  Sophron,  a  writer  of 
farces,  it  is  true,  but  so  highly  esteemed  by  Plato, 
that  he  is  believed  to  have  had  Sophron's  works 
under  his  pillow  on  his  deathbed  :  the  same  fact  is  18 
proved  by  the  case  of  Eupolis,  who  makes  Prodamus 
teach  both  music  and  literature,  and  whose  Maricas, 
who  was  none  other  than  Hyperbolus  in  disguise, 
asserts  that  he  knows  nothing  of  music  but  letters. 
Aristophanes  l  again  in  more  than  one  of  his  plays 
shows  that  boys  were  trained  in  music  from  remote 
antiquity,  while  in  the  Hypobolimaeus  of  Menander 
an  old  man,  when  a  father  claims  his  son  from  him, 
gives  an  account  of  all  expenses  incurred  on  behalf 
of  the  boy's  education  and  states  that  he  has  paid 
out  large  sums  to  musicians  and  geometricians. 
From  the  importance  thus  given  to  music  also  origi-  19 
nated  the  custom  of  taking  a  lyre  round  the  company 
after  dinner,  and  when  on  such  an  occasion  Themis- 
tocles  confessed  that  he  could  not  play,  his  education 
was  (to  quote  the  words  of  Cicero)  "  regarded  as  im- 
perfect."2 Even  at  the  banquets  of  our  own  forefathers  20 
it  was  the  custom  to  introduce  the  pipe  and  lyre,  and 
even  the  hymn  of  the  Salii  has  its  tune.  These 
practices  were  instituted  by  King  Numa  and  clearly 
prove  that  not  even  those  whom  we  regard  as  rude 
warriors,  neglected  the  study  of  music,  at  least  in  so 
far  as  the  resources  of  that  age  allowed.  Finally  21 
there  was  actually  a  proverb  among  the  Greeks, 



celebratum    est,    indoctos    a   Musis    atque   a  Gratiis 

22  abesse.      Verum   quid   ex   ea  proprie    petat   futurus 
orator,  disseramus. 

Numeros  musice  duplices  habet  in  vocibus  et  in 
corpore,  utriusque  enim  rei  aptus  quidam  modus 
desideratur.  Vocis  rationem  Aristoxenus  musicus 
dividit  in  pv@/jiov  et  /xe'Xos,  quorum  alterum  modula- 
tione, alterum  canore  ac  sonis  constat.  Num  igitur 
non  liaec  omnia  oratori  necessaria  ?  quorum  unum 
ad  gestum,  alterum  ad  collocationem  verborum, 
tertium  ad  flexus  vocis,  qui  sunt  in  agendo  quoque 

23  plurimi,  pertinet :  nisi  forte  in  carminibus  tantum  et 
in  canticis  exigitur   structura  quaedam   et  inoffensa 
copulatio  vocum,  in  agendo  supervacua  est ;  aut  non 
compositio  et   sonus   in   oratione    quoque  varie    pro 

24  rerum  modo  adhibetur  sicut  in  musice.     Namque  et 
voce  et  modulatione  grandia  elate,  iucunda  dulciter, 
moderata  leniter  canit,  totaque  arte  consentit  cum 

25  eorum  quae  dicuntur   adfectibus.      Atqui   in  orando 
quoque   intentio   vocis,   remissio,   flexus   pertinet   ad 
movendos    audientium   adfectus,   aliaque  et  colloca- 
tionis   et  vocis  (ut  eodem  utar  verbo)   modulatione 
concitationem    iudicis,   alia    misericordiam    petimus ; 
cum  etiam  organis,  quibus  sermo  exprimi  non  potest, 

26  adfici  animos  in  diversum  habit um  sentiamus.     Cor- 

1  Music  includes  dancing. 

BOOK    I.  x.  21-26 

that  the  uneducated  were  far  from  the  company  of 
the    Muses    and    Graces.       But    let    us  discuss    the  22 
advantages  which  our  future  orator  may  reasonably 

C_j  •/  J 

expect  to  derive  from  the  study  of  Music. 

Music  has  two  modes  of  expression  in  the  voice 
and  in  the  body ; 1  for  both  voice  and  body  require 
to  be  controlled  by  appropriate  rules.  Aristoxenus 
divides  music,  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  voice,  into 
rhythm  and  melody,  the  one  consisting  in  measure, 
the  latter  in  sound  and  song.  Now  I  ask  you  whether 
it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the  orator  to  be 
acquainted  with  all  these  methods  of  expression 
which  are  concerned  firstly  with  gesture,  secondly 
with  the  arrangement  of  words  and  thirdly  with  the 
inflexions  of  the  voice,  of  which  a  great  variety  are 
required  in  pleading.  Otherwise  we  must  assume  23 
that  structure  and  the  euphonious  combination  of 
sounds  are  necessary  only  for  poetry,  lyric  and  other- 
wise, but  superfluous  in  pleading,  or  that  unlike 
music,  oratory  has  no  interest  in  the  variation  of 
arrangement  and  sound  to  suit  the  demands  of  the 
case.  But  eloquence  does  vary  both  tone  and  rhythm,  24 
expressing  sublime  thoughts  with  elevation,  pleasing 
thoughts  with  sweetness,  and  ordinary  with  gentle 
utterance,  and  in  every  expression  of  its  art  is  in 
sympathy  with  the  emotions  of  which  it  is  the  mouth- 
piece. It  is  by  the  raising,  lowering  or  inflexion  of  25 
the  voice  that  the  orator  stirs  the  emotions  of  his 
hearers,  and  the  measure,  if  I  may  repeat  the  term, 
of  voice  or  phrase  differs  according  as  we  wish 
to  rouse  the  indignation  or  the  pity  of  the  judge. 
For,  as  we  know,  different  emotions  are  roused  even 
by  the  various  musical  instruments,  which  are 
incapable  of  reproducing  speech.  Further  the  26 



poris  quoque  aptus  et  decens  motus,  qui  dicitur 
fvpv@/j.ia,  et  est  necessarius  nee  aliunde  peti  potest ; 
in  quo  pars  actionis  non  minima  consistit,  qua  de 

27  re    sepositus    nobis    est    locus.      Age,    non    habebit 
imprimis   curam    vocis    orator  ?     Quid    tarn    musices 
proprium  ?     Sed  ne  haec  quidem  praesumenda  pars 
est.        Uno    interim     content!     simus     exemplo    C. 
Gracchi,    praecipui    suorum    temporum    oratoris,   cui 
contionanti     consistens     post     eum    musicus    fistula, 
quam  rovaptov  vacant,  modos,  quibus  deberet  intendi, 

28  monstrabat.       Haec     ei     cura     inter     turbidissimas 
actiones  vel  terrenti  optimates  vel  iam  timenti  fuit. 
Libet  propter  quosdam  imperitiores  etiam  crassiore, 
ut     vocant,     Musa     dubitationem      huius     utilitatis 

29  eximere.      Nam  poetas  certe  legendos  oratori  futuro 
concesserint :  num  igitur  hi  sine  musice  ?  ac  si  quis 
tarn  caecus  animi  est,  ut  de  aliis  dubitet,  illos  certe, 
qui  carmina  ad  lyram  composuerunt.      Haec  diutius 
forent  dicenda,  si  hoc  studium  velut  novum  praeci- 

30  perem.      Cum  vero  antiquitus  usque  a  Chirone  atque 
Achille    ad   nostra  tempora   apud   omnes,   qui   modo 
legitimam    disciplinam    non    sint    perosi,    duraverit, 

1  Book  XI.  chap.  iii. 

BOOK    I.  x.  26-30 

motion  of  the  body  must  be  suitable  and  becoming, 
or  as  the  Greeks  call  it  eurythmic,  and  this  can  only 
be  secured  by  the  study  of  music.  This  is  a  most 
important  department  of  eloquence,  and  will  receive 
separate  treatment  in  this  work.1  To  proceed,  an  27 
orator  will  assuredly  pay  special  attention  to  his 
voice,  and  what  is  so  specially  the  concern  of  music 
as  this  ?  Here  too  I  must  not  anticipate  a  later 
section  of  this  work,  and  will  content  myself  by 
citing  the  example  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  the  leading 
orator  of  his  age,  who  during  his  speeches  had  a 
musician  standing  behind  him  with  a  pitchpipe,  or 
tonarion  as  the  Greeks  call  it,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
give  him  the  tones  in  which  his  voice  was  to  be 
pitched.  Such  was  the  attention  which  he  paid  to  28 
this  point  even  in  the  midst  of  his  most  turbulent 
speeches,  when  he  was  terrifying  the  patrician  party 
and  even  when  he  had  begun  to  fear  their  power. 
I  should  like  for  the  benefit  of  the  uninstructed, 
those  "  creatures  of  the  heavier  Muse,"  as  the  saying 
is,  to  remove  all  doubts  as  to  the  value  of  music. 
They  will  at  any  rate  admit  that  the  poets  should  be  29 
read  by  our  future  orator.  But  can  they  be  read 
without  some  knowledge  of  music?  Or  if  any  of 
my  critics  be  so  blind  as  to  have  some  doubts  about 
other  forms  of  poetry,  can  the  lyric  poets  at  any 
rate  be  read  without  such  knowledge?  If  there 
were  anything  novel  in  my  insistence  on  the  study 
of  music,  1  should  have  to  treat  the  matter  at 
greater  length.  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  30 
study  of  music  has,  from  those  remote  times  when 
Chiron  taught  Achilles  down  to  our  own  day,  con- 
tinued to  be  studied  by  all  except  those  who 
have  a  hatred  for  any  regular  course  of  study,  it 


non  est  committendum,  ut  ilia  dubia  faciam  defensi- 

31  onis    sollicitudine.       Quamvis    antem    satis    iam    ex 
ipsis,  quibus  sum  modo  usus,  exemplis  credam  esse 
manifestum,  quae  mihi   et  quatenus  musice   placeat, 
apertius  tamen    profitendum  puto_,  non    hanc  a  me 
praecipi,  quae  nunc  in  scenis  effeminata  et  impudicis 
modis  fracta  non  ex  parte  minima,  si  quid  in  nobis 
virilis     roboris     manebat,    excidit,    sed     qua    laudes 
fortium   canebantur,    quaque    ipsi    fortes    canebant ; 
nee    psalteria    et    spadicns,    etiam    virginibus    probis 
recusanda,  sed    cognitionem    rationis,  quae    ad   mo- 
vendos     leniendosque     adfectus     plurimum     valet. 

32  Nam    et  Pvthagoran    accepimus    concitatos    ad    vim 
pudicae  domui  adferendam  iuvenes,  iussa  mutare  in 
spondeum    modos    tibicina,    composuisse ;    et    Chry- 
sippus  etiam  nutricum  illi^quae  adhibetur  infantibus, 

33  adlectationi    suum   quoddam    carmen    assignat.      Est 
etiam  non  inerudite  ad  declamandum  ficta  materia, 
in    qua    ponitur    tibicen,    qui    sacrificanti    Phrygium 
cecinerat.  acto   illo   in   insaniam    et    per    praecipitia 
delate   accusari,  quod   causa   mortis   extiterit ;    quae 
si    dici    debet    ab   oratore    nee   dici    citra    scientiam 


BOOK    I.  x.  30-33 

would  be  a  mistake  to  seem  to  cast  any  doubt  upon 
its  value  by  showing  an  excessive  zeal  in  its  defence. 
It  will,  however,  I  think  be  sufficiently  clear  from  31 
the  examples  I  have  already  quoted,  what  I  regard 
as  the  value  and  the  sphere  of  music  in  the  training 
of  an  orator.  Still  I  think  I  ought  to  be  more 
emphatic  than  I  have  been  in  stating  that  the  music 
which  I  desire  to  see  taught  is  not  our  modern  music, 
which  has  been  emasculated  by  the  lascivious  melo- 
dies of  our  effeminate  stage  and  has  to  no  small 
extent  destroyed  such  manly  vigour  as  we  still 
possessed.  No,  I  refer  to  the  music  of  old  which  was 
employed  to  sing  the  praises  of  brave  men  and  was 
sung  by  the  brave  themselves.  I  will  have  none 
of  your  psalteries  and  viols,  that  are  unfit  even  for 
the  use  of  a  modest  girl.  Give  me  the  knowledge 
of  the  principles  of  music,  which  have  power  to 
excite  or  assuage  the  emotions  of  mankind.  We  32 
are  told  that  Pythagoras  on  one  occasion,  when  some 
young  men  were  led  astray  by  their  passions  to 
commit  an  outrage  on  a  respectable  family,  calmed 
them  by  ordering  the  piper  to  change  her  strain  to  a 
spondaic  measure,  while  Chrysippus  selects  a  special 
tune  to  be  used  by  nurses  to  entice  their  little  charges 
to  sleep.  Further  I  may  point  out  that  among  the  33 
fictitious  themes  employed  in  declamation  is  one, 
doing  no  little  credit  to  its  author's  learning,  in 
which  it  is  supposed  that  a  piper  is  accused  of  man- 
slaughter because  he  had  played  a  tune  in  the  Phry- 
gian mode  as  an  accompaniment  to  a  sacrifice,  with 
the  result  that  the  person  officiating  went  mad  and 
flung  himself  over  a  precipice.  If  an  orator  is 
expected  to  declaim  on  such  a  theme  as  this,  which 
cannot  possibly  be  handled  without  some  knowledge 



musices    potest,  quomodo   non   hanc  quoque    artem 
necessariam  esse  operi  nostro  vel  iniqui  consentient  ? 

34  In  geometria  partem  fatentur  esse  utilem  teneris 
aetatibus.      Agitari  namque   animos  et  acui  ingenia 
et  celeritatem    percipiendi   venire    inde    concedunt, 
sed  prod  esse   earn   non   ut    ceteras   artes,   cum   per- 
ceptae  sint,  sed  cum  discatur,  existimant :  ea  vulgaris 

35  opinio   est.      Nee  sine   causa   summi   viri    etiam   im- 
pensam    huic    scientiae     operam     dederunt.       Nam 
cum   sit  geometria  divisa  in  numeros  atque  formas, 
numerorum   quidein    notitia    non    oratori  modo,  sed 
cuicunque   saltern    primis  litteris    erudito    necessaria 
est.     In  causis  vero  vel  frequentissime  versari  solet ; 
in  quibus  actor,  non  dico,  si  circa  summas  trepidat, 
sed  si  digitorum  saltern  incerto  aut  indecoro  gestu 

36  a  computatione  dissentit,  iudicatur    indoctus.       Ilia 
vero  linearis  ratio   et  ipsa  quidem  cadit  frequenter 
in  causas  (nam  de  terminis  mensurisque  sunt  lites), 
sed  habet  maiorem  quandam  aliam  cum  arte  oratoria 

37  cognationem.      lam    primum    ordo    est    geometriae 
necessarius ;    nonne  et   eloquentiae  ?      Ex    prioribus 
geometria    probat    insequentia,    ex    certis    incerta ; 
nonne  id  in  dicendo  facimus  ?     Quid  ?  ilia  proposi- 
tarum  quaestionum  conclusio  non  fere  tota  constat 

1  Geometry  here  includes  all  mathematics. 

a  There  was  a  separate  symbol  for  each  number,  depending 
on  the  hand  used  and  the  position  of  the  fingers.  See  Class. 
Review,  1911,  p.  72. 


BOOK    I.  x.  33-37 

of  music,  how  can  my  critics  for  all  their  prejudice 
fail  to  agree  that  music  is  a  necessary  element  in 
the  education  of  an  orator  ? 

As  regards  geometry/  it  is  granted  that  portions  of  34 
this  science  are  of  value  for  the  instruction  of  children: 
for  admittedly  it  exercises  their  minds,  sharpens 
their  wits  and  generates  quickness  of  perception. 
But  it  is  considered  that  the  value  of  geometry 
resides  in  the  process  of  learning,  and  not  as  with 
other  sciences  in  the  knowledge  thus  acquired. 
Such  is  the  general  opinion.  But  it  is  not  without  35 
good  reason  that  some  of  the  greatest  men  have 
devoted  special  attention  to  this  science.  Geometry 
has  two  divisions ;  one  is  concerned  with  numbers, 
the  other  with  figures.  Now  knowledge  of  the  former 
is  a  necessity  not  merely  to  the  orator,  but  to  any 
one  who  has  had  even  an  elementary  education. 
Such  knowledge  is  frequently  required  in  actual 
cases,  in  which  a  speaker  is  regarded  as  de- 
ficient in  education,  I  will  not  say  if  he  hesitates 
in  making  a  calculation,  but  even  if  he  contradicts 
the  calculation  which  he  states  in  words  by  making 
an  uncertain  or  inappropriate  gesture  with  his  fingers.2 
Again  linear  geometry  is  frequently  required  in  36 
cases,  as  in  lawsuits  about  boundaries  and  measure- 
ments. But  geometry  and  oratory  are  related  in  a 
yet  more  important  way  than  this.  In  the  first  37 
place  logical  development  is  one  of  the  necessities 
of  geometry.  And  is  it  not  equally  a  necessity  for 
oratory  ?  Geometry  arrives  at  its  conclusions  from 
definite  premises,  and  by  arguing  from  what  is  certain 
proves  what  was  previously  uncertain.  Is  not  this 
just  what  we  do  in  speaking  ?  Again  are  not  the 
problems  of  geometry  almost  entirely  solved  by  the 



syllogismis  ?  Propter  quod  plures  invenias,  qui 
dialecticae  similem  quam  qui  rhetoricae  fateantur 
hanc  artem.  Verum  et  orator  etiamsi  raro  non 

38  tamen  nunquam  probabit  dialectice.      Nam  et  syllo- 
gismo,  si  res  poscet,  utetur  et  certe  enthymemate, 
qui    rhetoricus   est   syllogismus.      Denique   probatio- 
num    quae    sunt    potentissimae    ypa/jLfj.LKal    aTroSei'^eis 
vulgo    dicuntur :     quid     autem     magis    oratio    quam 

39  probationem     petit?      Falsa     quoque     veris     similia 
geometrica    ratione    dej)rehendit.       Fit    hoc    et    in 
numeris    per     quasdam,    quas     i//tuSoypa</>ia<;    vacant, 
quibus    pueri    ludere    solebamus.      Sed    alia    maiora 
sunt.        Nam     quis     non     ita     proponent!     credat? 
"Quorum  locorum  extremae  lineae  eandemmensuram 
colligunt,    eorum    spatium    quoque,   quod    iis    lineis 

40  continetur,  par  sit  necesse  est."     At  id  falsum  est. 
Nam  plurimum  refert,  cuius  sit  formae  ille  circuitus  ; 
reprehensique  a  geometris   sunt  historici,   qui  mag- 
nitudinem    insularum     satis     significari     navigationis 
ambitu    crediderunt.      Nam   ut  quaeque    forma  per- 

41  fectissima  ita  capacissima  est.      Ideoque  ilia  circum- 
currens    linea  si   efficiet    orbem,   quae   forma   est   in 
planis   maxima    perfecta,  amplius   spatium    complec- 
tetur  quam  si  quadratum  paribus  oris  efficiat,  rursus 
quadrata  triangulis,  triangula  ipsa  plus  aequis  lateri- 

42  bus  quam  inaequalibus.      Sed  alia  forsitan  obscuriora  ; 

1  See  v.  xiv.  1  for  an  example  from  the  Pro  Ligario. 
"The  cause  was  then  doubtful,  as  there  were  arguments  on 
both  sides.  Now,  however,  we  must  regard  that  cause  as  the 
better,  to  which  the  gods  have  given  their  approval." 


BOOK    I.  x.  37-42 

syllogistic  method,  a  fact  which  makes  the  majority 
assert  that  geometry  bears  a  closer  resemblance  to 
logic  than  to  rhetoric  ?  But  even  the  orator  will 
sometimes,  though  rarely,  prove  his  point  by  formal 
logic.  For,  if  necessary,  he  will  use  the  syllogism,  38 
and  he  will  certainly  make  use  of  the  enthymeme 
which  is  a  rhetorical  form  of  syllogism.1  Further 
the  most  absolute  form  of  proof  is  that  which  is 
generally  known  as  linear  demonstration.  And  what 
is  the  aim  of  oratory  if  not  proof?  Again  oratory  39 
sometimes  detects  falsehoods  closely  resembling  the 
truth  by  the  use  of  geometrical  methods.  An 
example  of  this  may  be  found  in  connexion  with 
numbers  in  the  so-called  pseudographs,  a  favourite 
amusement  in  our  boyhood.2  But  there  are  more 
important  points  to  be  considered.  Who  is  there 
who  would  not  accept  the  following  proposition  ? 
"  When  the  lines  bounding  two  figures  are  equal  in 
length,  the  areas  contained  within  those  lines  are 
equal."  But  this  is  false,  for  everything  depends  on  40 
the  shape  of  the  figure  formed  by  these  lines,  and 
historians  have  been  taken  to  task  by  geometricians 
for  believing  the  time  taken  to  circumnavigate  an 
island  to  be  a  sufficient  indication  of  its  size.  For 
the  space  enclosed  is  in  proportion  to  the  perfection 
of  the  figure.  Consequently  if  the  bounding  line  41 
to  which  we  have  referred  form  a  circle,  the  most 
perfect  of  all  plane  figures,  it  will  contain  a  greater 
space  than  if  the  same  length  of  line  took  the  form 
of  a  square,  while  a  square  contains  a  greater  space 
than  a  triangle  having  the  same  total  perimeter,  and 
an  equilateral  triangle  than  a  scalene  triangle.  But  42 
there  are  other  points  which  perhaps  present  greater 

•  It  is  not  known  to  what  Quintilian  refers. 



nos  facillimum  etiam  imperitis  sequamur  experi- 
mentum,  lugeri  mensuram  ducentos  et  quadraginta 
longitudinis  pedes  esse  dimidioque  iri  latitudinem 
patere,  non  fere  quisquam  est  qui  ignoret,  et  qui  sit 
circuitus  et  quantum  campi  claudat,  colligere  expedi- 

43  turn.      At  centeni   et  octogeni  in  quamque  partem 
pedes  idem  spatium  extremitatis  sed  multo  amplius 
clausae  quattuor  lineis    areae    faciunt.      Id   si   corn- 
putare  quern  piget,  brevioribus  numeris  idem  discat. 
Nam  deni  in  quadram  pedes,  quadraginta  per  oram, 
intra    centum  erunt.      At    si   quini  deni  per  latera; 
quini    in    fronte    sint,    ex    illo,    quod    amplectuntur, 

44  quartam    deducent    eodem    circumductu.       Si    vero 
porrecti    utrinque   undeviceni    singulis    distent,   non 
plures    intus    quadrates    habebunt,    quam    per   quot 
longitude    ducetur ;    quae    circumibit    autem    linea, 
eiusdem  spatii  erit,  cuius  ea  quae  centum  continet. 
Ita  quidquid  formae  quadrati  detraxeris,  amplitudini 

45  quoque    peribit.       Ergo    etiam    id    fieri    potest,    ut 
maiore     circuitu     minor    loci    amplitudo    claudatur. 
Haec  in  planis.      Nam  in  collibus  vallibusque  etiam 

46  imperito    patet    plus    soli    esse    quam    caeli.       Quid 
quod  se  eadem  geometria  tollit  ad  rationem  usque 
mundi  ?    in  qua,  cum  siderum  certos  constitutosque 
cursus  numeris  docet,  discimus   nihil   esse  inordina- 
tum  atque  fortuitum  ;  quod  ipsum  nonnunquam  per- 

41  tinere  ad  oratorem  potest.     An  vero,  cum  Pericles 

1 80 

BOOK    I.  x.  42-47 

difficulty.  I  will  take  an  example  which  is  easy 
even  for  those  who  have  no  knowledge  of  geometry. 
There  is  scarcely  anyone  who  does  not  know  that 
the  Roman  acre  is  240  feet  long  and  120  feet 
broad,  and  its  total  perimeter  and  the  area  enclosed 
can  easily  be  calculated.  But  a  square  of  180  feet  43 
gives  the  same  perimeter,  yet  contains  a  much 
larger  area  within  its  four  sides.  If  the  calculation 
prove  irksome  to  any  of  my  readers,  he  can  learn  the 
same  truth  by  employing  smaller  numbers.  Take  a 
ten  foot  square :  its  perimeter  is  forty  feet  and  it 
contains  100  square  feet.  But  if  the  dimensions  be 
fifteen  feet  by  five,  while  the  perimeter  is  the  same, 
the  area  enclosed  is  less  by  a  quarter.  On  the  other  44 
hand  if  we  draw  a  parallelogram  measuring  nineteen 
feet  by  one,  the  number  of  square  feet  enclosed  will 
be  no  greater  than  the  number  of  linear  feet  making 
the  actual  length  of  the  parallelogram,  though  the 
perimeter  will  be  exactly  as  that  of  the  figure  which 
encloses  an  area  of  100  square  feet.  Consequently  the 
area  enclosed  by  four  lines  will  decrease  in  proportion 
as  we  depart  from  the  form  of  a  square.  It  further  45 
follows  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  the  space 
enclosed  to  be  less,  though  the  perimeter  be  greater. 
This  applies  to  plane  figures  only :  for  even  one  who 
is  no  mathematician  can  see  that,  when  we  have  to 
consider  hills  or  valleys,  the  extent  of  ground  enclosed 
is  greater  than  the  sky  over  it.  But  geometry  soars  46 
still  higher  to  the  consideration  of  the  system  of 
the  universe  :  for  by  its  calculations  it  demonstrates 
the  fixed  and  ordained  courses  of  the  stars,  and 
thereby  we  acquire  the  knowledge  that  all  things 
are  ruled  by  order  and  destiny,  a  consideration 
which  may  at  times  be  of  value  to  an  orator.  When  47 



Athenienses  soils  obscuratione  territos  redditis  eius 
rei  causis  metu  liberavit,  aut  cum  Sulpicius  ille 
Gallus  in  exercitu  L.  Paulli  de  lunae  defectione 
disseruit,  ne  velut  prodigio  divinitus  facto  militum 
animi  terrerentur,  non  videtur  usus  esse  oratoris 

48  officio  ?     Quod  si  Nicias  in  Sicilia  scisset,  non  eodem 
confusus  metu   pulcherrimum  Atheniensium  exerci- 
tum  perdidisset ;    sicut   Dion,   cum  ad  destruendam 
Dionysii  tyrannidem  venit,  non  est  tali  casu  deter- 
ritus.     Sint  extra  licet  usus  bellici,  transeamusque, 
quod  Archimedes  unus  obsidionem  Syracusarum   in 

49  longius  traxit.     Illud  utique  iam  proprium  ad  effici- 
endum     quod     intendimus,     plurimas     quaestiones, 
quibus  difficilior    alia  ratione    explicatio    est,   ut    de 
ratione  dividend!,  de  sectione  in  infinitum,  de  cele- 
ritate    augenda,    linearibus    illis    probationibus    solvi 
solere  ;  ut,  si  est  oratori  (quod  proximus  demonstra- 
bit   liber)   de   omnibus  rebus  dicendum,  nullo  modo 
sine  geometria  esse  possit  orator. 

XI.   Dandum  aliquid  comoedo  quoque,  dum  eate- 

nus,    qua     pronuntiandi     scientiam     futurus    orator 

desiderat.      Non  enim  puerum,  quern  in  hoc  institu- 

imus,  aut   femineae   vocis    exilitate   frangi   volo   aut 

2  seniliter     tremere.       Nee    vitia     ebrietatis    effingat 

1  Quintilian  is  perhaps  referring  to  the  measurement  of 
the  area  of  an  irregular  figure  by  dividing  it  into  a  number 
of  small  equal  and  regular  figures  the  size  of  which  was 


BOOK    I.  x.  47-xi.  2 

Pericles  dispelled  the  panic  caused  at  Athens  by  the 
eclipse  of  the  sun  by  explaining  the  causes  of  the 
phenomenon,  or  Sulpicius  Gallus  discoursed  on  the 
eclipse  of  the  moon  to  the  army  of  Lucius  Paulus  to 
prevent  the  soldiers  being  seized  with  terror  at  what 
they  regarded  as  a  portent  sent  by  heaven,  did  not 
they  discharge  the  function  of  an  orator?  If  Nicias  48 
had  known  this  when  he  commanded  in  Sicilv,  he 

v   •* 

would  not  have  shared  the  terror  of  his  men  nor  lost 
the  finest  army  that  Athens  ever  placed  in  the  field. 
Dion  for  instance  when  he  came  to  Syracuse  to  over- 
throw the  tyranny  of  Dionysius,  was  not  frightened 
away  by  the  occurrence  of  a  similar  phenomenon. 
However  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  uses  of 
geometry  in  war  and  need  not  dwell  upon  the  fact 
that  Archimedes  singlehanded  succeeded  in  appreci- 
ably prolonging  the  resistance  of  Syracuse  when  it 
was  besieged.  It  will  suffice  for  our  purpose  that  49 
there  are  a  number  of  problems  which  it  is  difficult 
to  solve  in  any  other  way,  which  are  as  a  rule  solved 
by  these  linear  demonstrations,  such  as  the  method 
of  division,  section  to  infinity,1  and  the  ratio  of  in- 
crease in  velocity.  From  this  we  may  conclude  that, 
if  as  we  shall  show  in  the  next  book  an  orator  has 
to  speak  on  every  kind  of  subject,  he  can  under 
no  circumstances  dispense  \vith  a  knowledge  of 

XI.  The  comic  actor  will  also  claim  a  certain 
amount  of  our  attention,  but  only  in  so  far  as  our 
future  orator  must  be  a  master  of  the  art  of  delivery. 
For  I  do  not  of  course  wish  the  boy,  whom  we  are 
training  to  this  end,  to  talk  with  the  shrillness  of  a 
woman  or  in  the  tremulous  accents  of  old  age.  Nor  2 
for  that  matter  must  he  ape  the  vices  of  the 



neque  servili  vernilitate  imbuatur  nee  arnoris,  avari- 
tiae,  metus  discat  adfectum  ;  quae  neque  oratori  sunt 
necessaria  et  mentem,  praecipue  in  aetate  prirna 

3  teneram  adhuc  et  rudem,  inficiunt.      Nam  frequens 
imitatio  transit  in  mores.      Ne  gestus  quidem  omnis 
ac    motus    a    comoedis    petendus    est.      Quanquam 
enim  utrumque  eorum  ad  quendam  modum  praestare 
debet  orator,  plurimum  tamen  aberit  a  scenico,  nee 
vultu  nee  manu  nee  excursionibus  nimius.      Nam  si 
qua  in   his  ars  est  dicentium,  ea  prima  est,  ne  ars 
esse  videatur. 

4  Quod    est    igitur    huius    doctoris    officium?      In 
primis  vitia   si  qua  sunt  oris  emendet,  ut   expressa 
sint  verba,  ut  suis  quaeque  litterae  sonis  enuntientur. 
Quarundam  enim  vel  exilitate  vel  pinguitudine  nimia 
laboramus,  quasdam  velut  acriores   parum   efficimus 
et  aliis  non  dissimilibus  sed  quasi  hebetioribus  per- 

6  mutamus.  Quippe  et  Rho  litterae,  qua  Demosthenes 
quoque  laboravit,  Labda  succedit  (quarum  vis  est 
apud  nos  quoque) ;  et  cum  c  ac  similiter  g  non 

6  evaluerunt,  in  t  ac  d  rnolliuntur.  Ne  illas  quidem 
circa  s  litteram  delicias  hie  magister  feret,  nee  verba 
in  faucibus  patietur  audiri  nee  oris  inanitate  resonare 

1  The  mis-spelling  of  flagro  as  Jraglo  exemplifies  the  con- 
fusion to  which  Quintilian  refers.  A  similar,  though  correct, 
substitution  is  found  in  lavacrum  for  lavaclum,  etc.  See 
Lindsay,  Lat.  Langu.,  pp.  92  ff. 


BOOK    1.  xi.  2-6 

drunkard,  or  copy  the  cringing  manners  of  a  slave, 
or  learn  to  express  the  emotions  of  love,  avarice  or 
fear.  Such  accomplishments  are  not  necessary  to 
an  orator  and  corrupt  the  mind,  especially  while  it 
is  still  pliable  and  unformed.  For  repeated  imita-  3 
tion  passes  into  habit.  Nor  yet  again  must  we 
adopt  all  the  gestures  and  movements  of  the  actor. 
Within  certain  limits  the  orator  must  be  a  master  of 
both,  but  he  must  rigorously  avoid  staginess  and  all 
extravagance  of  facial  expression,  gesture  and  gait. 
For  if  an  orator  does  command  a  certain  art  in  such 
matters,  its  highest  expression  will  be  in  the  con- 
cealment of  its  existence. 

What  then  is  the  duty  of  the  teacher  whom  4 
we  have  borrowed  from  the  stage  ?  In  the 
first  place  he  must  correct  all  faults  of  pro- 
nunciation, and  see  that  the  utterance  is  distinct, 
and  that  each  letter  has  its  proper  sound. 
There  is  an  unfortunate  tendency  in  the  case  of 
some  letters  to  pronounce  them  either  too  thinly 
or  too  fullv,  while  some  we  find  too  harsh  and  fail  to 

J  ' 

pronounce    sufficiently,    substituting    others    whose 
sound  is  similar  but  somewhat  duller.     For  instance,  5 
lambda  is  substituted    for    rho,  a    letter  which    was 
always   a    stumbling-block  to    Demosthenes ;    our  / 
and    r  have  of   course  the   same   value.1     Similarly 
when  c  and  g  are  not  given  their  full  value,  they 
are  softened  into  t  and  d.     Again  our  teacher  must  6 
not  tolerate  the  affected  pronunciation  of  s 2   with 
which   we    are    painfully  familiar,  nor   suffer   words 
to    be    uttered    from    the    depths    of  the  throat  or 

2  Quintilian  perhaps  alludes  to  the  habit  of  prefixing  t  to 
initial  st,  sp,  sc  found  in  inscriptions  of  the  later  Empire. 
See  Lindsay,  op.  cit.  p.  102. 


nee,  quod  minime  sermoni  puro  conveniat,  simplicern 
vocis    naturam    pleniore   quodam    sono    circumliniri, 

7  quod  Graeci  KaraTreTrXacr/xeVov  dicunt.      Sic  appellatur 
cantus   tibiarum,  quae    praeclusis    quibus  clarescunt 
foraminibus,  recto    modo    exitu    graviorem   spiritum 

8  reddunt.     Curabit   etiam,  ne   extremae   syllabae  in- 
tercidant,   ut  par  sibi  sermo  sit,  ut,  quotiens  excla- 
mandum  erit,  lateris  conatus  sit  ille  non  capitis,  ut 
gestus   ad   vocem,  vultus  ad  gestum  accommodetur. 

9  Observandum  erit  etiam,  ut  recta  sit  facies  dicentis, 
ne  labra  distorqueantur,  ne  immodicus  hiatus  rictum 
discindat,  ne   supinus  vultus,  ne  deiecti    in    terram 
oculi,  ne  inclinata  utrolibet  cervix.     Nam  frons  pluri- 

10  bus  generibus  peccat.      Vidi  mi.ltos,  quorum  super- 
cilia  ad  singulos  vocis  conatus  adlevarentur,  aliorum 
constricta,  aliorum  etiam  dissidentia,  cum  alterum  in 
verticem  tenderent,  altero  paene  oculus  ipse  preme- 

11  retur.      Infinitum   autem,   ut    mox    dicemus,   in    his 
quoque  rebus  momentum  est ;  et  nihil  potest  placere 
quod  non  decet. 

12  Debet  etiam  docere  comoedus_,   quomodo  narran- 
dum,  qua  sit  auctoritate  suadendum,  qua  concitatione 
consurgat  ira_,  qui  flexus  deceat  miserationem.     Quod 
ita    optima    faciet,   si    certos    ex   comoediis    elegerit 


BOOK    I.  xi.  6-12 

rolled  out  hollow-mouthed,  or  permit  the  natural 
sound  of  the  voice  to  be  over-laid  with  a  fuller 
sound,  a  fault  fatal  to  purity  of  speech ;  the 
Greeks  give  this  peculiarity  the  name  KaraTre- 
rrA.acr/xeVov  (plastered  over),  a  term  applied  to  the  7 
tone  produced  by  a  pipe,  when  the  stops  which 
produce  the  treble  notes  are  closed,  and  a  bass  note 
is  produced  through  the  main  aperture  only.  He  8 
will  also  see  that  final  syllables  are  not  clipped,  that 
the  quality  of  speech  is  continuously  maintained, 
that  when  the  voice  is  raised,  the  strain  falls  upon 
the  lungs  and  not  the  mouth,  and  that  gesture  and 
voice  are  mutually  appropriate.  He  will  also  insist  9 
that  the  speaker  faces  his  audience,  that  the  lips 
are  not  distorted  nor  the  jaws  parted  to  a  grin, 
that  the  face  is  not  thrown  back,  nor  the  eyes  fixed 
on  the  ground,  nor  the  neck  slanted  to  left  or  right. 
For  there  are  a  variety  of  faults  of  facial  expression. 
I  have  seen  many,  who  raised  their  brows  whenever  10 
the  voice  was  called  upon  for  an  effort,  others  who 
wore  a  perpetual  frown,  and  yet  others  who  could 
not  keep  their  eyebrows  level,  but  raised  one 
towards  the  top  of  the  head  and  depressed  the 
other  till  it  almost  closed  the  eye.  These  are  11 
details,  but  as  I  shall  shortly  show,  they  are  of 
enormous  importance,  for  nothing  that  is  unbecoming 
can  have  a  pleasing  effect. 

Our  actor  will  also  be  required  to  show  how  a  12 
narrative  should  be  delivered,  and  to  indicate  the 
authoritative  tone  that  should  be  given  to  advice, 
the  excitement  which  should  mark  the  rise  of  anger, 
and  the  change  of  tone  that  is  characteristic  of 
pathos.  The  best  method  of  so  doing  is  to  select 
special  passages  from  comedy  appropriate  for  the 



locos   et  ad   hoc  maxime  idoneos,  id  est,  actionibus 

13  similes.      lidem  autem  non  ad  pronuntiandum  modo 
utilissimi  verum  ad  augendam  quoque  eloquentiam 

14  maxime  accommodati  erunt.      Et  haec,  dum  infinna 
aetas  maiora  Don  capiet ;  ceterum,  cum  legere  ora- 
tiones    oportebit,  cum  virtutes    earum    iam    sentiet, 
turn  mihi  diligens  aliquis  ac  peritus  ads'istat,  neque 
solum  lectionem  format,  verum  ediscere  etiam  electa 
ex  iis  cogat  et  ea  dicere  stantem    clare  et  quemad- 
modum  agere  oportebit,  ut  protinus  pronuntiationem 
vocem,  memoriam  exerceat. 

15  Ne  illos  quidem  reprehendendos  puto,  qui  paulum 
etiam   palaestricis  vacaverunt.      Non  de    his   loquor, 
quibus  pars  vitae  in  oleo,  pars   in  vino  consumitur, 
qui    corporum    cura    mentem    obruerunt    (hos    enim 
abesse    ab    eo    quern    instituimus    quam     longissime 

16  velim) ;    sed    nornen    est    idem    iis,  a   quibus  gestus 
motusque  forinantur,   ut   recta   sint    brachia,   ne   in- 
doctae  rusticae  manus,  ne  status  indecorus,  ne  qua 
in  proferendis  pedibus  inscitia,  ne  caput  oculique  ab 

17  alia    corporis    inclinatione   dissideant.      Nam    neque 
haec   esse   in   parte    pronuntiationis    negaverit  quis- 
quam,    neque    ipsam    pronuntiationem    ab    oratore 
secernet,  et  certe,  quod  facere  oporteat,  non  indig- 
nandum  est  discere;  cum  praesertim  haec  chironomia, 
quae   est,  ut  nomine  ipso  declaratur.  lex  gestus,,  et 
ab    illis  temporibus   heroicis    orta    sit    et    a    summis 

BOOK    I.  xi.  12-17 

purpose,  that  is  to  say,,  resembling  the  speeches  of 
a  pleader.  These  are  not  onl}  most  useful  in  train-  13 
ing  the  delivery,,  but  are  admirably  adapted  to 
increase  a  speaker's  eloquence.  These  are  the  14 
methods  to  be  employed  while  the  pupil  is  too  young 
to  take  in  more  advanced  instruction ;  but  when 
the  time  has  come  for  him  to  read  speeches,  and  as 
soon  as  he  begins  to  appreciate  their  merits,  he 
should  have  a  careful  and  efficient  teacher  at  his 
side  not  merely  to  form  his  style  of  reading  aloud, 
but  to  make  him  learn  select  passages  by  heart  and 
declaim  them  standing  in  the  manner  which  actual 
pleading  would  require  :  thus  he  will  simultaneously 
train  delivery,  voice  and  memory. 

•    '  • 

I  will  not  blame  even  those  who  give  a  certain  15 
amount  of  time  to  the  teacher  of  gymnastics.  I  am 
not  speaking  of  those,  who  spend  part  of  their  life 
in  rubbing  themselves  with  oil  and  part  in  wine- 
bibbing,  and  kill  the  mind  by  over-attention  to  the 
body :  indeed,  I  would  have  such  as  these  kept 
as  far  a£  possible  from  the  boy  whom  we  are 
training.  But  we  give  the  same  name  to  those  who  16 
form  gesture  and  motion  so  that  the  arms  may  be 
extended  in  the  proper  manner,  the  management  of 
the  hands  free  from  all  trace  of  rusticity  and 
inelegance,  the  attitude  becoming,  the  movements 
of  the  feet  appropriate  and  the  motions  of  the  head 
and  eyes  in  keeping  with  the  poise  of  the  body.  No  17 
one  will  deny  that  such  details  form  a  part  of  the 
art  of  delivery,  nor  divorce  delivery  from  oratory  ; 
and  there  can  be  no  justification  for  disdaining  to 
learn  what  has  got  to  be  done,  especially  as 
chironomy,  which,  as  the  name  shows,  is  the  Ian-  of 
gesture,  originated  in  heroic  times  and  met  with  the 



Graeciae  viris  atque  ipso  etiara  Socrate  probata,  a 
Platone  quoque  in  parte  civilium  posita  virtutum  et 
a  Chrysippo  in  praeceptis  de  liberorum  educatione 

18  compositis  non  omissa.      Nam  Lacedaemonios  quidem 
etiam  saltationem  quandam  tanquam  ad  bella   quo- 
que utilem  habuisse  inter  exercitationes  accepimus. 
Neque    id   veteribus    Romanis   dedecori    fuit ;    argu- 
mentum  est  sacerdotum  nomine  ac  religione  durans 
ad  hoc  tempus  saltatio,  et  ilia  in  tertio  Ciceronis  de 
Oratore  libro  verba  Crassi,  quibus  praecipit,  ut  orator 
utatur  laterum  inclinatione  forti  ac  ririli,  non  a  scena  et 
histrionibus  sed  ab  armis  aid  etiam  a  palaestra  ;  cuius 
disciplinae  usus  in  nostram  usque  aetatem  sine  re- 

19  prehensione    descendit.       A    me    tamen    nee    ultra 
pueriles    annos     retinebitur     nee    in    his    ipsis    diu. 
Neque  enim   gestum  oratoris  componi  ad  similitudi- 
nem    saltationis   volo,   sed     subesse    aliquid    ex    hac 
exercitatione  puerili,  unde  nos  non  id  agentes  furtim 
decor  ille  discentibus  traditus  prosequatur. 

XII.  Quaeri  solet,  an,  etiamsi  discenda  sint  haec, 
eodem  tempore  tamen  tradi  omnia  et  percipi  possint. 
Negant  enim  quidam,  quia  confundatur  animus  ac 
fatigetur  tot  disciplinis  in  diversum  tendentibus,  ad 
quas  nee  mens  nee  corpus  nee  dies  ipse  sufficiat,  et 

1  lix.  220. 

BOOK    I.  xi.  17-xn.  i 

approval  of  the  greatest  Greeks,  not  excepting 
Socrates  himself,  while  it  was  placed  by  Plato  among 
the  virtues  of  a  citizen  and  included  by  Chrysippus 
in  his  instructions  relative  to  the  education  of 
children.  We  are  told  that  the  Spartans  even  18 
regarded  a  certain  form  of  dance  as  a  useful 
element  in  military  training.  Nor  again  did  the 
ancient  Romans  consider  such  a  practice  as  disgrace- 
ful :  this  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  priestly  and 
ritual  dances  have  survived  to  the  present  day,  while 
Cicero  in  the  third  book  of  his  de  Oralore1  quotes  the 
words  of  Crassus,  in  which  he  lays  down  the 
principle  that  the  orator  "should  learn  to  move  his 
body  in  a  bold  and  manly  fashion  derived  not  from 
actors  or  the  stage,  but  from  martial  and  even  from 
gymnastic  exercises."  And  such  a  method  of  train- 
ing has  persisted  uncensured  to  our  own  time.  In  my  19 
opinion,  however,  such  training  should  not  extend 
beyond  the  years  of  boyhood,  and  even  boys  should 
not  devote  too  much  time  to  it.  For  I  do  not  wish 
the  gestures  of  oratory  to  be  modelled  on  those 
of  the  dance.  But  I  do  desire  that  such  boyish 
exercises  should  continue  to  exert  a  certain  influ- 
ence, and  that  something  of  the  grace  which  we 
acquired  as  learners  should  attend  us  in  after  life 
without  our  being  conscious  of  the  fact. 

XII.  The  question  is  not  infrequently  asked,  as 
to  whether,  admitting  that  these  things  ought  to 
be  learned,  it  is  possible  for  all  of  them  to  be 
taught  and  taken  in  simultaneously.  There  are 
some  who  say  that  this  is  impossible  on  the  ground 
that  the  mind  is  confused  and  tired  by  application 
to  so  many  studies  of  different  tendencies  :  neither 
the  intelligence  nor  the  physique  of  our  pupils,  nor 



si   maxima    patiatur    hoc    aetas    robustior,    pueriles 

2  annos  onerari  non  oporteat.     Sed  non  satis  perspi- 
ciunt,  quantum  iiatura  human!  ingenii  valeat ;  quae 
ita  est  agilis  ac  velox,  sic  in  omnem  partem,  ut  ita 
dixerim,  spectat,  ut  ne  possit  quidem  aliquid  agere 
tantum  unum,  in  plura  vero  non  eodem  die  modo, 
sed   eodem    temporis    momento  vim  suam  intendat. 

3  An  vero  citharoedi  non  simul  et  memoriae  et  sono 
vocis  et  plurimis  flexibus  serviunt,  cum  interim  alios 
nervos   dextra   percurrunt,  alios  laeva  trahunt,  con- 
tinent,   praebent,    ne     pes    quidem    otiosus    certam 
legem    temporum    servat,    et    haec    pariter    omnia? 

4  Quid  ?    nos    agendi    subita    necessitate    deprehensi 
nonne    alia    dicimus,   alia    providemus,    cum    pariter 
inventio  rerum,  electio  verborum,  compositio,  gestus, 
pronuntiatio,  vultus,  motus   desiderentur  ?     Quae  si 
velut  sub  uno  conatu  tarn  diversa  parent  simul,  cur 
non  pluribus  curis  horas  partiamur  ?  cum  praesertim 
reficiat  animos  ac  reparet  varietas  ipsa,  contraque  sit 
aliquanto  difficilius  in  labore  uno  perseverare.      Ideo 
et    stilus     lectione     requiescit,    et     ipsius    lectionis 

5  taedium    vicibus    levatur.       Quamlibet    multa    egeri- 
mus,  quodam  tamen  modo  recentes  sumus  ad  id  quod 
incipimus.     Quis  non  obtundi   potest,  si  per  totum 
diem    cuiuscunque    artis    unum    magi  strum     ferat? 
Mutatione  recreabitur  sicut  in  cibis,  quorum  diversi- 


BOOK    I.  xii.  1-5 

the  time  at  our  disposal  are  sufficient,  they  say,  and 
even  though  older  boys  may  be  strong  enough,  it  is 
a  sin  to  put  such  a  burden  on  the  shoulders  of  child- 
hood. These  critics  show  an  insufficient  appre-  2 
ciation  of  the  capacities  of  the  human  mind,  which 
is  so  swift  and  nimble  and  versatile,  that  it  cannot 
be  restricted  to  doing  one  thing  only,  but  insists  on 
devoting  its  attention  to  several  different  subjects  not 
merely  in  one  day,  but  actually  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  Do  not  harpists  simultaneously  exert  3 
the  memory  and  pay  attention  to  the  tone  and 
inflexions  of  the  voice,  while  the  right  hand  runs 
over  certain  strings  and  the  left  plucks,  stops  or 
releases  others,  and  even  the  foot  is  employed  in 
beating  time,  all  these  actions  being  performed  at 
the  same  moment?  Again,  do  not  we  ourselves,  4 
when  unexpectedly  called  upon  to  plead,  speak 
while  we  are  thinking  what  we  are  to  say  next, 
invention  of  argument,  choice  of  words,  rhythm, 
gesture,  delivery,  facial  expression  and  movement  all 
being  required  simultaneously?  Jf  all  these  things 
can  be  done  with  one  effort  in  spite  of  their 
diversity,  why  should  we  not  divide  our  hours  among 
different  branches  of  study  ?  We  must  remember 
that  variety  serves  to  refresh  and  restore  the  mind, 
and  that  it  is  really  considerably  harder  to  work  at 
one  subject  without  intermission.  Consequently  we 
should  give  the  pen  a  rest  by  turning  to  read,  and 
relieve  the  tedium  of  reading  by  changes  of  subject. 
However  manifold  our  activities,  in  a  certain  sense  5 
we  come  fresh  to  each  new  subject.  Who  can 
maintain  his  attention,  if  he  has  to  listen  for  a 
whole  day  to  one  teacher  harping  on  the  same 
subject,  be  it  what  it  may?  Change  of  studies  is 



tate  reficitur  stomachus  et  pluribus  minore  fastidio 

6  alitur.       Aut    dicant    isti    mihi,    quae    sit    alia    ratio 
discendi.       Grammatico     soli     deserviamus,    deinde 
geometrae  taiitum,   omittamus   interim  quod  didici- 
mus  ?  mox  transeamus  ad  musicum,  excidaiit  priora? 
et  cum  Latinis  studebimus  litteris,  non  respiciamus 
ad  Graecas,  et,  ut  semel  finiam,  nihil  faciamus  nisi 

7  novissimum  ?      Cur  non  idem  suademus  agricolis,  ne 
arva  simul  et  vineta  et  oleas  et  arbustum  colant,  ne 
pratis  et  pecoribus  et  hortis  et  alvearibus  avibusque 
accommodent    curam  ?     Cur    ipsi   aliquid    forensibus 
negotiis,  aliquid  desideriis   amicorum,   aliquid   ratio- 
nibus    domesticis,    aliquid    curae     corpori.v,    nonniliil 
voluptatibus    cotidie    damus  ?    quarum    nos    una    res 
quaelibet      nihil      intermittentes     fatigaret.       Adeo 
facilius   est  multa  facere  quam  diu. 

8  Illud  quidem   minima  verendum  est,  ne  laborem 
studiorum  pueri  difficilius  tolerent,  neque  enim   ulla 
aetas  minus  fatigatur.      Mirum  sit  forsitan,   sed  ex- 

9  perimentis    depreliendas.       Nam    et    dociliora    sunt 
ingenia,  priusquam  obduruerunt.      Id  vel  hoc  argu- 
mento  patet,  quod  intra  biennium,  quam  verba  recte 
formare    potuerunt,   quamvis    nullo    instante^   omma 
fere  loquuntur;   at  noviciis  nostris   per   quot   annos 


BOOK    I.  xn.  5-9 

like  change  of  foods:  the  stomach  is  refreshed  by 
their  variety  and  derives  greater  nourishment  from 
variety  of  viands.  If  my  critics  disagree,  let  them  6 
provide  me  with  an  alternative  method.  Are  we 
first  to  deliver  ourselves  up  to  the  sole  service  of 
the  teacher  of  literature,  and  then  similarly  to  the 
teacher  of  geometry,  neglecting  under  the  latter 
what  was  taught  us  by  the  former  ?  And  then  are 
we  to  go  on  to  the  musician,  forgetting  all  that  we 
learned  before  ?  And  when  we  study  Latin  litera- 
ture, are  we  to  do  so  to  the  exclusion  of  Greek  ?  In 
fine,  to  have  done  with  the  matter  once  and  for  all, 
are  we  to  do  nothing  except  that  which  last  comes 
to  our  hand?  On  this  principle,  why  not  advise  7 
farmers  not  to  cultivate  corn,  vines,  olives  and 
orchard  trees  at  the  same  time  ?  or  from  devoting 
themselves  simultaneously  to  pastures,  cattle,  gar- 
dens, bees  and  poultry?  Why  do  we  ourselves  daily 
allot  some  of  our  time  to  the  business  of  the  courts, 
some  to  the  demands  of  our  friends,  some  to  our 
domestic  affairs,  some  to  the  exercise  of  the  body, 
and  some  even  to  our  pleasures  ?  Any  one  of  these 
occupations,  if  pursued  without  interruption,  would 
fatigue  us.  So  much  easier  is  it  to  do  many  things 
than  to  do  one  thing  for  a  long  time  continuously. 

We  need  have  no  fear  at  any  rate  that  boys  will  8 
find  their  work  too  exhausting:  there  is  no  age  more 
capable  of  enduring  fatigue.     The  fact  may  be  sur- 
prising, but  it  can  be  proved    by   experiment.      For 
the  mind  is  all  the  easier  to  teach  before  it  is  set.  This  9 
may  be  clearly  proved  by  the  fact  that  within  two 
years  after  a  child  has  begun  to  form  words  correctly, 
he  can  speak   practically  all  without    any    pressure 
from  outside.     On  the  other  hand  how  many  years 



sermo  Latinus  repugnat.  Magis  scias,  si  quern  iam 
robustum  instituere  litteris  coeperis,  non  sine  causa 
dici  7raiSo/za$eZ$  eos,  qui  in  sua  quidque  arte  optime 

10  faciant.      Et    patientior    est    laboris    natura    pueris 
quam    iuvenibus.      Videlicet,   ut    corpora   infantium 
nee   casus,  quo    in    terram    totiens   deferuntur,   tam 
graviter  adfligit  nee  ilia  per  manus  et  genua  reptatio 
nee  post  breve  tempus  continui  lusus  et  totius  diei 
discursus,    quia    pondus    illis    abest    nee    sese    ipsi 
gravant :    sic    animi'    quoque,    credo,    quia    minore 
conatu  moventur  nee  suo  nisu  studiis  insistunt,  sed 
formandos  se   tantummodo   praestant,  non   similiter 

11  fatigantur.      Praeterea  secundum  aliam  aetatis  illius 
facilitatem  velut  simplicius  docenles  sequuntur  nee 
quae    iam    egerint    metiuntur.      Abest    illis    adhuc 
etiam  laboris  iudicium.      Porro,  ut  frequenter  experti 
sumus,  minus  adficit  sensus  fatigatio  quam  cogitatio. 

12  Sed  ne  temporis  quidem  unquam  plus  erit,  quia 
his  aetatibus  omnis  in  audiendo  profectus  est.     Cum 
ad  stilum  secedet,  cum  generabit  ipse  aliquid  atque 
componet,  turn  inchoare  haec  studia  vel  non  vacabit 

13  vel    non     libebit.       Ergo    cum    grammaticus    totum 
occupare  diem  non  possit   nee  debeat,  ne  discentis 
animum   taedio   avertat,   quibus   potius   studiis   haec 

14  temporum    velut    subsiciva   donabimus  ?      Nam    nee 
ego    consumi    studentem    in    his    artibus    volo,   nee 


BOOK    I.  xii.  9-14 

it  takes  for  our  newly-imported  slaves  to  become 
familiar  with  the  Latin  language.  Try  to  teach  an 
adult  to  read  and  you  will  soon  appreciate  the  force 
of  the  saying  applied  to  those  who  do  everything 
connected  with  their  art  with  the  utmost  skill  "  he 
started  young  ! '  Moreover  boys  stand  the  strain  of  10 
work  better  than  young  men.  Just  as  small  children 
suffer  less  damage  from  their  frequent  falls,  from 
their  crawling  on  hands  and  knees  and,  a  little  later, 
from  their  incessant  play  and  their  running  about 
from  morn  till  eve,  because  they  are  so  light  in 
weight  and  have  so  little  to  carry,  even  so  their 
minds  are  less  susceptible  of  fatigue,  because  their 
activity  calls  for  less  effort  and  application  to  study 
demands  no  exertion  of  their  own,  since  they  are 
merely  so  much  plastic  material  to  be  moulded  by 
the  teacher.  And  further  owing  to  the  general  11 
pliability  of  childhood,  they  follow  their  instructors 
with  greater  simplicity  and  without  attempting  to 
measure  their  own  progress :  for  as  yet  they  do  not 
even  appreciate  the  nature  of  their  work.  Finally,  as 
I  have  often  noticed,  the  senses  are  less  affected  by 
mere  hard  work  than  they  are  by  hard  thinking. 

Moreover  there  will  never  be  more  time  for  such  12 
studies,  since  at  this  age  all  progress  is  made  through 
listening  to  the  teacher.  Later  when  the  boy  has  to 
write  by  himself,  or  to  produce  and  compose  some- 
thing out  of  his  own  head, he  will  neither  have  the  time 
nor  the  inclination  for  the  exercises  which  we  have 
been  discussing.  Since,  then,  the  teacher  ofliterature  13 
neither  can  nor  ought  to  occupy  the  whole  day,  for 
fear  of  giving  his  pupil  a  distaste  for  work,  what  are 
the  studies  to  which  the  spare  time  should  preferably 
be  devoted  ?  For  I  do  not  wish  the  student  to  wear  14 



moduletur  aut  musicis  notis  cantica  excipiat,  nee 
utique  ad  minutissima  usque  geometriae  opera  de- 
scendat,  non  comoedum  in  pronuntiando  nee  salta- 
torem  in  gestu  facio ;  quae  si  omnia  exigerem, 
suppeditabat  tamen  tempus.  Longa  est  enim,  quae 
discit,  aetas,  et  ego  non  de  tardis  ingeniis  loquor. 

15  Denique  cur  in  his  omnibus,  quae  discenda  oratori 
futuro    puto,    eminuit    Plato?     qui    non    contentus 
disciplinis,    quas    praestare    poterant    Athenae,    non 
Pythagoreorum,    ad    quos    in     Italiam    navigaverat, 
Aegypti  quoque  sacerdotes  adiit  atque  eorum  arcana 

16  Difficultatis      patrocinia      praeteximus     segnitiae. 
Neque    enim    nobis   operis    amor   est,   nee,   quia   sit 
honesta    ac    rerum    pulcherrima    eloquentia,  petitur 
ipsa,    sed    ad    venalem    usum    et    sordidum    lucrum 

17  accingimur.       Dicant    sine     his    in    foro    multi    et 
adquirant,  dum  sit  locupletior  aliquis  sordidae  mercis 
negotiator   et   plus  voci   suae   debeat   praeco.      Nee 
velim     quidem     lectorem     dari     mihi     quid     studia 

18  referant  computaturum.      Qui  vero  imaginem  ipsam 
eloquentiae  divina  quadam  mente  conceperit,  quique 
illam   (ut  ait  non  ignobilis   tragicus)    reginam  rerum 
orationem    ponet    ante    oculos,    fructumque    non    ex 
stipe  advocationum  sed  ex  animo  suo  et  contempla- 

1  Pacuvius  (Ribbeck,  177). 

BOOK    I.  xii.  14-18 

himself  out  in  such  pursuits :  I  would  not  have  him  sing 
or  learn  to  read  music  or  dive  deep  into  the  minuter 
details  of  geometry,,  nor  need  he  be  a  finished  actor  in 
his  delivery  or  a  dancer  in  his  gesture  :    if  I  did  de- 
mand all  these  accomplishments,,  there  would  yet  be 
time  for  them  ;    the  period  allotted  to  education  is 
longhand  I  am  not  speaking  of  duller  wits.      Why  did  16 
Plato  bear  away  the  palm  in  all  these  branches  of 
knowledge  which  in  my  opinion  the  future   orator 
should  learn?  I  answer,  because  he  was  not  merely  con- 
tent with  the  teaching  which  Athens  was  able  to  pro- 
vide or  even  with  that  of  the  Pythagoreans  whom  he 
visited  in   Italy,  but  even  approached  the  priests  of 
Egypt  and  made  himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
all  their  secret  lore. 

The  plea   of   the  difficulty  of  the  subject  is  put  16 
forward  merely  to  cloak  our  indolence,  because  we 
do  not  love  the  work  that  lies  before  us  nor  seek  to 
win  eloquence  for  our  own  because  it  is  a  noble  art 
and  the  fairest  thing  in  all  the  world,  but  gird  up 
our  loins  for  mercenary  ends  and  for  the  winning  of 
filthy  lucre.  Without  such  accomplishments  many  may  17 
speak  in  the  courts  and  make  an  income  ;  but  it  is 
my  prayer  that  every  dealer  in  the  vilest  merchandise 
may  be  richer  than  they  and  that  the  public  crier 
may  find  his  voice  a  more  lucrative  possession.     And 
I  trust  that  there  is  not  one  even  among  my  readers 
who  would  think  of  calculating  the  monetary  value 
of    such    studies.     But  he  that  has  enough  of  the   18 
divine  spark  to  conceive  the  ideal  eloquence,  he  who, 
as  the  great  tragic  poet l  says,  regards  "  oratory  "  as 
"the  queen  of  all  the  world"  and  seeks  not  the  transi- 
tory gains  of  advocacy,  but  those  stable  and  lasting 
rewards  which   his    own    soul    and    knowledge    and 



tione  ac  scientia  petet  perpetuum  ilium  nee  fortunae 
subiectum,  facile  persuadebit  sibi,  ut  tempora,  quae 
spectaculis,  campo,  tesseris,  otiosis  denique  sermo- 
nibus,  ne  dicam  somno  et  conviviorum  mora  con- 
teruntur,  geometrae  potius  ac  musico  impendat, 
quanto  plus  delectationis  habiturus  quam  ex  illis 
19  ineruditis  voluptatibus.  Dedit  enim  hoc  providentia 
hominibus  munus,  ut  honesta  magis  iuvarent.  Sed 
nos  haec  ipsa  dulcedo  longius  duxit.  Hactenus  ergo 
de  studiis,  quibus,  antequam  maiora  capiat,  puer 
instituendus  est ;  proximus  liber  velut  novum  sumet 
exordium  et  ad  rhetoris  officia  transibit. 


BOOK    I.  xii.  18-19 

contemplation  can  give,  he  will  easily  persuade  him- 
self to  spend  his  time  not,  like  so  many,  in  the  theatre 
or  in  the  Campus  Martins,  in  dicing  or  in  idle  talk, 
to  say  naught  of  the  hours  that  are  wasted  in  sleep 
or  long  drawn  banqueting,  but  in  listening  rather  to 
the  geometrician  and  the  teacher  of  music.  For  by 
this  he  will  win  a  richer  harvest  of  delight  than  can 
ever  be  gathered  from  the  pleasures  of  the  ignorant, 
since  among  the  many  gifts  of  providence  to  man 
not  the  least  is  this  that  the  highest  pleasure  is  the 
child  of  virtue.  But  the  attractions  of  my  theme  19 
have  led  me  to  say  overmuch.  Enough  of  those 
studies  in  which  a  boy  must  be  instructed,  while  he 
is  yet  too  young  to  proceed  to  greater  things  !  My 
next  book  will  start  afresh  and  will  pass  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  duties  of  the  teacher  of  rhetoric. 




I.  TENUIT  consuetude,  quae  cotidie  magis  inva- 
lescit,  ut  praeceptoribus  eloquentiae,  Latinis  quidem 
semper  sed  etiam  Graecis  interim,  discipuli  serius 
quam  ratio  postulat,  traderentur.  Eius  rei  duplex 
causa  est,  quod  et  rhetores  utique  nostri  suas  partes 
omiserunt  et  grammatici  alienas  occupaverunt. 

2  Nam  et  illi  declamare  modo  et  scientiam  declamandi 
ac  facultatem  tradere  officii  sui  ducunt,  idque  intra 
deliberativas  iudicialesque  materias  (nam  cetera   ut 
professione  sua  minora  despiciunt),  et  hi  non  satis 
credunt  excepisse,  quae  relicta  erant,  (quo  nomine 
gratia  quoque  iis  babenda  est),  sed  ad  prosopopoeias 
usque    ac    suasorias,    in    quibus    onus    dicendi    vel 

3  maximum    est,   irrumpunt.      Hinc    ergo    accidit,   ut, 
quae    alterius    artis    prima    erant    opera,    facta    sint 
alterius  novissima,  et  aetas  altioribus  iam  disciplinis 
debita  in  schola  minore  subsidat  ac  rhetoricen  apud 
grammaticos  exerceat.      Ita,  quod  est  maxime  ridi- 
culum,  non  ante  ad  declamandi  magistrum  mittendus 
videtur  puer  quam  declamare  sciat. 

1  suasoriae  are  declamations  on  deliberative  themes  (e.g. 
Hannibal  deliberates  whether  he  should  cross  the  Alps). 



I.  THE  custom  has  prevailed  arid  is  daily  growing 
commoner  of  sending  boys  to  the  schools  of  rhetoric 
much   later   than  is  reasonable  :    this  is  always  the 
case    as    regards     Latin    rhetoric     and     occasionally 
applies  to   Greek   as  well.     The  reason  for  this   is 
twofold :  the  rhetoricians,  more  especially  our  own, 
have    abandoned    certain    of    their    duties    and  the 
teachers  of  literature  have  undertaken  tasks  which 
rightly  belong  to  others.     For  the  rhetorician  con-  2 
siders  that  his  duty  is  merely  to  declaim  and  give 
instruction  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  declamation 
and  confines  his  activities  to  deliberative  and  judicial 
themes,  regarding  all  others  as  beneath  the  dignity 
of  his  profession  ;  while  the  teacher  of  literature  is 
not  satisfied  to  take  what  is  left  him  (and  we  owe 
him  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  this),  but  even  presumes 
to  handle  declamations  in  character  and  deliberative 
themes,1  tasks  which  impose  the  very  heaviest  burden 
on  the  speaker.     Consequently  subjects  which  once  3 
formed  the  first   stages    of    rhetoric    have   come  to 
form    the    final  stages  of  a    literary  education,  and 
boys  who  are  ripe  for  more  advanced  study  are  kept 
back   in  the  inferior    school    and    practise    rhetoric 
under  the  direction  of  teachers  of  literature.     Thus 
we  get  the  absurd  result  that  a  boy  is  not  regarded 
as  fit  to  go  on  to  the  schools  of  declamation  till  he 
knows  how  to  declaim. 



4  Nos  suuni  cuique  professioni  modum  demus.     Et 
grainrnatice  (quam  in  Latinum  transferentes  littera- 
turani     vocaverunt)     fines     suos     norit,     praesertim 
tantum  ab  hac  appellationis  suae   paupertate,  intra 
quam  primi  illi  constitere,  provecta ;   nam  tenuis  a 
fonte   assumptis   historicorum   criticorumque   viribus 
pleno  iam  satis    alveo   flu  it,   cum   praeter    rationem 
recte   loquendi  non    parum   alioqui   copiosam   prope 
omnium  maximarum  artium  scientiam  amplexa  sit ; 

5  et  rhetorice,  cui  nomen  vis  eloquendi  dedit,   officia 
sua  non  detrectet  nee  occupari  gaudeat  pertinentem 
ad  se   laborem,  quae,   dum  opere  cedit,  iam   paene 

G  possessione  depulsa  est.  Neque  infitiabor,  aliquem 
ex  his,  qui  grammaticen  profiteantur,  eo  usque 
scientiae  progredi  posse,  ut  ad  haec  quoque  tradenda 
sufficiat ;  sed  cum  id  aget,  rhetoris  officio  fungetur 
non  suo. 

7  Nos   porro  quaerimus,  quando  iis,  quae  rhetorice 
praecipit,   percipiendis  puer   maturus  esse  videatur. 
In  quo  quidem  non  id  est  aestimandum,  cuius  quis- 
que  sit  aetatis,  sed  quantum  in  studiis  iam  effecerit. 
Et  ne  diutius  disseram,  quando  sit  rhetori  tradendus, 

8  sic  optime  finiri  credo  ;  cum  poterit.      Sed  hoc  ipsum 
ex   superiore   pendet  quaestione.      Nam  si  gramma- 
tices  muuus  usque  ad    suasorias  prorogating  tardius 


BOOK    II.  i.  4-8 

The  two  professions  must  each  be  assigned  their  4 
proper  sphere.  Grammatice,  which  we  translate  as 
the  science  of  letters,  must  learn  to  know  its  own 
limits,  especially  as  it  has  encroached  so  far  beyond 
the  boundaries  to  which  its  unpretentious  name 
should  restrict  it  and  to  which  its  earlier  professors 
actually  confined  themselves.  Springing  from  a  tiny 
fountain-head,  it  has  gathered  strength  from  the 
historians  and  critics  and  has  swollen  to  the  dimen- 
sions of  a  brimming  river,  since,  not  content  with  the 
theory  of  correct  speech,  no  inconsiderable  subject, 
it  has  usurped  the  study  of  practically  all  the  highest 
departments  of  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand  5 
rhetoric,  which  derives  its  name  from  the  power  of 
eloquence,  must  not  shirk  its  peculiar  duties  nor  re- 
joice to  see  its  own  burdens  shouldered  by  others. 
For  the  neglect  of  these  is  little  less  than  a  surrender 
of  its  birthright.  I  will  of  course  admit  that  there  G 
may  be  a  few  professors  of  literature  who  have 
acquired  sufficient  knowledge  to  be  able  to  teach  rhe- 
toric as  well  ;  but  when  they  do  so,  they  are  perform- 
ing the  duties  of  the  rhetorician,  not  their  own. 

A  further  point  into  which  we  must  enquire  con-  ' 
cerns  the  age  at  which  a  boy  may  be  considered 
sufficiently  advanced  to  profit  by  the  instructions  of 
the  rhetorician.  In  this  connexion  we  must  consider 
not  the  boy's  actual  age,  but  the  progress  he  has 
made  in  his  studies.  To  put  it  briefly,  I  hold  that 
the  best  answer  to  the  question  "  When  should  a 
boy  be  sent  to  the  school  of  rhetoric  ? "  is  this, 
"  When  he  is  fit."  But  this  question  is  really  depen-  8 
dent  on  that  previously  raised.  For  if  the  duties  of 
the  teacher  of  literature  are  prolonged  to  include 
instruction  in  deliberative  declamation,  this  will 



rhetore  opus  est.  At  si  rhetor  prirna  officia  operis 
sui  non  recusat,  a  narrationibus  statim  et  laudandi 
9  vituperandique  opusculis  cura  eius  desideratur.  An 
ignoramus  antiquis  hoc  fuisse  ad  augendam  eloquen- 
tiam  genus  exercitationis,  ut  theses  dicerent  et 
communes  locos  et  cetera  citra  complexum  rerum 
personarumque,  quibus  verae  fictaeque  controversiae 
continentur  ?  Ex  quo  palam  est,  quam  turpiter 
deserat  earn  partem  rhetorices  institutio,  quam  et 

10  primam  habuit  et  diu  solam.      Quid  autem  est  ex  iis, 
de  quibus   supra  dixi,   quod   non   cum  in  alia,  quae 
sunt  propria  rhetorum,  turn  certe  in  illud  iudiciale 
causae  genus  incidat  ?     An  non  in  foro  narrandum 

1 1  est  ?  qua  in  parte  nescio  an  sit  vel  plurimum.      Non 
laus  ac  vituperatio  certaminibus  illis  frequenter  in- 
seritur  ?     Non  communes  loci,  sive  qui  sunt  in  vitia 
derecti,   quales   legimus  a  Cicerone   composites,  seu 
quibus    quaestiones    generaliter    tractantur,    quales 
sunt  editi    a    Quinto    quoque    Hortensio :    ut,   Sitne 
parvis    argumentis  credendum,    et    pro  testibus    et  in 

12  testes,  in  mediis  litium  medullis  versantur  ?     Arma 
sunt  haec  quodammodo  praeparanda  semper,  ut  iis, 
cum  res  poscet,  utare.     Quae  qui  pertinere  ad  ora- 

1  communes    loci  =  passages   dealing   with    some   general 
principle  or  theme.     For  theses  see  II.  iv.  24. 

2  controversiae  are  declamations  on  controversial  or  judicial 
themes.     A  general  rule  or  law  is  stated  :  then  a  special  case, 
which    has  to   be  solved   in   accordance  with   the   law.     An 
abbreviated  controversia  is  to  be  found  in  I.  x.  33,  and  they 
occur  frequently  hereafter  (cp.  esp.  in.  vi.  96). 


BOOK    II.  i.  8-12 

postpone  the  need  for  the  rhetorician.  On  the  other 
hand  if  the  rhetorician  does  not  refuse  to  undertake 
the  first  duties  of  his  task,  his  instruction  will  be  re- 
quired from  the  moment  the  boy  begins  to  compose 
narratives  and  his  first  attempts  at  passages  of  praise 
or  denunciation.  We  know  that  the  orators  of  9 
earlier  days  improved  their  eloquence  by  declaiming 
themes  and  common-places l  and  other  forms  of 
rhetorical  exercises  not  involving  particular  circum- 
stances or  persons  such  as  provide  the  material  for 
real  or  imaginary  causes.2  From  this  we  can  clearly 
see  what  a  scandalous  dereliction  of  duty  it  is  for 
the  schools  of  rhetoric  to  abandon  this  department 
of  their  work,  which  was  not  merely  its  first,  but 
for  a  long  time  its  sole  task.  What  is  there  in  10 
those  exercises  of  which  I  have  just  spoken  that 
does  not  involve  matters  which  are  the  special  con- 
cern of  rhetoric  and  further  are  typical  of  actual 
legal  cases  ?  Have  we  not  to  narrate  facts  in 
the  law-courts  ?  Indeed  I  am  not  sure  that  this  is 
not  the  most  important  department  of  rhetoric  in 
actual  practice.  Are  not  eulogy  and  denunciation  11 
frequently  introduced  in  the  course  of  the  contests 
of  the  courts  ?  Are  not  common-places  frequently 
inserted  in  the  very  heart  of  lawsuits,  whether,  like 
those  which  we  find  in  the  works  of  Cicero,  they  are 
directed  against  vice,  or,  like  those  published  by 
Quintus  Hortensius,  deal  with  questions  of  general 
interest  such  as  "whether  small  points  of  argu- 
ment should  carry  weight,"  or  are  employed  to 
defend  or  impugn  the  credibility  of  witnesses  ? 
These  are  weapons  which  we  should  always  have  1£ 
stored  in  our  armoury  ready  for  immediate  use  as 
occasion  may  demand.  The  critic  who  denies  that 



tionem  non  putabit,  is  ne  statuam  quidem  inchoari 
credet,  cum  eius  membra  fundentur.  Neque  hanc 
(ut  aliqui  putabunt)  festinationem  meam  sic  quis- 
quam  calumnietur,  tanquam  eum,  qui  sit  rhetori 
traditus,  abducendum  protinus  a  grammaticis  putem. 
13  Dabuntur  et  illis  turn  quoque  tempora  sua,  neque 
erit  verendum,  ne  binis  praeceptoribus  oneretur 
puer.  Non  enim  crescet  sed  dividetur,  qui  sub  uno 
miscebatur,  labor,  et  erit  sui  quisque  operis  magister 
utilior  ;  quod  adhuc  obtinent  Graeci,  a  Latinis  omis- 
sum  est,  et  fieri  videtur  excusate,  quia  sunt  qui 
labori  isti  successerint. 

II.  Ergo  cum  ad  eas  in  studiis  vires  pervenerit 
puer,  ut,  quae  prima  esse  praecepta  rhetor  um 
diximus,  mente  consequi  possit,  tradendus  eius 
artis  magistris  erit ;  quorum  in  primis  inspici  mores 

2  oportebit.      Quod  ego  non  idcirco  potissimum  in  hac 
parte   tractare   sum   aggressus,   quia   non    in   ceteris 
quoque    doctoribus    idem    hoc    examinandum    quam 
diligentissime  putem,  sicut  testatus  sum  libro  priore  ; 
sed    quod    magis    necessariam    eius    rei    mentionem 

3  facit   aetas   ipsa    discentium.       Nam    et    adulti    fere 
pueri  ad  hos  praeceptores  transferuntur  et  apud  eos 
iuvenes     etiam    facti     perseverant ;     ideoque    maior 


BOOK   II.  i.  I2-H.  3 

such  matters  concern  an  orator  is  one  who  will 
refuse  to  believe  that  a  statue  is  being  begun 
when  its  limbs  are  actually  being  cast.  Some  will 
think  that  I  am  in  too  great  a  hurry,  but  let  no  one 
accuse  me  of  thinking  that  the  pupil  who  has  been 
entrusted  to  the  rhetorician  should  forthwith  be 
withdrawn  from  the  teacher  of  literature.  The  latter  13 
will  still  have  certain  hours  allotted  him,  and  there 
is  no  reason  to  fear  that  a  bov  will  be  overloaded  by 
receiving  instruction  from  two  different  masters.  It 
will  not  mean  any  increase  of  work,  but  merely  the 
division  among  two  masters  of  the  studies  which 
were  previously  indiscriminately  combined  under  one  : 
and  the  efficiency  of  either  teacher  will  be  increased. 
This  method  is  still  in  vogue  among  the  Greeks,  but 
has  been  abandoned  by  us,  not  perhaps  without  some 
excuse,  as  there  were  others  ready  to  step  into  the 
rhetorician's  shoes. 

II.  As  soon  therefore  as  a  boy  has  made  sufficient 
progress  in  his  studies  to  be  able  to  follow  what  I 
have  styled  the  first  stage  of  instruction  in  rhetoric, 
he  should  be  placed  under  a  rhetorician.  Our  first 
task  must  be  to  enquire  whether  the  teacher  is  of 
good  character.  The  reason  which  leads  me  to  deal  2 
with  this  subject  in  this  portion  of  my  work  is  not 
that  I  regard  character  as  a  matter  of  indifference 
where  other  teachers  are  concerned,  (I  have  already 
shown  how  important  I  think  it  in  the  preceding 
book),  but  that  the  age  to  which  the  pupil  has  now 
attained  makes  the  mention  of  this  point  especially 
necessary.  For  as  a  rule  boys  are  on  the  verge  of  3 
manhood  when  transferred  to  the  teacher  of  rhetoric 
and  continue  with  him  even  when  they  are  young 
men :  consequently  we  must  spare  no  effort  to  secure 



adhibenda  turn  cura  est,  ut  et  teneriores  annos  ab 
iniuria  sanctitas  docentis   custodial   et    ferociores    a 

4  licentia    gravitas    deterreat.      Neque    vero    sat    est 
summam     praestare     abstinentiam,    nisi     disciplinae 
severitate     convenientium     quoque     ad     se     mores 

5  Sumat  igitur  ante  omnia  parentis  erga  discipulos 
suos   animum,   ac   succedere    se   in   eorum   locum,   a 
quibus   sibi   liberi    tradantur,    existimet.       Ipse    nee 
habeat  vitia  nee  ferat.      Non  austeritas  eius  tristis, 
non  dissoluta  sit  comitas,  ne  inde  odium  hinc  con- 
temptus   oriatur.      Plurimus   ei  de  honesto   ac   bono 
sermo  sit ;    nam   quo   saepius    monuerit,    hoc    rarius 
castigabit.      Minime    iracundus,,    nee    tamen    eorum, 
quae    emendanda    erunt,    dissimulator,     simplex    in 
docendo,      patiens     laboris,    assiduus    potius    quam 

6  immodicus.      Interrogantibus     libenter    respondeat, 
non  interrogantes   percontetur   ultro.      In  laudandis 
discipulorum  dictionibus   nee   malignus  nee   effusus, 
quia   res  altera   taedium   laboris,   altera   securitatem 

7  parit.      In  emendando,  quae   corrigenda  erunt,  non 
acerbus  minimeque  contumeliosus  ;   nam  id  quidem 
multos  a  proposito  studendi  fugat,  quod  quidam  sic 

8  obiurgant  quasi    oderint.      Ipse   aliquid  immo  multa 

cotidie  dicat,  quae  secum  auditores  referant.      Licet 
enim   satis   exemplorum   ad   imitandum   ex   lectione 


BOOK    II.  ii.  3-8 

that  the  purity  of  the  teacher's  character  should 
preserve  those  of  tenderer  years  from  corruption, 
while  its  authority  should  keep  the  bolder  spirits 
from  breaking  out  into  licence.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  4 


that  he  should  merely  set  an  example  of  the  highest 
personal  self-control ;  he  must  also  be  able  to  govern 
the  behaviour  of  his  pupils  by  the  strictness  of  his 

Let  him  therefore  adopt  a  parental  attitude  to  his  5 
pupils,  and  regard  himself  as  the  representative  of 
those  who  have  committed  their  children  to  his 
charge.  Let  him  be  free  from  vice  himself  and 
refuse  to  tolerate  it  in  others.  Let  him  be  strict  but 
not  austere,  genial  but  not  too  familiar  :  for  austerity 
will  make  him  unpopular,  while  familiarity  breeds 
contempt.  Let  his  discourse  continually  turn  on  what 
is  good  and  honourable  ;  the  more  he  admonishes, 
the  less  he  will  have  to  punish.  He  must  control 
his  temper  without  however  shutting  his  eyes  to 
faults  requiring  correction  :  his  instruction  must  be 
free  from  affectation,  his  industry  great,  his  demands 
on  his  class  continuous,  but  not  extravagant.  He  6 
must  be  ready  to  answer  questions  and  to  put 
them  unasked  to  those  who  sit  silent.  In  praising 
the  recitations  of  his  pupils  he  must  be  neither 
grudging  nor  over-generous  :  the  former  quality  will 
give  them  a  distaste  for  work,  while  the  latter  will 
produce  a  complacent  self-satisfaction.  In  correcting  7 
faults  he  must  avoid  sarcasm  and  above  all  abuse  : 
for  teachers  whose  rebukes  seem  to  imply  positive 
dislike  discourage  industry.  He  should  declaim  8 
daily  himself  and,  what  is  more,  without  stint,  that 
his  class  may  take  his  utterances  home  with  them. 
For  however  many  models  for  imitation  he  may 



suppeditet,  tamen  viva  ilia,  ut  dicitur,  vox  alit 
plenius  praecipueque  eius  praeceptoris,  quern  dis- 
cipuli,  si  modo  recte  sunt  instituti,  et  amant  et 
verentur.  Vix  auteni  dici  potest,  quanto  libentius 
imitemur  eos,  quibus  favemus. 

9  Minima  vero  permittenda  pueris,  ut  fit  apud 
plerosque,  adsurgendi  exultandique  in  laudando 
licentia ;  quin  etiam  iuveiium  modicum  esse,  cum 
audient,  testimonium  debet.  Ita  net,  ut  ex  iudicio 
praeceptoris  discipuius  pendeat,  atque  id  se  dixisse 

10  recte,    quod    ab    eo    probabitur,    credat.       Ilia    vero 
vitiosissima,    quae   iam    humanitas    vocatur,   invicem 
qualiacunque    laudandi,   cum    est   indecora   et  thea- 
tralis   et  severe  institutes  scholis   aliena,  turn   studi- 
orum     perniciosissima     hostis.       Supervacua     enim 
videntur  cura  ac  labor,  parata,  quidquid  eff'uderint, 

11  laude.      Vultum  igitur  praeceptoris  intueri  tarn,  qui 
audiunt,  debent,  quam  ipse  qui  dicit ;  ita  enim  pro- 
banda  atque   improbanda  discernet,  si  stilo  facultas 

12  continget,  auditione  indicium.      At  mine  proni  atque 
succincti  ad  omnem  clausulam  non  exsurgunt  modo 
verum  etiam  excurrunt  et  cum  indecora  exultatione 
conclamant.      Id   mutuum    est    et    ibi  declamationis 


BOOK    II.  ii.  8-12 

give  them  from  the  authors  they  are  reading,  it  will 
still  be  found  that  fuller  nourishment  is  provided  by 
the  living  voice,  as  we  call  it,  more  especially  when 
it  proceeds  from  the  teacher  himself,  who,  if  his 
pupils  are  rightly  instructed,  should  be  the  object 
of  their  affection  and  respect.  And  it  is  scarcely 
possible  to  say  how  much  more  readily  we  imitate 
those  whom  we  like. 

I  strongly  disapprove  of  the  prevailing  practice  of  9 
allowing  boys  to  stand  up  or  leap  from  the  seats  in 
the  expression  of  their  applause.  Young  men,  even 
when  they  are  listening  to  others,  should  be 
temperate  in  manifesting  their  approval.  If  this 
be  insisted  upon,  the  pupil  will  depend  on  his 
instructor's  verdict  and  will  take  his  approval  as 
a  guarantee  that  he  has  spoken  well.  The  worst  10 
form  of  politeness,  as  it  has  come  to  be  called,  is 
that  of  mutual  and  indiscriminate  applause,  a  practice 
which  is  unseemly,  theatrical  and  unworthy  of  a 
decently  disciplined  school,  in  addition  to  being  the 
worst  foe  to  genuine  study.  For  if  every  effusion  is 
greeted  with  a  storm  of  ready-made  applause,  care 
and  industry  come  to  be  regarded  as  superfluous. 
The  audience  no  less  than  the  speaker  should  there-  11 
fore  keep  their  eyes  fixed  on  their  teacher's  face,  since 
thus  they  will  learn  to  distinguish  between  what  is 
praiseworthy  and  what  is  not:  for  just  as  writing 
gives  facility,  so  listening  begets  the  critical 
faculty.  But  in  the  schools  of  to-day  we  see  boys  12 
stooping  forward  ready  to  spring  to  their  feet :  at 
the  close  of  each  period  they  not  merely  rise,  but 
rush  forward  with  shouts  of  unseemly  enthusiasm. 
Such  compliments  are  mutual  and  the  success  of  a 
declamation  consists  in  this  kind  of  applause.  The 



fortuna.  Hinc  tumor  et  vana  de  se  persuasio  usque 
adeo,  ut  illo  condiscipulorum  tumultu  inflati,  si  parum 
a  praeceptore  laudentur,  ipsi  de  illo  male  sentiant. 

13  Sed    se   quoque    praeceptores    intente    ac    modeste 
audiri  velint ;  non  enirn  iudicio  discipulorum  dicere 
debet    magister    sed    discipulus    magistri.     Quin,  si 
fieri  potest,  intendendus   animus  in  hoc  quoque,  ut 
perspiciat,    quae    quisque     et    quomodo    laudet,    et 
placere,  quae  bene  dicet,  non  suo  magis  quam  eorum 
nomine  delectetur,  qui  recte  iudicabunt. 

14  Pueros     adolescer.tibus     permixtos     sedere,     non 
placet   mihi.      Nam    etiamsi   vir    talis,  qualem    esse 
oportet   studiis  moribusque   praepositum,  modestam 
habere  potest  etiam  iuventutem,  tamen  vel  infirmi- 
tas  a  robustioribus  separanda  est,  et  carendum  non 
soluni  crimine  turpitudinis  verum  etiam  suspicione. 

15  Haec    notanda    breviter    existimavi ;    nam    ut    absit 
ab  ultimis   vitiis  ipse   ac   schola,  ne    praecipiendum 
quidem  credo.     Ac  si  quis  est,  qui  flagitia  manifesta 
in    eligendo    filii    praeceptore    non    vitet,   iam    hinc 
sciat  cetera   quoque,  quae   ad   utilitatem   iuventutis 
componere    conamur,    esse    sibi    hac    parte    omissa 

III.   Ne  illorum  quidem  persuasio  silentio  transe- 


BOOK    II.  ii.  12-in.  i 

result  is  vanity  and  empty  self-sufficiency,  carried  to 
such  an  extent  that,  intoxicated  by  the  wild  enthus- 
iasm of  their  fellow-pupils,  they  conceive  a  spite 
against  their  master,  if  his  praise  does  not  come  up 
to  their  expectation.  But  teachers  must  also  insist  13 
on  receiving  an  attentive  and  quiet  hearing  from  the 
class  when  they  themselves  declaim.  For  the 
master  should  not  speak  to  suit  his  pupil's  standard, 
but  they  should  speak  to  suit  his.  Further  he  should, 
if  possible,  keep  his  eyes  open  to  note  the  points 
which  each  boy  praises  and  observe  the  manner  in 
which  he  expresses  his  approval,  and  should  rejoice 
that  his  words  give  pleasure  not  only  for  his  own 
sake,  but  for  that  of  those  who  show  sound  judg- 
ment in  their  appreciation. 

I  do  not  approve  of  boys  sitting  mixed  with  young  14 
men.  For  even  if  the  teacher  be  such  an  one  as  we 
should  desire  to  see  in  charge  of  the  morals  and 
studies  of  the  young,  and  can  keep  his  youthful 
pupils  under  proper  control,  it  is  none  the  less 
desirable  to  keep  the  weaker  members  separate  from 
the  more  mature,  and  to  avoid  not  only  the  actual 
charge  of  corruption  but  the  merest  suspicion  of  it. 
I  have  thought  it  worth  while  to  put  my  views  on  15 
this  subject  quite  briefly.  For  I  do  not  think  it 
necessary  even  to  warn  the  teacher  that  both  he  and 
his  school  must  be  free  from  the  grosser  vices.  And 
should  there  be  any  father  who  does  not  trouble  to 
choose  a  teacher  for  his  son  who  is  free  from  the 
obvious  taint  of  immorality,  he  may  rest  assured 
that  all  the  other  precepts,  which  I  am  attempting 
to  lay  down  for  the  benefit  of  our  youth,  will  be 
absolutely  useless  to  him,  if  he  neglects  this. 

III.   I  do  not  think  that  I  should  pass  by  in  silence 



unda  est,  qui,  etiam  cum  idoneos  rhetori  pueros 
putaverunt,  non  tamen  continue  tradendos  emi- 
nentissimo  credunt,  sed  apud  minores  aliquamdiu 
detinent,  tanquam  instituendis  artibus  magis  sit 
apta  mediocritas  praeceptoris,  cum  ad  intellectum 
atque  ad  imitationem  facilior  turn  ad  suscipiendas 

2  elementorum  molestias  minus  superba.     Qua  in  re 
mihi    non    arbitror    diu    laborandum,    ut    ostendam, 
quanto  sit  melius  optimis  imbui,  quanta  in  eluendis 
quae  semel  insederint  vitiis    difficultas  consequatur, 
cum  geminatum  onus  succedentes  premat  et  quidem 

3  dedocendi  gravius  ac  prius  quam  docendi.      Propter 
quod    Timotbeum    clarum    in    arte    tibiarum    ferunt 
duplices  ab  iis,  quos  alius  instituisset,  solitum  exigere 
mercedes,  quam  si  rudes  traderentur.     Error  tamen 
est  in  re  duplex  :   unus,  quod  interim  sufficere  illos 
minores  existimant,  et  bono  sane  stomacho  contenti 

4  sunt ;  quae  quanquam  est  ipsa  reprehensione  digna 
securitas,  tameri   esset  utcunque  tolerabilis,  si  eius- 
modi  praeceptores  minus  docerent  non  peius ;  alter 
ille     etiam    frequentior,    quod    eos,    qui    ampliorem 
dicendi    facultatem    sint   consecuti,   non    putant    ad 
minora    descendere,    idque    interim    fieri,    quia    fas- 
tidiant    praestare    hanc   inferioribus   curam,   interim 

6  quia  omnino  non  possint.      Ego  porro  eum  qui  nolit 


BOOK    If.  in.  1-5 

even  the  opinion  of  those  who,  even  when  they 
regard  boys  as  ripe  for  the  rhetorician,,  still  do  not 
think  that  they  should  at  once  be  placed  under  the 
most  eminent  teacher  available,  but  prefer  to  keep 
them  for  a  while  under  inferior  masters,  on  the 
ground  that  in  the  elementary  stages  a  mediocre 
instructor  is  easier  to  understand  and  to  imitate,  and 
less  reluctant  to  undertake  the  tiresome  task  of  teach- 
ing the  rudiments  as  being  beneath  his  notice.  I  do  2 
not  think  that  I  need  waste  much  time  in  pointing 
out  how  much  better  it  is  to  absorb  the  best  possible 
principles,  or  how  hard  it  is  to  get  rid  of  faults  which 
have  once  become  engrained  ;  for  it  places  a  double 
burden  on  the  shoulders  of  the  later  teacher  and 
the  preliminary  task  of  unteaching  is  harder  than 
that  of  teaching.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  3 
famous  piper  Timotheus  is  said  to  have  demanded 
from  those  who  had  previously  been  under  another 
master  a  fee  double  the  amount  which  he  charged 
for  those  wrho  came  to  him  untaught.  The  mistake 
to  which  I  am  referring  is,  however,  twofold.  First 
they  regard  these  inferior  teachers  as  adequate  for 
the  time  being  and  are  content  with  their  instruction 
because  they  have  a  stomach  that  will  swallow  any- 
thing :  this  indifference,  though  blameworthy  in  4 
itself,  would  yet  be  tolerable,  if  the  teaching  provided 
by  these  persons  were  merely  less  in  quantity  and 
not  inferior  in  quality  as  well.  Secondly,  and  this 
is  a  still  commoner  delusion,  they  think  that  those 
who  are  blest  with  greater  gifts  of  speaking  will  not 
condescend  to  the  more  elementary  details,  and  that 
consequently  they  sometimes  disdain  to  give  atten- 
tion to  such  inferior  subjects  of  study  and  sometimes 
are  incapable  of  so  doing.  For  my  part  I  regard  the  5 



in  numero  praecipientium  non  habeo,  posse  autem 
maxima,  si  velit,  optimum  quemque  contendo : 
primum,  quod  eum,  qui  eloquentia  ceteris  praestet, 
ilia  quoque,  per  quae  ad  eloquentiam  pervenitur, 

6  diligentissime  percepisse  credibile  est ;  deinde,  quia 
plurimum  in  praecipiendo  valet  ratio,  quae  doctis- 
simo   cuique   plenissima   est ;    postremo,   quia    nemo 
sic  in   maioribus  eminet,  ut  eum   minora    deficiant. 
Nisi  forte  lovem  quidem   Phidias  optime  fecit,  ilia 
autem,  quae   in   ornamentum   operis  eius  accedunt, 
alius  melius  elaborasset,  aut  orator  loqui  nesciet  aut 
leviores  morbos  curare  non  poterit  praestantissimus 

7  Quid  ergo  ?    non   est  quaedam   eloquentia  maior 
quam  ut  earn  intellectu  consequi  puerilis  infirmitas 
possit  ?       Ego    vero    confiteor :    sed  huiic    disertum 
praeceptorem   prudentem   quoque    et    non    ignarum 
docendi    esse    oportebit   summittentem  se  ad   men- 
suram    discentis ;    ut   velocissimus    quoque,  si    forte 
iter    cum    parvulo    faciat,    det    manum    et    gradum 
suum   minuat  nee   procedat  ultra  quam  comes  pos- 

8  sit.      Quid  ?     si   plerumque  accidit  ut  faciliora   sint 
ad   intelligendum  et    lucidiora   multo,  quae    a    doc- 
tissimo  quoque  dicuntur?      Nam   et   prima   est  elo- 
quentiae    virtus    perspicuitas,    et    quo    quis    ingenio 
minus    valet,    hoc    se    magis    attollere    et    dilatare 
conatur,    ut    statura    breves    in    digitos     eriguntur 

BOOK    II.  in.  5-8 

teacher  who  is  unwilling  to  attend  to  such  details 
as  being  unworthy  of  the  name  of  teacher :  and  as 
for  the  question  of  capacity,  I  maintain  that  it  is  the 
most  capable  man  who,  given  the  will,  is  able  to  do 
this  with  most  efficiency.  For  in  the  first  place  it  is  a 
reasonable  inference  that  a  man  blest  with  abnormal 
powers  of  eloquence  will  have  made  careful  note  of 
the  various  steps  by  which  eloquence  is  attained, 
and  in  the  second  place  the  reasoning  faculty,  which  6 
is  specially  developed  in  learned  men,  is  all-important 
in  teaching,  while  finally  no  one  is  eminent  in  the 
greater  things  of  his  art  if  he  be  lacking  in  the  lesser. 
Unless  indeed  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  while 
Phidias  modelled  his  Jupiter  to  perfection,  the 
decorative  details  of  the  statue  would  have  been 
better  executed  by  another  artist,  or  that  an  orator 
does  not  know  how  to  speak,  or  a  distinguished 
physician  is  incapable  of  treating  minor  ailments. 

"  Yes  "  it  may  be  answered  "  but  surely  you  do  not  7 
deny  that  there  is  a  type  of  eloquence  that  is 
too  great  to  be  comprehended  by  undeveloped 
boys?"  Of  course  there  is.  But  this  eloquent 
teacher  whom  they  fling  in  my  face  must  be  a 
sensible  man  with  a  good  knowledge  of  teaching  and 
must  be  prepared  to  stoop  to  his  pupil's  level,  just  as 
a  rapid  walker,  if  walking  with  a  small  child,  will 
give  him  his  hand  and  lessen  his  own  speed  and 
avoid  advancing  at  a  pace  beyond  the  powers  of  his 
little  companion.  Again  it  frequently  happens  that  8 
the  more  learned  the  teacher,  the  more  lucid  and 
intelligible  is  his  instruction.  For  clearness  is  the 
first  virtue  of  eloquence,  and  the  less  talented  a  man 
is,  the  more  he  will  strive  to  exalt  and  dilate  himself, 
just  as  short  men  tend  to  walk  on  tip-toe  and  weak 



9  et  pi ura  infirmi  minantur.  Nam  tumidos  et  cor 
ruptos  et  tinnulos  et  quocunque  alio  cacozeliae 
genere  peccantes  certum  habeo  non  virium  sed  in- 
firmitatis  vitio  laborare,  ut  corpora  non  robore  sed 
valetudine  inflantur  et  recto  itinere  lassi  plerumque 
devertunt.  Erit  ergo  etiam  obscurior,  quo  quisque 

10  Non  excidit  mihi,  scripsisse  me  in  libro  priore,  cum 
potiorem    in    scholis    eruditionem    esse    quam    domi 
dicerem,  libentius  se   prima  studia  tenerosque  pro- 
fectus  ad  imitationem  condiscipulorum,  quae  facilior 
esset,  erigere  ;  quod  a  quibusdam  sic  accipi  potest, 
tanquam    haee,   quam    mine    tueor,   sententia    priori 

11  diversa    sit.       Id    a    me    procul   aberit ;    namque    ea 
causa  vel  maxima  est,  cur  optimo  cuique  praeceptori 
sit  tradendus  puer,  quod  apud  eum  discipuli  quoque 
melius    instituti    aut    dicent,    quod    inutile    non    sit 
imitari,  aut  si  quid  erraverint,  statim  corrigentur ;  at 
indoctus  ille  etiam  probabit  fortasse  vitiosa  et  placere 

12  audientibus   iudicio    suo    coget.      Sit  ergo   tarn  elo- 
quentia    quam    moribus     praestantissimus,    qui    ad 
Phoenicis     Homerici     exemplum    dicere    ac    facere 


BOOK    II.  HI.  8-12 

men  to  use  threats.  As  for  those  whose  style  is  9 
inflated  or  vicious,  and  whose  language  reveals  a 
passion  for  high-sounding  words  or  labours  under 
any  other  form  of  affectation,  in  my  opinion  they 
suffer  not  from  excess  of  strength  but  of  weakness, 
like  bodies  swollen  not  with  the  plumpness  of 
health  but  with  disease,  or  like  men  who  weary  of 
the  direct  road  betake  them  to  bypaths.  Conse- 
quently the  worse  a  teacher  is,  the  harder  he  will 
be  to  understand. 

I  have  not  forgotten  that  I  stated  in  the  preced-  10 
ing  book,  when  I  urged  that  school  was  preferable 
to  home  education,  that  pupils  at  the  commence- 
ment of  their  studies,  when  progress  is  as  yet 
but  in  the  bud,  are  more  disposed  to  imitate  their 
schoolfellows  than  their  masters,  since  such  imitation 
comes  more  easily  to  them.  Some  of  my  readers 
may  think  that  the  view  which  I  am  now  maintaining 
is  inconsistent  with  my  previous  statement.  But  111 
am  far  from  being  inconsistent :  for  my  previous 
assertion  affords  the  strongest  reason  for  selecting  the 
very  best  teachers  for  our  boys  ;  since  pupils  of  a 
first  rate  master,  having  received  a  better  training, 
will  when  they  speak  say  something  that  may  be 
worthy  of  imitation,  while  if  they  commit  some 
mistake,  they  will  be  promptly  corrected.  But  the 
incompetent  teacher  on  the  other  hand  is  quite 
likely  to  give  his  approval  to  faulty  work  and  by  the 
judgment  which  he  expresses  to  force  approval 
on  the  audience.  The  teacher  should  therefore  be  12 
as  distinguished  for  his  eloquence  as  for  his  good 
character,  and  like  Phoenix  in  the  Iliad  be  able  to 
teach  his  pupil  both  how  to  behave  and  how  to 



IV.  Hinc  iam,  quas  primas  in  docendo  partes 
rhetorum  putem,  tradere  incipiam,  dilata  parumper 
ilia  quae  sola  vulgo  vocatur  arte  rhetorica.  Ac  mihi 
opportunus  maxime  videtur  ingressus  ab  eo,  cuius 
aliquid  simile  apud  grammaticos  puer  didicerit. 

2  Et  quia  narrationum,  excepta  qua  in  causis  utimur, 
tres    accepimus    species,   fabulam,  quae   versatur   in 
tragoediis  atque  carminibus,  non  a  veritate  modo  sed 
etiam  a  forma  veritatis  remota ;  argunientum,  quod 
falsum  sed  vero  simile  comoediae  fingunt ;  historian^ 
in  qua  est  gestae  rei  expositio  ;  grammaticis  autem 
poeticas  dedimus :    apud   rhetorem   initium    sit   his- 

3  torica,  tanto  robustior  quanto  verier.      Sed  narrandi 
quidem  quae   nobis  optima  ratio  videatur,  turn  de- 
monstrabimus,    cum     de     iudiciali     parte     dicemus. 
Interim    admonere    illud  satis   est,  ut  sit  ea  neque 
arida    prorsus    atque    ieiuna,    (nam    quid    opus    erat 
tantum  studiis  laboris  impendere,  si  res  nudas  atque 
inornatas    indicare    satis    videretur  ?)    neque    rursus 
sinuosa  et  arcessitis  descriptionibus,  in  quas  plerique 
imitatione     poeticae     licentiae    ducuntur,    lasciviat. 

4  Vitium  utrumque,  peius  tamen  illud,  quod  ex  inopia 

1  With  special  reference  to  the  element  of  the  miraculous. 
Ovid's  Metamorphoses  would  give  a  good  example. 

2  Book  IV.  chap.  ii. 


BOOK    II.  iv.  1-4 

IV.  I  shall  now  proceed  to  indicate  what  I  think 
should  be  the  first  subjects  in  which  the  rhetorician 
should  give  instruction,  and  shall  postpone  for  a 
time  our  consideration  of  the  art  of  rhetoric  in  the 
narrow  sense  in  which  that  term  is  popularly  used. 
For  in  my  opinion  it  is  most  desirable  that  we 
should  commence  with  something  resembling  the 
subjects  already  acquired  under  the  teacher  of 

Now  there  are  three  forms  of  narrative,  without  2 
counting  the  type  used  in  actual  legal  cases.      First 
there    is   the    fictitious    narrative    as    we    get    it    in 
tragedies  and  poems,  which  is  not  merely  not  true 
but  has  little  resemblance  to  truth.1    Secondly,  there 
is  the  realistic  narrative  as  presented  by  comedies, 
which,  though  not  true,  has  yet  a  certain  verisimili- 
tude.    Thirdly  there  is  the  historical  narrative,  which 
is  an   exposition  of  actual    fact.      Poetic   narratives 
are  the  property  of  the  teacher  of  literature.     The 
rhetorician    therefore    should    begin    with    the    his- 
torical narrative,  whose  force  is  in  proportion  to  its 
truth.      I  will,  however,  postpone  my  demonstration  3 
of  what  I  regard  as   the  best  method  of  narration 
till  I  come  to  deal  with  narration  as  required  in  the 
courts.2     In  the  meantime,  it  vrill   be   sufficient  to 
urge  that  it  should  be  neither  dry  nor  jejune  (for 
why  spend  so  much  labour  over  our  studies  if  a  bald 
and  naked  statement  of  fact  is  regarded  as  sufficiently 
expressive  ?) ;    nor  on  the    other   hand  must    it    be 
tortuous   or    revel    in    elaborate    descriptions,   such 
as    those    in    wrhich    so    many  are    led    to    indulge 
by  a  misguided   imitation  of  poetic  licence.      Both  4 
these  extremes  are  faults;    but  that  which  springs 
from  poverty  of  wit  is  worse  than  that  which  is  due 



quam  quod  ex  copia  venit.  Nam  in  pueris  oratio 
perfecta  nee  exigi  nee  sperari  potest ;  melior  autem 
indoles  laeta  generosique  conatus  et  vel  plura  iusto 

5  concipiens  interim  spiritus.      Nee  unquam  me  in  his 
discentis  annis  offendat,  si   quid   superfuerit.      Quin 
ipsis    quoque   doctoribus    hoc    esse    curae   velim,  ut 
teneras  adhuc   mentes  more  nutricum  mollius  alant 
et  satiari  velut  quodam  iucundioris  disciplinae  lacte 
patiantur.      Erit  illud  plenius   interim   corpus,  quod 

6  mox    adulta    aetas    astringat.       Hinc    spes    roboris. 
Maciem  namque  et  infirmitatem  in  posterum  minari 
solet   protinus   omnibus    membris    expressus    infans. 
Audeat    haec    aetas    plura    et    inveniat    et    inventis 
gaudeat,   sint    licet    ilia    non  satis  sicca   interim    ac 
severa.     Facile  remedium  est  ubertati ;  sterilia  nullo 

7  labore   vincuntur.     Ilia  mihi  in  pueris  natura  mini- 
mum spei  dederit,  in  qua  ingenium  iudicio  praesumi- 
tur.    Materiam  esse  primum  volo  vel  abundantiorem 
atque    ultra    quam   oporteat   fusam.       Multum    inde 
decoquent  anni,  multum  ratio  limabit,  aliquid  velut 
usu  ipso  deteretur,  sit  modo  unde  excidi  possit  et 
quod  exsculpi ;  erit  autem,  si  non  ab  initio  tenuem 
nimium  laminam  duxerimus  et  quam  caelatura  altior 

8  rumpat.     Quod  me   de   his  aetatibus  sentire  minus 


BOOK    II.  iv.  4-8 

to  imaginative  excess.  For  we  cannot  demand  or 
expect  a  perfect  style  from  boys.  But  there  is 
greater  promise  in  a  certain  luxuriance  of  mind,  in 
ambitious  effort  and  an  ardour  that  leads  at  times  to 
ideas  bordering  on  the  extravagant.  I  have  no  ob-  5 
jection  to  a  little  exuberance  in  the  young  learner. 
Nay,  I  would  urge  teachers  too  like  nurses  to  be 
careful  to  provide  softer  food  for  still  undeveloped 
minds  and  to  suffer  them  to  take  their  fill  of  the  milk 
of  the  more  attractive  studies.  For  the  time  being 
the  body  may  be  somewhat  plump,  but  maturer  years 
will  reduce  it  to  a  sparer  habit.  Such  plumpness  6 
gives  hope  of  strength ;  a  child  fully  formed  in 
every  limb  is  likely  to  grow  up  a  puny  weakling. 
The  young  should  be  more  daring  and  inventive 
and  should  rejoice  in  their  inventions,  even  though 
correctness  and  severity  are  still  to  be  acquired. 
Exuberance  is  easilv  remedied,  but  barrenness  is 


incurable,  be  your  efforts  what  they  may.  To  my  7 
mind  the  boy  who  gives  least  promise  is  one  in 
whom  the  critical  faculty  develops  in  advance  of  the 
imagination.  I  like  to  see  the  firstfruits  of  the  mind 
copious  to  excess  and  almost  extravagant  in  their 
profusion.  The  years  as  they  pass  will  skim  off 
much  of  the  froth,  reason  will  file  away  many 
excrescences,  and  something  too  will  be  removed 
by  what  I  may  perhaps  call  the  wear  and  tear  of 
life,  so  long  as  there  is  sufficient  material  to  admit 
of  cutting  and  chiselling  away.  And  there  will 
be  sufficient,  if  only  we  do  not  draw  the  plate  too 
thin  to  begin  with,  so  that  it  runs  the  risk  of  being 
broken  if  the  graver  cut  too  deep.  Those  of  my  8 
readers  who  know  their  Cicero  will  not  be  surprised 



mirabitur,  qui    apud  Ciceronera   legerit :    Volo  enim 
se  efferat  in  adolescente  fecunditas. 

Quapropter  in  primis  evitandus  et  in  pueris 
praecipue  magister  aridus,  non  minus  quam  teneris 
adhuc  plantis  siccum  et  sine  humore  ullo  solum. 
9  Inde  fiunt  humiles  statim  et  velut  terram  spectantes, 
qui  nihil  supra  cotidianum  sermonem  attollere 
audeant.  Macies  illis  pro  sanitate  et  iudicii  loco 
infirmitas  est,  et  dum  satis  putant  vitio  carere,  in  id 
ipsum  incidunt  vitium,  quod  virtutibus  carent. 
Quare  mihi  ne  maturitas  quidem  ipsa  festinet,  nee 
musta  in  lacu  statim  austera  sint ;  sic  et  annos  ferent 
et  vetustate  proficient. 

10  Ne    illud    quidem    quod    admoneamus    indignum 
est,   ingenia   puerorum   nimia   interim   emendationis 
severitate  deficere  ;  nam  et  desperant  et  dolent  et 
novissime    oderunt    et,    quod    maxime    nocet,    dum 

11  omnia  timent,  nihil  conantur.      Quod  etiam  rusticis 
notum   est,  qui  frondibus  teneris  non  putant  adhi- 
bendam  esse  falcem,  quia  reformidare  ferrum  viden- 

12  tur    et    nondum    cicatricem    pati    posse.       lucundus 
ergo  turn  maxime  debet  esse  praeceptor,  ut  remedia, 
quae  alioqui   natura   sunt   aspera,  molli   manu  leni- 
antur  ;  laudare  aliqua,  ferre  quaedam,  mutare  etiam, 
reddita  cur  id  fiat  ratione,  illuminare  interponendo 

1  de  Or.  ii.  xxi.  88. 

2  cp.  Verg.  G.  ii.  369,  ante  rejormidant  Jerrum. 


BOOK    II.  iv.  8-12 

that  I  take  this  view  :  for  does  he  not  say  "  I  would 
have  the  youthful  mind  run  riot  in  the  luxuriance  of 
its  growth  "  ? l 

We  must,  therefore,  take  especial  care,  above 
all  where  boys  are  concerned,  to  avoid  a  dry 
teacher,  even  as  we  avoid  a  dry  and  arid  soil  for 
plants  that  are  still  young  and  tender.  For  with  9 
such  a  teacher  their  growth  is  stunted  and  their 
eyes  are  turned  earthwards,  and  they  are  afraid  to 
rise  above  the  level  of  daily  speech.  Their  leanness 
is  regarded  as  a  sign  of  health  and  their  weakness  as 
a  sign  of  sound  judgment,  and  while  they  are  con- 
tent that  their  work  should  be  devoid  of  faults  they 
fall  into  the  fault  of  being  devoid  of  merit.  So  let 
not  the  ripeness  of  vintage  come  too  soon  nor  the 
must  turn  harsh  while  yet  in  the  vat ;  thus  it  will 
last  for  years  and  mellow  with  age. 

It  is  worth  while  too  to  warn  the  teacher  that  10 
undue  severity  in  correcting  faults  is  liable  at  times 
to  discourage  a  boy's  mind  from  effort.  He  loses 
hope  and  gives  way  to  vexation,  then  last  of  all 
comes  to  hate  his  work  and  fearing  everything  at- 
tempts nothing.  This  phenomenon  is  familiar  to  11 
farmers,  who  hold  that  the  pruning-hook  should  not 
be  applied  while  the  leaves  are  yet  young,  for  they 
seem  to  "shrink  from  the  steel"  2  and  to  be  unable 
as  yet  to  endure  a  scar.  The  instructor  therefore  12 
should  be  as  kindly  as  possible  at  this  stage ;  reme- 
dies, which  are  harsh  by  nature,  must  be  applied  with 
a  gentle  hand  :  some  portions  of  the  work  must  be 
praised,  others  tolerated  and  others  altered :  the 
reason  for  the  alterations  should  however  be  given, 
and  in  some  cases  the  master  will  illumine  an 
obscure  passage  by  inserting  something  of  his  own. 



aliquid    sui.      Nonnunquam  hoc   quoque    erit    utile, 
ipsum  totas  dictare  materias,  quas  et  imitetur  puer 

13  et  interim  tanquam  suas  amet.     At  si  tarn  negligens 
ei    stilus    fuerit,    ut    emendationem    non   recipiat ; 
expertus  sum  prodesse,  quotiens  eandem  materiam 
rursus  a  me  tractatam  scribere  de  integro  iuberem; 
posse  enim  adhuc  eum  melius,  quatenus  nullo  magis 

14  studia  quam  spe  gaudent.      Aliter  autem  alia  aetas 
emendanda  est,  et   pro  modo  virium  et  exigendum 
et  corrigendum   opus.     Solebam   ego   dicere    pueris 
aliquid  ausis  licentius  aut  laetius,  laudure  illud  me 
adhuc,    venturum    tempus,    quo    idem    non    permit- 
terem ;    ita    et    ingenio    gaudebant    et    iudicio    non 

15  Sed   ut  eo   revertar,   unde   sum  digressus :   narra- 
tiones  stilo  componi  quanta  maxima  possit  adhibita 
diligentia  volo.      Nam  ut  primo,  cum  sermo  institu- 
itur,    dicere    quae    audierint     utile     est    pueris    ad 
loquendi  facultatem,  ideoque  et  retro  agere  exposi- 
tionem    et  a  media  in   utramque   partem   discurrere 
sane  merito  cogantur,  sed  ad  gremium  praeceptoris, 
et  dum  aliud  l  non  possunt  et  dum  res  ac  verba  con- 
nectere   incipiunt,  ut   protinus    memoriam    firment : 
ita  cum   iam   formam  rectae  atque   emendatae  ora- 

1  aliud,  added  by  Ed.  Gryphiana. 

BOOK    II.  iv.  12-15 

Occasionally  again  the  teacher  will  find  it  useful  to 
dictate  whole  themes  himself  that  the  boy  may 
imitate  them  and  for  the  time  being  love  them  as  if 
they  were  his  own.  But  if  a  boy's  composition  is  so  13 
careless  as  not  to  admit  of  correction,  I  have  found 
it  useful  to  give  a  fresh  exposition  of  the  theme  and 
to  tell  him  to  write  it  again,  pointing  out  that  he 
was  capable  of  doing  better  :  for  there  is  nothing 
like  hope  for  making  study  a  pleasure.  Different  14 
ages  however  demand  different  methods  :  the  task 
set  and  the  standard  of  correction  must  be  propor- 
tioned to  the  pupil's  strength.  When  boys  ventured 
on  something  that  was  too  daring  or  exuberant,  I 
used  to  say  to  them  that  I  approved  of  it  for  the 
moment,  but  that  the  time  would  come  when  I 
should  no  longer  tolerate  such  a  style.  The  result 
was  that  the  consciousness  of  ability  filled  them  with 
pleasure,  without  blinding  their  judgment. 

However,  to  return  to  the  point  from  which  I  had  15 
digressed.  Written  narratives  should  be  composed 
with  the  utmost  care.  It  is  useful  at  first,  when  a 
child  has  just  begun  to  speak,  to  make  him  repeat 
what  he  has  heard  with  a  view  to  improving  his 
powers  of  speech  ;  and  for  the  same  purpose,  and 
with  good  reason,  I  would  make  him  tell  his  story 
from  the  end  back  to  the  beginning  or  start  in  the 
middle  and  go  backwards  or  forwards,  but  only  so 
long  as  he  is  at  his  teacher's  knee  and  while  he  is 
incapable  of  greater  effort  and  is  beginning  to  con- 
nect words  and  things,  thereby  strengthening  the 
memory.  Even  so  when  he  is  beginning  to  under- 
stand the  nature  of  correct  and  accurate  speech, 
extempore  effusions,  improvised  without  waiting 
for  thought  to  supply  the  matter  or  a  moment's 



tionis  accipient,  extemporalis  garrulitas  nee  exspec- 
tata    cogitatio    et    vix    surgendi    mora    circulatoriae 

16  vere  iactationis   est.      Hinc   parentium  imperitorum 
inane  gaudium,  ipsis  vero  contemptus  operis  et  in- 
verecunda   frons   et   consuetude  pessime  dicendi  et 
malorum   exercitatio   et,  quae   magnos  quoque  pro- 
fectus  frequenter  perdidit,  arrogans  de  se  persuasio 

17  innascitur.     Erit   suum   parandae    facilitati  tempus, 
nee  a  nobis  negligenter  locus  iste  transibitur.     In- 
terim satis  est,  si  puer  omni  cura  et  summo,  quantum 
ilia  aetas  capit,  labore  aliquid  probabile  scripserit ; 
in    hoc    assuescat,    huius    sibi    rei    naturam    faciat. 
Ille  demum  in  id,  quod  quaerimus,  aut  ei  proximum 
poterit  evadere,  qui  ante  discet  recte  dicere  quam 

18  Narrationibus     non     inutiliter     subiungitur    opus 
destruendi     confirmandique    eas,    quod    avaa-Kfv^   et 
Karao-Kev??  vocatur.      Id  porro  non  tantum  in  fabulosis 
et  carmine  traditis  fieri  potest,  verum  etiam  in  ipsis 
annalium  monumentis  ;   ut,  si  quaeratur,  an  sit  credi- 
bile  super   caput   Valeri   pugnantis   sedisse   corvum, 
qui  os  oculosque  hostis  Galli  rostro  atque  alls  ever- 
beraret,  sit  in  utramque  partem  ingens  ad  dicendum 

19  materia  ;  aut  de  serpente,  quo  Scipio  traditur  genitus, 
et  lupa   Romuli   et   Egeria    Numae.      Nam   Graecis 
historiis    plerumque     poeticae    similis    licentia    est. 

1  See  Aul.  Cell.  vii.  i. 

BOOK    II.  iv.  15-19 

hesitation  before  rising  to  the  feet,  must  not  be  per- 
mitted :  they  proceed  from  a  passion  for  display  that 
would  do  credit  to  a  common  mountebank.  Such  16 
proceedings  fill  ignorant  parents  with  senseless  pride, 
while  the  boys  themselves  lose  all  respect  for  their 
work,  adopt  a  conceited  bearing,  and  acquire  the 
habit  of  speaking  in  the  worst  style  and  actually  prac- 
tising their  faults,  while  they  develop  an  arrogant  con- 
viction of  their  own  talents  which  often  proves  fatal 
even  to  the  most  genuine  proficiency.  There  will  be  17 
a  special  time  for  acquiring  fluency  of  speech  and  I 
shall  not  pass  the  subject  by  unnoticed.  For  the  mean- 
time it  will  suffice  if  a  boy,  by  dint  of  taking  pains  and 
working  as  hard  as  his  age  will  permit,  manages  to 
produce  something  worthy  of  approval.  Let  him  get 
used  to  this  until  it  becomes  a  second  nature.  It  is 
only  he  who  learns  to  speak  correctly  before  he  can 
speak  with  rapidity  who  will  reach  the  heights  that 
are  our  goal  or  the  levels  immediately  below  them. 

To  narratives  is  annexed  the  task  of  refuting  and  18 
confirming  them,  styled  anaskeue  and  kataskeue,  from 
which  no  little  advantage  may  be  derived.  This  may 
be  done  not  merely  in  connexion  with  fiction  and 
stories  transmitted  by  the  poets,  but  with  the  actual 
records  of  history  as  well.  For  instance  we  may  dis- 
cuss the  credibility  of  the  story  that  a  raven  settled 
on  the  head  of  Valerius  in  the  midst  of  a  combat  and 
with  its  wings  and  beak  struck  the  eyes  of  the  Gaul 
who  was  his  adversary,  and  a  quantity  of  arguments 
may  be  produced  on  either  side  :  or  we  may  discuss  19 
the  tradition  that  Scipio1  was  begotten  by  a  serpent, 
or  that  Romulus  was  suckled  by  the  she-wolf,  or  the 
story  of  Numa  and  Egeria.  As  regards  Greek  his- 
tory, it  allows  itself  something  very  like  poetic 



Saepe  etiam  quaeri  solet  de  tempore,  de  loco  quo 
gesta  res  dicitur,  nonnunquam  de  persona  quoque ; 
sicut  Livius  frequentissime  dubitat,  et  alii  ab  aliis 
historic!  dissentiunt. 

20  Inde  paulatim  ad  maiora  tendere  incipiet,  laudare 
claros  viros  et  vituperare  improbos,  quod  non  sim- 
plicis    utilitatis     opus     est.       Namque    et    ingenium 
exercetur    multiplici    variaque     materia,    et    animus 
contemplatione    recti    pravique    formatur,   et    multa 
inde  cognitio  rerum  venit  exemplisque,  quae  sunt  in 
omni   genere   causarum    potentissima,   iam    turn    in- 

21  struit,  cum   res   poscet,   usurum.      Hinc  ilia  quoque 
exercitatio  subit   comparationis,  uter  melior  uterve 
deterior  ;  quae  quanquam  versatur  in  ratione  simili, 
tamen  et  duplicat  materiam  et  virtutum  vitiorumque 
non    tantum    naturam,    sed    etiam    modum    tractat. 
Verum  de   ordine  laudis  contraque,  quoniam   tertia 
haec  rhetorices  pars  est,  praecipiemus  suo  tempore. 

22  Communes   loci   (de   iis  loquor,  quibus   citra   per- 
sonas  in  ipsa  vitia   moris   est  perorare,   ut  in   adul- 
terum,     aleatorem,     petulantem)     ex     mediis     sunt 
iudiciis  et_,  si  reum  adiicias,  accusationes  ;  quanquam 
hi  quoque  ab  illo  general!  tractatu  ad  quasdam  de- 
duci   species    solent,   ut   si   ponatur    adulter   caecus, 
aleator    pauper,    petulans    senex.       Habent    autem 

1  Book  III.  chap.  vii. 

BOOK    II.  iv.  19-22 

licence.  Again  the  time  and  place  of  some  particu- 
lar occurrence  and  sometimes  even  the  persons  con- 
cerned often  provide  matter  for  discussion  :  Livy  for 
instance  is  frequently  in  doubt  as  to  what  actually 
occurred  and  historians  often  disagree. 

From  this  our  pupil  will  begin  to  proceed  to  more  20 
important  themes,  such  as  the  praise  of  famous  men 
and  the  denunciation  of  the  wicked.  Such  tasks  are 
profitable  in  more  than  one  respect.  The  mind  is 
exercised  by  the  variety  arid  multiplicity  of  the  sub- 
ject matter,  while  the  character  is  moulded  by  the 
contemplation  of  virtue  and  vice.  Further  wide 
knowledge  of  facts  is  thus  acquired,  from  which  ex- 
amples may  be  drawn  if  circumstances  so  demand, 
such  illustrations  being  of  the  utmost  value  in  every 
kind  of  case.  It  is  but  a  step  from  this  to  practice  21 
in  the  comparison  of  the  respective  merits  of  two 
characters.  This  is  of  course  a  very  similar  theme 
to  the  preceding,  but  involves  a  duplication  of  the 
subject  matter  and  deals  not  merely  with  the  nature 
of  virtues  and  vices,  but  with  their  degree  as  well. 
But  the  method  to  be  followed  in  panegyric  and  in- 
vective will  be  dealt  with  in  its  proper  place,  as  it 
forms  the  third  department  of  rhetoric.1 

As  to  commonplaces  (I  refer  to  those  in  which  22 
we  denounce  vices  themselves  such  as  adultery, 
gambling  or  profligacy  without  attacking  parti- 
cular persons),  they  come  straight  from  the  courts 
and,  if  we  add  the  name  of  the  defendant,  amount 
to  actual  accusations.  As  a  rule,  however,  the 
general  character  of  a  commonplace  is  usually 
given  a  special  turn  :  for  instance  we  make  our 
adulterer  blind,  our  gambler  poor  and  our  profligate 
far  advanced  in  years.  Sometimes  too  they  entail 



23  nonnunquam     etiam    defensionem.       Nam    et     pro 
luxuria  et  pro  amore  dicimus,  et  leno  interim  para- 
situsque  defenditur  sic,  ut  non  homini  patrocinemur, 
sed  crimini. 

24  Theses  autem,  quae  sumuntur  ex  rerum  compara- 
tione,  ut    rusticane  vita  an  urbana  potior,  iurisperiti 
an  militaris  viri  laus  maior,  mire  sunt  ad  exercita- 
tionem  dicendi  speciosae  atque  uberes,  quae  vel  ad 
suadendi  officium  vel  etiam  ad  iudiciorum  discepta- 
tionem  iuvant  plurimum.     Nam   posterior  ex  prae- 
dictis  locus  in  causa  Murenae  copiosissime  a  Cicerone 

25  tractatur.      Sunt  et   illae   paene   totae   ad   delibera- 
tivum  pertineiites  genus,  ducendane  uxor,  petendine 
sint  magistratus.      Namque   et    hae   personis    modo 
adiectis  suasoriae  erunt. 

26  Solebant  praeceptores  mei  neque  inutili  et  nobis 
etiam  iucundo  genere  exercitationis  praeparare  nos 
coniecturalibus   causis,  cum   quaerere  atque  exsequi 
iuberent,    Cur  armata  apud  Lacedaemonios   Venus,  et 
Quid  ita  crederetur  Cupido  puer  atque  volucer  et  sagittis 
ac  face    annatus,   et   similia,  in   quibus   scrutabamur 
voluntatem,  cuius  in  controversiis  frequens  quaestio 
est,  quod  genus  chriae  videri  potest. 

27  Nam  locos  quidem,  quales  sunt  de  testibus,  sem- 

1  Pro  Mur.  ix.  21  sqq. 

2  The  reason  according  to  Lactantius  (Inst.  Div.  i.  20)  was 
the  bravery  of  the  Spartan  women  in  one  of  the  Messenian 


BOOK    II.  iv.  22-27 

defence  :  for  we  may  speak  on  behalf  of  luxury  or  23 
love,  while  a  pimp  or  a  parasite  may  be  defended  in 
such  a  way  that  we  appear  as  counsel  not  for  the 
character   itself,  but  to  rebut  some  specific  charge 
that  is  brought  against  him. 

Theses  on  the  other  hand  are  concerned  with  24 
the  comparison  of  things  and  involve  questions  such 
as  "  Which  is  preferable,  town  or  country  life  ?  ' 
or  "Which  deserves  the  greatest  praise,  the  lawyer 
or  the  soldier?  '  These  provide  the  most  attractive 
and  copious  practice  in  the  art  of  speaking,  and  are 
most  useful  whether  we  have  an  eye  to  the  duties 
of  deliberative  oratory  or  the  arguments  of  the 
courts.  For  instance  Cicero  in  his  pro  Murena  ]  deals 
very  fully  with  the  second  of  the  two  problems 
mentioned  above.  Other  theses  too  belong  entirely  25 
to  the  deliberative  class  of  oratory,  as  for  instance 
the  questions  as  to  <l  Whether  marriage  is  desir- 
able '  or  "  Whether  a  public  career  is  a  proper 
object  of  ambition."  Put  such  discussions  into 
the  mouths  of  specific  persons  and  they  become 
deliberative  declamations  at  once. 

My  own  teachers  used  to  prepare  us  for  conject-  26 
ural  cases  by  a  form  of  exercise  which  was  at  once 
useful  and  attractive :  they  made  us  discuss  and 
develop  questions  such  as  "  Why  in  Sparta  is  Venus 
represented  as  wearing  armour?"2  or  "Why  is  Cupid 
believed  to  be  a  winged  boy  armed  with  arrows  and 
a  torch  ?  "  and  the  like.  In  these  exercises  our  aim 
was  to  discover  the  intention  implied,  a  question 
which  frequently  occurs  in  controversial  declamations. 
Such  themes  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as  a  kind  ot 
chria  or  moral  essay. 

That  certain   topics  such  as   the    question  as    to  27 



perne  his  credendum,  et  de  argumentis,  an  habenda 
etiam  parvis  fides,  adeo  manifestum  est  ad  forenses 
actiones  pertinere,  ut  quidam  neque  ignobiles  in 
officiis  civilibus  scriptos  eos  memoriaeque  diligen- 
tissime  mandates  in  prompl;u  habuerint,  ut  quotiens 
esset  occasio,  extemporales  eorum  dictiones  his  velut 

28  emblematis     exornarentur.       Quo     quidem     (neque 
enim   eius  rei   iudicium   differre    sustineo)    summam 
videbantur  mihi  infirmitatem  de  se  confiteri.      Nam 
quid  ii  possint  in  causis,  quarum  varia  et  nova  semper 
est  facies,  proprium  invenire  ?  quomodo  propositis  ex 
parte    adversa    respondere,   altercationibus  velociter 
occurrere,    testem    rogare  ?    qui    etiain    in    iis,   quae 
sunt  communia  et  in  plurimis  causis  tractantur,  vul- 
gatissimos  sensus  verbis   nisi  tanto  ante  praeparatis 

29  prosequi    nequeant.      Necesse    vero  iis,  cum  endem 
iudiciis  pluribus  dicunt^  aut  fastidium  moveant  velut 
frigidi    et    repositi    cibi,    aut    pudorem    deprehensa 
totiens  audientium   memoria   infelix    supellex,   quae 
sicut  apud  pauperes  ambitiosos  pluribus  et  diversis 

30  officiis  conteratur  :    cum   eo  quidem    quod  vix    ullus 
est  tarn   communis   locus^  qui  possit  cohaerere  cum 
causa  nisi  aliquo  propriae  quaestionis  vinculo  copu- 


BOOK    II.  iv.  27-30 

whether  we  should  always  believe  a  witness  or 
whether  we  should  rely  on  circumstantial  evidence, 
are  part  and  parcel  of  actual  forensic  pleading  is  so 
obvious  that  certain  speakers,  men  too  who  have 
held  civil  office  with  no  small  distinction,  have 
written  out  passages  dealing  with  such  themes,  com- 
mitted them  to  memory  and  kept  them  ready  for 
immediate  use,  with  a  view  to  employing  them  when 
occasion  arose  as  a  species  of  ornament  to  be  inserted 
into  their  extempore  speeches.  This  practice —  28 
for  I  am  not  going  to  postpone  expressing  my  judg- 
ment on  it — I  used  to  regard  a  confession  of  ex- 
treme weakness.  For  how  can  such  men  find  appro- 
priate arguments  in  the  course  of  actual  cases  which 
continually  present  new  and  different  features? 
How  can  they  answer  the  points  that  their  opponents 
may  bring  up  ?  how  deal  a  rapid  counterstroke  in 
debate  or  cross-examine  a  witness  ?  if,  even  in  those 
matters  which  are  of  common  occurrence  and  crop 
up  in  the  majority  of  cases,  they  cannot  give  expres- 
sion to  the  most  familiar  thoughts  except  in  words 
prepared  so  far  in  advance.  And  when  they  produce  29 
the  same  passage  in  a  number  of  different  cases,  they 
must  come  to  loathe  it  like  food  that  has  grown  cold 
or  stale,  and  they  can  hardly  avoid  a  feeling  of  shame 
at  displaying  this  miserable  piece  of  furniture  to  an 
audience  whose  memory  must  have  detected  it  so 
many  times  already :  like  the  furniture  of  the 
ostentatious  poor,  it  is  sure  to  shew  signs  of  wear 
through  being  used  for  such  a  variety  of  different 
purposes.  Also  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  30 
is  hardly  a  single  commonplace  of  such  universal 
application  that  it  will  fit  any  actual  case,  unless 
some  special  link  is  provided  to  connect  it  with 


latus ;    appareat    alioqui     non    tarn    insertum    quam 

31  adplicitum,  vel  quod  dissimilis  est  ceteris  vel  quod 
plerumque  adsumi  etiam  parum  apte  solet,  non  quia 
desideratur   sed  quia   paratus   est :    ut  quidam    sen- 
tentiarum  gratia  verbosissimos  locos  arcessunt,  cum 

32  ex   locis   debeat  nasci    sententia.      Ita    sunt   autem 
speciosa  haec  et  utilia,  si  oriuntur  ex  causa ;  ceterum 
quamlibet  pulchra  elocutio,  nisi  ad  victoriam  tendit, 
utique  supervacua,  sed   interim  etiam  contraria  est. 
Verum  hactenus  evagari  satis  fuerit. 

33  Legum  laus  ac  vituperatio  iam  maiores  ac  prope 
summis  operibus  suflfecturas  vires  desiderant ;   quae 
quidem    suasoriis   an  controversiis   magis    accommo- 
data  sit  exercitatio,  consuetudine  et  iure  civitatium 
differt.     Apud  Graecos  enim  lator  earum  ad  iudicem 
vocabatur,  Romanis  pro  contione  suadere  ac  dissua- 
dere  moris  fuit.     Utroque  autem  modo  pauca  de  his 
et  fere  certa  dicuntur.      Nam   et   genera   sunt   tria, 

34  sacrr,  publici,  privati  iuris.     Quae  divisio  ad  laudem 
magis  spectat,  si  quis  earn  per  gradus  augeat,  quod 
lex,  quod   publica,  quod  ad   religionem  deum  com- 
parata    sit.       Ea    quidem,    de    quibus    quaeri    solet, 

1  i.e.  a   court   of  nomothetae  appointed  by  the  Athenian 
assembly,  who  examined  the  provisions  of  the  proposed  law. 


BOOK    II.   iv,   30-34 

the  subject  :  otherwise  it  will  seem  to  have  been 
tacked  on  to  the  speech,  not  interwoven  in  its 
texture,  either  because  it  is  out  of  keeping  with  the  31 
circumstances  orlike  mostof  its  kind  is  inappropriately 
employed  not  because  it  is  wanted,  but  because  it  is 
ready  for  use.  Some  speakers,  for  example,  introduce 
the  most  long-winded  commonplaces  just  for  the  sake 
of  the  sentiments  they  contain,  whereas  rightly  the 
sentiments  should  spring  from  the  context.  Such  32 
disquisitions  are  at  once  ornamental  and  useful,  only  if 
they  arise  from  the  nature  of  the  case.  But  the  most 
finished  eloquence,  unless  it  tend  to  the  winning  of 
the  case,  is  to  say  the  least  superfluous  and  may  even 
defeat  its  own  purpose.  However  I  must  bring  this 
digression  to  a  close. 

The  praise  or  denunciation  of  laws  requires  greater  33 
powers  ;  indeed  they  should  almost  be  equal  to  the 
most  serious  tasks  of  rhetoric.  The  answer  to  the 
question  as  to  whether  this  exercise  is  more  nearly 
related  to  deliberative  or  controversial  oratory 
depends  on  custom  and  law  and  consequently  varies 
in  different  states.  Among  the  Greeks  the  proposer 
of  a  law  was  called  upon  to  set  forth  his  case  before 
a  judge,1  while  in  Rome  it  was  the  custom  to  urge 
the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  law  before  the  public 
assembly.  But  in  any  case  the  arguments  advanced 
in  such  cases  are  few  in  number  and  of  a  definite 
type.  For  there  are  only  three  kinds  of  law,  sacred, 
public  and  private.  This  division  is  of  rhetorical  value  3J 
chiefly  when  a  law  is  to  be  praised.  For  example  the 
orator  may  advance  from  praise  to  praise  by  a  series  of 
gradations,  praising  an  enactment  first  because  it  is 
law,  secondly  because  it  is  public,  and,  finally,  designed 
for  the  support  of  religion.  As  regards  the  questions 



35  communia    omnibus.       Aut    enim    de    iure    dubitari 
potest  eius,  qui  rogat,  ut  de   P.  Clodi,  qui  non  rite 
creatus    tribunus    arguebatur ;    aut    de    ipsius    roga- 
tionis,  quod  est  varium,  sive  non  trino  forte  nundino 
promulgata  sive  non  idoneo  die,  sive   contra  inter- 
cessionem  vel  auspicia  aliudve  quid,  quod  legitimis 
obstet,  dicitur  lata  esse  vel  ferri,  sive  alicui  manen- 

36  tium  legum  repugnare.     Sed   haec   ad   illas   primas 
exercitationes   non   pertinent ;    nam   sunt   hae    citra 
complexum  personarum,  temporum,  causarum.      Re- 
liqua  eadem  fere  vero  fictoque  huiusmodi  certamine 

37  tractantur.      Nam  vitium  aut  in  verbis  aut  in  rebus 
est.      In  verbis  quaeritur,  an  satis  significent,  an  sit 
in   iis  aliquid  ambiguum  ;    in  rebus,  an  lex  sibi  ipsa 
consentiat,  an    in    praeteritum    ferri   debeat,  an    in 
singulos     homines.       Maxima    vero     commune     est 

38  quaerere,   an    sit    honesta,   an    utilis.      Nee    ignoro, 
plures  fieri  a  plerisque  partes  ;  sed  nos  iustum,  pium, 
religiosum,  ceteraque   his   similia   honesto   complec- 
timur.      lusti  tamen   species  non   simpliciter   excuti 
solent.     Aut  enim  de  re  ipsa  quaeritur,  ut  dignane 

1  Clodius  was  a  patrician  and  got  himself  made  a  plebeian 
by  adoption    to   enable   him  to    hold    the    tribunate.      The 
question   of  the  legality  of  this   procedure  is   discussed   by 
Cicero  in  the  de  Domo,  13-17. 

2  Lit.  within  the  space  of  three  market-days,     nundinum 
=  9   days,    the    second     market-day   being   the   ninth,    and 

forming  the  last  day  of  the  first  nundinum  and  the  first  of 


BOOK    II.  iv.  34-38 

which  generally  arise,  they  are  common  to  all  cases. 
Doubts  may  be  raised  as  to  whether  the  mover  is  35 
legally  in  a  position  to  propose  a  law,  as  happened  in 
the  case  of  Publius  Clodius,  whose  appointment  as 
tribune  of  the  plebs  was  alleged  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional.1    Or  the  legality  of  the  proposal  itself  may 
be  impugned  in  various  ways  ;  it  may  for  instance  be 
urged    that    the    law    was    not   promulgated   within 
seventeen  2   days,  or  was  proposed,  or  is  being  pro- 
posed   on   an    improper  day,  or   in   defiance  of  the 
tribunicial  veto  or   the  auspices   or  any  other  legal 
obstacle,  or  again  that  it  is  contrary  to  some  exist- 
ing law.       But    such    points    are    not    suitable    to  36 
elementary  rhetorical  exercises,  which  are  not  con- 
cerned   with     persons,    times     or    particular    cases. 
Other  subjects,  whether  the  dispute  be  real  or  fic- 
titious, are  generally  treated  on  the  following  lines. 
The    fault    must   lie    either    in    the    words    or    the  37 
matter.     As  regards   the    words,   the   question   will 
be    whether  they  are    sufficiently  clear    or    contain 
some  ambiguity,  and  as  regards  the  matter  whether 
the  law  is  consistent  with  itself  or  should  be  retro- 
spective or  apply  to  special  individuals.      The.  point 
however    which    is    most    commonly    raised    is    the 
question  whether  the  law  is  right  or  expedient.      I  38 
am  well  aware  that  many  rhetoricians   introduce  a 
number  of  sub-divisions  in  connexion  with  this  latter 
enquiry.     I   however  include  under  the  term  right 
all    such    qualities    as   justice,    piety    and    religion. 
Justice   is  however  usually  discussed  under  various 
aspects.      A  question  may  be  raised  about  the  acts 
with  which  the  law  is  concerned,  as  to  whether  they 

the  second.     Similarly  the  third  market-day  is  the  last  day 
of  the  second  nundinum  and  the  first  of  the  third. 



poena  vel   praemio  sit,  aut  de  modo  praemii  poenae- 
ve,     qui     tarn     maior     quam    minor    culpari     potest. 

39  Utilitas  quoque   interim  natura  discernitur,  interim 
tempore.       Quaedam    an    obtineri     possint,    ambigi 
solet.       Ne    illud    quidem    ignorare    oportet,    leges 
aliquando  totas,  aliquando  ex  parte  reprehendi  solere, 
cum  exemplum  rei  utriusque  nobis  claris  orationibus 

40  praebeatur.      Nee  me  fallit,  eas  quoque  leges  esse, 
quae  non  in  perpetuum  rogentur,  sed  de  honoribus 
aut   imperiis,  qualis    Manilia   fuit,  de  qua   Ciceronis 
oratio  est.      Sed  de  his  nihil  hoc  loco  praecipi  potest ; 
constant     enim     propria    rerum,    de    quibus    agitur, 
non  communi  qualitate. 

41  His   fere  veteres  facultatem  dicendi   exercuerunt 
assumpta  tamen  a  dialecticis  argumentandi  ratione. 
Nam     fictas     ad     imitationem     fori     consiliorumque 
materias     apud    Graecos    dicere    circa     Demetrium 

42  Phalerea   institutum    fere    constat.       An   ab   ipso   id 
genus   exercitationis    sit   inventum,    ut    alio    quoque 
libro    sum    confessus,    parum     comperi ;    sed    ne    ii 
quidem,    qui    hoc    fortissime    adfirmant,    ullo     satis 
idoneo     auctore     nituntur.       Latinos    vero    dicendi 
praeceptores  extremis  L.  Crassi  temporibus  coepisse 

1  The  lex  Manilia  proposed  to  give  Pompey  the  command 
against  Mithridates. 

8  Probably  the  lost  treatise  on  "The  causes  of  the 
decline  of  oratory  "  (De  causis  corruptae  eloquentiae), 


BOOK    II.   iv.  38-42 

deserve  punishment  or  reward  or  as  to  the  degree  of 
punishment  or  reward  that  should  be  assigned,  since 
excess  in  either  direction  is  open  to  criticism.  Again  39 
expediency  is  sometimes  determined  by  the  nature 
of  things,  sometimes  by  the  circumstances  of  the  time. 
Another  common  subject  of  controversy  is  whether 
a  law  can  be  enforced,  while  one  must  not  shut  one's 
eyes  to  the  fact  that  exception  is  sometimes  taken 
to  laws  in  their  entirety,  but  sometimes  only  in 
part,  examples  of  both  forms  of  criticism  being 
found  in  famous  speeches.  I  am  well  aware,  too,  40 
that  there  are  laws  which  are  not  proposed  with 
a  view  to  perpetuity,  but  are  concerned  with  tem- 
porary honours  or  commands,  such  as  the  lex  Manilla l 
which  is  the  subject  of  one  of  Cicero's  speeches. 
This  however  is  not  the  place  for  instructions  on 
this  topic,  since  they  depend  on  the  special  circum- 
stances of  the  matters  under  discussion,  not  on  their 
general  characteristics. 

Such  were  the  subjects  on  which  the  ancients  as  41 
a  rule  exercised  their  powers  of  speaking,  though 
they  called  in  the  assistance  of  the  logicians  as  well 
to  teach  them  the  theory  of  argument.  For  it  is 
generally  agreed  that  the  declamation  of  fictitious 
themes  in  imitation  of  the  questions  that  arise  in 
the  lawcourts  or  deliberative  assemblies  came  into 
vogue  among  the  Greeks  about  the  time  of  De- 
metrius of  Phalerum.  Whether  this  type  of  exer-  42 
cise  was  actually  invented  by  him  I  have  failed  to 
discover,  as  I  have  acknowledged  in  another  work.2 
But  not  even  those  who  most  strongly  assert  his 
claim  to  be  the  inventor,  can  produce  any  adequate 
authority  in  support  of  their  opinion.  As  regards 
Latin  teachers  of  rhetoric,  of  whom  Plotius  was  the 



Cicero  auctor  est ;  quorum  insignis  maxime   Plotius 

V.  Sed  de  ratione  declamandi  post  paulum. 
Interim,  quia  prima  rhetorices  rudimenta  tractamus, 
non  omittendum  videtur  id  quoque,  ut  moneam, 
quantum  sit  collaturus  ad  profectum  discentium 
rhetor,  si,  quemadmodum  a  grammaticis  exigitur 
poetarum  enarratio,  ita  ipse  quoque  historiae  atque 
etiam  magis  orationum  lectione  susceptos  a  se  dis- 
cipulos  instruxerit ;  quod  nos  in  paucis,  quorum  id 
aetas  exigebat  et  parentes  utile  esse  crediderant, 

2  servavimus.      Ceterum  sentientibus  iam  turn  optima 
duae  res  impedimento  fuerunt,  quod  et  longa  con- 
suetudo  aliter  docendi  fecerat  legem,  et  robusti  fere 
iuvenes   nee   hunc   laborem   desiderantes   exemplum 

3  nostrum    sequebantur.       Nee    tamen,    etiamsi    quid 
novi    vel    sero    invenissem,    praecipere   in    posterum 
puderet.     Nunc  vero  scio  id  fieri  apud  Graecos  sed 
magis    per    adiutores,    quia    non    videntur    tempora 
suffectura,  si  legentibus  singulis  praeire  semper  ipsi 

4  velint.      Et  hercule  praelectio,  quae  in  hoc  adhibe- 
tur,   ut    facile    atque    distincte    pueri    scripta    oculis 
sequantur,   etiam   ilia,    quae   vim    cuiusque   verbij  si 
quod    minus   usitatum    incidat,   docet^   multum   infra 

6  rhetoris  officium   existimanda   est.     At  demonstrare 
virtutes    vel,    si    quando    ita    incidat,   vitia,    id    pro- 

1  See  Cic.  de  Or.  iii.  24,  93. 

BOOK    II.  iv.  42-v.  5 

most  famous,  Cicero  1  informs  us  that  they  came  into 
existence  towards  the  end  of  the  age  of  Crassus. 

V.  I  will  speak  of  the  theory  of  declamation  a 
little  later.  In  the  mean  time,  as  we  are  discussing 
the  elementary  stages  of  a  rhetorical  education,  I 
think  I  should  not  fail  to  point  out  how  greatly  the 
rhetorician  will  contribute  to  his  pupils'  progress,  if 
he  imitates  the  teacher  of  literature  whose  duty  it  is 
to  expound  the  poets,  and  gives  the  pupils  whom  he 
has  undertaken  to  train,  instruction  in  the  reading 
of  history  and  still  more  of  the  orators.  I  myself 
have  adopted  this  practice  for  the  benefit  of  a  few 
pupils  of  suitable  age  whose  parents  thought  it 
would  be  useful.  But  though  my  intentions  were  2 
excellent,  I  found  that  there  were  two  serious  ob- 
stacles to  success  :  long  custom  had  established  a 
different  method  of  teaching,  and  my  pupils  were 
for  the  most  part  full-grown  youths  who  did  not 
require  this  form  of  teaching,  but  were  taking  my 
work  as  their  model.  However,  the  fact  that  I  3 
have  been  somewhat  late  in  making  the  discovery  is 
not  a  reason  why  I  should  be  ashamed  to  recommend 
it  to  those  who  come  after  me.  I  now  know  that  this 
form  of  teaching  is  practised  by  the  Greeks,  but  is 
generally  entrusted  to  assistants,  as  the  professors 
themselves  consider  that  they  have  no  time  to  give 
individual  instruction  to  each  pupil  as  he  reads. 
And  I  admit  that  the  form  of  lecture  which  this  4 
requires,  designed  as  it  is  to  make  boys  follow  the 
written  word  with  ease  and  accuracy,  and  even  that 
which  aims  at  teaching  the  meaning  of  any  rare 
words  that  may  occur,  are  to  be  regarded  as  quite 
below  the  dignity  of  the  teacher  of  rhetoric.  On  5 
the  other  hand  it  is  emphatically  part  of  his  pro- 



fessionis  eius  atque  promissi,  quo  se  magistrum 
eloquentiae  pollicetur,  maxime  proprium  est,  eo 
quidem  validius,  quod  non  utique  hunc  laborem 
docentium  postulo,  ut  ad  gremium  revocatis  cuius 

6  quisque  eorum  velit  libri  lectione  deserviant.      Nam 
mihi   cum   facilius  turn  etiam   multo  videtur    magis 
utile,  facto  silentio  unum  aliquem  (quod  ipsum  im- 
perari  per  vices  optimum  est)  constituere  lectorem, 
ut  protinus  pronuntiationi  quoque   assuescant ;   turn 

7  exposita  causa,  in  quam  scripta  legetur  oratio,  (nam 
sic    clarius    quae    dicentur    intelligi   poterunt)    nihil 
otiosum    pati,    quodque    in    inventione    quodque    in 
elocutione    adnotandum     erit,    quae     in     prooemio 
conciliandi   iudicis   ratio,   quae   narrandi    lux,  brevi- 
tas,  fides,  quod  aliquando  consilium  et  quam  occulta 

8  calliditas  (namque  ea  sola  in  hoc  ars  est,  quae   in- 
telligi nisi  ab  artifice  non  possit) ;  quanta  deinceps 
in    dividendo    prudentia,    quam    subtilis    et    crebra 
argumentatio,  quibus  viribus  inspiret,  qua    iucundi- 
tate    permulceat,  quanta  in  maledictis  asperitas,  in 
iocis  urbanitas,  ut  denique  dominetur  in  adfectibus 


BOOK    II.  v.  5-8 

fession  and  the  undertaking  which  he  makes  in 
offering  himself  as  a  teacher  of  eloquence,  to  point 
out  the  merits  of  authors  or,  for  that  matter,  any 
faults  that  may  occur :  and  this  is  all  the  more  the 
case,  as  I  am  not  asking  teachers  to  undertake  the 
task  of  recalling  their  pupils  to  standat  their  knee  once 
more  and  of  assisting  them  in  the  reading  of  what- 
ever book  they  may  select.  It  seems  to  me  at  once  6 
an  easier  and  more  profitable  method  to  call  for 
silence  and  choose  some  one  pupil — and  it  will  be 
best  to  select  them  by  turns — to  read  aloud,  in 
order  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  learn  the 
correct  method  of  elocution.  The  case  with  which  7 
the  speech  selected  for  reading  is  concerned  should 
then  be  explained,  for  if  this  be  done  they  will 
have  a  clearer  understanding  of  what  is  to  be  read. 
When  the  reading  is  commenced,  no  important 
point  should  be  allowed  to  pass  unnoticed  either 
as  regards  the  resourcefulness  or  the  style  shown 
in  the  treatment  of  the  subject :  the  teacher  must 
point  out  how  the  orator  seeks  to  win  the  favour 
of  the  judge  in  his  exordium,  what  clearness,  brevity 
and  sincerity,  and  at  times  what  shrewd  design  and 
well-concealed  artifice  is  shown  in  the  statement  of 
facts.  For  the  only  true  art  in  pleading  is  that  8 
which  can  only  be  understood  by  one  who  is  a 
master  of  the  art  himself.  The  teacher  will  proceed 
further  to  demonstrate  what  skill  is  shown  in  the  divi- 
sion into  heads,  how  subtle  and  frequent  are  the  thrusts 
of  argument,  what  vigour  marks  the  stirring  and 
what  charm  the  soothing  passage,  how  fierce  is  the 
invective  and  how  full  of  wit  the  jests,  and  in 
conclusion  how  the  orator  establishes  his  sway 
over  the  emotions  of  his  audience,  forces  his  way 



atque  in  pectora  irrumpat  animumque  iudicum 
9  similem  iis,  quae  dicit,  efficiat.  Turn  in  ratione 
eloquendi,  quod  verbum  proprium,  ornatum,  sublime  ; 
ubi  amplificatio  laudanda,  quae  virtus  ei  contraria, 
quid  speciose  translatum,  quae  figura  verborum, 
quae  levis  et  quadrata  sed  virilis  tamen  compositio. 

10  Ne  id  quidem  inutile,  etiam  corruptas  aliquando 
et  vitiosas  orationes,  quas  tamen  plerique  iudiciorum 
pravitate    mirantur,   legi    palam    ostendique    in    his, 
quam    multa    impropria,    obscura,    tumida,    humilia, 
sordida,  lasciva,  efFeminata  sint ;  quae  non  laudantur 
modo  a  plerisque,  sed,  quod   est  perns,  propter  hoc 

11  ipsum,    quod    sunt   prava,    laudantur.       Nam    sermo 
rectus  et  secundum  naturam  enuntiatus  nihil  habere 
ex  ingenio  videtur ;  ilia  vero,  quae  utcunque  deflexa 
sunt,    tanquam     exquisitiora    miramur ;    non    aliter 
quam  distortis  et  quocunque  modo  prodigiosis  cor- 
poribus  apud   quosdam  maius  est  pretium  quam  iis, 
quae    nihil    ex    communi    habitu    boni    perdiderunt. 

12  Atque  etiam  qui  specie  capiuntur,  vulsis  levatisque 
et  inustas  comas  acu  comentibus  et  non  suo  colore 
nitidis  plus  esse  formae  putant,  quam  possit  tribuere 
incorrupta    natura,    ut    pulchritude    corporis    venire 
videatur  ex  malis  morum. 

13  Neque  solum  haec  ipse  debebit  docere  praeceptor 


BOOK    II.  v.  8-13 

into  their  very  hearts  and  brings  the  feelings  of  the 
jury  into  perfect  sympathy  with  all  his  words. 
Finally  as  regards  the  style,  he  will  emphasise  the  9 
appropriateness,,  elegance  or  sublimity  of  particular 
words,  will  indicate  wrhere  the  amplification  of  the 
theme  is  deserving  of  praise  and  where  there  is 
virtue  in  a  diminuendo;  and  will  call  attention  to 
brilliant  metaphors,  figures  of  speech  and  passages 
combining  smoothness  and  polish  with  a  general 
impression  of  manly  vigour. 

It  will  even  at  times  be  of  value  to  read  speeches  10 
which  are  corrupt  and  faulty  in  style,  but  still  meet 
with  general  admiration  thanks  to  the  perversity  of 
modern  tastes,  and  to  point  out  how  many  expres- 
sions in  them  are  inappropriate,  obscure,  high-flown, 
grovelling,  mean,  extravagant  or  effeminate,  although 
they  are  not  merely  praised  by  the  majority  of  critics, 
but,  worse  still,  praised  just  because  they  are  bad.  For  1 1 
we  have  come  to  regard  direct  and  natural  speech 
as  incompatible  with  genius,  while  all  that  is  in  any 
way  abnormal  is  admired  as  exquisite.  Similarly  we 
see  that  some  people  place  a  higher  value  on  figures 
which  are  in  any  way  monstrous  or  distorted  than 
they  do  on  those  who  have  not  lost  any  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  normal  form  of  man.  There  are  12 
even  some  who  are  captivated  by  the  shams  of  artifice 
and  think  that  there  is  more  beauty  in  those  who 
pluck  out  superfluous  hair  or  use  depilatories,  who 
dress  their  locks  by  scorching  them  with  the  curling 
iron  and  glow  with  a  complexion  that  is  not  their 
own,  than  can  ever  be  conferred  by  nature  pure  and 
simple,  so  that  it  really  seems  as  if  physical  beauty 
depended  entirely  on  moral  hideousness. 

It  will,  however,  be  the  duty  of  the   rhetorician  13 



sed  frequenter  interrogare  et  iudicium  discipulorum 
experiri.  Sic  audientibus  securitas  aberit  nee  quae 
dicentur  superfluent  aures,  simulque  ad  id  perdu- 
centur,  quod  ex  hoc  quaeritur,  ut  inveniant  ipsi  et 
intelligant.  Nam  quid  aliud  agimus  docendo  eos, 

14  quam    ne    semper    docendi    sint?      Hoc    diligentiae 
genus    ausim    dicere     plus    collaturum    discentibus 
quam  omnes  omnium  artes,  quae  iuvant  sine  dubio 
multum ;    sed    latiore    quadam   comprehensione    per 
omnes  quidem  species  rerum  cotidie  paene  nascen- 

15  tium  ire   qui   possunt  ?     Sicut  de  re  militari,  quan- 
quam    sunt    tradita   quaedam    praecepta    communia, 
magis    tamen    proderit    scire,    qua    ducum     quisque 
ratione,  in  quali  re,  tempore,,  loco  sit  sapienter  usus 
aut    contra.       Nam    in   omnibus    fere    minus    valent 

16  praecepta  quam  experimenta.      An  vero  declamabit 
quidem  praeceptor,  ut  sit  exemplo  suis  auditoribus ; 
non  plus  contulerint  lecti  Cicero  aut  Demosthenes? 
Corrigetur  palam,  si  quid  in  declamando  discipulus 
erraverit ;  non   potentius   erit   emendare   orationem, 
quin    immo    etiam    iucundius?      Alier:a    enim    vitia 

17  reprehendi  quisque  mavult  quam  sua.      Nee  deerant 
plura,    quae    dicerem ;    sed   neminem    haec    utilitas 


BOOK    II.  v.  13-17 

not  merely  to  teach  these  things,  but  to  ask  frequent 
questions  as  well,  and  test  the  critical  powers  of  his 
class.  This  will  prevent  his  audience  from  becoming 
inattentive  and  will  secure  that  his  words  do  not  fall 
on  deaf  ears.  At  the  same  time  the  class  will  be  led 
to  find  out  tilings  for  themselves  and  to  use  their 
intelligence,  which  is  after  all  the  chief  aim  of  this 
method  of  training.  For  what  else  is  our  object  in 
teaching,  save  that  our  pupils  should  not  always 
require  to  be  taught?  I  will  venture  to  say  that  14 
this  particular  form  of  exercise,  if  diligently  pursued, 
will  teach  learners  more  than  all  the  text-books  of 
all  the  rhetoricians :  these  are  no  doubt  of  very 
considerable  use,  but  being  somewhat  general  in 
their  scope,  it  is  quite  impossible  for  them  to  deal 
with  all  the  special  cases  that  are  of  almost  daily 
occurrence.  The  art  of  war  will  provide  a  parallel :  15 
it  is  no  doubt  based  on  certain  general  principles, 
but  it  will  none  the  less  be  far  more  useful  to  know 
the  methods  employed,  whether  wisely  or  the  re- 
verse, by  individual  generals  under  varying  circum- 
stances and  conditions  of  time  and  place.  For  there 
are  no  subjects  in  which,  as  a  rule,  practice  is  not 
more  valuable  than  precept.  Is  a  teacher  to  declaim  16 
to  provide  a  model  for  his  audience,  and  will  not 
more  profit  be  derived  from  the  reading  of  Cicero  or 
Demosthenes  ?  Is  a  pupil  to  be  publicly  corrected 
if  he  makes  a  mistake  in  declaiming,  and  will  it  not 
be  more  useful,  and  more  agreeable  too,  to  correct 
some  actual  speech?  For  everyone  has  a  preference 
for  hearing  the  faults  of  others  censured  rather  than 
his  own.  I  might  say  more  on  the  subject.  But  17 
everv  one  can  see  the  advantages  of  this  method. 
Would  that  the  reluctance  to  put  it  into  practice 



fugit,  atque   utinam    tarn    non    pigeat    facere    istud 
quam  non  displicebit. 

18  Quod  si  potuerit  obtineri,  non  ita  difficilis  super- 
erit   quaestio,  qui  legendi  sint  incipientibus.      Nam 
quidam  illos  minores,  quia  facilior  intellectus  vide- 
batur,  probaverunt ;  alii  floridius  genus,  ut  ad  alenda 
primarum    aetatum    ingenia    magis    aecommodatum. 

19  Ego  optimos  quidem  et  statim  et  semper  sed  tamen 
eorum  candidissimum   quemque   et   maxime  exposi- 
tum  velim,  ut  Livium  a  pueris  magis  quam  Sallus- 
tium,  etsi  hie  historiae  maior  est  auctor,   ad    quern 

20  tamen  intelligendurn  iam  profectu  opus  sit.      Cicero, 
ut  mihi   quidem  videtur,  et   iucundus   incipientibus 
quoque  et  apertus  est  satis,  nee  prodesse  tantum  sed 
etiam    amari    potest,    turn     (quemadmodum     Livius 
praecipit)  ut  quisque  erit  Ciceroni  simillimus. 

21  Duo  autem  genera  maxime  cavenda  pueris  puto  : 
unum,  ne  quis  eos  antiquitatis  nimius  admirator  in 
Gracchorum  Catonisque  et  aliorum  similium  lectione 
durescere    velit ;    fient    enim    horridi    atque    ieiuni ; 
nam  neque  vim  eorum  adhuc  intellectu  consequentur 
et  elocutione,  quae  turn  sine  dubio  erat  optima,  sed 
nostris    temporibus   aliena    est,    contenti,    quod    est 


BOOK    II.  v.  17-21 

were  not  as  great  as   the   pleasure  that  would  un- 
doubtedly be  derived  from  so  doing  ! 

This  method  once  adopted,  we  are  faced  by  the  18 
comparatively  easy  question  as  to  what  authors 
should  be  selected  for  our  reading.  Some  have  re- 
commended authors  of  inferior  merit  on  the  ground 
that  they  were  easier  to  understand.  Others  on  the 
contrary  would  select  the  more  florid  school  of  writers 
on  the  ground  that  they  are  likely  to  provide  the 
nourishment  best  suited  to  the  minds  of  the  young. 
For  my  part  I  would  have  them  read  the  best  authors  19 
from  the  very  beginning  and  never  leave  them, 
choosing  those,  however,  who  are  simplest  and  most 
intelligible.  For  instance,  when  prescribing  for  boys, 
I  should  give  Livy  the  preference  over  Sallust ; 
for,  although  the  latter  is  the  greater  historian, 
one  requires  to  be  well-advanced  in  one's  studies 
to  appreciate  him  properly.  Cicero,  in  my  opinion,  20 
provides  pleasant  reading  for  beginners  and  is  suffi- 
ciently easy  to  understand  :  it  is  possible  not  only 
to  learn  much  from  him,  but  to  come  to  love  him. 
After  Cicero  I  should,  following  the  advice  of  Livy, 
place  such  authors  as  most  nearly  resemble  him. 

There  are  two  faults  of  taste  against  which  boys  21 
should  be  guarded  with  the  utmost  care.  Firstly 
no  teacher  suffering  from  an  excessive  admiration 
of  antiquity,  should  be  allowed  to  cramp  their 
minds  by  the  study  of  Cato  and  the  Gracchi  and 
other  similar  authors.  For  such  reading  will  give 
them  a  harsh  and  bloodless  style,  since  they  will  as 
yet  be  unable  to  understand  the  force  and  vigour  of 
these  authors,  and  contenting  themselves  with  a 
style  which  doubtless  was  admirable  in  its  day,  but 
is  quite  unsuitable  to  ours,  will  come  to  think  (and 



pessimum,    similes    sibi     magnis    viris     videbuntur 

22  Alterum,  quod  huic  diversum  est,  ne  recentis  huius 
lasciviae  flosculis  capti  voluptate  prava  deleniantur, 
ut  praedulce  illud  genus  et  puerilibus  ingeniis  hoc 

23  gratius,  quo    propius   est,    adament.      Firmis   autem 
iudiciis  iamque  extra  periculum  positis  suaserim  et 
antiques   legere,   ex   quibus    si   assumatur   solida    ac 
virilis  ingenii  vis,  deterso  rudis  saeculi  squalore,  turn 
noster  hie  cultus  clarius  enitescet,  et  novos,  quibus 

24  et  ipsis  multa  virtus  adest.      Neque  enim  nos  tardi- 
tatis  natura  damnavit,  sed  dicendi  mutavimus  genus 
et  ultra  nobis  quam  oportebat  indulsimus ;  ita  non 
tarn    ingenio    illi    nos    superarunt    quam     proposito. 
Multa   ergo  licebit   eligere  ;   sed   curandum  erit,  ne 

25  iis,  quibus   permixta   sunt,   inquinentur.      Quosdam 
vero    etiam,   quos   totos    imitari    oporteat,   et    fuisse 
nuper  et  nunc  esse,  quidni  libenter  non  modo  con- 

26  cesserim,  verum  etiam    contenderim  ?      Sed   hi   qui 
sint,  non  cuiuscunque  est  pronuntiare.     Tutius  circa 
priores   vel    erratur,  ideoque   hanc    novorum   distuli 
lectionem,  ne  imitatio  iudicium  antecederet. 


BOOK    II.  v.  21-26 

nothing  could  be  more  fatal)  that  they  really  resem- 
ble great  men.  Secondly  the  opposite  extreme  must  22 
be  equally  avoided  :  they  must  not  be  permitted  to 
fall  victims  to  the  pernicious  allurements  of  the 
precious  blooms  produced  by  our  modern  euphuists, 
thus  acquiring  a  passion  for  the  luscious  sweetness 
of  such  authors,  whose  charm  is  all  the  more  attrac- 
tive to  boyish  intellects  because  it  is  so  easy  of 
achievement.  Once,  however,  the  judgment  is  23 
formed  and  out  of  danger  of  perversion,,  I  should 
strongly  recommend  the  reading  of  ancient  authors, 
since  if,  after  clearing  away  all  the  uncouthness  of 
those  rude  ages,  we  succeed  in  absorbing  the  robust 
vigour  and  virility  of  their  native  genius,  our  more 
finished  style  will  shine  with  an  added  grace  : 
I  also  approve  the  study  of  the  moderns  at 
this  stage,  since  even  they  have  many  merits. 
For  nature  has  not  doomed  us  to  be  dullards,  24 
but  we  have  altered  our  style  of  oratory  and  in- 
dulged our  caprices  over  much.  It  is  in  their  ideals 
rather  than  their  talents  that  the  ancients  show 
themselves  our  superiors.  It  will  therefore  be 
possible  to  select  much  that  is  valuable  from  modern 
writers,  but  we  must  take  care  that  the  precious 
metal  is  not  debased  by  the  dross  with  which  it  is 
so  closely  intermingled.  Further  I  would  not  25 
merely  gladly  admit,  but  would  even  contend  that 
we  have  recently  had  and  still  have  certain  authors 
who  deserve  imitation  in  their  entirety.  But  it  is  26 
not  for  everyone  to  decide  who  these  writers  are. 
Error  in  the  choice  of  earlier  authors  is  attended 
with  less  danger,  and  I  have  therefore  postponed 
the  study  of  the  moderns,  for  fear  that  we  should 
imitate  them  before  we  are  qualified  to  judge  of 
their  merits.  - ,_ 


VI.  Fuit  etiam  in  hoc  diversum  praecipientiuin 
propositum,  quod  eorum  quidam  materias,  quas  dis- 
cipulis  ad  diceiidum  dabant,  non  content!  divisione 
dirigere  latius  dicendo  prosequebantur,  nee  solum 

2  probationibus  implebant  sed  etiam  adfectibus.     Alii, 
cum  primas   modo    lineas   duxissent,  post    declama- 
tiones,  quid  omisisset  quisque,  tractabant ;  quosdam 
vero  locos  non  minore  cura,  quam  cum  ad  dicendum 
ipsi  surgerent,  excolebant.      Utile  utrumque,  et  ideo 
neutrum    ab    altero    separo ;    sed    si    facere    tantum 
alterum     necesse    sit,    plus    proderit    demonstrasse 
rectam  protinus  viam  quam  revocare  ab  errore  iam 

3  lapses :    primum  quia  emendationem   auribus    modo 
accipiunt,  divisionem  vero  ad  cogitationem   etiam  et 
stilum   perferunt ;    deinde   quod    libentius    praecipi- 
entem  audiunt  quam  reprehendentem.     Si  qui  vero 
paulo    sunt    vivaciores,    in    his    praesertim    moribus, 
etiam    irascuntur    admonitioni    et   taciti    repugnant. 

4  Neque  ideo  tamen   minus  vitia    aperte    coarguenda 
sunt.      Habenda    enim    ratio    ceterorum,    qui    recta 
esse,    quae    praeceptor    non    emendaverit,    credent. 
Utraque  autem  ratio  miscenda  est  et  ita  tractanda, 

5  ut   ipsae    res    postulabunt.       Namque    incipientibus 


BOOK    II.  vi.  1-5 

VI.  I  come  now  to  another  point  in  which  the 
practice  of  teachers  has  differed.  Some  have  not  been 
content  with  giving  directions  as  to  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  subjects  set  diem  as  themes  for 
declamation,  but  have  developed  them  at  some 
length  themselves,  supplying  not  merely  the  proofs, 
but  the  lines  upon  which  the  emotional  passages 
should  proceed.  Others  have  merely  suggested  a  2 
bare  outline,  and  then  when  the  declamations  were 
over,  have  indicated  the  points  missed  by  each 
speaker  and  worked  up  certain  passages  with  no  less 
care  than  they  would  have  used,  had  they  been  going 
to  stand  up  to  speak  themselves.  Both  practices 
have  their  advantages,  and  therefore  I  will  not  give 
either  the  pre-eminence.  But  if  we  must  choose  one 
of  the  two,  it  will  be  found  more  profitable  to  point 
out  the  right  road  at  the  outset,  and  not  merely  to 
recall  the  pupil  from  his  error  when  he  has  already 
gone  astray,  since  in  the  first  place  the  correction  3 
is  only  received  by  the  ear,  whereas  when  he  is 
given  a  sketch  of  the  various  heads  of  the  declama- 
tion, he  has  to  take  them  down  and  think  about 
them  :  secondly  instruction  is  always  more  readily 
received  than  reproof.  Indeed  those  of  our  pupils 
who  have  a  lively  disposition  are  liable  in  the 
present  condition  of  manners  to  lose  their  temper 
when  admonished  and  to  offer  silent  resistance. 
That,  however,  is  no  reason  for  refraining  from  4 
the  public  correction  of  faults  ;  for  we  must  take 
the  rest  of  the  class  into  account,  who  will  believe 
that  whatever  has  not  been  corrected  by  the  master 
is  right.  The  two  methods  should  be  employed 
conjointly  and  in  such  a  way  as  circumstances  may 
demand.  Beginners  must  be  given  a  subject  5 



danda  erit  velut  praeformata  materia  secundum 
cuiusque  vires ;  at  cum  satis  composuisse  sese  ad 
exemplum  videbuntur,  brevia  quaedam  demonstranda 
vestigia,  quae  persecuti  iam  suis  viribus  sine  admini- 

6  culo  progredi  possint.      Nonnunquam  credi  sibi  ipsos 
oportebit,    ne    mala    consuetudine    semper   alienum 
laborem    sequendi    nihil   per   se   conari   et  quaerere 
sciant.      Quodsi    satis    prudenter    dicenda    viderint, 
iam   prope   consummata    fuerit   praecipientis   opera ; 
at  si  quid   erraverint  adhuc,  erunt  ad  ducem  redu- 

7  cendi.     Cui   rei   simile   quiddam  facientes  aves  cer- 
nimus,  quae  teneris  infirmisque  fetibus  cibos  ore  suo 
collates  partiuntur  ;  at  cum  visi  sunt  adulti,  paulum 
egredi    nidis    et    circumvolare   sedem   illam    praece- 
dentes  ipsae  decent,  turn  expertas  vires  libero  caelo 
suaeque  ipsorum  fiduciae  permittunt. 

VII.  Illud  ex  consuetudine  mutandum  prorsus 
existimo  in  iis,  de  quibus  nunc  disserimus,  aetatibus, 
ne  omnia  quae  scripserint  ediscant  et  certa,  ut  moris 
est,  die  dicant ;  quod  quidem  maxime  patres  exigunt 
atque  ita  demum  studere  liberos  sues,  si  quam  fre- 

quentissime  declamaverint,  credunt,  cum  profectus 

BOOK    II.  vi.  5-vn.  i 

sketched  out  ready  for  treatment  and  suitable  to 
their  respective  powers.  But  when  they  show  that 
they  have  formed  themselves  sufficiently  closely  on 
the  models  placed  before  them,  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  give  them  a  few  brief  hints  for  their  guidance 
and  to  allow  them  to  advance  trusting  in  their  own 
strength  and  without  external  support.  Sometimes 
they  should  be  left  entirely  to  their  own  devices, 
that  they  may  not  be  spoilt  by  the  bad  habit  of 
always  relying  on  another's  efforts,  and  so  prove  in- 
capable of  effort  and  originality.  But  as  soon  as 
they  seem  to  have  acquired  a  sound  conception  of 
what  they  ought  to  say,  the  teacher's  work  will  be 
near  completion :  if  they  still  make  some  mistakes, 
they  must  be  brought  back  under  his  guidance.  We 
may  draw  a  lesson  from  the  birds  of  the  air,  whom 
we  see  distributing  the  food  which  they  have  col- 
lected in  their  bills  among  their  weak  and  helpless 
nestlings ;  but  as  soon  as  they  are  fledged,  we  see 
them  teaching  their  young  to  leave  the  nest  and  fly 
round  about  it,  themselves  leading  the  way ;  finally, 
when  they  have  proved  their  strength,  they  are  given 
the  freedom  of  the  open  sky  and  left  to  trust  in 

VII.  There  is  one  practice  at  present  in  vogue 
for  boys  of  the  age  under  discussion,  which  ought 
in  my  opinion  undoubtedly  to  be  changed.  They 
should  not  be  forced  to  commit  all  their  own  com- 
positions to  memory  and  to  deliver  them  on  an 
appointed  day,  as  is  at  present  the  custom.  This 
practice  is  especially  popular  with  the  boys'  fathers, 
who  think  that  their  sons  are  not  really  studying 
unless  they  declaim  on  every  possible  occasion, 
although  as  a  matter  of  fact  progress  depends 



2  praecipue  diligentia  constet.      Nam  ut  scribere  pueros 
plurimumque  esse  in  hoc  opere  plane  velim,  sic  edi- 
scere  electos  ex  orationibus  vel  historiis  aliove  quo 
genere   dignorum   ea   cura   voluminum   locos,   multo 

3  magis  suadeam.      Xam  et  exercebitur  acrius  memoria 
aliena    complectendo    quam    sua ;    et    qui    erunt    in 
difficiliore  huius  laboris  genere  versati,  sine  molestia 
quae    ipsi    composuerint   iara    familiaria    animo    suo 
adfigent,  et  adsuescent  optimis  semperque  habebunt 
intra    se,    quod    imitentur ;    et    iam    non    sentientes 
formam  orationis   illam,  quam  mente  penitus  acce- 

4  perint,   expriment.     Abundabunt   autem    copia   ver- 
borum  optimorum  et  compositione  et  figuris  iam  non 
quaesitis  sed  sponte  et  ex  reposito  velut  thesauro  se 
offerentibus.      Accedit    his    et    iucunda  in   sermone 
bene  a  quoque   dictorum   relatio  et  in  causis  utilis. 
Nam  et  plus  auctoritatis  adferunt  ea,  quae  non  prae- 
sentis  gratia  litis  sunt  comparata,  et  laudem  saepe 

5  maiorem  quam  si  nostra  sint  conciliant.      Aliquando 
tamen  permittendum  quae  ipsi  scripserint  dicere,  ut 
laboris  sui  fructum  etiam  ex  ilia  quae  maxime  petitur 
laude  plurium  capiant.      Yerum  id  quoque  turn  fieri 

BOOK    II.  vii.  1-5 

mainly  on  industry.  For  though  I  strongly  ap-  2 
prove  of  boys  writing  compositions  and  would  have 
them  spend  as  much  time  as  possible  over  such 
tasks,  I  had  much  rather  that  for  the  purpose  of 
learning  by  heart  passages  should  be  selected  from 
the  orators  or  historians  or  any  other  works  that 
may  be  deserving  of  such  attention.  For  it  is  a  3 
better  exercise  for  the  memory  to  learn  the  words 
of  others  than  it  is  to  learn  one's  own,  and  those 
who  have  practised  this  far  harder  task  will  find 
no  difficulty  in  committing  to  memory  their  own 
compositions  with  which  they  are  already  familiar. 
Further  they  will  form  an  intimate  acquaintance 
with  the  best  writings,  will  carry  their  models 
with  them  and  unconsciously  reproduce  the  style 
of  the  speech  which  has  been  impressed  upon  the 
memory.  They  will  have  a  plentiful  and  choice  4 
vocabulary  and  a  command  of  artistic  structure  and 
a  supply  of  figures  which  will  not  have  to  be 
hunted  for,  but  will  offer  themselves  spontane- 
ously from  the  treasure-house,  if  I  may  so  call  it, 
in  which  they  are  stored.  In  addition  they  will 
be  in  the  agreeable  position  of  being  able  to 
quote  the  happy  sayings  of  the  various  authors,  a 
power  which  they  will  find  most  useful  in  the 
courts.  For  phrases  which  have  not  been  coined 
merely  to  suit  the  circumstances  of  the  lawsuit  of 
the  moment  carry  greater  weight  and  often  win 
greater  praise  than  if  they  were  our  own.  I  5 
would  however  allow  boys  occasionally  to  declaim 
their  own  compositions  that  they  may  reap  the  re- 
ward of  their  labours  in  the  applause  of  a  large 
audience,  that  most  coveted  of  all  prizes.  But  this 
should  not  be  permitted  until  they  have  produced 



oportebit,  cum  aliquid  commodius  elimaverint,  ut  eo 
velut  praemio  studii  sui  donentur  ac  se  meruisse  ut 
dicerent  gaudeant. 

VIII.  Virtus  praeceptoris  haberi  solet  nee  imme- 
rito  diligenter  in  iis,  quos  erudiendos  susceperit, 
notare  discrimina  ingeniorum  et,  quo  quemque  natura 
maxime  ferat,  scire.  Nam  est  in  hoc  incredibilis 
quaedam  varietas  nee  pauciores  animorum  paene 

2  quam  corporum   formae.      Quod    intelligi  etiam    ex 
ipsis  oratoribus  potest,  qui  tantum  inter  se  distant 
genere   dicendi,  ut  nemo   sit  alteri  similis,  quamvis 
plurimi    se    ad    eorum    quos   probabant    imitationem 

3  composuerint.      Utile  deinde  plerisque  visum  est  ita 
quemque  instituere,  ut  propria  naturae  bona  doctrina 
foverent  et  in  id  potissimum  ingenia,  quo  tenderent, 
adiuvarentur ;  ut  si  quis  palaestrae  peritus,  cum  in 
aliquod  plenum  pueris  gymnasium  venerit,  expertus 
eorum  omni  modo  corpus  animumque  discernat,  cui 

4  quisque    certamini  praeparandus  sit,    ita   praecepto- 
rem  eloquentiae,  cum  sagaciter  fuerit  intuitus,  cuius 
ingenium    presso    limatoque    genere    dicendi,    cuius 
acri,    gravi,    dulci,    aspero,    nitido,    urbano    maxime 
gaudeat,  ita   se  commodaturum   singulis,  ut    in    eo, 

6  quo  quisque  eminet,  provehatur ;  quod  et  adiuta 
cura  natura  magis  evalescat,  et  qui  in  diversa  ducatur 
neque  in  iis,  quibus  minus  aptus  est,  satis  possit 
efficere  et  ea,  in  quae  natus  videtur,  deserendo  faciat 

6  infirmiora.    Quod   mihi   (libera  enim   vel   contra  re- 


BOOK    II.  vn.   5-vin.  6 

something  more  finished  than  usual  :  they  will  thus 
be  rewarded  for  their  industry  and  rejoice  in  the 
thought  that  the  privilege  accorded  them  is  the 
recompense  of  merit. 

VIII.   It  is  generally  and  not  unreasonably  regarded 
as  the  sign  of  a  good  teacher  that  he  should  be  able 
to  differentiate  between  the  abilities  of  his  respective 
pupils  and  to  know  their  natural  bent.     The  gifts  of 
nature  are  infinite  in  their  variety,  and  mind  differs 
from  mind  almost  as  much  as  body  from  body.     This  2 
is  clear  from  a  consideration  of  the  orators  them- 
selves, who  differ  in  style  to  such  an  extent  that  no 
one  is  like  another,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  numbers 
have  modelled  their  style   on  that  of  their  favorite 
authors.      Many  again  think  it  useful  to  direct  their  3 
instruction  to  the  fostering  of  natural  advantages  and 
to  guide  the  talents  of  their  pupils  along  the  lines 
which  they  instinctively  tend  to  follow.     Just  as  an 
expert  gymnast,  when  he  enters  a  gymnasium  full  of 
boys,  after  testing  body  and  mind  in  every  way,  is 
able  to  decide  for  what  class  of  athletic  contest  they 
should  be  trained,  even  so,  they  say,  a  teacher  of  4 
oratory  after  careful  observation  of  a  boy's  stylistic 
preferences,  be  they  for  terseness  and  polish,  energy, 
dignity,  charm,   roughness,  brilliance  or  wit,  will  so 
adapt  his  instructions  to  individual  needs  that  each 
pupil  will  be  pushed  forward  in  the  sphere  for  which 
his  talents  seem  specially  to  design  him ;  for  nature,  5 
when    cultivated,    goes    from    strength  to  strength, 
while  he  who  runs  counter  to  her  bent  is  ineffective 
in  those   branches  of  the   art  for  which  he  is  less 
suited  and   weakens  the   talents   which  he  seemed 
born    to    employ.       Now,    since    the    critic    who    is  6 
guided   by  his  reason  is  free  to  dissent  even  from 



ceptas  persuasiones  rationem  sequent!  sententia  est) 
in  parte  verum  videtur.      Nam  proprietates  ingenio- 

7  rum  dispicere  prorsus  necessarium  est.   In  his  quoque 
certum  studiorum  facere  delectum  nemo  dissuaserit. 
Namque  erit  alius  liistoriae  magis  idoneus,  alius  com- 
positus  ad  carmen,  alius  utilis  studio  iuris,  ut  nonnulli 
rus    fortasse    mittendi.      Sic   discernet  haec  dicendi 
magister,  quomodo  palaestricus  ille  cursorem  faciet 
aut  pugilem  aut  luctatorem  aliudve  quid  ex  iis,  quae 

8  sunt    sacrorum     certaminum.       Verum    ei,    qui    foro 
destinabitur,   non   in    unam   partem  aliquam   sed   in 
omnia,  quae  sunt  eius  opens,  etiam  si  qua  difficiliora 
discenti    videbuntur,    elaborandum     est.       Nam     et 
omnino    supervacua    erat    doctrina,    si    natura    suffi- 

9  ceret.     An  si  quis  ingenio  corruptus  ac  tumidus,  ut 
plerique  sunt,  incident,  in  hoc   eum   ire   patiemur? 
aridum    atque    ieiunum    non    alemus    et    quasi  ves- 
tiemus?      Nam   si   quaedam   detrahere    necessarium 

10  est,   cur  non   sit  adiicere   concessum  ?      Neque   ego 
contra  naturam  pugno.      Non  enim  deserendum  id 
bonum,  si  quod  ingenitum  est,  existimo,  sed  augen- 

11  dum  addendumque  quod  cessat.     An  vero   clarissi- 
mus  ille  praeceptor  Isocrates,  quern  non  magis  libri 
bene  dixisse  quam  discipuli  bene  docuisse  testantur, 


BOOK    II.  viii.  6-1 1 

received  opinions,  I  must  insist  that  to  my  think- 
ing this  view  is  only  partially  true.  It  is  un- 
doubtedly necessary  to  note  the  individual  gifts  of 
each  boy,  and  no  one  would  ever  convince  me  7 
that  it  is  not  desirable  to  differentiate  courses  of 
study  with  this  in  view.  One  boy  will  be  better 
adapted  for  the  study  of  history,  another  for  poetry, 
another  for  law,  while  some  perhaps  had  better  be 
packed  off  to  the  country.  The  teacher  of  rhetoric 
will  distinguish  such  special  aptitudes,  just  as  our 
gymnast  will  turn  one  pupil  into  a  runner,  another 
into  a  boxer  or  wrestler  or  an  expert  at  some  other 
of  the  athletic  accomplishments  for  which  prizes  are 
awarded  at  the  sacred  games.  But  on  the  other  8 
hand,  he  who  is  destined  for  the  bar  must  study  not 
one  department  merely,  but  must  perfect  himself  in 
all  the  accomplishments  which  his  profession  de- 
mands, even  though  some  of  them  may  seem  too  hard 
for  him  when  he  approaches  them  as  a  learner.  For  if 
natural  talent  alone  were  sufficient,  education  might 
be  dispensed  with.  Suppose  we  are  given  a  pupil  9 
who,  like  so  many,  is  of  depraved  tastes  and  swollen 
with  his  own  conceit ;  shall  we  suffer  him  to  go  his 
own  sweet  way  ?  If  a  boy's  disposition  is  naturally 
dry  and  jejune,  ought  we  not  to  feed  it  up  or  at  any 
rate  clothe  it  in  fairer  apparel  ?  For,  if  in  some  cases 
it  is  necessary  to  remove  certain  qualities,  surely 
there  are  others  where  we  may  be  permitted  to  add 
what  is  lacking.  Not  that  I  would  set  myself  against  10 
the  will  of  nature.  No  innate  good  quality  should  be 
neglected,  but  defects  must  be  made  good  and  weak- 
nesses made  strong.  When  Isocrates,  the  prince  of  11 
instructors,  whose  works  proclaim  his  eloquence  no 
less  than  his  pupils  testify  to  his  excellence  as  a 



cum  de  Ephoro  atque  Theopompo  sic  iudicaret,  ut 
alteri  frenis  alter!  calcaribus  opus  esse  diceret,  aut 
in  illo  lentiore  tarditatem  aut  in  illo  paene  praecipiti 
concitationem  adiuvandam  docendo  existimavit,  cum 
alterum  alterius  natura  misccndum  arbitraretur  ? 

12  Imbecillis  tamen  ingeniis   sane   sic   obsequendum 
sit,  ut  tantum  in  id,  quo  vocat  natura,  ducantur  ;  ita 
enim,  quod  solum  possunt,  melius  efficient.     Si  vero 
liberalior    materia    contigerit    et    in    qua   merito    ad 
spem   oratoris   simus    aggressi,   nulla   dicendi    virtus 

13  omittenda    est.       Nam   licet   sit   aliquam    in   partem 
pronior,  ut  necesse  est,  ceteris  tamen  non  repugna- 
bit,  atque  ea  cura  paria  faciet  iis,  in  quibus  eminebat ; 
sicut  ille  (ne  ab   eodem   exemplo   recedamus)  exer- 
cendi  corpora  peritus,  non,  si  docendum  pancratias- 
ten  susceperit,   pugno  ferire   vel   calce   tantum    aut 
nexus  modo  atque  in  iis  certos  aliquos  docebit,  sed 
omnia  quae  sunt  eius   certaminis.       Erit  qui   ex   his 
aliqua    non   possit :    in    id   maxime  quod   poterit   in- 

14  cumbet.       Nam     sunt     haec    duo    vitanda     prorsus  : 
unum  ne  temptes  quod  effici  non   possit,  alterum   ne 
ab    eo,   quod    quis   optime    facit,    in    aliud,    ad    quod 
minus     est    idoneus,    transferas.       At    si    fuerit    qui 

1  The  pancration  was  a  mixture  of  wrestling  and  boxing. 

BOOK    II.   VIH.  11-14 

teacher,  gave  his  opinion  of  Ephorus  and  Theopompus 
to  the  effect  that  the  former  needed  the  spur  and  the 
latter  the  curb,  what  was  his  meaning?  Surely  not 
that  the  sluggish  temperament  of  the  one  and  the 
headlong  ardour  of  the  other  alike  required  modifi- 
cation by  instruction,  but  rather  that  each  would  gain 
from  an  admixture  of  the  qualities  of  the  other. 

In  the  case  of  weaker  understandings  however  some  12 


concession  must  be  made  and  thev  should  be  directed 


merely  to  follow  the  call  of  their  nature,  since  thus 
they  will  be  more  effective  in  doing  the  only  thing 
that  lies  in  their  power.  But  if  we  are  fortunate 
enough  to  meet  with  richer  material,  such  as  justifies 
us  in  the  hope  of  producing  a  real  orator,  we  must 
leave  no  oratorical  virtue  uncared  for.  For  though  he  13 
will  necessarily  have  a  natural  bent  for  some  special 
department  of  oratory,  he  will  not  feel  repelled  by 
the  others,  and  by  sheer  application  will  develop  his 
other  qualities  until  they  equal  those  in  which  he 
naturally  excels.  The  skilled  gymnast  will  once  again 
provide  us  with  a  parallel :  if  he  undertakes  to  train 
a  pancratiast,1  he  will  not  merely  teach  him  how 
to  use  his  fists  or  his  heels,  nor  will  he  restrict 
his  instructions  to  the  holds  in  wrestling,  giving 
special  attention  to  certain  tricks  of  this  kind, 
but  will  train  him  in  every  department  of  the 
science.  Some  will  no  doubt  be  incapable  of  at- 
taining proficiency  in  certain  exercises  ;  these  must 
specialise  on  those  which  lie  within  their  powers. 
For  there  are  two  things  which  he  must  be  most  14 
careful  to  avoid  :  first,  he  must  not  attempt  the  im- 
possible, secondly  he  must  not  switch  off  his  pupil 
from  what  he  can  do  well  to  exercises  for  which  he  is 
less  well  suited.  But  if  his  pupil  is  like  the  famous 



docebitur  ille,  quern  adolescentes  senem  vidimus, 
Nicostratus,  omnibus  in  eo  docendi  partibus  similiter 
utetur,  efficietque  ilium,  qualis  hie  fuit,  luctando 
pugnandoque,  quorum  utroque  ccrtamine  iisdem 
15  diebus  coronabatur,  invictum.  Et  quanto  id  magis 
oratoris  futuri  magistro  providendum  erit?  Non 
enim  satis  est  dicere  presse  tantum  aut  subtiliter  aut 
aspere,  non  magis  quam  phonasco  acutis  tantum  aut 
mediis  aut  gravibus  soriis  aut  horum  etiam  particulis 
excellere.  Nam  sicut  cithara  ita  oratio  perfecta  non 
est,  nisi  ab  imo  ad  summum  omnibus  intenta  nervis 

IX.  Plura  de  officio  docentium  locutus  discipulos 
id  unum  interim  moneo,  ut  praeceptores  suos  non 
minus  quam  ipsa  studia  ament,  et  parcntes  esse  non 

2  quidem  corporum   sed   mentium   credant.      Multum 
haec    pietas    conferet    studio ;    nam    ita   et    libenter 
audient  et  dictis  credent  et  esse  similes  concupiscent, 
in   ipsos  denique   coetus  scholarum  laeti  alacresque 
convenient,  emendati  non  irascentur,  laudati  gaude- 

3  bunt,  ut  sint  carissimi,  studio  merebuntur.      Nam  ut 
illorum   officium   est  docere,  sic  horum  praebere  se 
dociles ;    alioqui    neutrum    sine    altero    sufficit.       Et 
sicut    hominis    ortus    ex    utroque    gignentium    con- 
fertur,    et    frustra    sparseris    semina,  nisi    ilia    prae- 
mollitus    foverit    sulcus :    ita    eloquentia    coalescere 


BOOK    II.  vin.  i4-ix.  3 

Nicostratus,  whom  we  saw  when  he  was  old  and  we 
were  boys,  he  will  train  him  equally  in  every  depart- 
ment of  the  science  and  will  make  him  a  champion 
both  in  boxing  and  wrestling,,  like  Nicostratus  himself 
who  won  the  prize  for  both  contests  within  a  few  days 
of  each  other.  And  how  much  more  important  is  the  13 
employment  of  such  methods  where  our  future  orator 
is  concerned !  It  is  not  enough  to  be  able  to  speak 
with  terseness,  subtlety  or  vehemence,  any  more  than 
it  would  be  for  a  singing  master  to  excel  in  the  upper, 
middle  or  lower  register  only,  or  in  particular  sections 
of  these  registers  alone.  Eloquence  is  like  a  harp 
and  will  never  reach  perfection,  unless  all  its  strings 
be  taut  and  in  tune. 

IX.  Though  I  have  spoken  in  some  detail  of  the 
duties  of  the  teacher,  I  shall  for  the  moment  confine 
my  advice  to  the  learners  to  one  solitary  admonition, 
that  they  should  love  their  masters  not  less  than 
their  studies,  and  should  regard  them  as  the  parents 
not  indeed  of  their  bodies  but  of  their  minds.  Such  2 
attachments  are  of  invaluable  assistance  to  study. 
For  under  their  influence  they  find  it  a  pleasure  to 
listen  to  Iheir  teachers,  believe  what  they  say  and 
Ions;  to  be  like  them,  come  cheerfully  and  gladly  to 

e  ^  .    . 

school,  are  not  angry  when  corrected,  rejoice  when 
praised,  and  seek  to  win  their  master's  affection  by 
the  devotion  with  which  they  pursue  their  studies. 
For  as  it  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to  teach,  so  it  is  3 
the  duty  of  the  pupil  to  show  himself  teachable.  The 
two  obligations  are  mutually  indispensable.  And  just 
as  it  takes  two  parents  to  produce  a  human  being, 
and  as  the  seed  is  scattered  in  vain,  if  the  ground  is 
hard  and  there  is  no  furrow  to  receive  it  and  bring  it 
to  growth,  even  so  eloquence  can  never  come  to 



nequit    nisi    sociata     tradentis    accipientisque     con- 

X.  In  his  primis  operibus,  quae  non  ipsa  parva 
sunt  sed  maiorum  quasi  membra  atque  partes,  bene 
institute  atque  exercitato  iam  fere  tempus  appetet 
aggrediendi  suasorias  iudicialesque  materias  ;  quarum 
antequam  viam  ingredior,  pauca  mihi  de  ipsa  ratione 
declamandi  dicenda  sunt,  quae  quidern  ut  ex  omni- 

2  bus  novissime  inventa  ita  multo  est  utilissima.      Nam 
et  cuncta  ilia,  de  quibus  diximus,  in  se  fere  continet, 
et  veritati    proximam  imaginem  reddit,  ideoque  ita 
est  celebrata,  ut  plerisque  videretur  ad   formandam 
eloquentiam  vel  sola  sufficere.      Neque   enim  virtus 
ulla    perpetuae    duntaxat    orationis    reperiri    potest, 
quae  non  sit  cum  hac  dicendi  meditatione  communis. 

3  Eo  quidem  res  ista  culpa  docentium  reccidit,  ut  inter 
praecipuas    quae    corrumperent    eloquentiam    causas 
licentia  atque  inscitia  declainantium  fuerit.      Sed  eo, 

4  quod  natura  bonum  est,  bene  uti  licet.      Sint  ergo 
et  ipsae    materiae,  quae  fingentur,  quam  simillimae 
veritatis,  et  declamatio,  in  quantum  maxime  potest, 
imitetur    eas    actiones,    in    quarum     exercitationem 

6  reperta  est.  Nam  magos  et  pestilentiam  et  responsa 
et  saeviores  tragicis  novercas  aliaque  magis  adhuc 
fabulosa  frustra  inter  sponsiones  et  interdicta  quae- 

1  sponsio  (=  a  wager)  was  a  form  of  lawsuit  in  which  the 
litigant  promised  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  if  he  lost 
his  case.  The  interdict  was  an  order  issued  by  the  praetor 


BOOK    II.  ix.  3-x.  5 

maturity,  unless  teacher  and  taught  are  in  perfect 

X.  These  elementary  stages  aio  in  themselves 
no  small  undertaking,  but  they  are  merely  members 
and  portions  of  the  greater  whole  ;  when  therefore 
the  pupil  has  been  thoroughly  instructed  and  exer- 
cised in  these  departments,  the  time  will  as  a  rule 
have  come  for  him  to  attempt  deliberative  and 
forensic  themes.  But  before  I  begin  to  discuss 
these,,  I  must  say  a  few  words  on  the  theory  of 
declamation,  which  is  at  once  the  most  recent  and 
most  useful  of  rhetorical  exercises.  For  it  includes  2 
practically  all  the  exercises  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking  and  is  in  close  touch  with  reality.  As  a 
result  it  has  acquired  such  a  vogue  that  many  think 
that  it  is  the  sole  training  necessary  to  the  formation 
of  an  orator,  since  there  is  no  excellence  in  a  formal 
speech  which  is  not  also  to  be  found  in  this  type  of 
rhetorical  exercise.  On  the  other  hand  the  actual  3 
practice  of  declamation  has  degenerated  to  such  an 
extent  owing  to  the  fault  of  our  teachers,  that  it  has 
come  to  be  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  corruption 
of  modern  oratory  ;  such  is  the  extravagance  and 
ignorance  of  our  declaimers.  But  it  is  possible  to 
make  a  sound  use  of  anything  that  is  naturally  sound. 
The  subjects  chosen  for  themes  should,  therefore,  be  4 
as  true  to  life  as  possible,  and  the  actual  declamation 
should,  as  far  as  may  be,  be  modelled  on  the  plead- 
ings for  which  it  was  devised  as  a  training.  For  we  5 
shall  hunt  in  vain  among  sponsions1  and  interdicts 
for  magicians  and  plagues  and  oracles  and  step- 
mothers more  cruel  than  any  in  tragedy,  and  other 

commanding   or   prohibiting    certain   action.      It    occurred 
chiefly  in  disputes  about  property. 



remus.  Quid  ergo  ?  Nunquam  haec  supra  fidem  et 
poetica,  ut  vere  dixerim,  themata  iuvenibus  trad  are 
permittamus,  ut  exspatientur  et  gaudeant  materia  et 

6  quasi  in  corpus  eant  ?     Erit  optimum  ;  sed  certe  sint 
grandia    et    tumida,  non    stulta   etiam   et    acrioribus 
oculis   intuenti   ridicula :    ut,   si   iam  cedendum   est, 
impleat    se    declamator    aliquando,    dum     sciat,    ut 
quadrupedes,  cum  viridi  pabulo  distentae  sunt,  san- 
guinis   detractione    curantur   et  sic   ad   cibos  viribus 
conservandis  idoneos  redeunt,  ita  sibi  quoque  tenu- 
andas    adipes,    et    quidquid    humoris    corrupti    con- 
traxerit,  emittendum,  si  esse  sanus  ac  robustus  volet. 

7  Alioqui  tumor  ille  inanis  primo  cuiusque  veri  operis 
conatu    dcprehendetur.       Totum   autem   declamandi 
opus  qui    diversum   omni   modo   a   forensibus   causis 
existimant,  ii  profecto  ne  rationem  quidem,  qua  ista 

8  exercitatio  inventa  sit,  pervident.      Nam  si  foro  non 
praeparat,  aut  scenicae  ostentation!  aut  furiosae  voci- 
ferationi  simillimum  est.      Quid  enim  attinet  iudicem 
praeparare,    qui    nullus    est ;    narrare,    quod    omnes 
sciant  falsum  ;  probationes  adhibere  causae,  de  qua 
nemo   sit   pronuntiaturus  ?      Et    haec   quidem   otiosa 
tantum  ;  adfici  vero  et  ira  vel  luctu  permovere,  cuius 
est   ludibrii,    nisi    quibusdam    pugnae    simulacris    ad 

1  The  themes  of  the  controversiae  often  turned  on  the 
supernatural  and  on  crimes  and  incidents  such  as  rarely  or 
never  occur  in  actual  life. 


BOOK    II.  x.  5-8 

subjects  still  more  unreal  than  these.1  What  then? 
are  we  never  to  permit  young  men  to  handle  unreal 
or,  to  be  more  accurate,  poetic  themes  that  they  may 
run  riot  and  exult  in  their  strength  and  display  their 
full  stature?  It  were  best  to  prohibit  them  absolutely.  6 
But  at  any  rate  the  themes,  however  swelling  and 
magnificent,  should  not  be  such  as  to  seem  foolish 

c3  * 

and  laughable  to  the  eye  of  an  intelligent  observer. 
Consequently,  if  we  must  make  some  concession,  let 
us  allow  the  declaimer  to  gorge  himself  occasion- 
ally, as  long  as  he  realises  that  his  case  will  be  like 
that  of  cattle  that  have  blown  themselves  out  with  a 
surfeit  of  green  food  :  they  are  cured  of  their  disorder 
by  blood-letting  and  then  put  back  to  food  such  as 
will  maintain  their  strength;  similarly  the  declaimer 
must  be  rid  of  his  superfluous  fat,  and  his  corrupt 
humours  must  be  discharged,  if  he  wants  to  be 
strong  and  healthy.  Otherwise,  the  first  time  he  7 

O  J  f 

makes  any  serious  effort,  his  swollen  emptiness  will 
stand  revealed.  Those,  however,  who  hold  that 
declamation  has  absolutely  nothing  in  common  with 
pleading  in  the  courts,  are  clearly  quite  unaware  of 
the  reasons  which  gave  rise  to  this  type  of  exercise. 
For  if  declamation  is  not  a  preparation  for  the  actual  8 
work  of  the  courts,  it  can  only  be  compared  to  the 
rant  of  an  actor  or  the  raving  of  a  lunatic.  For  what 
is  the  use  of  attempting  to  conciliate  a  non-existent 
judge,  or  of  stating  a  case  which  all  know  to  be 
false,  or  of  trying  to  prove  a  point  on  which  judg- 
ment will  never  be  passed?  Such  waste  of  effort 
is,  however,  a  comparative  trifle.  But  what  can  be 
more  ludicrous  than  to  work  oneself  into  a  passion 
and  to  attempt  to  excite  the  anger  or  grief  of 
our  hearers,  unless  we  are  preparing  ourselves  by 



verum  discrimen  aciemque  iustam  consuescimus  ? 
9  Nihil  ergo  inter  forense  genus  dicendi  atque  hoc 
declamatorium  intererit  ?  Si  profectus  gratia  dici- 
mus,  nihil.  Utinamque  adiici  ad  consuetudinem 
posset,  ut  nominibus  uteremur,  et  perplexae  mngis 
et  longioris  aliquando  actus  controversiae  finge- 
rentur,  et  verba  in  usu  cotidiano  posita  minus 
timeremus,  et  iocos  inserere  moris  esset ;  quae  nos, 
quamlibet  per  alia  in  scholis  exercitati  simus,  tirones 

10  in   foro  inveniunt.      Si  vero  in  ostentationem   com- 
paretur    declamatio,   sane    paulum  aliquid    inclinare 

11  ad  voluptatem  audientium  debemus.      Nam  et  in  iis 
actionibus,  quae   in   aliqua   sine   dubio  veritate  ver- 
santur,  sed  sunt  ad  popularem  aptatae  delectationem, 
quales  legimus   panegyricos,   totumque   hoc    demon- 
strativum    genus,    permiltitur    adhibere    plus   cultus 
omnemque  artem,  quae  latere  plerumque  in  iudiciis 
debet,  non  confiteri  modo  sed  ostentare  etiam  homi- 

12  nibus  in  hoc  advocatis.      Quare  declamatio,  quoniain 
est   iudiciorum    consiliorumque    imago,    similis    esse 
debet  veritati ;    quoniam  autem  aliquid   in  se  habet 

13  eViSeiKTtKoY,  nonnihil    sibi    nitoris    assumere.       Quod 
faciunt  actores  comici,  qui  neque  ita  prorsus,  ut  nos 
vulgo  loquimur,  pronuntiant,  quod   esset  sine   arte> 


BOOK    II.  x.  8-13 

such  mimic  combats  for  the  actual  strife  and  the 
pitched  battles  of  the  law-courts  ?  Is  there  then  no  9 
difference  between  our  declamations  and  genuine 
forensic  oratory?  I  can  only  reply,  that  if  we  speak 
with  a  desire  for  improvement,  there  will  be  no 
difference.  I  wish  indeed  that  certain  additions 
could  be  made  to  the  existing  practice  ;  that  we  made 
use  of  names,  that  our  fictitious  debates  dealt  with 
more  complicated  cases  and  sometimes  took  longer 
to  deliver,  that  we  were  less  afraid  of  words  drawn 
from  everyday  speech  and  that  we  were  in  the  habit 
of  seasoning  our  words  with  jests.  For  as  regards 
all  these  points,  we  are  mere  novices  when  we  come 
to  actual  pleading,  however  elaborate  the  training 
that  the  schools  have  given  us  on  other  points.  And  10 
even  if  display  is  the  object  of  declamation,  surely 
we  ought  to  unbend  a  little  for  the  entertainment  of 
our  audience.  For  even  in  those  speeches  which,  11 
although  undoubtedly  to  some  extent  concerned 
with  the  truth,  are  designed  to  charm  the  multi- 
tude (such  for  instance  as  panegyrics  and  the  oratory 
of  display  in  all  its  branches),  it  is  permissible  to 
be  more  ornate  and  not  merely  to  disclose  all  the 
resources  of  our  art,  which  in  cases  of  law  should  as 
a  rule  be  concealed,  but  actually  to  flaunt  them 
before  those  who  have  been  summoned  to  hear  us. 
Declamation  therefore  should  resemble  the  truth,  12 
since  it  is  modelled  on  forensic  and  deliberative 
oratory.  On  the  other  hand  it  also  involves  an 
element  of  display,  and  should  in  consequence 
assume  a  certain  air  of  elegance.  In  this  connexion  1? 
I  may  cite  the  practice  of  comic  actors,  whose  de- 
livery is  not  exactly  that  of  common  speech,  since 
that  would  be  inartistic,  but  is  on  the  other  hand  not 



neque    procul    tainen   a   natura    recedunt,   quo  vitio 
periret   imitatio ;    sed   morem   communis   huius   ser- 

14  monis  decore  quodam  scenico  exornant.      Sic  quoque 
aliqua  nos  incommoda  ex  iis,  quas  finxerimus,  materiis 
consequentur,  in   eo    praecipue,  quod    multa    in    iis 
relinquuntur  incerta,  quae  sumimus  utvidetur,aetates; 
facilitates,    liberi,    parentes,    urbium    ipsarum    vires, 

15  iura,  mores,  alia  his  similia ;    quin  aliquando   etiam 
argumentuni  ex  ipsis  positionum  vitiis  duciinus.    Sed 
haec  suo  quaeque  loco.      Quamvis  enim  omne  pro- 
positum  operis  a  nobis  destinati  eo  spectet,  ut  orator 
instituatur,  tamen,  ne  quid  studiosi  requirant,  etiam 
si  quid   erit,   quod  ad  scholas  proprie  pertineat,  in 
transitu  non  omittemus. 

XI.  lam  hinc  ergo  iiobis  inchoanda  est  ea  pars 
artis,  ex  qua  capere  initium  solent,  qui  priora  omise- 
runt ;  quanquam  video  quosdam  in  ipso  statim  limine 
obstaturos  mihi,  qui  nihil  egere  huiusmodi  praeceptis 
eloqueritiam  putent,  sed  natura  sua  et  vulgari  modo 
et  scholarum  exercitatione  contend  rideant  etiam 
diligentiam  nostram  exemplo  magni  quoque  nominis 
professorum,  quorum  aliquis,  ut  opinor,  interrogatus, 
quid  esset  cr\T]/J.a.  et  vo^ua,  nescire  se  quidem  sed,  si 


BOOK    II.  x.  13-xi.  i 

far  removed  from  the  accents  of  nature,  for,,  if  it  were, 
their  mimicry  would  be  a  failure:  what  they  do  there- 
fore is  to  exalt  the  simplicity  of  ordinary  speech 
by  a  touch  of  stage  decoration.  So  too  we  shall  14 
have  to  put  up  with  certain  inconveniences  arising 
from  the  nature  of  our  fictitious  themes  ;  such  draw- 
backs occur  more  especially  in  connexion  with  those 
numerous  details  which  are  left  uncertain  and  which 
we  presume  to  suit  our  purpose,  such  as  the  ages  of 
our  characters,  their  wealth,  their  families,  or  the 
strength,  laws  and  manners  of  the  cities  where  our 
scenes  are  laid,  and  the  like.  Sometimes  we  even  lo 
draw  arguments  from  the  actual  flaws  of  the  assump- 
tions involved  by  the  theme.  But  each  of  these 
points  shall  be  dealt  with  in  its  proper  place.  For 
although  the  whole  purpose  of  this  work  is  the 
formation  of  an  orator,  I  have  no  intention  of  passing 
over  anything  that  has  a  genuine  connexion  with  the 
practice  of  the  schools,  for  fear  that  students  may 
complain  of  the  omission. 

XI.  I  have  now  arrived  at  the  point  when  I  must 
begin  to  deal  with  that  portion  of  the  art  at  which 
those  who  have  omitted  the  preceding  stages  gener- 
ally commence.  I  can  see,  however,  that  certain 
critics  will  attempt  to  obstruct  my  path  at  the  very 
outset:  for  they  will  urge  that  eloquence  can  dis- 
pense with  rules  of  this  kind  and,  in  smug  satis- 
faction with  themselves  and  the  ordinary  methods 
and  exercises  of  the  schools,  will  laugh  at  me  for 
my  pains  ;  in  which  they  will  be  only  following  the 
example  of  certain  professors  of  no  small  reputation. 
One  of  these  gentlemen,  I  believe,  when  asked  to 
define  a  figure  and  a  thought,  replied  that  he  did  not 
know  what  they  were,  but  that,  if  they  had  anything 



ad  rem  pertineret,  esse  in  sua  declamatione  respon- 

2  dit.      Alias  percontanti,  Theodoreus  an  Apollodoreus 
esset  ?      Ego,    inquit,   parmularius    sum.       Nee  sane 
potuit  urbanius  ex  confessione   inscitiae  suae  elabi. 
Porro  hi,  quia  et  beneficio  ingenii  praestantes  sunl 
habiti  et  multa  etiam  memoria  digna  exclamaverunt, 
plurimos   habent   similes  negligentiae    suae,   paucis- 

3  simos   naturae.      Igitur  impetu   dicere   se  et  viribus 
uti  gloriantur ;  neque  enim  opus  esse  probatione  ant 
dispositione    in    rebus    fictis,    sed,    cuius    rei    gratia 
plenum  sit  auditorium,  sententiis  grandibus,  quarum 

4  optima  quaeque  a  periculo  petatur.      Quin  etiam  in 
coffitando,   nulla     ratione    adhibita    aut    tectum    in- 

O  y 

tuentes  magnum  aliquid,  quod  ultro  se  offerat, 
pluribus  saepe  diebus  expectant,  aut  murmure  in- 
certo  velut  classico  instinct!  concitatissimum  cor- 
poris  motum  non  enuntiandis  sed  quaerendis  verbis 

5  accommodant.      Nonnulli  certa  sib!  initia,  priusquam 
sensum  invenerint,  destinant,  quibus  aliquid  diserti 
subiungendum   sit,   eaque   diu   secum    ipsi    clareque 
meditati  desperata  conectendi  facultate  deserunt  et 

1  i.e.  I  care  naught  for  your  rival  schools  of  rhetoric.  I 
give  all  my  favour  to  the  men  armed  with  the  buckler  (the 
gladiators  known  as  Thraces).  Such  contests  of  the  amphi- 
theatre interest  me  far  more  than  the  contests  between  rival 
schools  of  rhetoric. 


BOOK    II.  xi.  1-5 

to  do  with  the  subject,  they  would  be  found  in 
his  declamation.  Another  when  asked  whether  he  2 
was  a  follower  of  Theodorusor  Apollodorus,  replied, 
"Oh!  as  for  me,  I  am  all  for  the  Thracians." 1 
To  do  him  justice,  he  could  hardly  have  found  a 
neater  way  to  avoid  confessing  his  ignorance.  These 
persons,  just  because,  thanks  to  their  natural  gifts, 
they  are  regarded  as  brilliant  performers  and  have, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  uttered  much  that  deserves  to 
be  remembered,  think  that,  while  most  men  share 
their  careless  habits,  few  come  near  them  for  talent. 
Consequently  they  make  it  their  boast  that  they  3 
speak  on  impulse  and  owe  their  success  to  their 
native  powers ;  they  further  assert  that  there  is  no 
need  of  proof  or  careful  marshalling  of  facts  when 
we  are  speaking  on  fictitious  themes,  but  only  of 
some  of  those  sounding  epigrams,  the  expectation  of 
which  has  filled  the  lecture-room  ;  and  these  they 
say  are  best  improvised  on  the  spur  of  the  moment. 
Further,  owing  to  their  contempt  for  method,  when  4 
they  are  meditating  on  some  future  effusion,  they 
spend  whole  days  looking  at  the  ceiling  in  the  hope 
that  some  magnificent  inspiration  may  occur  to 
them,  or  rock  their  bodies  to  and  fro,  booming 

*  c5 

inarticulately  as  if  they  had  a  trumpet  inside  them 
and  adapting  their  agitated  movements,  not  to  the 
delivery  of  the  words,  but  to  their  pursuit.  Some  5 
again  settle  on  certain  definite  openings  long  be- 
fore they  have  thought  what  they  are  going  to  say, 
with  a  view  to  using  them  as  pegs  for  subsequent 
snatches  of  eloquence,  and  then  after  practising 
their  delivery  first  in  silent  thought  and  then 
aloud  for  hours  together,  in  utter  desperation  of 
providing  any  connecting  links,  abandon  them  and 



ad  alia  deinceps  atque  inde  alia  non  minus  communia 

6  ac  nota  devertunt.      Qui  plurimum  videntur  habere 
rationis,  non  in  causas  tamen  laborem  suum  sed  in 
locos  intendunt,  atque  in  iis  non  corpori  prospiciunt 
sed  abrupta    quaedam,   ut   forte  ad   manum   venere, 

7  iaculantur.       Unde    fit,    ut    dissoluta    et   ex   diversis 
congesta  oratio  cohaerere   non  possit   similisque  sit 
commentariis  puerorum,  in  quos   ea,  quae  aliis  de- 
clamantibus  laudata  sunt,  regerunt.      Magnas  tamen 
sententias    et    res    bonas,   ita    enim    gloriari    solent, 
elidunt ;  nam  et  barbari  et  servi ;  et  si  hoc  sat  est, 
nulla  est  ratio  dicendi. 

XII.  Ne  hoc  quidem  negaverim,  sequi  plerumque 
hanc  opinionenx,  ut  fortius  dicere  videantur  indocti  ; 
primum  vitio  male  iudicantium,  qui  maiorem  habere 
vim  credunt  ea_,  quae  non  habent  artem,  ut  effringere 
quam  aperire,  rumpere  quam  solvere,  trahere  quam 
2  ducere  putant  robustius.  Nam  et  gladiator,  qui 
armorum  inscius  in  rixam  ruit,  et  luctator,  qui  totius 
corporis  nisu  in  id,  quod  semel  invasit,  incumbit, 
fortior  ab  his  vocatur ;  cum  interim  et  hie  frequenter 
suis  viribus  ipse  prosternitur,  et  ilium  vehementis 

BOOK    II.  xi.  5-xn.  2 

take  refuge  in  one  formula  after  another,  each  no 
less   hackneyed    and   familiar   than    the   last.       The  6 


least  unreasonable  of  them  devote  their  atten- 
tion not  to  the  actual  cases,  but  to  their  purple 
patches,  in  the  composition  of  which  they  pay  no 
attention  to  the  subject-matter,  but  fire  off  a  series 
of  isolated  thoughts  just  as  they  happen  to  come  to 
hand.  The  result  is  a  speech  which,  being  com-  7 
posed  of  disconnected  passages  having  nothing  in 
common  with  each  other,  must  necessarily  lack 
cohesion  and  can  only  be  compared  to  a  schoolboy's 
notebook,  in  which  he  jots  down  any  passages  from 
the  declamations  of  others  that  have  come  in  for  a 
word  of  praise.  None  the  less  they  do  occasionally 
strike  out  some  good  things  and  some  fine  epigrams, 
such  as  they  make  their  boast.  Why  not  ?  slaves 
and  barbarians  sometimes  achieve  the  same  effects, 
and  if  we  are  to  be  satisfied  with  this  sort  of  thing, 
then  good-bye  to  any  theory  of  oratory. 

XII.  I  must,  however,  admit  that  the  general 
opinion  is  that  the  untrained  speaker  is  usually 
the  more  vigorous.  This  opinion  is  due  primarily 
to  the  erroneous  judgment  of  faulty  critics,  who 
think  that  true  vigour  is  all  the  greater  for  its  lack 
of  art,  regarding  it  as  a  special  proof  of  strength  to 
force  what  might  be  opened,  to  break  what  might 
be  untied  and  to  drag  what  might  be  led.  Even  a  2 
gladiator  who  plunges  into  the  fight  with  no  skill  at 
arms  to  help  him,  and  a  wrestler  who  puts  forth  the 
whole  strength  of  his  body  the  moment  he  has  got 
a  hold,  is  acclaimed  by  them  for  his  outstanding 
vigour,  although  it  is  of  frequent  occurrence  in  such 
cases  for  the  latter  to  be  overthrown  by  his  own 
strength  and  for  the  former  to  find  the  fury  of  his 



3  impetus    excipit    adversarii    mollis    articulus.       Sed 
sunt  in  hac  parte,  quae  imperitos  etiam  naturaliter 
fallant ;    nam    et    divisio,    cum    plurimum   valeat   in 
causis,  speciem  virium  minuit,  et  rudia  politis  maiora 

4  et    sparsa   compositis    numerosiora    creduntur.       Est 
praeterea    quaedam    virtutum    vitiorumque    vicinia, 
qua  maledicus  pro  libero,  temerarius  pro  forti,  effusus 
pro  copioso   accipitur.      Maledicit   autem    ineruditus 
apertius  et  saepius  vel  cum  periculo  suscepti  litiga- 

5  toris,     frequenter    etiam     suo.      Adfert    et    ista    res 
opinionem,    quia    libentissime    homines    audiunt    ea, 
quae  dicere  ipsi  noluissent.       Illud  quoque  alterum 
quod   est  in   elocutione  ipsa   periculum    minus   vitat 
conaturque    perdite,  unde    evenit    nonnunquam,    ut 
aliquid    grande    inveniat    qui    semper    quaerit   quod 
nimium   est ;  verum   id   et   raro   provenit,   et   cetera 
vitia  non  pensat. 

6  Propter    hoc    quoque    interdum    videntur    indocti 
eopiam  habere  maiorem,  quod  dicunt  omnia  ;  doctis 
est  et  electio  et  modus.      His  accedit,  quod  a  cura 
docendi  quod   intenderunt  recedunt.      Itaque   illud 
quaestionum  et  argumentorum  apud  corrupta  iudicia 


BOOK    II.  xn.  2-6 

onslaught  parried  by  his  adversary  with  a  supple 
turn  of  the  wrist.  But  there  are  many  details  in  this  3 
department  of  our  art  which  the  unskilled  critic  will 
never  notice.  For  instance,  careful  division  under 
heads,  although  of  the  utmost  importance  in  actual 
cases,  makes  the  outward  show  of  strength  seem 
less  than  the  reality;  the  unhewn  block  is  larger 
than  the  polished  marble,  and  things  when  scattered 
seem  more  numerous  than  when  placed  together. 
There  is  moreover  a  sort  of  resemblance  between  4 
certain  merits  and  certain  defects :  abuse  passes  for 
freedom  of  speech,  rashness  for  courage,  prodigality 
for  abundance.  But  the  untrained  advocate  will 
abuse  too  openly  and  too  often,  even  though  by  so 
doing  he  imperils  the  success  of  the  case  which  he 
has  undertaken  and  not  seldom  his  own  personal 
safety  as  well.  But  even  such  violence  will  win  5 
men's  good  opinion,  since  they  are  only  too  pleased 
to  hear  another  say  things  which  nothing  would 
have  induced  them  to  utter  themselves.  Such 
speakers  are  also  less  careful  to  avoid  that  other 
peril,  the  pitfall  of  style,  and  are  so  reckless  in  their 
efforts  that  sometimes  in  their  passion  for  extrava- 
gance they  light  upon  some  really  striking  expres- 
sion. But  such  success  is  rare  and  does  not 
compensate  for  their  other  defects. 

For  the  same  reason  the  uninstructed  sometimes  6 
appear  to  have  a  richer  flow  of  language,  because 
they  say  everything  that  can  be  said,  while  the 
learned  exercise  discrimination  and  self-restraint. 
To  this  must  be  added  the  fact  that  such  persons 
take  no  trouble  to  prove  their  contentions,  and 
consequently  steer  clear  of  the  chilly  reception 
given  in  our  decadent  law-courts  to  arguments  and 



frigus  evitant  nihilque  aliud,  quam  quod  vel  pravis 
voluptatibus  aures  assistentium  permulceat,  quaerunt. 

7  Sententiae  quoque   ipsae,  quas   solas   petunt,  magis 
eminent,   cum   omnia  circa   illas   sordida   et   abiecta 
sunt ;  ut  lumina  non   inter  umbras,  quemadmodum 
Cicero    dicit,    sed    plane    in    tenebris    clariora    sunt. 
Itaque  ingeniosi  vocentur,  ut  libet,  dum  tamen  con- 

8  stet  contumeliose  sic  laudari  disertum.      Nihilominus 
confitendum   est  etiam  detrahere  doctrinam  aliquid, 
ut  limam  rudibus  et  cotes  hebetibus  et  vino  vetus- 
tatem,  sed  vitia  detrahit,  atque   eo  solo  minus  est, 
quod  Htterae  perpolierunt,  quo  melius. 

9  Verum  hi  pronuntiatione  quoque  famam  dicendi 
fortius  quaerunt.      Nam   et  clamant  ubique  et  omnia 
levata,   ut  ipsi   vocant,  manu    emugiunt,  multo   dis- 
cursu,    anhelitu,     iactatione     gestus,     motu     capitis 

10  furentes.  lam  collidere  manus,  tcrrae  pedem  in- 
cutere,  femur,  pectus,  frontem  caedere,  mire  ad 
pullatum  circulum  facit ;  cum  ille  eruditus,  ut  in 
oratione  multa  summittere,  variare,  disponere,  ita 
etiam  in  pronuntiando  suum  cuique  eorum,  quae 

1  de  Or.  in.  xxvi.  101. 

2  puHatiis  =  wearing  dark  clothes,  i.e.  the  common  people, 
as  opposed  to  the  upper  classes  wearing  the  white  or  purple- 
bordered  toga. 


BOOK    II.  xii.  6-10 

questions  and  seek  only  for  such  themes  as  may 
beguile  the  ears  of  the  public  even  at  the  cost  of 
appealing  to  the  most  perverted  tastes.  Again,  7 
their  epigrams,,  the  sole  objects  of  their  quest,  seem 
all  the  more  striking  because  of  the  dreariness  and 
squalor  of  their  context,  since  flashes  are  more 
clearly  seen  against  a  background,  not  of  mere 
"  shade,"  as  Cicero1  says,  but  of  pitchy  darkness. 
Well,  let  the  world  credit  them  with  as  much  genius 
as  it  pleases,  so  long  as  it  is  admitted  that  such 
praise  is  an  insult  to  any  man  of  real  eloquence. 
None  the  less  it  must  be  confessed  that  learning  8 
does  take  something  from  oratory,  just  as  the  file 
takes  something  from  rough  surfaces  or  the  whet- 
stone from  blunt  edges  or  age  from  wine  ;  it  takes 
away  defects,  and  if  the  results  produced  after  sub- 
jection to  the  polish  of  literary  study  are  less,  they 
are  less  only  because  they  are  better. 

But  these  creatures  have  another  weapon  in  their  9 
armoury  :  they  seek  to  obtain  the  reputation  of 
speaking  with  greater  vigour  than  the  trained  orator 
by  means  of  their  delivery.  For  they  shout  on  all 
and  every  occasion  and  bellow  their  every  utterance 
"with  uplifted  hand,"  to  use  their  own  phrase, 
dashing  this  way  and  that,  panting,  gesticulating 
wildly  and  wagging  their  heads  with  all  the  frenzy 
of  a  lunatic.  Smite  your  hands  together,  stamp  10 
the  ground,  slap  your  thigh,  your  breast,  your  fore- 
head, and  you  will  go  straight  to  the  heart  of  the 
dingier  members  of  your  audience.2  But  the  edu- 
cated speaker,  just  as  he  knows  how  to  moderate 
his  style,  and  to  impart  variety  and  artistic  form  to 
his  speech,  is  an  equal  adept  in  the  matter  of  de- 
livery and  will  suit  his  action  to  the  tone  of  each 



dicet,  colori  accommodare  actum  sciat,  et,  si  quid  sit 
perpetua  observatione  dignum,  modestus  et  esse  et 

11  videri  malit.     At  illi  hanc  vim  appellant,  quae  est 
potius    violentia ;     cum    interim    non    actores    modo 
aliquos  invenias  sed,  quod  est  turpius,  praeceptores 
etiam,  qui  brevem  dicendi  exercitationem  consecuti 
omissa  ratione  ut  tulit  impetus,  passim  tumultuentur 
eosque,  qui  plus  honoris  litteris  tribuerunt,  ineptos 
et  ieiunos  et  trepidos  et  infirmos,  ut  quodque  verbum 

12  contumeliosissimum  occurrit,  appellent.     Verum  illis 
quidem   gratulemur  sine    labore,    sine    ratione,    sine 
disciplina     disertis ;     nos,     quando     et     praecipiendi 
munus  iam  pridem  deprecati  sumus  et  in  foro  quo- 
que  dicendi,   quia  honestissimum    finem   putabamus 
desinere  dum  desideraremur,  inquirendo  scribendo- 
que    talia  consolemur    otium    nostrum,   quae    futura 
usui  bonae  mentis  iuvenibus  arbitramur,  nobis  certe 
sunt  voluptati. 

XIII.  Nemo  autem  a  me  exigat  id  praeceptorum 
genus,  quod  est  a  plerisque  scriptoribus  artium  tra- 
ditum,  ut  quasi  quasdam  leges  immutabili  necessitate 
constrictas  studiosis  dicendi  feram  :  utique  prooe- 
mium  et  id  quale,  proxima  huic  narratio,  quae  lex 
deinde  narrandi,  propositio  post  hanc  vel,  ut  quibus- 
dam  placuit,  excursio,  turn  certus  ordo  quaestionum 
ceteraque,  quae,  velut  si  aliter  facere  fas  non  sit, 


BOOK    II.  xii.  lo-xm.  i 

portion  of  his  utterances,  while,  if  he  has  any  one 
canon  for  universal  observance,,  it  is  that  he  should 
both  possess  the  reality  and  present  the  appearance 
of  self-control.  But  the  ranters  confer  the  title  of  11 
force  on  that  which  is  really  violence.  You  may 
also  occasionally  find  not  merely  pleaders,  but,  what 
is  far  more  shameful,  teachers  as  well,  who,  after  a 
brief  training  in  the  art  of  speaking,  throw  method 
to  the  winds  and,  yielding  to  the  impulse  of  the 
moment,  run  riot  in  every  direction,  abusing  those 
who  hold  literature  in  higher  respect  as  fools  with- 
out life,  courage  or  vigour,  and  calling  them  the 
first  and  worst  name  that  occurs  to  them.  Still  let  12 
me  congratulate  these  gentlemen  on  attaining  elo- 
quence without  industry,  method  or  studv.  As  for 
myself  I  have  long  since  retired  from  the  task  of 
teaching,  in  the  schools  and  of  speaking  in  the 
courts,  thinking  it  the  most  honourable  conclusion  to 
retire  while  my  services  were  still  in  request,  and  all 
I  ask  is  to  be  allowed  to  console  my  leisure  by 
making  such  researches  and  composing  such  instruc- 
tions as  will,  I  hope,  prove  useful  to  young  men  of 
ability,  and  are,  at  any  rate,  a  pleasure  to  myself. 
XIII.  Let  no  one  however  demand  from  me  a  rigid 


code  of  rules  such  as  most  authors  of  textbooks  have 
laid  down,  or  ask  me  to  impose  on  students  of  rhe- 
toric a  system  of  laws  immutable  as  fate,  a  system  in 
which  injunctions  as  to  the  exordium  and  its  nature 
lead  the  way;  then  come  the  statement  of  facts  and 
the  laws  to  be  observed  in  this  connexion  :  next  the 
proposition  or,  as  some  prefer,  the  digression,  followed 
by  prescriptions  as  to  the  order  in  which  the  various 
questions  should  be  discussed,  with  all  the  other  rules, 
which  some  speakers  follow  as  though  they  had  no 



2  quidam   tanquam   iussi  sequuntur.     Erat  enim  rhe- 
torice  res  prorsus  facilis  ac   parva,   si  uno  et  brevi 
praescripto    contineretur ;    sed    mutantur    pleraque 
causis,    temporibus,    occasione,    necessitate.      Atque 
ideo    res    in   oratore    praecipua    consilium    est,  quia 

3  varie  et  ad  reruin  momenta   convertitur.      Quid   si 
enim  praecipias  imperatori,  quotiens  aciem  instruat, 
derigat  frontem,  cornua  utrinque  promoveat,  equites 
pro    cornibus    locet?     erit    haec    quidem    rectissima 
fortasse  ratio,  quotiens  licebit ;  sed  mutabitur  natura 
loci,   si  mons  occurret,   si  flumen  obstabit,   collibus, 

4  silvis,  asperitate  alia  prohibebitur ;  mutabit  hostium 
genus,  mutabit  praesentis  condicio  discriminis  ;  nunc 
acie  directa  nunc  cuneis,  nunc  auxiliis  nunc  legione 
pugnabitur,  nonnunquam  terga  etiam  dedisse  simu- 

5  lata  fuga   proderit.      Ita  prooemium  necessarium  an 
supervacuum,    breve    an    longius,   ad    iudicem    omni 
sermone  derecto  an  aliquando    averse  per    aliquam 
figuram  dicendum  sit,  constricta  an  latius  fusa  nar- 
ratio,  continua  an  divisa,  recta  an  ordine  permutato, 
causae  docebunt.     Itemque  de  quaestionum  ordine, 

1  i.e.  by  the  figure  known  as  apostrophe,  in  which  the 
orator  diverts  his  speech  from  the  judge  to  some  other 
person  :  see  ix.  ii.  38. 


BOOK    II.  xin.  1-5 

choice  but  to  regard  them  as  orders  and  as  if  it  were 
a  crime  to  take  any  other  line.  If  the  whole  of  rhe-  2 
toric  could  be  thus  embodied  in  one  compact  code, 
it  would  be  an  easy  task  of  little  compass :  but 
most  rules  are  liable  to  be  altered  by  the  nature  of 
the  case,  circumstances  of  time  and  place,  and  by 
hard  necessity  itself.  Consequently  the  all-important 
gift  for  an  orator  is  a  wise  adaptability  since  he  is 
called  upon  to  meet  the  most  varied  emergencies. 
What  if  you  should  instruct  a  general,  as  often  as  he  3 
marshals  his  troops  for  battle,  to  draw  up  his  front  in 
line,  advance  his  wings  to  left  and  right,  and  station 
his  cavalry  to  protect  his  flank?  This  will  perhaps  be 
the  best  plan,  if  circumstances  allow.  But  it  may 
have  to  be  modified  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
if,  for  instance,  he  is  confronted  by  a  mountain,  if  a 
river  bars  his  advance,  or  his  movements  are  hampered 
by  hills,  woods  or  broken  country.  Or  again  it  may  4 
be  modified  by  the  character  of  the  enemy  or  the 
nature  of  the  crisis  by  which  he  is  faced.  On  one 
occasion  he  will  fight  in  line,  on  another  in  column, 
on  one  he  will  use  his  auxiliary  troops,  on  another  his 
legionaries  ;  while  occasionally  a  feint  of  flight  may 
win  the  day.  So,  too,  with  the  rules  of  oratory.  Is  5 
the  exordium  necessary  or  superfluous?  should  it  be 
long  or  short  ?  addressed  entirely  to  the  judge  or 
sometimes  directed  to  some  other  quarter  by  the 
employment  of  some  figure  of  speech  ? l  Should  the 
statement  of  facts  be  concise  or  developed  at  some 
length  ?  continuous  or  divided  into  sections  ?  and 
should  it  follow  the  actual  or  an  artificial  order  of 
events  ?  The  orator  will  find  the  answers  to  all  these 
questions  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  So,  too, 
with  the  order  in  which  questions  should  be  discussed, 



6  cum    in    eadem    controversia    aliud    alii    parti    prius 
quaeri  frequenter  expediat.      Neque  enim  rogationi- 
bus  plebisve   scitis   sancta   sunt   ista   praecepta,  sed 

7  hoc  quidquid   est   utilitas  excogitavit.      Non  negabo 
autem  sic  utile  esse  plerumque,  alioqui  nee  scribe- 
rem ;     verum,    si    eadem    ilia    nobis    aliud     suadebit 
utilitas,     hanc     relictis     magistrorum     auctoritatibus 

8  Equidem  id  maxime  praecipiam  ac  repetens  iterum- 
que  iterumqiie  moneho  :   res  duas  in  omni  actu  spectet 
orator,    quid     deceat    et    quid    expediat.       Expedit 
autem   saepe   mutare   ex    illo    constitute    traditoque 
ordine  aliqua  et  interim  decet,  ut  in  statuis  atque 
picturis  videmus  variari  habitus,,  vultus,  status.      Nam 

9  recti  quidem   corporis  vel  minima  gratia  est ;  nempe 
enim  adversa  sit  facies  et  demissa  brachia  et  iuncti 
pedes  et  a  summis  ad  ima  rigens  opus.      Flexus  ille 
et,   ut   sic   dixerim,   motus    dat    actum   quendam    et 
adfectum.       Ideo    iiec    ad    unum    modum    formatae 

10  manus  et  in  vultu  mille  species.  Cursum  habent 
quaedam  et  impetum,  sedent  alia  vel  incumbunt ; 
nuda  haec,  ilia  velata  sunt,  quaedam  mixta  ex 
utroque.  Quid  tarn  distortum  et  elaboratum  quam 
est  ille  discobolos  Myronis  ?  Si  quis  tamen, 

'Verg.  Aen.  iii.  436. 

BOOK    II.  xin.  6-10 

since  in  any  given  debate  it  may  often  suit  one  party  6 
best  that  such  and  such  a  question  come  up  first, 
while  their  opponents  would  be  best  suited  by  another. 
For  these  rules  have  not  the  formal  authority  of  laws 
or  decrees  of  the  plebs,  but  are,  with  all  they  contain, 
the  children  of  expediency.  I  will  not  deny  that  it  7 
is  generally  expedient  to  conform  to  such  rules,  other- 
wise I  should  not  be  writing  now  ;  but  if  our  friend 
expediency  suggests  some  other  course  to  us,  why, 
we  shall  disregard  the  authority  of  the  professors 
and  follow  her. 

For  my  part  above  all  things  8 

"This  I  enjoin  and  urge  and  urge  anew  "  1 

that  in  all  his  pleadings  the  orator  should  keep  two 
things  constantly  in  view,  what  is  becoming  and  what 
is  expedient.  But  it  is  often  expedient  and  occa- 
sionally becoming  to  make  some  modification  in  the 
time-honoured  order.  We  see  the  same  thing  in 
pictures  and  statues.  Dress,  expression  and  attitude 
are  frequently  varied.  The  body  when  held  bolt  9 
upright  has  but  little  grace,  for  the  face  looks  straight 
forward,  the  arms  hang  by  the  side,  the  feet  are 
joined  and  the  whole  figure  is  stiff  from  top  to  toe. 
But  that  curve,  I  might  almost  call  it  motion,  with 
which  we  are  so  familiar,  gives  an  impression  of  action 
and  animation.  So,  too,  the  hands  will  not  always  be 
represented  in  the  same  position,  and  the  variety 
given  to  the  expression  will  be  infinite.  Some  figures  10 
are  represented  as  running  or  rushing  forward,  others 
sit  or  recline,  some  are  nude,  others  clothed,  while 
some  again  are  half-dressed,  half-naked.  Where  can 
we  find  a  more  violent  and  elaborate  attitude  than 
that  of  the  Discobolus  of  Myron  ?  Yet  the  critic  who 



ut  parum  rectum,  improbet  opus,  nonne  ab 
intellectu  artis  abfuerit,  in  qua  vel  praecipue 
laudabilis  est  ipsa  ilia  novitas  ac  difficultas  ? 

1 1  Quam    quidem   gratiam    et  delectationem    adferunt 
figurae,  quaeque  in  sensibus  quaeque  in  verbis  sunt ; 
mutant    enim    aliquid   a   recto   atque    hanc   prae   se 
virtutem  ferunt,  quod  a  consuetudine  vulgari  reces- 

12  serunt.       Habet    in    pictura    speciem    tota    facies ; 
Apelles    tamen    imaginem    Antigoni    latere    tantum 
altero   ostendit,  ut  amissi   oculi   deformitas    lateret. 
Quid?  non  in  oratione  operienda  sunt  quaedam,  sive 
ostendi  non  debent  sive  exprimi  pro  dignitate  non 

13  possunt?      Ut  fecit  Timanthes,  opinor,   Cythnius  in 
ea  tabula,  qua  Coloten  Teium  vicit.      Nam  cum  in 
Iphigeniae   immolatione   pinxisset   tristem   Calchan- 
tem,  tristiorem    Ulixen,   addidisset    Menelao,  quern 
surmnum  poterat  ars  efficere,  maerorem,  consumptis 
adfectibus,   non    reperiens,   quo   digne    modo    patris 
vultum  posset  exprimere,  velavit  eius   caput  et  suo 

14  cuique     animo     dedit    aestimandum.       Nonne     huic 
simile    est    illud     Sallustianum,    Nam    de    Carthagine 
tacere  satins  puto  quam  panim  dicere  ?     Propter  quae 
mihi  semper  moris  fuit,  quam  minime  alligare  me  ad 
praecepta,  quae  KaOoXiKa.  vocitant,  id  est  (ut  dicamus 
quomodo  possumus)  universalia  vel  perpetualia.    Raro 
enim  reperitur  hoc  genus,   ut  non  labefactari  parte 

1  Jug.  xix. 

BOOK    II.  xin.  10-14 

disapproved  of  the  figure  because  it  was  not  upright, 
would  merely  show  his  utter  failure  to  understand  the 
sculptor's  art,  in  which  the  very  novelty  and  difficulty 
of  execution  is  what  most  deserves  our  praise.  A  11 
similar  impression  of  grace  and  charm  is  produced  by 
rhetorical  figures,  whether  they  be  figures  of  thought 
or  fgures  of  speech.  For  they  involve  a  certain  de- 
parture from  the  straight  line  and  have  the  merit  of 
variation  from  the  ordinary  usage.  In  a  picture  the  12 
full  face  is  most  attractive.  But  Apelles  painted 
Antigonus  in  profile,  to  conceal  the  blemish  caused 
by  the  loss  of  one  eye.  So,  too,  in  speaking,  there 
are  certain  things  which  have  to  be  concealed,  either 
because  they  ought  not  to  be  disclosed  or  because 
they  cannot  be  expressed  as  they  deserve.  Timanthes,  13 
who  was,  1  think,  a  native  of  Cythnus,  provides  an 
example  of  this  in  the  picture  with  which  he  won  the 
victory  over  Colotes  of  Teos.  It  represented  the 
sacrifice  of  Iphigenia,  and  the  artist  had  depicted  an 
expression  of  grief  on  the  face  of  Calchas  and  of  still 
greater  grief  on  that  of  Ulysses,  while  he  had  given 
Menelaus  an  agony  of  sorrow  beyond  which  his  art 
could  not  go.  Having  exhausted  his  powers  of  emo- 
tional expression  he  was  at  a  loss  to  portray  the 
father's  face  as  it  deserved,  and  solved  the  problem 
by  veiling  his  head  and  leaving  his  sorrow  to  the 
imagination  of  the  spectator.  Sallust1  did  some-  14 
thing  similar  when  he  wrote  "I  think  it  better  to  say 

c^  * 

nothing  of  Carthage  rather  than  say  too  little."  It 
has  always,  therefore,  been  my  custom  not  to  tie  my- 
self down  to  universal  or  general  rules  (this  being  the 
nearest  equivalent  I  can  find  for  the  Greek  catholic 
rules}.  For  rules  are  rarely  of  such  a  kind  that  their 
validity  cannot  be  shaken  and  overthrown  in  some 



15  aliqua    et    subrui    possit.      Sed    de    his    plenius   suo 
quidque  loco  tractabimus.      Interim  nolo  se  iuvenes 
satis  instructos,  si  quern  ex  his,  qui  breves  plerumque 
circumferuntur,  artis    libellum    edidicerint,    et   velut 
decretis   technicorum   tutos   putent.      Multo    labore, 
assiduo  studio,  varia  exercitatione,  plurimis    experi- 
mentis,  altissima   prudentia,  praesentissimo   consilio 

16  constat  ars  dicendi.      Sed   adiuvatur   liis   quoque,   si 
tamen  rectam  viam,  non  unam  orbitam  monstrent ; 
a  qua  declinare  qui  crediderit  nefas,  patiatur  necesse 
est  illam  per  funes  ingredientium  tarditatem.      Itaque 
et  stratum  militari  labore  iter  saepe  deserimus  com- 
pendio  ducti ;  et,  si  rectum  limitem  rupti  torrentibus 
pontes    inciderint,  circumire   cogemur,  et,    si    ianua 

17  tenebitur  incendio,  per  parietem  exibimus.        Late 
fusum  opus  est  et  multiplex  et  prope  cotidie  novum, 
et  de  quo  minquam  dicta  erunt  omnia.        Quae  sint 
tamen  tradita,  quid  ex  his  optimum,  et  si  qua  mutari, 
adiici,  detrahi  melius  videbitur,  dicere  experiar. 

XIV.  Rhetoricen  in  Latinum  transferentes  turn 
oratoriam,  turn  oratricem  nominaveruiit.  Quos  equi- 
dem  non  fraudaverim  debita  laude,  quod  copiam 
Romani  sermonis  augere  temptarint.  Sed  non  omnia 


BOOK    II.  xiii.  14-xiv.  i 

particular  or  other.  But  I  must  reserve  each  of  these  15 
points  for  fuller  treatment  in  its  proper  place.  For 
the  present  I  will  only  say  that  I  do  not  want  young 
men  to  think  their  education  complete  when  they 
have  mastered  one  of  the  small  text-books  of  which 
so  many  are  in  circulation,  or  to  ascribe  a  talismanic 
value  to  the  arbitrary  decrees  of  theorists.  The  art 
of  speaking  can  only  be  attained  by  hard  work  and 
assiduity  of  study,  by  a  variety  of  exercises  and  re- 
peated trial,  the  highest  prudence  and  unfailing 
quickness  of  judgement.  But  rules  are  helpful  all  the  16 
same  so  long  as  they  indicate  the  direct  road  and  do 


not  restrict  us  absolutely  to  the  ruts  made  by  others. 
For  he  who  thinks  it  an  unpardonable  sin  to  leave  the 
old,  old  track,  must  be  content  to  move  at  much  the 
same  speed  as  a  tight-rope  walker.  Thus,  for  example, 
we  often  leave  a  paved  military  road  to  take  a  short 
cut  or,  finding  that  the  direct  route  is  impossible 
owing  to  floods  having  broken  down  the  bridges,  are 
forced  to  make  a  circuit,  while  if  our  house  is  on  fire 
and  flames  bar  the  way  to  the  front  door,  we  make 
our  escape  by  breaking  through  a  party  wall.  The  17 
orator's  task  covers  a  large  ground,  is  extremely 
varied  and  develops  some  new  aspect  almost  every 
day,  so  that  the  last  word  on  the  subject  will  never 
have  been  said.  I  shall  however  try  to  set  forth  the 
traditional  rules  and  to  point  out  their  best  features, 
mentioning  the  changes,  additions  and  subtractions 
which  seem  desirable. 

XIV.  Rhetoric  is  a  Greek  term  which  has  been 
translated  into  Latin  by  oratorio,  or  oratrix.  I  would 
not  for  the  world  deprive  the  translators  of  the 
praise  which  is  their  due  for  attempting  to  increase 
the  vocabulary  of  our  native  tongue;  but  translations 



nos    ducentes    ex    Graeco    sequuntur  sicut    ne    illos 
quidem,   quotiens  utique  suis  verbis  signare   nostra 

2  voluerunt.      Et   haec  interpretatio   non    minus  dura 
est  quam  ilia  Plauti  essentia  atque  queentia,  sed  ne 
propria  quidem ;  nam  oratoria  sic  effertur  ut  elocu- 
toria,  oratrix  ut  elocutrix  ;  ilia  autem  de  qua  loqui- 
mur  rhetorice  talis  est  qualis  eloquentia,  nee  dubie 
apud    Graecos  quoque   duplicem  intellectum  habet. 

3  Namque   uno  modo   fit   appositum    ars   rhetorica   ut 
navis   piratica,   altero    nomen    rei,    qualis    est    philo- 
sophia,   amicitia.      Nos    ipsam  mine   volumus  signifi- 
care  substantiam  ut  grammatice  litteratura  est,  non 
litteratrix    quemadmodum    oratrix,    nee     litteratoria 
quemadmodum  oratoria  ;  verum  id  in  rhetorice  non 

4  fit.      Ne  pugnemus  igitur,  cum  praesertim   plurimis 
alioqui  Graecis   sit  utendum.      Nam  certe  et  philo- 
sophos    et    musicos    et    geometras    dicam,    nee    vim 
adferam  nominibus  his  indecora  in  Latinum  sermonem 
mutatione.     Denique  cum   M.  Tullius  etiam  in  ipsis 
librorunij  quos  hac   de   re   primum  scripserat,  titulis 
Graeco  nomine  utatur,  profecto  non   est  verendum, 
ne  temere  videamur  oratori  maximo  de  nomine  artis 
suae  credidisse. 

5  Igitur  rhetorice  (iam  enim  sine  metu  cavillationis 
utemur    hac    appellatione)    sic,    ut    opinor,    optime 
dividetur,  ut  de  arte,  de  artifice,  de  opere  dicamus. 
Ars  erit,  quae  disciplina  percipi  debet ;  ea  est  bene 

1  sr.  essence  and  possibility.     5  A  Stoic,     cp.  x.  i.  124. 
8  See  §  6  of  next  chapter. 


BOOK    II.  xiv.  1-5 

from  Greek  into  Latin  are  not  always  satisfactory, 
just  as  the  attempt  to  represent  Latin  words 
in  a  Greek  dress  is  sometimes  equally  unsuccessful. 
And  the  translations  in  question  are  fully  as  2 
harsh  as  the  essentia  and  queentia l  of  Plautus,2 
and  have  not  even  the  merit  of  being  exact. 
For  oratorio,  is  formed  like  elocutoria  and  oratrix 
like  elocutrix,  whereas  the  rhetoric  with  which 
we  are  concerned  is  rather  to  be  identified  with 
eloquentia,  and  the  word  is  undoubtedly  used  in  two 
senses  by  the  Greeks.  In  the  one  case  it  is  an  3 
adjective  i.e.  ars  rhelorica,  the  rhetorical  art,  like 
piratic  in  the  phrase  nauis  piratic  a,  in  the  other  it  is 
a  noun  like  philosophy  or  friendship.  It  is  as  a  sub- 
stantive that  we  require  it  here  ;  now  the  correct 
translation  of  the  Greek  grammatice  is  litteratura  not 
litteralrix  or  litteratoria,  which  would  be  the  forms 
analogous  to  oratrix  and  oratoria.  But  in  the  case  of 
"  rhetoric  "  there  is  no  similar  Latin  equivalent.  It  is  4 
best  therefore  not  to  quarrel  about  it,  more  especially 
as  we  have  to  use  Greek  terms  in  many  other  cases. 
For  I  may  at  least  use  the  words  philosophies,  musicus 
and  geomctres  without  outraging  them  by  changing 
them  into  clumsy  Latin  equivalents.  Finally, 
since  Cicero  gave  a  Greek  title  3  to  the  earlier  works 
which  he  wrote  on  this  subject,  I  may  without  fear 
of  rashness  accept  the  great  orator  as  sufficient 
authority  for  the  name  of  the  art  which  he  pro- 

To  resume,  then,  rhetoric  (for  I  shall  now  use  the   6 
name  without   fear  of   captious   criticism)  is  in  my 
opinion  best  treated  under  the  three  following  heads, 
the  art,  the  artist  and  the  work.     The  art  is  that 
which  we  should  acquire  by  study,  and  is  the  art  of 



dicendi  scientia.  Artifex  est,  qui  percepit  hanc 
artem,  id  est,  orator,  cuius  est  summa  bene  dicere ; 
opus,  quod  efficitur  ab  artifice,  id  est,  bona  oratio. 
Haec  omnia  rursus  diducuntur  in  species  ;  sed  ilia 
sequentia  suo  loco,  nunc  quae  de  prima  parte  trac- 
tanda  sunt,  ordiar. 

XV.  Ante  omnia,  quid  sit  rhetorice.  Quae  finitur 
quidem  varie,  sed  quaestionem  habet  duplicem,  aut 
enim  de  qualitate  ipsius  rei  aut  de  comprehensione 
verborum  dissensio  est.  Prima  atque  praecipua 
opinionum  circa  hoc  differentia,  quod  alii  malos 
quoque  viros  posse  oratores  dici  putant ;  alii,  quorum 
nos  sententiae  accedimus,  nomen  hoc  artemque, 
de  qua  loquimur,  bonis  demum  tribui  volunt. 

2  Eorum    autem,   qui   dicendi   facultatem  a  maiore  ac 
magis    expetenda    vitae    laude    secernunt,    quidam 
rhetoricen   vim   tantum,  quidam   scientiam  sed  non 
virtutem,  quidam  usum,  quidam  artem  quidem  sed  a 
scientia   et  virtute  diiunctam,   quidam    etiam   pravi- 
tatem    quandam    artis,    id    est    KaKore^vtai',    nomina- 

3  verunt.      Hi  fere  aut  in  persuadendo  aut  in  dicendo 
apte  ad   persuadendum    positum    orandi  munus  sunt 
arbitrati.      Id  enim  fieri  potest  ab  eo  quoque,  qui  vir 
bonus    non    sit.       Est    igitur    frequentissimus    finis, 
rhetoricen   esse   vim    persuadendi.      Quod    ego   vim 
appello,    plerique    potestatem,    nonnulli    facultatem 
vocant ;  quae  res  ne  quid  adferat  ambiguitatis,  rim 

4  dico  Swa/iiv.      Haec  opinio  originem  ab  Isocrate  (si 


BOOK    II.  xiv.  5-xv.  4 

speaking  well.  The  artist  is  he  who  has  acquired  the 
art,  that  is  to  say,  he  is  the  orator  whose  task  it  is 
to  speak  well.  The  work  is  the  achievement  of 
the  artist,  namely  good  speaking.  Each  of  these 
three  general  divisions  is  in  its  turn  divided  into 
species.  Of  the  two  latter  divisions  I  shall  speak 
in  their  proper  place.  For  the  present  I  shall  pro- 
ceed to  a  discussion  of  the  first. 

XV.  The  first  question  which  confronts  us  is 
"  What  is  rhetoric  ?  "  Many  definitions  have  been 
given  ;  but  the  problem  is  really  twofold.  For  the 
dispute  turns  either  on  the  quality  of  the  thing 
itself  or  on  the  meaning  of  the  words  in  which  it 
is  defined.  The  first  and  chief  disagreement  on  the 
subject  is  found  in  the  fact  that  some  think  that 
even  bad  men  may  be  called  orators,  while  others, 
of  whom  I  am  one,  restrict  the  name  of  orator  and 
the  art  itself  to  those  who  are  good.  Of  those  who 
divorce  eloquence  from  that  yet  fairer  and  more  de- 
sirable title  to  renown,  a  virtuous  life,  some  call 
rhetoric  merely  a  power,  some  a  science,  but  not  a 
virtue,  some  a  practice,  some  an  art,  though  they  will 
not  allow  the  art  to  have  anything  in  common  with 
science  or  virtue,  while  some  again  call  it  a  perver- 
sion of  art  or  Ka/corexvia.  These  persons  have  as  a 
rule  held  that  the  task  of  oratory  lies  in  persuasion 
or  speaking  in  a  persuasive  manner :  for  this  is 
within  the  power  of  a  bad  man  no  less  than  a  good. 
Hence  we  get  the  common  definition  of  rhetoric  as 
the  power  of  persuading.  What  I  call  a  power, 
many  call  a  capacity,  and  some  a  faculty.  In  order 
therefore  that  there  may  be  no  misunderstanding  I 
will  say  that  by  power  I  mean  Swa/xis.  This  view 
is  derived  from  Isocrates,  if  indeed  the  treatise  on 



tamen  revera  Ars,  quae  circumfertur,  eius  est)  duxit. 
Qui,  cum  longe  sit  a  voluntate  infamantium  oratoris 
officia,  finem  artis  temere  comprehendit,  dicens  esse 
rhetoric-en  persuaclendi  opificem,  id  est  7rei$ous  Sr//^- 
ovpyov ;  neque  enim  mihi  permiserim  eadem  uti 
declinatione,  qua  Ennius  M.  Cethegum  Suadac 

5  meduUam  vocat.      Apud  Platonem  quoque  Gorgias  in 
libro,  qui  nomine  eius  inscriptus  est,,  idem  fere  dicit ; 
sed  hanc  Plato  illius  opinionem  vult  accipi  non  suam. 
Cicero  pluribus   locis    scripsit,  officium    oratoris   esse 

6  dicere  apposite  ad  persuadendum.      In  rhetoricis  etiam, 
quos  sine  dubio  ipse  non  probat,  finem  facit  persua- 
dere.      Verum    et    pecunia    persuadet    et    gratia    et 
auctoritas    dicentis    et    dignitas,    postremo    aspectus 
etiam  ipse  sine  voce,  quo  vel  recordatio  meritorum 
cuiusque    vel    facies    aliqua    miserabilis    vel     formae 

7  pulchritudo    sententiam    dictat.       Nam    et    Manium 
Aquilium    defendens     Antonius,    cum    scissa     veste 
cicatrices_,  quas  is  pro  patria  pectore  adverso  susce- 
piss^t,   osteridit,  non    orationis   habuit  fiduciam   sed 
oculis    populi    Romani    vim    attulit,   quern    illo    ipso 
aspectu  maxime  motum  in  hoc;  ut  absolveret  reum, 

8  creditum  est.      Servium  quidem  Galbam  miseratione 
sola,  qua  non  suos  modo  liberos  parvulos  in  contione 

1  This  treatise  is  lost.     It  may  have  been  the  work  of  the 
younger  Isocrates. 

2  Ann.    ix.    309   (Vahlen).     The   derivative  to   which    he 
objects  is  the  rare  word  suada.  3  Gorg.  453  A. 

•*  de  Inv.  I.  v.  fi,  de  Or.  i.  xxxi.   138. 


BOOK    II.  xv.  4-8 

rhetoric  l  which  circulates  under  his  name  is  really 
from  his  hand.  He,  although  far  from  agreeing 
with  those  whose  aim  is  to  disparage  the  duties  of 
an  orator,  somewhat  rashly  defined  rhetoric  as 
7ra$ot'5  Bri/jiiovp-yos,  the  "worker  of  persuasion":  for 
I  cannot  bring  myself  to  use  the  peculiar  derivative 
which  Ennius 2  applies  to  Marcus  Cethegus  in  the 
phrase  suadae  medulla,  the  "marrow  of  persuasion." 
Again  Gorgias,3  in  the  dialogue  of  Plato  that  takes  5 
its  title  from  his  name,  says  practically  the  same 
thing,  but  Plato  intends  it  to  be  taken  as  the  opinion 
of  Gorgias,  not  as  his  own.  Cicero  4  in  more  than 
one  passage  defined  the  duty  of  an  orator  as  "speak- 
ing in  a  persuasive  manner."  In  his  Rhetoricab  too,  6 
a  work  which  it  is  clear  gave  him  no  satisfaction,  he 
makes  the  end  to  be  persuasion.  But  many  other 
things  have  the  power  of  persuasion,  such  as  money, 
influence,  the  authority  and  rank  of  the  speaker,  or 
even  some  sight  unsupported  by  language,  when 
for  instance  the  place  of  words  is  supplied  by  the 
memory  of  some  individual's  great  deeds,  by  his 
lamentable  appearance  or  the  beauty  of  his  person. 
Thus  when  Antonius  in  the  course  of  his  defence  of  7 
Manius  Aquilius  tore  open  his  client's  robe  and  re- 
vealed the  honourable  scars  which  he  had  acquired 
while  facing  his  country's  foes,  he  relied  no  longer 
on  the  power  of  his  eloquence,  but  appealed  directly 
to  the  eyes  of  the  Roman  people.  And  it  is  believed 
that  they  were  so  profoundly  moved  by  the  sight  as 
to  acquit  the  accused.  Again  there  is  a  speech  of  8 
Cato,  to  mention  no  other  records,  which  informs  us 
that  Servius  Galba  escaped  condemnation  solely  by 

B  cp.  m.  i.  20  and  Cic.  de  Or.  I.  ii.  5.     The  work  in  question 
is  better  known  as  the  de  Inventione. 



produxerat,  sed  Galli  etiam  Sulpicii  filium  suis  ipse 
manibus  circumtulerat,  elapsum  esse,  cum  aliorum 
9  monumentis  turn  Catonis  oratione  testatum  est.  Et 
Phrynen  non  Hyperidis  actione,  quanquam  admira- 
bili,  sed  conspectu  corporis,  quod  ilia  speciosissimum 
alioqui  diducta  nudaverat  tunica,  putant  periculo 
liberatam.  Quae  si  omnia  persuadent,  non  est  hie, 

10  de   quo   locuti   sumus,  idoneus   finis.      Ideoque  dili- 
gentiores  sibi  sunt  visi,  qui,  cum  de  rhetorice  idem 
sentirent,  existimaverunt  earn  vim  dicendo   persua- 
dendi.       Quern    finem    Gorgias    in    eodem,    de    quo 
supra  diximus,  lil)ro,  velut  coactus  a  Socrate  facit ;  a 
quo  non  dissentit  Theodectes,  sive  ipsius  id  opus  est, 
quod  de  rhetorice  nomine   eius  inscribitur,  sive,  ut 
creditum    est,    Aristotelis,    in    quo    est,    finem    esse 
rhetorices  ducere  homines  dicendo  in  id,  quod  actor 

11  velit.      Sed  ne  hoc  quidem  satis  est  comprehensum  ; 
persuadent    enim    dicendo    vel    ducunt   in    id   quod 
volunt  alii  quoque,  ut  meretrices,  adulatores,  corrup- 
tores.      At  contra  non  persuadet  semper  orator  ;   ut 
interim   non   sit   proprius    hie  finis   eius,  interim   sit 
communis   cum   iis,    qui  ab    oratore    procul     absunt. 

12  Atqui  lion   mul turn  ab  hoc   fine   abest  Apollodorus, 
dicens   iudicialis    orationis    primum    et   super  omnia 
esse  persuadere  iudici  et  sententiam  eius  ducere  in 

1  Gorg.  p.  452  K. 


BOOK    II.  xv.  8-12 

the  pit}7  which  he  aroused  not  only  by  producing  his 
own  young  children  before  the  assembly,  but  by 
carrying  round  in  his  arms  the  son  of  Sulpicius 
Gallus.  So  also  according  to  general  opinion  Phryne  9 
was  saved  not  by  the  eloquence  of  Hyperides,  ad- 
mirable as  it  was,  but  by  the  sight  of  her  exquisite 
body,  which  she  further  revealed  by  drawing  aside 
her  tunic.  And  if  all  these  have  power  to  per- 
suade, the  end  of  oratory,  which  we  are  discussing, 
cannot  adequately  be  denned  as  persuasion.  Con-  10 
sequently  those  who,  although  holding  the  same 
general  view  of  rhetoric,  have  regarded  it  as  the 
power  of  persuasion  by  speaking,  pride  themselves  on 
their  greater  exactness  of  language.  This  definition 
is  given  by  Gorgias,  in  the  dialogue l  mentioned 
above,  under  compulsion  from  the  inexorable  logic  of 
Socrates.  Theodectes  agrees  with  him,  whether  the 
treatise  on  rhetoric  which  has  come  down  to  us 
under  his  name  is  really  by  him  or,  as  is  generally 
believed,  by  Aristotle.  In  that  work  the  end  of 
rhetoric  is  defined  as  the  leading  of  men  by  the 
power  of  speech  to  the  conclusioji  desired  by  the  orator. 
But  even  this  definition  is  not  sufficiently  compre-  11 
iiensive,  since  others  besides  orators  persuade  by 
speaking  or  lead  others  to  the  conclusion  desired,  as 
for  example  harlots,  flatterers  and  seducers.  On 
the  other  hand  the  orator  is  not  always  engaged  on 
persuasion,  so  that  sometimes  persuasion  is  not  his 
special  object,  while  sometimes  it  is  shared  by 
others  who  are  far  removed  from  being  orators.  And  12 
yet  Apollodorus  is  not  very  far  off  this  definition 
when  he  asserts  that  the  first  and  all-important  task 
of  forensic  oratory  is  to  persuade  the  judge  and  lead 
his  mind  to  the  conclusions  desired  by  the  speaker.  For 



id,  quod  velit ;   nam   et  ipse    oratorem  fortunae  sub- 
iicit,  ut,   si  non    persuaserit,  nomen  suum    retinere 

13  non    possit.       Quidam    recesserunt   ab   eventu,  sicut 
Aristoteles  dicit :  rhelorice  cst   vis  inveniendi  omnia  in 
orations  persuasibilia.      Qui    finis   et  illud   vitium,  de 
quo  supra  diximus,  habet  et  insuper  quod  nihil  nisi 
inventionem  complectitur,  quae  sine  elocutione  non 

14  est  oratio.      Hermagorae,  qui  finem  eius  esse  ait  per- 
suasibiliter  dicere,  et  aliis,  qui  eandem   sententiam 
non    iisdem  tantum    verbis   explicant   ac   finem   esse 
demonstrant  dicere   quae  oporteat  omnia  ad  persua- 
dendum,  satis  responsum    est,   cum  persuadere   non 

15  tantum  oratoris  esse    convicimus.       Addita  sunt  his 
alia   varie.       Quidam    enim    circa    res   omnes,  quidam 
circa    civiles    modo    versari     rhetoricen     putaverunt; 
quorum  verius  utrum  sit,  in  eo  loco,  qui   huius  quae- 

16  stionis  proprius  est,  dicam.      Omnia  subiecisse  oratori 
videtur  Aristoteles,  cum  dixit  vim   esse  videndi,  quid 
in  quaque  re  possit  esse  persuasibile.      Et  Patrocles,1 
qui  noil  quidem  adiicit  in  quaque  re,  sed  nihil  excipi- 
endo  idem  ostendit ;  vim  enim  vocat  inveniendi,  quod 
sit  in  oratione  persuasibile  ;  qui  fines  et  ipsi   solam 
complectuntur   inventionem.      Quod  vitium  fugiens 
Theodorus  vim   putat  inveniendi    et  eloquendi    cum 

17  ornatu  credibilia  in  omni  oratione.     Sed  cum  eodem 

1  latrocles,  B.     latrocles,  Radermachcr. 

1  Rhet.  i.  2. 

BOOK    II.  xv.  12-17 

even  Apollodorus  makes  the  orator  the  sport  of  for- 
tune by  refusing  him  leave  to  retain  his  title  if  he 
fails  to  persuade.  Some  on  the  other  hand  pay  no  13 
attention  to  results,  as  for  example  Aristotle,1  who 
says  "  rhetoric  is  the  power  of  discovering  all  means  of 
persuading  by  speech."  This  definition  has  not  merely 
the  fault  already  mentioned,  but  the  additional  de- 
fect of  including  merely  the  power  of  invention, 
which  without  style  cannot  possibly  constitute 
oratory.  Hermagoras,  who  asserts  that  its  end  is  to  14 
speak  persuasively,  and  others  who  express  the  same 
opinion,  though  in  different  words,  and  inform  us 
that  the  end  is  to  say  everything  which  ought  to  be 
said  with  a  view  to  persuasion,  have  been  sufficiently 
answered  above,  when  I  proved  that  persuasion  was 
not  the  privilege  of  the  orator  alone.  Various  additions  1ft 
have  been  made  to  these  definitions.  For  some  hold 
that  rhetoric  is  concerned  with  everything,  while 
some  restrict  its  activity  to  politics.  The  question 
as  to  which  of  these  views  is  the  nearer  to  the  truth 
shall  be  discussed  later  in  its  appropriate  place.  Aris-  16 
totle  seems  to  have  implied  that  the  sphere  of  the 
orator  was  all-inclusive  when  he  defined  rhetoric  as 
the  power  to  detect  every  element  in  any  given  subject 
which  might  conduce  to  persuasion  ;  so  too  does  Patro- 
cles  who  omits  the  words  in  any  given  subject,  but 
since  he  excludes  nothing,  shows  that  his  view  is 
identical.  For  he  defines  rhetoric  as  the  power  to 
discover  whatever  is  persuasive  in  speech.  These  defini- 
tions like  that  quoted  above  include  no  more  than 
the  power  of  invention  alone.  Theodorus  avoids  this 
fault  and  holds  that  it  is  the  power  to  discover  and  to 
utter  forth  in  elegant  language  whatever  is  credible  in 
every  subject  of  oratory.  But,  while  others  besides  17 



modo  credibilia  quo  persuasibilia  etiam  non  orator 
inveniat,  adiiciendo  in  omni  oralione  magis  quam 
superiores  concedit  scelera  quoque  suadentibus  pul- 

18  cherrimae  rei  nomen.      Gorgias  apud  Platonem  sua- 
dendi   se   artificem  in  iudiciis  et  aliis  coetibus  esse 
ait,  de  iustis  quoque  et  iniustis  tractare  ;  cui  Socrates 

19  persuadendi,  non  docendi  concedit  facultatem.      Qui 
vero   non   omnia    subiiciebant    oratori,   sollicitius    ac 
verbosius,  ut  necesse  erat,  adhibuerunt  discrimina ; 
quorum  fuit  Ariston,  Critolai   Peripatetic!  discipulus, 
cuius  hie  finis  est,  scientia  videndi  et  agendi  in  quae- 
stionibus  civilibus  per   orationem  popularis  persuasionis. 

20  Hie    scientiam,    quia     Peripateticus     est,    non,    ut 
Stoici,   virtutis  loco  ponit ;    popularem   aut.ern   coin- 
prehendendo  persuasionem  etiam  contumeliosus  est 
adversus  artem  orandi,  quam  nihil  putat  doctis  per- 
suasuram.      Illud  de  omnibus,  qui  circa  civiles  demurn 
quaestiones    oratorem    iudicant    versari,    dictum    sit, 
excludi   ab   his   plurima   oratoris   officia,   illam   certe 
laudativam   totam,   quae   est   rhetorices   pars    tertia. 

21  Cautius  Theodorus  Gadareus,  ut  iam  ad  eos  veniamus, 
qui  artem  quidem  esse  earn  sed  non  virtutem  puta- 
verunt.      Ita  enim  dicit  (ut  ipsis  eorum  verbis  utar, 
qui   haec  ex    Graeco  transtulerunt),  Ars  inventrix  et 
iudicatrix  et  nuntiatrix  decenti  ornatu  secundum  mensio- 
nem    eius,    quod    in    quoque  potest  sumi  persuasibile,  in 

22  inateria  civili.      Itemque   Cornelius  Celsus,  qui  finem 

1  Gorg.  454  B. 

BOOK    II.  xv.  17-22 

orators  may  discover  what  is  credible  as  well  as  per- 
suasive, by  adding  the  words  in  every  subject  he,  to  a 
greater  extent  than  the  others,  concedes  the  fairest 
name  in  all  the  world  to  those  who  use  their  gifts  as 
an  incitement  to  crime.  Plato  makes  Gorgias  ]  say  18 
that  he  is  a  master  of  persuasion  in  the  law-courts 
and  other  assemblies,  and  that  his  themes  are  justice 
and  injustice,  while  in  reply  Socrates  allows  him  the 
power  of  persuading,  but  not  of  teaching.  Those  19 
who  refused  to  make  the  sphere  of  oratory  all-inclu- 
sive, have  been  obliged  to  make  somewhat  forced 
and  long-winded  distinctions  :  among  these  I  may 
mention  Ariston,  the  pupil  of  the  Peripatetic  Crito- 
laus,  who  produced  the  following  definition,  ''Rhetoric 
is  the  science  of  seeing  and  uttering  what  ought  to  be 
said  on  political  questions  in  language  that  is  likely  to 
prove  persuasive  to  the  people."  Being  a  Peripatetic  he  20 
regards  it  as  a  science,  not,  like  the  Stoics,  as  a 
virtue,  while  in  adding  the  words  "  likely  to  prove 
persuasive  to  the  people"  he  inflicts  a  positive  insult  on 
oratory,  in  implying  that  it  is  not  likely  to  persuade  the 
learned.  The  same  criticism  will  apply  to  all  those  who 
restrict  oratory  to  political  questions,  for  they  ex- 
clude thereby  a  large  number  of  the  duties  of  an 
orator,  as  for  example  panegyric,  the  third  depart- 
ment of  oratory,  which  is  entirely  ignored.  Turning  21 
to  those  who  regard  rhetoric  as  an  art,  but  not  as  a 
virtue,  we  find  that  Theodorus  of  Gadara  is  more 
cautious.  For  he  says  (I  quote  the  words  of  his 
translators),  "  rhetoric  is  the  art  which  discovers  and 
judges  and  expresses,  with  an  elegance  duly  proportioned 
to  the  importance  of  all  such  elements  of  persuasion  as 
may  exist  in  any  subject  in  the  Jield  of  politics"  Simi-  22 
larly  Cornelius  Celsus  defines  the  end  of  rhetoric  as 



rhetorices  ait  dicere  persuasibiliter  in  dubia  civili 
materia.  Quibus  sunt  non  dissimiles,  qui  ab  aliis 
traduntur  ;  qualis  est  ille,  Vis  videndi  et  eloquendi  de 
rebus  civilibus  subieciis  sibi  cum  quadam  persuasions  et 
quodam  corporis  habilu  et  corum,  quae  dicet,  pronuntia- 

23  tione.      Mille    alia,  sed    ant    eadem    aut    ex    eisdem 
composita  ;  quibus  item,  cum  de  materia  rhetorices 
dicendum  erit,  respondebimus.      Quidam  earn  neque 
vim  neque  scientiam  neque  artem   putaverunt,  sed 
Critolaus    usum    dicendi   (nam    hoc   TpLfSrj  significat), 

24  Athenaeus    fallendi    artem.      Plerique    autem,    dum 
pauca  ex   Gorgia    Platonis   a  prioribus   imperite  ex- 
cerpta  legere  content!  neque  hoc  totum  neque  alia 
eius  volumina  evolvunt,  in  maximum  errorem  inci- 
derunt,   creduntque    eum   in   hac   esse   opinione,   ut 
rhetoricen  non  artem  sed  peritiam  quandam  gratiae 

25  ac  voluptatis  existimet ;  et  alio  loco  civilitatis   par- 
ticulae   simulacrum    et  quartam   partem  adulationis, 
quod  duas  partes  civilitatis  corpori  adsignet,  medici- 
nam    et    quam    interpretantur    exercitatricem,    duas 
animo,  legalem  atque  iustitiam  ;  adulationem  autem 
medicinae    vocet    cocorum    artificium,    exercitatricis 
mangonum,  qui  colorem  fuco  et  verum  robur  inani 
sagina    mentiantur,     legalis     cavillatricem,    iustitiae 

26  rhetoricen.      Quae  omnia  sunt  quidem  scripta  in  hoc 
libro  dictaque  a  Socrate,  cuius  persona  videtur  Plato 

1  Gorg.  4(J2c.         2  ib.  463D. 

3  ib.  4(3  IB.  4  ib.  464  B  405  E. 


BOOK    II.  xv.  22-26 

lo  speak  persuasively  on  any  doubtful  subject  within  the 
Jield  of  politics.  Similar  definitions  are  given  by 
others,  such  for  instance  as  the  following  : —  "  rhetoric 
is  the  power  of  judging  and  holding  forth  on  such  poli- 
tical subjects  as  come  before  it  with  a  certain  persuasive- 
ness, a  certain  action  of  the  body  and  delivery  of  the 
words."  There  are  countless  other  definitions,  23 
either  identical  with  this  or  composed  of  the  same 
elements,  which  I  shall  deal  with  when  I  come  to 
the  questions  concerned  with  the  subject  matter  of 
rhetoric.  Some  regard  it  as  neither  a  power,  a 
science  or  an  art ;  Critolaus  calls  it  the  practice  of 
speaking  (for  this  is  the  meaning  of  rpi/3?/), 
Athenaeus  styles  it  the  art  of  deceiving,  while  the  24 
majority,  content  with  reading  a  few  passages  from 
the  Gorgias  of  Plato,  unskilfully  excerpted  by 
earlier  writers,  refrain  from  studying  that  dialogue 
and  the  remainder  of  Plato's  writings,  and  thereby 
fall  into  serious  error.  For  they  believe  that  in 
Plato's  view  rhetoric  was  not  an  art,  but  a  certain 
adroitness  in  the  production  of  delight  and  gratijlca- 
tion,1  or  with  reference  to  another  passage  the  25 
shadow  of  a  small  part  of  politics*  and  the  fourth  de- 
partment of  flattery.  For  Plato  assigns  3  two  depart- 
ments of  politics  to  the  body,  namely  medicine  and 
gymnastic,  and  two  to  the  soul,  namely  law  and 
justice,  while  he  styles  the  art  of  cookery  4  a  form  of 
flattery  of  medicine,  the  art  of  the  slave-dealer  a 
flattery  of  gymnastic,  for  they  produce  a  false  com- 
plexion by  the  use  of  paint  and  a  false  robustness 
by  puffing  them  out  with  fat  :  sophistry  he  calls  a 
dishonest  counterfeit  of  legal  science,  and  rhetoric  of 
justice.  All  these  statements  occur  in  the  Gorgiasand  26 
are  uttered  by  Socrates  who  appears  to  be  the  mouth- 



significare  quid  sentiat ;  sed  alii  sunt  eius  sermones 
ad  coarguendos,  qui  contra  disputant,  compositi,  quos 
eAeyKTiKov's  vocant,  alii  ad  praecipiendum,  qui  Soy//a- 

27  TLKOL   appellantur.      Socrates    autem   seu    Plato   earn 
quidem,    quae    turn    exercebatur,    rhetoricen    talem 
putat,  nam  et  dicit   his  verbis  TOVTOV  TOV  rpoTrov,  ov 
tyxcis  7roA.n-eveo-$e,  veram  autem  et  honestam  intelligit. 
Itaque   disputatio  ilia  contra  Gorgian  ita  clauditur, 
OVKOVV   avayKr)  TOV  prjTOptKOV  OLKU.IOV  tlvai,  TOV  8e  Sucaiov 

28  (3ov\eo-@ai  Sucaia  Trparreiv ;  Ad  quod  ille  quidem  con- 
ticescit,  sed  sermonem  suscipit  Polus  iuvenili  calore 
inconsideratior,    contra    quem    ilia    de    simulacro    et 
adulatione  dicuntur.     Turn  Callicles  adhuc  concita- 
tior,  qui  tamen  ad  hanc   perducitur   clausulam,  TOV 
/jL€\\ovTa  op$a>5  prjTopiKov  t(T€o~6ai,  OLKO.LOV  avopa  Set  cum 
Kat  eiria-TrjfLova  TWV  Si/cauov ;  ut  appareat,  Platoni  non 
rhetoricen  videri  malum,  sed  earn  veram  nisi  iusto  ac 

29  bono   non    contingere.      Adhuc    autem    in    Phaedro 
manifestius    facit,    hanc    artem    consummari     citra 
iustitiae  quoque   scientiam  non   posse ;   cui  opinioni 
nos  quoque  accedimus.     An  aliter  defensionem  So- 
cratis  et  eorum,   qui  pro  patria  ceciderant,  laudem 

30  scripsisset?  quae  certe  sunt  oratoris  opera.     Sed  in 
illud   hominum  genus,  quod   facilitate  dicendi  male 
utebatur,  invectus  est.      Nam  et  Socrates  inhonestam 

1  500  c.  2  460  c.  3  508  c. 

4  261  A-273  E.         6  Menexenus. 

BOOK    II.  xv.  26-30 

piece  of  the  views  held  by  Plato.  But  some  of  his 
dialogues  were  composed  merely  to  refute  his 
opponents  and  are  styled  ref illative,  while  others  are 
for  the  purpose  of  teaching  and  are  called  doctrinal. 
Now  it  is  only  rhetoric  as  practised  in  their  own  day  27 
that  is  condemned  by  Plato  or  Socrates,  for  he 
speaks  of  it  as  "  the  manner  in  which  you  engage  in 
public  affairs  " 1  :  rhetoric  in  itself  he  regards  as  a 
genuine  and  honourable  thing,  and  consequently  the 
controversy  with  Gorgias  ends  with  the  words,  "  The 
rhetorician  therefore  must  be  just  and  the  just  man 
desirous  to  do  what  is  just." 2  To  this  Gorgias  28 
makes  no  reply,  but  the  argument  is  taken  up  by 
Polus,  a  hot-headed  and  headstrong  young  fellow, 
and  it  is  to  him  that  Socrates  makes  his  remarks 
about  "  shadows "  and  "forms  of  flattery."  Then 
Callicles,3  who  is  even  more  hot-headed,  intervenes, 
but  is  reduced  to  the  conclusion  that  "he  who  would 
truly  be  a  rhetorician  ought  to  be  just  and  possess  a 
knowledge  of  justice."  It  is  clear  therefore  that 
Plato  does  not  regard  rhetoric  as  an  evil,  but  holds 
that  true  rhetoric  is  impossible  for  any  save  a  just 
arid  good  man.  In  the  Phaedrus  4  he  makes  it  even  29 
clearer  that  the  complete  attainment  of  this  art  is 
impossible  without  the  knowledge  of  justice,  an 
opinion  in  which  I  heartily  concur.  Had  this  not 
been  his  view,  would  he  have  ever  written  the 
Apology  of  Socrates  or  the  Funeral  Oration 5  in 
praise  of  those  who  had  died  in  battle  for  their 
country,  both  of  them  works  falling  within  the 
sphere  of  oratory.  It  was  against  the  class  of  men  30 
who  employed  their  glibness  of  speech  for  evil  pur- 
poses that  he  directed  his  denunciations.  Similarly 
Socrates  thought  it  incompatible  with  his  honour  to 



sibi  credidit  orationem,  quam  ei  Lysias  reo  compo- 
suerat ;  et  turn  maxime  scribere  litigatoribus,  quae 
illi  pro  se  ipsi  dicerent,  erat  moris,  atque  ita  iuri,  quo 
non  licebat  pro  altero  agere,  fraus  adhibebatur. 

31  Doctores    quoque    eius    artis    parum    idonei    Platoni 
videbantur,  qui  rhetoricen  a  iustitia    separarent    et 
veris  credibilia  praeferrent ;  nam  id  quoque  dicit  in 

32  Phaedro.     Consensisse  autem  illis  superioribus  videri 
potest  etiam  Cornelius  Celsus,  cuius  liaec  verba  sunt : 
Orator  simile  tantum  veri  petit.       Deinde  paulo  post : 
Non    enim    bona    conscientia    sed    victoria    litigantis    est 
praemium.      Quae  si  vera  essent,  pessimorum   homi- 
num  foret,  haec  tarn  perniciosa  nocentissimis  moribus 
dare  instrumenta  et  nequitiam  praeceptis  adiuvare. 
Sed  illi  rationem  opinionis  suae  viderint. 

33  Nos   autem  ingress!  formare  perfectum  oratorem, 
quern  in  primis  esse  virum  bonum  volumus,  ad  eos. 
qui  de  hoc  opere  melius  sentiunt,  revertamur.      Rhe- 
toricen autem  quidam  eandem  civilitatem  esse  iudi- 
caverunt ;  Cicero  scientiae  civilis  partem  vocat  (civilis 
autem    scientia    idem  quod    sapientia    est) ;   quidam 

34  eandem  philosophiam,  quorum  est  Isocrates.      Huic 
eius  substantiae  maxime  conveniet  finitio,  rhetoricen 
esse    bene    dicendi     scientiam.      Nam    et    orationis 
omnes  virtutes  semel  complectitur  et  protinus  etiam 
mores  oratoris,  cum  bene  dicere  non  possit  nisi  bonus. 

35  Idem  valet    Chrysippi    finis   ille   ductus   a    Cleanthe 

1  267  A,  with  special  reference  to  Tisias  and  Gorgias. 

2  de  Inv.  i.  v.  6. 

BOOK    II.  xv.  30-35 

make  use  of  the  speech  which  Lysias  composed  for 
his  defence,  although  it  was  the  usual  practice  in 
those  days  to  write  speeches  for  the  parties  con- 
cerned to  speak  in  the  courts  on  their  own  behalf, 
a  device  designed  to  circumvent  the  law  which  for- 
bade the  employment  of  advocates.  Further  the  31 
teachers  of  rhetoric  were  regarded  by  Plato  as  quite 
unsuited  to  their  professed  task.  For  they  divorced 
rhetoric  from  justice  and  preferred  plausibility  to 
truth,  as  he  states  in  the  Pkaedri/s.1  Cornelius  Celsus  32 
seems  to  have  agreed  with  these  early  rhetoricians, 
for  he  writes  "The  orator  only  aims  at  the  semblance 
of  truth,"  and  again  a  little  later  "  The  reward  of 
the  party  to  a  suit  is  not  a  good  conscience,  but  vic- 
tory." If  this  were  true,  only  the  worst  of  men 
would  place  such  dangerous  weapons  at  the  disposal 
of  criminals  or  employ  the  precepts  of  their  art  for 
the  assistance  of  wickedness.  However  I  will  leave 
those  who  maintain  these  views  to  consider  what 
ground  they  have  for  so  doing. 

For  my  part,  I  have  undertaken  the  task  of  mould-  33 
ing  the  ideal  orator,  and  as  my  first  desire  is  that  he 
should  be  a  good  man,  1  will  return  to  those  who 
have  sounder  opinions  on  the  subject.  Some  how- 
ever identify  rhetoric  with  politics,  Cicero  2  calls  it  a 
department  of  the  science  of  politics  (and  science  of 
politics  and  philosophy  are  identical  terms),  while 
others  again  call  it  a  branch  of  philosophy,  among 
them  Isocrates.  The  definition  which  best  suits  its  34 
real  character  is  that  which  makes  rhetoric  the  science 
of  speaking  well.  For  this  definition  includes  all  the 
virtues  of  oratory  and  the  character  of  the  orator  as 
well,  since  no  man  can  speak  well  who  is  not  good 
himself.  The  definition  given  by  Chrysippus,  who  35 



scientia  recte  dicendi.  Sunt  plures  eiusdem,  sed  ad 
alias  quaestiones  magis  pertinent.  Idem  sentit  et 
finis  hoc  modo  comprehensus,  persuadere  quod 

36  oporteat,   nisi   quod    artem   ad    exitum   alligat.      At 
bene    Areus    dicere     secundum    virtutem    orationis. 
Excludunt   a   rhetorice   malos   et   illi,  qui   scientiam 
civilium  officiorum  earn  putaverunt,  si  scientiam  vir- 
tutem iudicant ;  sed  anguste  intra  civiles  quaestiones 
coercent.      Albutius,    non   obscurus   professor  atque 
auctor,   scientiam   bene  dicendi   esse   consentit,   sed 
exceptionibus    peccat   adiiciendo   circa   civiles   quae- 
stiones et  credibiliter ;  quarum  utrique  iam  respon- 

37  sum    est.      Probabilis    et    illi    voluntatis,    qui    recte 
sentire  et  dicere  rhetorices  putaverunt. 

Hi  sunt  fere  fines  maxime  illustres  et  de  quibus 
praecipue  disputatur.  Nam  omnes  quidem  persequi 
neque  attinet  neque  possum,  cum  pravum  quoddam, 
ut  arbitror,  studium  circa  scriptores  artium  extiterit, 
nihil  eisdem  verbis,  quae  prior  aliquis  occupasset, 

38  finiendi,  quae   ambitio   procul  aberit  a  me.     Dicam 
enim  non  utique  quae  invenero  sed  quae  placebunt, 
sicut  hoc,  rhetoricen  esse  bene  dicendi   scientiam ; 

BOOK    II.   xv.  35-38 

derived  it  from  Cleanthes,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  the 
science  of  speaking  rightly,  amounts  to  the  same  thing. 
The  same  philosopher  also  gives  other  definitions, 
but  they  concern  problems  of  a  different  character 
from  that  on  which  we  are  now  engaged.  Another 
definition  defines  oratory  as  the  power  of  persuading 
men  to  do  what  ought  to  be  done,  and  yields  practically 
the  same  sense  save  that  it  limits  the  art  to  the  result 
which  it  produces.  Areus  again  defines  it  well  as  36 
speaking  according  to  the  excellence  of  speech.  Those  who 
regard  it  as  the  science  of  political  obligations,  also 
exclude  men  of  bad  character  from  the  title  of  orator, 
if  by  science  they  mean  virtue,  but  restrict  it  over- 
much by  confining  it  to  political  problems.  Albutius, 
a  distinguished  author  and  professor  of  rhetoric, 
agrees  that  rhetoric  is  the  science  of  speaking  well, 
but  makes  a  mistake  in  imposing  restrictions  by  the 
addition  of  the  words  on  political  questions  and  with 
credibility ;  with  both  of  these  restrictions  I  have 
already  dealt.  Finally  those  critics  who  hold  that  37 
the  aim  of  rhetoric  is  to  think  and  speak  rightly,  were 
on  the  correct  track. 

These  are  practically  all  the  most  celebrated  and 
most  discussed  definitions  of  rhetoric.  It  would  be 
both  irrelevant  and  beyond  my  power  to  deal  with  all. 
For  I  strongly  disapprove  of  the  custom  which  has 
come  to  prevail  among  writers  of  text-books  of  refusing 
to  define  anything  in  the  same  terms  as  have  been 
employed  by  some  previous  writer.  I  will  have 
nothing  to  do  with  such  ostentation.  What  I  say  38 
will  not  necessarily  be  my  own  invention,  but  it  will 
be  what  I  believe  to  be  the  right  view,  as  for  instance 
that  oratory  is  the  science  of  speaking  well.  For 
when  the  most  satisfactory  definition  has  been 



cum  reperto  quod  est  optimum,  qui  quaerit  aliud, 
peius  velit. 

His  approbatis,  simul  manifestum  est  illud  quoque, 
quern  finem  vel  quid  summum  et  ultimum  habeat 
rhetorice,  quod  Te'Aos  dicitur,  ad  quod  omnis  ars 
tendit ;  nam  si  est  ipsa  bene  dicendi  scientia,  finis 
eius  et  summum  est  bene  dicere. 

XVI.  Sequitur  quaestio,  an  utilis  rhetorice.  Nam 
quidam  vehementer  in  earn  invehi  solent,  et,  quod 
sit  indignissimum,  in  accusationem  orationis  utuntur 

2  orandi  viribus  :  eloquentiam  esse,  quae  poenis  eripiat 
scelestos,  cuius  fraude  damnentur  interim  boni,  con- 
silia  ducantur  in  peius,  nee  seditiones  modo  turbae- 
que  populares  sed  bella  etiam  inexpiabilia  excitentur  ; 
cuius  denique  turn  maximus  sit  usus,  cum  pro  falsis 

3  contra  veritatem  valet.      Nam   et   Socrati   obiiciunt 
comici  docere  eum,  quomodo  peiorem  causam  melio- 
rem  faciat,  et  contra  Tisian  et  Gorgian  similia  dicit 

4  polliceri  Plato.      Et  his  adiiciunt  exempla  Graecorum 
Romanorumque   et    enumerant,   qui    perniciosa    non 
singulis   tantum   sed    rebus    etiam    publicis   usi    elo- 
quentia  turbaverint  civitatium  status  vel  everterint, 
eoque    et    Lacedaemoniorum    civitate    expulsam    et 
Athenis  quoque,  ubi  actor  movere  adfectus  vetabatur, 

5  velut  recisam  orandi  potestatem.      Quo  quidem  modo 
nee  duces  erunt  utiles  nee  magistratus  nee  medicina 

BOOK    II.  xv.  38-xvi.  5 

found,  he  who  seeks  another,  is  merely  looking  for  a 
worse  one. 

Thus  much  being  admitted  we  are  now  in 
a  position  to  see  clearly  what  is  the  end,  the 
highest  aim,  the  ultimate  goal  of  rhetoric,  that  re'Aos 
in  fact  which  every  art  must  possess.  For  if  rhetoric 
is  the  science  of  speaking  well,  its  end  and  highest 
aim  is  to  speak  well. 

XVI.  There  follows  the  question  as  to  whether 
rhetoric  is  useful.  Some  are  in  the  habit  of 
denouncing  it  most  violently  and  of  shamelessly 
employing  the  powers  of  oratory  to  accuse  oratory 
itself.  "It  is  eloquence"  they  say  "that  snatches  2 
criminals  from  the  penalties  of  the  law,  eloquence 
that  from  time  to  time  secures  the  condemna- 
tion of  the  innocent  and  leads  deliberation  astray, 
eloquence  -that  stirs  up  not  merely  sedition  and 
popular  tumult,  but  wars  beyond  all  expiation,  and 
that  is  most  effective  when  it  makes  falsehood  prevail 
over  the  truth."  The  comic  poets  even  accuse  3 
Socrates  of  teaching  how  to  make  the  worse  cause 
seem  the  better,  while  Plato  says  that  Gorgias  and 
Tisias  made  similar  professions.  And  to  these  they  4 
add  further  examples  drawn  from  the  history  of 
Rome  and  Greece,  enumerating  all  those  who  used 
their  pernicious  eloquence  not  merely  against  indi- 
viduals but  against  whole  states  and  threw  an  ordered 
commonwealth  into  a  state  of  turmoil  or  even  brought 
it  to  utter  ruin  ;  and  they  point  out  that  for  this 
very  reason  rhetoric  was  banished  from  Sparta,  while 
its  powers  were  cut  down  at  Athens  itself  by  the  fact 
that  an  orator  was  forbidden  to  stir  the  passions  of 
his  audience.  On  the  showing  of  these  critics  not  only  5 
orators  but  generals,  magistrates,  medicine  and  philo- 


nee  denique  ipsa  sapientia.  Nam  et  dux  Flaminius 
et  Gracchi,  Saturnini,  Glauciae  magistratus,  et 
in  medicis  venena  et  in  his,  qui  philosophorum 
nomine  male  utuntur,  gravissima  nonnunquarn  flagitia 

6  deprehensa    sunt.       Cibos    aspernemur ;     attulerunt 
saepe  valetudinis  causas.      Nunquam  tecta  subeamus  ; 
super  habitantes  aliquando  procumbunt.      Non  fabri- 
cetur  militi   gladius ;   potest  uti   eodem   ferro  latro. 
Quis  nescit,  ignes,  aquas,  sine  quibus  nulla  sit  vita, 
et  (ne  terrenis  imrnorer)  solem  lunamque,  praecipua 
siderum,  aliquando  et  nocere  ? 

7  Num    igitur    negabitur    deformem    Pyrrhi     pacem 
caecus   ille    Appius   dicendi    viribus    diremisse  ?    aut 
non     divina    M.    Tulli    eloquentia    et    contra    leges 
agrarias   popularis  fuit   et  Catilinae  fregit  audaciam 
et  supplicationes,  qui  maximus  honor  victoribus  bello 

8  ducibus   datur,   in  toga  meruit ':     Nonne   perterritos 
militum  animos  frequenter  a  metu  revocat  oratio  et 
tot  pugnandi  pericula  ineuntibus  laudem  vita  potio- 
rem  esse  persuadet  ?     Neque  vero  me  Lacedaernonii 
atque    Athenienses    magis    moverint   quarn    populus 
Romanus,    apud    quern     surnma     semper     oratoribus 

9  dignitas  fuit.  Equidem  nee  urbium  conditores  reor 
aliter  effecturos  fuisse  ut  vaga  ilia  multitudo  coiret 
in  populos,  nisi  docta  voce  commota ;  nee  legum 
repertores  sine  summa  vi  orandi  consecutos,  ut  se 

1  i.e.   though  denouncing  laws  which  would  naturally  be 


BOOK    II.  xvi.  5-9 

sopby  itself  will  all  be  useless.  For  Flaminius  was  a 
general,  while  men  such  as  the  Gracchi,  Saturninus 
and  Glaucia  were  magistrates.  Doctors  have  been 
caught  using  poisons,and  those  who  falsely  assume  the 
name  of  philosopher  have  occasionally  been  detected 
in  the  gravest  crimes.  Let  us  give  up  eating,  it  t 
often  makes  us  ill ;  let  us  never  go  inside  houses, 
for  sometimes  they  collapse  on  their  occupants ; 
let  never  a  sword  be  forged  for  a  soldier,  since 
it  might  be  used  by  a  robber.  And  who  does 
not  realise  that  fire  and  water,  both  necessities  of 
life,  and,  to  leave  mere  earthly  things,  even  the  sun 
and  moon,  the  greatest  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  are 
occasionally  capable  of  doing  harm. 

On  the  other  hand  will  it  be  denied  that  it  was   " 
by  his  gift  of  speech  that  Appius  the  Blind  broke 
off  the  dishonourable  peace  which  was  on  the  point 
of   beincr    concluded   with    Pvrrhus  ?     Did    not    the 

~  • 

divine  eloquence  of  Cicero  win  popular  applause 
even  when  he  denounced  the  Agrarian  laws,1  did  it 
not  crush  the  audacious  plots  of  Catiline  and  win, 
while  he  still  wore  the  garb  of  civil  life,  the  highest 
honour  that  can  be  conferred  on  a  victorious  general, 
a  public  thanksgiving  to  heaven  ?  Has  not  oratory  S 
often  revived  the  courage  of  a  panic-stricken  army 
and  persuaded  the  soldier  faced  by  all  the  perils  of 
war  that  glorv  is  a  fairer  thing  than  life  itself?  Xor 
shall  the  history  of  Sparta  and  Athens  move  me 
more  than  that  of  the  Roman  people,  who  have 
always  held  the  orator  in  highest  honour.  Never  in  9 
my  opinion  would  the  founders  of  cities  have  in- 
duced their  unsettled  multitudes  to  form  communi- 
ties had  they  not  moved  them  by  the  magic  of  their 
eloquence  :  never  without  the  highest  gifts  of  oratory 



10  ipsi  homines  ad  servitutem  iuris  astringerent.      Quin 
ipsa  vitae    praecepta,   etiamsi   natura   sunt    honesta. 
plus   tamen   ad    formandas   mentes   valent,  quotiens 
pulchritudinem    rerum    claritas    orationis    illuminat. 
Quare,    etiamsi    in    utramque     partem    valent    arma 
facundiae,  non  est  tamen  aequum  id  haberi  malum, 
quo  bene  uti  licet. 

1 1  Verum    haec    apud    eos    forsitan    quaerantur,    qui 
summam  rhetorices  ad  persuadendi  vim  rettulerunt. 
Si  vero  est  bene  dicendi   scientia,  quern  nos  finem 
sequimur,  ut  sit   orator  in   primis  vir  bonus,  utilem 

12  certe   esse   earn   confitendum  est.      Et   hercule  deus 
ille     princeps,    parens    rerum    fabricatorque    mundi, 
nullo    magis     hominem     separavit     a    ceteris,    quae 
quidem   mortalia    essent,   animalibus,   quam    dicendi 

13  facultate.      Nam  corpora  quidem  magnitudine,  viri- 
bus,  firmitate,  patientia,  velocitate  praestantiora   in 
illis  mutis   videmus,  eadem  minus    egere   acquisitae 
extrinsecus  opis.      Xam  et  ingredi  citius  et  pasci  et 
tranare  aquas  citra  docentem  natura  ipsa  sciunt.      Et 

14  pleraque  contra  frigus  ex  suo  corpore  vestiuntur,  et 
arma  iis  ingenita  quaedam   et  ex  obvio  fere  victus, 
circa  quae  omnia  multus   hominibus  labor  est.      Ra- 
tionem    igitur  nobis  praecipuam    dedit   eiusque   nos 

15  socios  esse  cum  dis  immortalibus  voluit.      Sed    ipsa 
ratio  neque  tarn  nos  iuvaret  neque  tarn  esset  in  nobis 
manifesta,  nisi,  quae  concepissemus  mente,  promere 
etiam  loquendo  possemus,  quod  magis  deesse  ceteris 


BOOK    II.  xvi.  9-15 

would  the  great  legislators  have  constrained  man- 
kind to  submit  themselves  to  the  yoke  of  law.  Nay,  10 
even  the  principles  which  should  guide  our  life, 
however  fair  they  may  be  by  nature,  yet  have  greater 
power  to  mould  the  mind  to  virtue,  when  the  beauty 
of  things  is  illumined  by  the  splendour  of  eloquence. 
Wherefore,  although  the  weapons  of  oratory  may 
be  used  either  for  good  or  ill,  it  is  unfair  to  regard 
that  as  an  evil  which  can  be  employed  for  good. 

These   problems,  however,  may  be  left  to  those  11 
who  hold  that  rhetoric  is  the  power  to  persuade.     If 
our  definition  of  rhetoric  as  the  science  of  speaking 
well  implies    that  an   orator  must  be  a  good  man, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  about  its  usefulness.      And  12 
in  truth   that  god,  who  was  in  the    beginning,  the 
father  of  all  things  and  the  architect  of  the  universe, 
distinguished    man  from    all    other   living  creatures 
that    are    subject  to   death,  by  nothing  more  than 
this,  that  he  gave  him  the  gift  of  speech.      For  as  13 
regards  physical   bulk,  strength,  robustness,  endur- 
ance or  speed,  man  is  surpassed  in  certain  cases  by 
dumb  beasts,  who  also  are  far  more  independent  of 
external  assistance.     They  know  by  instinct  without 
need  of  any  teacher  how  to  move  rapidly,  to  feed 
themselves  and  swim.      Many  too  have  their  bodies   14 
clothed   against   cold,  possess   natural  weapons  and 
have    not    to  search    for  their   food,  whereas  in   all 
these   respects   man's   life    is    full  of  toil.      Reason 
then  was  the   greatest  gift  of  the  Almighty,  who 
willed  that  we  should  share  its  possession  with  the 
immortal  gods.      But  reason  by  itself  would  help  us  15 
but  little  and  would  be  far  less  evident  in  us,  had 
we  not  the  power  to  express  our  thoughts  in  speech ; 
for  it  is  the  lack  of  this  power  rather  than  thought 



animalibus  quam  intellectum  et  cogitationem  quan- 

16  dam    vidernus.       Nam    et    mollire    cubilia    et    nidos 
texere    et    educare    fetus   et  excludere,  quin   etiam 
reponere  in  hiemem  alimenta,  opera  quaedam  nobis 
inimitabilia  (qualia  sunt  cerarum  ac  mellis)  efficere, 
nonnullius    forlasse    rationis    est ;    sed    quia    carent 
sermone,   quae   id    faciunt,   muta    atque    irrationalia 

17  vocantur.      Denique  homines,  quibus  negata  vox  est, 
quantulum  adiuvat  animus  ille  caelestis  ?     Quare  si 
nihil    a    dis    oratione    melius    accepimus,   quid    tarn 
dignum  cultu  ac  labore  ducamus,  aut  in  quo  malimus 
praestare  hominibus,  quam  quo  ipsi  homines  ceteris 

18  animalibus  praestant,  eo  quidem  magis,  quod  nulla 
in  arte  plenius  labor  gratiam  refert  ?     Id  adeo  mani- 
festum  erit,  si  cogitaverimus,  unde  et  quo  usque  iam 
provecta  sit  orandi  facultas ;  et  adhuc  augeri  potest. 

19  Nam  ut  omittam,  defendere  amicos,  regere  consiliis 
senatum,  populum,  exercitum  in  quae  velit  ducere, 
quam  sit  utile  conveniatque  bono  viro,   nonne  pul- 
chrum   vel    hoc    ipsum    est,  ex    communi  intellectu 
verbisque,   quibus    utuntur    omnes,   tantum    adsequi 
laudis  et  gloriae,   ut  non  loqui  et  orare   sed,  quod 
Pericli  contigit,  fulgurare  ac  tonare  videaris  ? 

XVII.   Finis  non  erit,  si  exspatiari  in  parte  hac  et 

1  cp.  Aristoph.  Ach.  530  :  "  Then  in  his  wrath  Pericles 
the  Olympian  lightened  and  thundered  and  threw  all  Greece 
into  confusion." 

BOOK    II.  xvi.  15-xvii.  i 

and  understanding  which  they  do  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent possess,  that  is  the  great  defect  in  other  living 
things.  The  construction  of  a  soft  lair,  the  weaving  16 
of  nests,  the  hatching  and  rearing  of  their  young,  and 
even  the  storing  up  of  food  for  the  coming  winter, 
together  with  certain  other  achievements  which  we 
cannot  imitate,  such  as  the  making  of  honey  and 
wax,  all  these  perhaps  indicate  the  possession  of  a 
certain  degree  of  reason  ;  but  since  the  creatures  that 
do  these  things  lack  the  gift  of  speech  they  are  called 
dumb  and  unreasoning  beasts.  Finally,  how  little  17 
the  heavenly  boon  of  reason  avails  those  who  are 
born  dumb.  If  therefore  we  have  received  no  fairer 
gift  from  heaven  than  speech,  what  shall  wre  regard 
as  so  worthy  of  laborious  cultivation,  or  in  what 
should  we  sooner  desire  to  excel  our  fellowr-men, 
than  that  in  which  mankind  excels  all  other  living 
things?  And  we  should  be  all  the  more  eager  to  do  18 
so,  since  there  is  no  art  which  yields  a  more  grateful 
recompense  for  the  labour  bestowed  upon  it.  This 
will  be  abundantly  clear  if  we  consider  the  origins 
of  oratory  and  the  progress  it  has  made  ;  and  it  is 
capable  of  advancing  still  further.  I  will  not  stop  19 
to  point  out  how  useful  and  how  becoming  a  task  it  is 
for  a  good  man  to  defend  his  friends,  to  guide  the 
senate  by  his  counsels,  and  to  lead  peoples  or  armies 
to  follow  his  bidding ;  I  merely  ask,  is  it  not  a 
noble  thing,  by  employing  the  understanding  which 
is  common  to  mankind  and  the  words  that  are  used 
by  all,  to  win  such  honour  and  glory  that  you  seem 
not  to  speak  or  plead,  but  rather,  as  was  said  of 
Pericles,  to  thunder  and  lighten  ? l 

XVII.   However,  if  I  were  to  indulge  my  own  in- 
clinations in  expatiating  on  this  subject,  1  should  go 



indulgere    voluptati    velim.      Transeamus    igitur   ad 
earn   quaestionem,   quae    sequitur,   an   rhetorice    ars 

2  sit.     Quod  quidem  adeo  ex  iis,  qui  praecepta  dicendi 
tradiderunt,  nemo  dubitavit,  ut  etiam  ipsis  librorum 
titulis  testatum  sit,  scriptos  eos  de  arte  rhetorica; 
Cicero     vero     earn,    quae    rhetorice     vocetur,    esse 
artificiosam  eloquentiam  dicat.     Quod  non  oratores 
tantum   vindicarunt,   ut   studiis  aliquid   suis   praesti- 
tisse  videantur,  sed  cum  iis  philosophi  et  Stoici  et 

3  Peripatetici  plerique  consentiunt.      Ac  me  dubitasse 
confiteor,   an    hanc    partem    quaestionis    tractandam 
putarem  ;  nam  quis  est  adeo  non  ab  eruditione  modo 
sed  a  sensu  remotus  hominis,  ut  fabricandi  quidem 
et  texendi  et  e  luto  vasa  ducendi  artem  putet,  rhe- 
toricen  autem,  maximum  ac  pulcherrimum,  ut  supra 
diximus,   opus,   in   tarn   sublime    fastigium   existimet 

4  sine   arte   venisse  ?     Equidem   illos,   qui   contra   dis- 
putaverunt,  non  tarn  id  sensisse  quod  dicerent,  quam 
exercere  ingenia  materiae  difficultate  credo  voluisse, 
sicut  Polycraten,  cum  Busirim  laudaret  et  Clytaem- 
nestram ;  quanquam  is,  quod  his  dissimile  non  est, 
composuisse     orationem,     quae     est     habita     contra 
Socraten,  dicitur. 

5  Quidam  natural  em  esse  rhetoricen  volunt  et  tamen 
adiuvari    exercitatione    non   diffitentur,   ut    in    libris 
Ciceronis  de  Oratore  dicit  Antonius,  observationem 

6  quandam  esse  non  artem.      Quod   non   ideo,  ut  pro 
vero  accipiamus,  est  positum,  sed  ut  Aiitoni  persona 

1  de  Inv.  i.  v.  6.     The  titles  in  question  are  such  as  Ars 
rhetorica,  Ars  Hermagorae,  etc. 


BOOK    II.  xvn.  1-6 

on  for  ever.  Let  us  therefore  pass  to  the  next 
question  and  consider  whether  rhetoric  is  an  art. 
No  one  of  those  who  have  laid  down  rules  for  2 
oratory  has  ever  doubted  that  it  is  an  art.  It  is  clear 
even  from  the  titles  of  their  books  that  their  theme 
is  the  art  of  rhetoric,  while  Cicero1  defines  rhetoric 
as  artistic  eloquence.  And  it  is  not  merely  the  orators 
who  have  claimed  this  distinction  for  their  studies 
with  a  view  to  giving  them  an  additional  title  to 
respect,  but  the  Stoic  and  Peripatetic  philosophers  for 
the  most  part  agree  with  them.  Indeed  I  will  confess  3 
that  I  had  doubts  as  to  whether  I  should  discuss  this 
portion  of  my  inquiry,  for  there  is  no  one,  I  will  not 
say  so  unlearned,  but  so  devoid  of  ordinary  sense,  as 
to  hold  that  building,  weaving;  or  moulding  vessels 

O-7  O  O 

from  clay  are  arts,  and  at  the  same  time  to  consider 
that  rhetoric,  which,  as  I  have  already  said,  is  the 
noblest  and  most  sublime  of  tasks,  has  reached  such 
a  lofty  eminence  without  the  assistance  of  art.  For  4 
my  own  part  I  think  that  those  who  have  argued 
against  this  view  did  not  realise  what  they  were 
saying,  but  merely  desired  to  exercise  their  wits  by 
the  selection  of  a  difficult  theme,  like  Poly  crates, 
when  he  praised  Busiris  and  Clytemnestra  ;  I  may 
add  that  he  is  credited  with  a  not  dissimilar  per- 
formance, namely  the  composition  of  a  speech  which 
was  delivered  against  Socrates. 

Some  wrould  have  it  that  rhetoric  is  a  natural  gift  5 
though  they  admit  that  it  can  be  developed  by  practice. 
So  Antonius  in  the  de  Oraiore2  of  Cicero  styles  it  a  knack 
derived  from  experience,  but  denies  that  it  is  an  art : 
this  statement  is  however  not  intended  to  be  accepted  6 
by  us  as  the  actual  truth,  but  is  inserted  to  make 

2  ii.  Ivii.  232. 



servetur,  qui  dissimulator  artis  fuit.  Hanc  autem 
opinionem  habuisse  Lysias  videtur.  Cuius  sententiae 
talis  defensio  est,  quod  indocti  et  barbari  et  servi, 
pro  se  cum  loquuntur,  aliquid  dicant  simile  principle, 
narrent,  probent,  refutent,  et  (quod  vim  habeat 

7  epilogi)    deprecentur.      Deinde    adiiciunt    illas   ver- 
borum  cavillationes,  nihil,  quod    ex    arte    fiat,  ante 
artem  fuisse  ;  atqui  dixisse  homines  pro  se  et  in  alios 
semper,  doctores  artis  sero  et  circa  Tisian  et  Coraca 
primum  repertos,  orationem  igitur  ante  artem  fuisse 

8  eoque  artem  non  esse.     Nos  porro,  quando  coeperit 
huius  rei  doctrina,  non  laboramus  exquirere,  quan- 
quam  apud    Homerum  et  praeceptorem   Phoenicem 
cum  agendi  turn  etiam  loquendi  et  oratores  plures  et 
omne  in  tribus  ducibus  orationis  genus  et  certamina 
quoque  proposita  eloquentiae  inter  iuvenes  invenimus, 
quin    in    caelatura    clipei   Achillis    et   lites    sunt    et 

9  actores.      Illud  enim  admonere  satis  est,  omnia,  quae 
ars    consummaverit,  a    natura    initia    duxisse.      Aut 
tollatur    medicina,   quae   ex   observatione    salubrium 
atque  iis  contrariorum  reperta  est,  et,  ut  quibusdam 
placet,   tota    constat   experimentis ;    nam    et   vulnus 
deligavit  aliquis,  antequam  haec  ars  esset,  et  febrem 
quiete  et  abstinentia,  non  quia  rationem  videbat,  sed 

1  77.  ix.  432. 

3  i.e.  the  copious  style  by  Xestor,  the  plain  by  Menelaua, 
the  intermediate  by  Ulysses. 

1  II.  xv.  284.  «'7J.  xviii.  497  sqq. 


BOOK    II.  xvn.  6-9 

Antonius  speak  in  character,  since  he  was  in  the 
habit  of  concealing  his  art.  Still  Lysias  is  said  to 
have  maintained  this  same  view,  which  is  defended 
on  the  ground  that  uneducated  persons,  barbarians 
and  slaves,  when  speaking  on  their  own  behalf,  say 
something  that  resembles  an  exordium,  state  the  facts 
of  the  case,  prove,  refute  and  plead  for  mercy  just  as 
an  orator  does  in  his  peroration.  To  this  is  added  7 
the  quibble  that  nothing  that  is  based  on  art  can 
have  existed  before  the  art  in  question,  whereas  men 
have  always  from  time  immemorial  spoken  in  their 
own  defence  or  in  denunciation  of  others :  the 
teaching  of  rhetoric  as  an  art  was,  they  say,  a  later 
invention  dating  from  about  the  time  of  Tisias  and 
Corax :  oratory  therefore  existed  before  art  and 
consequently  cannot  be  an  art.  For  my  part  I  am  not  8 
concerned  with  the  date  when  oratory  began  to  be 
taught.  Even  in  Homer  we  find  Phoenix l  as  an 
instructor  not  only  of  conduct  but  of  speaking,  while 
a  number  of  orators  are  mentioned,  the  various  styles 
are  represented  by  the  speeches  of  three  of  the 
chiefs  2  and  the  young  men  are  set  to  contend  among 
themselves  in  contests  of  eloquence  :3  moreover  law- 
suits and  pleaders  are  represented  in  the  engravings 
on  the  shield  of  Achilles.4  It  is  sufficient  to  call  9 
attention  to  the  fact  that  everything  which  art  has 
brought  to  perfection  originated  in  nature.  Other- 
wise we  might  deny  the  title  of  art  to  medicine, 
which  was  discovered  from  the  observation  of 
sickness  and  health,  and  according  to  some  is 
entirely  based  upon  experiment :  wounds  were  bound 
up  long  before  medicine  developed  into  an  art,  and 
fevers  were  reduced  by  rest  and  abstention  from  food, 
long  before  the  reason  for  such  treatment  was 



10  quia  id  valetudo  ipsa  cogebat,  mitigavit.      Nee  fabrica 
sit  ars  ;  casas  eiiim  priini  illi  sine  arte  fecerunt ;  nee 
musica  ;  caritatur  ac  saltatur  per  omnes  gentes  aliquo 
modo.      Ita  si  rhetoriee  vocari  debet  sermo  quicun- 

11  que,  fuisse  earn,  antequam  esset  ars,  confitebor ;  si 
vero  iion  quisquis  loquitur,  orator  est,  et  turn  non 
tanquam  oratores  loquebantur,  necesse  est,  oratorem 
factum  arte  nee  ante  artem  fuisse  fateantur.     Quo 
illud  quoque  excluditur,  quod  dicunt,  non  esse  artis 
id,    quod    faeiat    qui    non    didicerit,    dicere    autem 

12  homines  et  qui   non  didicerint.      Ad  cuius  rei  con- 
firmationem  adferunt,  Demaden  remigem,  et  Aesclii- 
nen  hypocriten  oratores  fuisse.      Falso  ;  nam  neque 
orator  esse,  qui  non  didicit,  potest,  et  hos  sero  potius 
quam     nunquam    didicisse    quis     dixerit,    quanquam 
Aeschines  ab  initio  sit  versatus  in  litteris,  quas  pater 
eius  etiam   docebat,   Demaden   neque  non  didicisse 
certum  sit,  et  continua  dicendi  exercitatio  potuerit 
tantum,  quantuscunque  postea  fuit,  fecisse  ;  nam  id 

13  potentissimum  discendi  genus  est.     Sed  et  praestan- 
tiorem,    si    didicisset,    futurum    fuisse    dicere    licet ; 
neque    enim    orationes    scribere    est  ausus,  ut    eum 

14  multum   valuisse   in   dicendo    sciamus.      Aristoteles, 
ut  solet,  quaerendi  gratia  quaedam  subtilitatis  suae 

1  A    lost    treatise,     named    after    Gryllus,     the     son     of 


BOOK    II.  xvii.  9-14 

known,  simply  because  the  state  of  the  patient's 
health  left  no  choice.  So  too  building  should  not  be  10 
styled  an  art ;  for  primitive  man  built  himself  a  hut 
without  the  assistance  of  art.  Music  by  the  same 
reasoning  is  not  an  art ;  for  every  race  indulges  in 
some  kind  of  singing  and  dancing.  If  therefore  any 
kind  of  speech  is  to  be  called  eloquence,  I  will  admit 
that  it  existed  before  it  was  an  art.  If  on  the  other  1 1 
hand  not  every  man  that  speaks  is  an  orator  and 
primitive  man  did  not  speak  like  an  orator,  my 
opponents  must  needs  acknowledge  that  oratory  is 
the  product  of  art  and  did  not  exist  before  it.  This 
conclusion  also  rules  out  their  argument  that  men 
speak  who  have  never  learnt  how  to  speak,  and  that 
which  a  man  does  untaught  can  have  no  connexion 
with  art.  In  support  of  this  contention  they  adduce  12 
the  fact  that  Demades  was  a  waterman  and  Aeschines 
an  actor,  but  both  were  orators.  Their  reasoning  is 
false.  For  no  man  can  be  an  orator  untaught  and  it 
would  be  truer  to  say  that  these  orators  learned 
oratory  late  in  life  than  that  they  never  learned  at  all ; 
although  as  a  matter  of  fact  Aeschines  had  an 
acquaintance  with  literature  from  childhood  since  his 
father  was  a  teacher  of  literature,  while  as  regards 
Demades,  it  is  quite  uncertain  that  he  never  studied 
rhetoric  and  in  any  case  continuous  practice  in 
speaking  was  sufficient  to  bring  him  to  such  profici- 
ency as  he  attained  :  for  experience  is  the  best  of  all 
schools.  On  the  other  hand  it  may  fairly  be  asserted  13 
that  he  would  have  achieved  greater  distinction,  if  he 
had  received  instruction  :  for  although  he  delivered 
his  speeches  with  great  effect,  he  never  ventured  to 
write  them  for  others.  Aristotle,  it  is  true,  in  his  14 
Gryttus l  produces  some  tentative  arguments  to 



argumenta  excogitavit  in  Gryllo ;  sed  idem  et  de 
arte  rhetorica  tris  libros  scripsit,  et  in  eorum  primo 
non  artem  solum  earn  fatetur,  sed  ei  particulam 

15  civilitatis  sicut  dialectices  adsignat.      Multa  Critolaus 
contra,  multa  Rhodius  Athenodorus.     Agnon  quidem 
detraxit  sibi  inscriptione  ipsa  fidem,  qua  rhetorices 
accusationem  professus   est.      Nam  de   Epicuro,   qui 
disciplinas  omnes  fugit,  nihil  miror. 

16  Hi    complura  dicunt    sed   ex   paucis   loois   ducta ; 
itaque  potentissimis  eorum  breviter  occurram,  ne  in 

17  infinitum  quaestio   evadat.      Prima  iis   argumentatio 
ex    materia    est.      Omnes   enim   artes   aiunt    habere 
materiarn,  quod   est  verum  ;   rhetorices   nullam  esse 
propriam,  quod  esse  falsum  in  sequentibus  probabo. 

18  Altera   est    calumnia    nullam    artem    falsis    assentiri 
opinionibus,    quia    constitui    sine    perceptione    non 
possit,  quae  semper  vera  sit ;  rhetoricen  assentiri  falsis, 

19  non  esse  igitur  artem.      Ego  rhetoricen  nonnunquam 
dicere  falsa  pro  veris  confitebor,  sed  non  ideo  in  falsa 
quoque  esse  opinione  concedam,  quia  longe  diversum 
est,    ipsi    quid    videri    et,   ut    alii    videatur,   efficere. 
Nam  et  imperator  falsis  utitur  saepe,  ut  Hannibal, 
cum  inclusus  a  Fabio,  sarmentis  circum  cornua  bourn 

BOOK    II.  xvn.  14-19 

the  contrary,  which  are  marked  by  characteristic 
ingenuity.  On  the  other  hand  he  also  wrote  three 
books  on  the  art  of  rhetoric,  in  the  first  of  which 
he  not  merely  admits  that  rhetoric  is  an  art,  but 
treats  it  as  a  department  of  politics  and  also  of 
logic.  Critolaus  and  Athenodorus  of  Rhodes  have  15 


produced  many  arguments  against  this  view,  while 
Agnon  renders  himself  suspect  by  the  very  title  of 
his  book  in  which  he  proclaims  that  he  is  going  to 
indict  rhetoric.  As  to  the  statements  of  Epicurus 
on  this  subject,  they  cause  me  no  surprise,  for  he  is 
the  foe  of  all  systematic  training. 

These  gentlemen  talk  a  great  deal,  but  the  16 
arguments  on  which  they  base  their  statements  are 
few.  I  will  therefore  select  the  most  important  of 
them  and  will  deal  with  them  briefly,  to  prevent  the 
discussion  lasting  to  all  eternity.  Their  first  con-  17 
tention  is  based  on  the  subject-matter;  for  they 
assert  that  all  arts  have  their  own  subject-matter 
(which  is  true)  and  go  on  to  say  that  rhetoric  has 
none,  which  I  shall  show  in  what  follows  to  be  false. 
Another  slander  is  to  the  effect  that  no  art  will  IS 
acquiesce  in  false  opinions :  since  an  art  must  be 
based  on  direct  perception,  which  is  always  true: 
now,  say  they,  rhetoric  does  give  its  assent  to  false 
conclusions  and  is  therefore  not  an  art.  I  will  admit  19 
that  rhetoric  sometimes  substitutes  falsehood  for 
truth,  but  I  will  not  allow  that  it  does  so  because  its 
opinions  are  false,  since  there  is  all  the  difference 
between  holding  a  certain  opinion  oneself  and 
persuading  someone  else  to  adopt  an  opinion.  For 
instance  a  general  frequently  makes  use  of  false- 
hood :  Hannibal  when  hemmed  in  by  Fabius 
persuaded  his  enemy  that  he  was  in  retreat  by 



deligatis  incensisque,  per  noctem  in  adversos  rnontes 
agens  armenta  speciem  hosti  abeuntis  exercitus  dedit; 
sed  ilium  fefellit,  ipse,  quid  verum  esset,  non  igno- 

20  ravit.      Nee  vero  Theopompus  Lacedaemonius,  cum 
permutato  cum    uxore   habitu    e    custodia   ut   mulier 
evasit,  falsam  de  se  opinionem  habuit,  sed  custodibus 
praebuit.       Item    orator,,  cum    falso    utitur  pro  vero, 
scit  esse   falsum   eoque   se   pro  vero   uti ;    non   ergo 

21  falsam  habet  ipse  opinionem,  sed  fallit  alium.      Nee 
Cicero,  cum  se  tenebras  offudisse  iudicibus  in  causa 
Cluenti    gloriatus    est,   nihil   ipse    vidit.       Et   pictor, 
cum    vi    artis    suae    efficit,    ut   quaedam    eminere    in 
opere,  quaedam   recessisse  credamus,  ipse  ea   plana 

22  esse  non  nescit.       Aiunt  etiam  omnes  artes   habere 
finem  aliquem  propositum,  ad  quern  tendant ;  hunc 
modo  nullum  esse  in  rhetorice.  modo  non  praestari 
eum,  qui  promittatur.      Mentiuntur ;   nos  enim  esse 

23  finem   iam   ostendimus,   et  quis   esset   diximus.      Et 
praestabit   hunc   semper    orator,   semper   enim   bene 
dicet.     Firmum  autem  hoc,  quod  opponitur,  adversus 
eos   fortasse   sit,   qui    persuadere    finem    putaverunt. 
Noster  orator  arsque  a  nobis  finita  non  sunt  posita  in 
eventu.       Tendit  quidem  ad  victoriam  qui  dicit ;  sed 
cum  bene  dixit,  etiamsi  non  vincat,  id  quod  arte  con- 

24  tinetur  eflfecit.     Nam  et  gubernator  vult  salva  nave 

1  See  Livy,  XXII.  xvi 

2  Probably  a  king  of  Sparta,  770-7'20  B.C. 


BOOK    II.  xvn.  19-24 

tying  brushwood  to  the  horns  of  oxen,  setting  fire 
to  them  by  night  and  driving  the  herds  across 
the  mountains  opposite.1  But  though  he  deceived 
Fabius,  he  himself  was  fully  aware  of  the  truth. 

'  •> 

Again  when  the  Spartan  Theopompus  changed  '20 
clothes  with  his  wife  and  escaped  from  custody 
disguised  as  a  woman,  he  deceived  his  guards, 
but  was  not  for  a  moment  deceived  as  to  his  owrn 
identity.2  Similarly  an  orator,  when  he  substitutes 
falsehood  for  the  truth,  is  aware  of  the  falsehood 
and  of  the  fact  that  he  is  substituting  it  for  the 


truth.  He  therefore  deceives  others,  but  not  him- 
self. When  Cicero  boasted  that  he  had  thrown  21 
dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  jury  in  the  case  of 
Cluentius,  he  was  far  from  being  blinded  himself. 
And  when  a  painter  by  his  artistic  skill  makes  us 
believe  that  certain  objects  project  from  the  picture, 
while  others  are  withdrawn  into  the  background,  he 
knows  perfectly  well  that  they  are  really  all  in  the 
same  plane.  My  opponents  further  assert  that  every  22 
art  has  some  definite  goal  towards  which  it  directs  its 
efforts,  but  that  rhetoric  as  a  rule  has  no  such  goal, 
while  at  other  times  it  professes  to  have  an  aim,  but 
fails  to  perform  its  promise.  They  lie :  I  have  already 
shown  that  rhetoric  has  a  definite  purpose  and  have 
explained  what  it  is.  And,  what  is  more,  the  orator  23 
will  always  make  good  his  professions  in  this  respect, 
for  he  will  always  speak  well.  On  the  other  hand 
this  criticism  may  perhaps  hold  good  as  against  those 
who  think  persuasion  the  end  of  oratory.  But  our 
orator  and  his  art,  as  we  define  it,  are  independent  of 
results.  The  speaker  aims  at  victory,  it  is  true,  but  if 
he  speaks  well,  he  has  lived  up  to  the  ideals  of  his  art, 
even  if  he  is  defeated.  Similarly  a  pilot  will  desire  24 



in    portum    pervenire ;    si    tamen    tempestate    fuerit 
abreptus,  non  ideo  minus   erit   gubernator  dicetque 

25  notum  illud,  Dum  clavum  rectum  tencam.     Et  rnedicus 
sanitatem  aegri  petit ;  si  tamen  aut  valetudinis  vi  aut 
intemperantia  aegri  aliove  quo  casu  summa  non  con- 
tingit,  dum  ipse  omnia  secundum  rationem  fecerit, 
medicinae  fine  non  excidet.      Ita  oratori  bene  dixisse 
finis   est.      Nam   est   ars    ea,   ut  post  paulum   clarius 

26  ostendemus,  in  actu  posita  non  in  efFectu.      Ita  falsum 
erit  illud   quoque,  quod  dicitur,  artes  scire  quando 
sint  finem  consecutae,  rhetoricen  nescire.       Nam  se 
quisque  bene  dieere  intelligit.      Uti  etiam  vitiis  rhe- 
toricen, quod  ars  nulla  faciat,  crirninantur,  quia   et 

27  falsum  dicat  et  adfectus  moveat.     Quorum  neutrum 
est  turpe,  cum  ex  bona  ratione  proficiscitur,  ideoque 
nee    vitium.        Nam    et     mendacium     dieere    etiam 
sapienti  aliquando  concessum  est,  et  adfectus,  si  aliter 
ad  aequitatem  perduci  iudex  non  poterit,  necessario 

28  movebit  orator.     Imperiti  enim  iudicant  et  qui  fre- 
quenter in  hoc  ipsum  fallendi  sint,  ne  errent.     Nam, 
si  mihi  sapientes  indices  dentur,  sapientium  contiones 
atque     omne     consilium,    nihil    invidia    valeat,    nihil 
gratia,  nihil  opinio  praesumpta  falsique  testes :  per- 
quam  sit  exiguus  eloquentiae  locus  et  prope  in  sola 

29  delectatione    ponatur.      Sin    et    audientium    mobiles 

1  Ennius,  Ann.  483  (Vahlen). 

BOOK    II.  xvn.  24-29 

to  bring  his  ship  safe  to  harbour;  but  if  he  is  swept 
out  of  his  course  by  a  storm,  he  will  not  for  that 
reason  cease  to  be  a  pilot,  but  will  say  in  the  well- 
known  words  of  the  old  poet l  "  Still  let  me  steer 
straight  on  !  "  So  too  the  doctor  seeks  to  heal  the  25 
sick  ;  but  if  the  violence  of  the  disease  or  the  refusal 
of  the  patient  to  obey  his  regimen  or  any  other 
circumstance  prevent  his  achieving  his  purpose,  he 
will  not  have  fallen  short  of  the  ideals  of  his  art, 
provided  he  has  done  everything  according  to  reason. 
So  too  the  orator's  purpose  is  fulfilled  if  he  has  spoken 
well.  For  the  art  of  rhetoric,  as  I  shall  show  later, 
is  realised  in  action,  not  in  the  result  obtained.  From  26 
this  it  follows  that  there  is  no  truth  in  yet  another 
argument  which  contends  that  arts  know  when  they 
have  attained  their  end,  whereas  rhetoric  does  not. 
For  every  speaker  is  aware  when  he  is  speaking  well. 
These  critics  also  charge  rhetoric  with  doing  what 
no  art  does,  namely  making  use  of  vices  to  serve  its 
ends,  since  it  speaks  the  thing  that  is  not  and  excites 
the  passions.  But  there  is  no  disgrace  in  doing  27 
either  of  these  things,  as  long  as  the  motive  be  good  : 
consequently  there  is  nothing  vicious  in  such  action. 
Even  a  philosopher  is  at  times  permitted  to  tell  a  lie, 
while  the  orator  must  needs  excite  the  passions,  if 
that  be  the  only  way  by  which  he  can  lead  the 
judge  to  do  justice.  For  judges  are  not  always  2S 
enlightened  and  often  have  to  be  tricked  to  prevent 
them  falling  into  error.  Give  me  philosophers  as 
judges,  pack  senates  and  assemblies  with  philosophers, 
and  you  will  destroy  the  power  of  hatred,  influence, 
prejudice  and  false  witness  ;  consequently  there  will 
be  very  little  scope  for  eloquence  whose  value  will 
lie  almost  entirely  in  its  power  to  charm.  But  if,  as  is  29 



animi  et  tot  nialis  obnoxia  veritas,  arte  pugnandura 
est  et  adhibenda  quae  prosunt.  Neque  enim,  qui 
recta  via  depulsus  est,  reduci  ad  earn  nisi  alio  flexu 

;40  Plurima  vero  ex  eo  contra  rhetoricen  cavillatio  est, 
quod  ex  utraque  causae  parte  dicatur.  Inde  haec : 
nullam  esse  arteni  contrariam  sibi,  rhetoricen  esse 
contrariam  sibi ;  nullam  artem  destruere  quod  effe- 
cerit,  accidere  hoc  rhetorices  open  ;  item  aut  dicenda 
earn  docere  aut  non  dicenda ;  ita  vel  per  hoc  non 
esse  artem,  quod  non  dicenda  praecipiat,  vel  per  hoc, 
quod,  cum  dicenda  praeceperit,  etiam  contraria  his 

31  doceat.     Quae  omnia  apparet  de  ea  rhetorice  dici, 
quae  sit  a  bono  viro  atque  ab  ipsa  virtute  seiuncta  ; 
alioqui  ubi  iniusta  causa  est,  ibi  rhetorice  non   est, 
adeo  ut  vix  admirabili  quodam  casu  possit  accidere, 
ut  ex  utraque  parte  orator,  id  est  vir  bonus,  dicat. 

32  Tamen  quoniam  hoc  quoque  in  rerum  naturam  cadit, 
ut  duos  sapientes  aliquando  iustae  causae  in  diversum 
trahant,  (quando  etiam   pugnaturos   eos   inter  se,  si 
ratio    ita    duxerit,    credunt)    respondebo    propositis, 
atque  ita    quidem,   ut    appareat,  haec    adversus  eos 
quoque  frustra  excogitata,  qui  malis  moribus  nomen 

33  oratoris  indulgent.       Nam  rhetorice  non  est  contraria 


BOOK    II.  xvn.  29-33 

the  case,  our  hearers  are  fickle  of  mind,  and  truth  is 
exposed  to  a  host  of  perils,  we  must  call  in  art  to  aid 
us  in  the  fight  and  employ  such  means  as  will  help 
our  case.  He  who  has  been  driven  from  the  right  road 
cannot  be  brought  back  to  it  save  by  a  fresh  detour. 

The  point,  however,  that  gives  rise  to  the  greatest  30 
number  of  these  captious  accusations  against  rhetoric, 
is    found   in   the   allegation   that    orators    speak    in- 
differently on  either  side  of  a  case.   From  which  they 
draw  the  following  arguments  :    no  art  is  self-contra- 
dictory,  but  rhetoric  does   contradict  itself;   no  art 
tries  to  demolish  what  itself  has  built,   but  this  does 
happen  in  the  operations  of  rhetoric  ;  or  again  :- 
rhetoric  teaches  either  what  ought  to  be  said  or  what 
ought  not  to  be  said  ;  consequently  it  is  not  an  art 
because   it  teaches   what   ought  not  to  be  said,   or 
because,  while  it  teaches  what  ought  to  be  said,  it 
also  teaches  precisely  the  opposite.   Now  it  is  obvious  3 1 
that  all  such  charges  are  brought  against  that  type 
of  rhetoric  with  which  neither  good  men  nor  virtue 
herself  will  have  anything  to  do ;  since  if  a  case  be 
based  on  injustice,  rhetoric  has  no  place  therein  and 
consequently  it  can  scarcely  happen  even  under  the 
most  exceptional  circumstances  that  an  orator,   that 
is  to  say,  a  good  man,  will  speak  indifferently  on  either 
side.      Still  it  is  in  the  nature  of  things  conceivable  32 
that  just  causes   may   lead  two   wise   men    to   take 
different  sides,  since  it  is  held  that  wise  men  may  fight 
among  themselves,  provided  that  they  do  so  at  the 
bidding   of  reason.       I  will  therefore  reply  to  their 
criticisms  in  such  a  way  that  it  will  be  clear  that  these 
arguments  have  no  force  even  against  those  who  con- 
cede the  name  of  orator  to  persons  of  bad  character. 
For  rhetoric  is  not  self-contradictory.    The  conflict  is  33 



sibi.  Causa  enim  cum  causa,  non  ilia  secum  ipsa 
componitur.  Nee,  si  pugnent  inter  se,  qui  idem 
didicerunt,  idcirco  ars,  quae  utrique  tradita  est,  non 
erit ;  alioqui  nee  armorum,  quia  saepe  gladiatores  sub 

34  eodem  magistro  eruditi  inter  se  componuntur ;  nee 
gubernandi,  quia    navalibus   proeliis   gubernator    est 
gubernatori  adversus  ;  nee  imperatoria,  quia  impera- 
tor   cum    imperatore    contendit.       Item   non    evertit 
opus   rhetorice,  quod   efficit.       Neque  enim   positum 
a    se    argumentum    solvit    orator    sed    ne    rhetorice 
quidem,   quia   apud   eos,   qui    in   persuadendo   finem 
putant,  aut  si  quis  (ut  dixi)  casus  duos  inter  se  bonos 
viros  composuerit,  verisimilia  quaerentur  ;  non  autem, 
si  quid   est  altero   credibilius,  id  ei   contrarium   est, 

35  quod  fuit  credibile.      Nam   ut  candido   candidius  et 
dulci   dulcius   non   est   adversum,   ita    nee    probabili 
probabilius.      Neque  praecipit  unquam  non  dicenda 
nee   dicendis    contraria,   sed    quae    in   quaque    causa 

36  dicejida  sunt.      Non   semper   autem   ei,  etiamsi    fre- 
quentissime,  tuenda  veritas  erit ;  sed  aliquando  exigit 
communis  utilitas,  ut  etiam  falsa  defendat. 

Ponuntur  hae  quoque  in  secundo  Ciceronis  de 
Oratore  libro  contradictiones :  artem  earum  rerum 
esse,quae  sciantur ;  oratoris  omnem  actionem  opinione, 
non  scientia  contineri,  quia  et  apud  eos  dicat,  qui 

1  ii.  vii.  30. 

BOOK    II.  xvn.  33-36 

between  case  and  case,  not  between   rhetoric    and 
itself.      And  even  if  persons  who  have  learned  the 
same  thing  fight  one  another,  that  does  not  prove 
that  what  they  have  learned  is  not  an  art.      Were 
that  so,  there  could  be  no  art  of  arms,  since  gladiators 
trained  under  the  same  master  are  often  matched 
against  each  other ;  nor  would  the  pilot's  art  exist,  34 
because  in  sea-fights  pilots  may  be  found  011  different 
sides;  nor  yet  could  there  be  an  art  of  generalship, 
since  general  is  pitted  against  general.     In  the  same 
way  rhetoric  does  not  undo  its  own  work.      For  the 
orator  does  not  refute  his  own  arguments,  nor  does 
rhetoric  even  do  so,  because  those  who  regard  persua- 
sion as  its  end,  or  the  two  good  men  whom  chance  has 
matched  against  one  another  seek  merely  for   proba- 
bilities :  and  the  fact  that  one  thing  is  more  credible 
than  another,  does  not  involve  contradiction  between 
the  two.     There  is  no  absolute  antagonism  between  35 
the  probable  and  the  more  probable,  just  as  there  is 
none  between  that  which  is  white  and  that  which  is 
whiter,    or  between  that  which   is   sweet  and   that 
which  is  sweeter.     Nor  does  rhetoric  ever  teach  that 
which  ought  not  to  be  said,  or  that  which  is  contrary 
to  what  ought  to  be  said,  but  solely  what  ought  to  be 
said  in  each  individual  case.      But  though  the  orator  36 
will   as   a   rule   maintain   what   is  true,  this  will  not 
always  be  the  case  :    there  are  occasions  when  the 
public  interest  demands  that  he  should  defend  what 
is  untrue. 

The  following  objections  are  also  put  forward  in 
the  second  book  of  Cicero's  de  Oratore  l  : — "  Art  deals 
with  things  that  are  known.  But  the  pleading  of  an 
orator  is  based  entirely  on  opinion,  not  on  knowledge, 
because  he  speaks  to  an  audience  who  do  not  know, 


37  nesciant,  ct  ipse  dicat  aliquando,  quod  nesciat.      Ex 
his  alterum,   id   est,  an   sciat  index,  de  quo  dicatur, 
nihil    ad   oratoris   artein ;    alteri   respondendum,  Ars 
ear um  rerum  est,  quae  sctuntur.      Rhetorice  ars  est  bene 

38  dicendi,  bene  autem  dicere  scit  orator.      Sed  nescit, 
an  verum  sit  quod  dicit.      Ne  hi  quidem,  qui  ignem 
aut  aquain  aut  quattuor  elenienta  aut  corpora  inseca- 
bilia    esse,   ex    quibus    res    omnes   initium  duxerint, 
tradunt,  nee  qui  intervalla  siderum  et  mensuras  solis 
ac  terrae    colligunt ;  disciplinam  tamen  suam  arteni 
vocant.      Quodsi  ratio  efficit,  ut  haec  non  opinari  sed 
propter    vim    probationum    scire    videaiitur,    eadein 

39  ratio   idem  praestare  oratori   potest.      Sed  an  causa 
vera   sit,   nescit.      Ne   medicus  quidem,  an   dolorern 
capitis  habeat,  qui  hoc  se  pati  dicet ;  curabit  tamen, 
tanquam   id   verum  sit,  et  erit  ars  medicina.      Quid 
quod  rhetorice  non  utique  propositum  habet  semper 
vera  dicendi,  sed  semper  verisimilia?  scit  autem  esse 

40  verisimilia  quae  dicit.      Adiiciunt  his,  qui  contra  sen- 
tiunt,  quod  saepe,  quae  in  aliis  litibus  impugnarunt 
actores  causarum,  eadem  in  aliis  defendant.      Quod 
non  artis  sed  hominis  est  vitium.     Haec  sunt  praeci- 
pua,  quae  contra  rhetoricen  dicantur  ;    alia  et  minora 
et  tamen  ex  his  fontibus  derivata. 


BOOK    II.  xvn.  36-40 

and  sometimes  himself  states  things  of  which  he  has 
no  actual  knowledge."  Now  one  of  these  points,  3" 
namely  whether  the  judges  have  knowledge  of  what 
is  being  said  to  them,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  art 
of  oratory.  The  other  statement,  that  art  is  concerned 
with  things  that  are  known,  does  however  require  an 
answer.  Rhetoric  is  the  art  of  speaking  well  and  the 
orator  knows  how  to  speak  well.  "  But,"  it  is  urged,  38 
"  he  does  not  know  whether  what  he  says  is  true.'' 
Neither  do  they,  who  assert  that  all  things  derive 
their  origin  from  fire  or  water  or  the  four  elements 
or  indivisible  atoms ;  nor  they  who  calculate  the 
distances  of  the  stars  or  the  size  of  the  earth  and  sun. 
And  yet  all  these  call  the  subject  which  they  teach 
an  art.  But  if  reason  makes  them  seem  not  merely 
to  hold  opinions  but,  thanks  to  the  cogency  of  the 
proofs  adduced,  to  have  actual  knowledge,  reason  will 
do  the  same  service  to  the  orator.  "  But,"  they  say,  39 
"he  does  not  know  whether  the  cause  which  he  has 
undertaken  is  true."  But  not  even  a  doctor  can  tell 
whether  a  patient  who  claims  to  be  suffering  from  a 
headache,  really  is  so  suffering  :  but  he  will  treat  him 
on  the  assumption  that  his  statement  is  true,  and 
medicine  will  still  be  an  art.  Again  what  of  the  fact 
that  rhetoric  does  not  always  aim  at  telling  the  truth, 
but  always  at  stating  what  is  probable  ?  The  answer 
is  that  the  orator  knows  that  what  he  states  is  no 
more  than  probable.  My  opponents  further  object  40 
that  advocates  often  defend  in  one  case  what  they 
have  attacked  in  another.  This  is  not  the  fault  of  the 
art,  but  of  the  man.  Such  are  the  main  points  that 
are  urged  against  rhetoric  ;  there  are  others  as  well, 
but  they  are  of  minor  importance  and  drawn  from  the 
same  sources. 



41  Confirmatur  autem  esse  artem  earn  breviter.     Nam 
sive,  lit  Clcanthes  voluit,  ars  est  potestas  via,  id  est 
ordine,   efficiens,  esse   certe  viam  atque  ordinem  in 
bene  dicendo  nemo  dubitaverit ;  sive  ille  ab  omnibus 
fere  probatus  finis  observatur,  artem  constare  ex  per- 
ceptionibus  consentientibus  et  coexercitatis  ad  finem 
utilem    vitae,  iam   ostendemus   nihil   non   horum   in 

42  rhetorice  inesse.      Quid  quod  et  inspectione  et  exer- 
citatione  ut  artes  ceterae  constat  ?      Nee  potest  ars 
non  esse,  si  est  ars  dialectice,  quod  fere  constat,  cum 
ab  ea  specie  magis  quam  genere  differat.     Sed  nee 
ilia  omittenda  sunt,  qua  in  re  alius  se  inartificialiter 
alius  artificialiter  gerat,  in  ea  esse  artem,  et  in  eo 
quod,  qui  didicerit,  melius  faciat  quam  qui  non  didi- 

13  cerit,  esse  artem.  Atqui  non  solum  doctusindoctum, 
sed  etiam  doctior  doctum  in  rhetorices  opere  supera- 
bit,  neque  essent  aliter  eius  tarn  multa  praecepta 
tamque  magni,  qui  docerent ;  idque  cum  omnibus 
confitendum  est,  turn  nobis  praecipue,  qui  rationem 
dicendi  a  bono  viro  non  separamus. 

XVIII.   Cum   sint   autem   artium  aliae   positae    in 
inspectione,  id  est  cognitione  et  aestimatione  rerum, 

1  Fr.  790.          a  i.e.  since  our  ideals  are  so  high. 

BOOK    II.  xvn.  41-xvin.  i 

That  rhetoric  is  an  art  may,  however,  be  proved  in  41 
a  very  few  words.  For  if  Cleanthes' l  definition  be 
accepted  that  "Art  is  a  power  reaching  its  ends  by  a 
definite  path,  that  is,  by  ordered  methods,"  no  one 
can  doubt  that  there  is  such  method  and  order  in 
good  speaking  :  while  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  accept 
the  definition  which  meets  with  almost  universal 
approval  that  art  consists  in  perceptions  agreeing 
and  cooperating  to  the  achievement  of  some  useful 
end,  we  shall  be  able  to  show  that  rhetoric  lacks  none 
of  these  characteristics.  Again  it  is  scarcely  necessary  42 
for  me  to  point  out  that  like  other  arts  it  is  based  on 
examination  and  practice.  And  if  logic  is  an  art,  as 
is  generally  agreed,  rhetoric  must  also  be  an  art,  since 
it  differs  from  logic  in  species  rather  than  in  genus. 
Nor  must  I  omit  to  point  out  that  where  it  is  possible 
in  any  given  subject  for  one  man  to  act  without  art 
and  another  with  art,  there  must  necessarily  be  an 
art  in  connexion  with  that  subject,  as  there  must  also 
be  in  any  subject  in  which  the  man  who  has  received 
instruction  is  the  superior  of  him  who  has  not.  But  43 
as  regards  the  practice  of  rhetoric,  it  is  not  merely 
the  case  that  the  trained  speaker  will  get  the  better 
of  the  untrained.  For  even  the  trained  man  will 
prove  inferior  to  one  who  has  received  a  better 
training.  If  this  were  not  so,  there  would  not  be  so 
many  rhetorical  rules,  nor  would  so  many  great  men 
have  come  forward  to  teach  them.  The  truth  of  this 
must  be  acknowledged  by  everyone,  but  more 
especially  by  us,  since  we  concede  the  possession  of 
oratory  to  none  save  the  good  man.2 

XVIII.  Some  arts,  however,  are  based  on  examina- 
tion, that  is  to  say  on  the  knowledge  and  proper 
appreciation  of  things,  as  for  instance  astronomy, 



qualis  est  astrologia,  nullum  exigens  actum  sed  ipso 
rei,  cuius  studium  habet,  intellectu  contenta,  quae 
#€cop7?TiKr)  vocatur ;  aliae  in  agendo,  quarum  in  hoc 
finis  est  et  ipso  actu  perficitur  nihilque  post  actum 
operis  relinquit,  quae  7rpa/m/o/  dicitur,  qualis  saltatio 

2  est;  aliae  in  effectu,  quae  operis, quod  oculis  subiicitur, 
consummatione  finem  accipiunt,  quam  Trot^rtKr/v  appel- 
lamus,  qualis  est  pictura  :  fere  iudicandum  est,  rheto- 
ricen  in  actu  consistere  ;  hoc  enim,  quod  est  ofiicii  sui, 

3  perficit.      Atque  ita   ab   omnibus   dictum   est.      Mihi 
autem  videtur  etiarn  ex  illis  ceteris  artibus  multum 
assumere.      Nam  et  potest  aliquando  ipsa  res  per  se 
inspectione  esse  contenta.       Erit   enim  rhetorice  in 
oratore  etiam  tacente,  et  si   desierit  agere  vel  pro- 
posito  vel  aliquo  casu  impeditus,  non  magis  desinet 
esse  orator  quam  medicus,  qui  curandi  fecerit  finem. 

4  Nam   est   aliquis,   ac  nescio    an   maximus,   etiam   ex 
secretis  studiis  fructus  ac  turn  pura  voluptas  litterarum, 
cum  ab  actu,  id  est  opera,  recesserunt  et  contempla- 

5  tione    sui   fruuntur.      Sed   effectivae   quoque   aliquid 
simile   scriptis  orationibus   vel  historiis,  quod  ipsum 
opus  in  parte  oratoria  merito  ponimus,  consequetur. 
Si    tamen  una  ex   tribus   artibus  habenda    sit,   quia 
maxime  eius  usus  actu   continetur  atque   est  in   eo 


BOOK    II.  xvin.  1-5 

which  demands  no  action,  but  is  content  to  understand 
the  subject  of  its  study  :  sucli  arts  are  called  theoretical. 
Others  again  are  concerned  with  action  :  this  is  their 
end,  which  is  realised  in  action,  so  that,  the  action 
once  performed,  nothing  more  remains  to  do  :  these 
arts  we  style  practical,  and  dancing  will  provide  us 
with  an  example.  Thirdly  there  are  others  which  2 
consist  in  producing  a  certain  result  and  achieve  their 
purpose  iri  the  completion  of  a  visible  task  :  such  we 
style  productive,  and  painting  may  be  quoted  as  an 
illustration.  In  view  of  these  facts  we  must  come  to 
the  conclusion  that,  in  the  main,  rhetoric  is  concerned 
with  action ;  for  in  action  it  accomplishes  that  which 
it  is  its  duty  to  do.  This  view  is  universally  accepted,  3 
although  in  my  opinion  rhetoric  draws  largely  on  the 
two  other  kinds  of  art.  For  it  may  on  occasion  be 
content  with  the  mere  examination  of  a  thing. 
Rhetoric  is  still  in  the  orator's  possession  even  though 
he  be  silent,  while  if  he  gives  up  pleading  either 
designedly  or  owing  to  circumstances  over  which  he 
has  no  control,  he  does  not  therefore  cease  to  be  an 
orator,  any  more  than  a  doctor  ceases  to  be  a  doctor 
when  he  withdraws  from  practice.  Perhaps  the  4 
highest  of  all  pleasures  is  that  which  we  derive  from 
private  study,  and  the  only  circumstances  under 
which  the  delights  of  literature  are  unalloyed  are 
when  it  withdraws  from  action,  that  is  to  say  from 
toil,  and  can  enjoy  the  pleasure  of  self-contemplation. 
But  in  the  results  that  the  orator  obtains  by  writing  5 
speeches  or  historical  narratives,  which  we  may  reason- 
ably count  as  part  of  the  task  of  oratory,  we  shall 
recognise  features  resembling  those  of  a  productive 
art.  Still,  if  rhetoric  is  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  these 
three  classes  of  art,  since  it  is  with  action  that  its 



frequentissima,  dicatur  activa  vel  administrativa,  nam 
et  hoc  eiusdem  rei  nomen  est. 

XIX.  Scio,  quaeri  etiam,  naturane  plus  ad  elo- 
quentiam  conferat  an  doctrina.  Quod  ad  propositum 
quidem  operis  nostri  nihil  pertinet  (neque  enim  con- 
summatus  orator  nisi  ex  utroque  fieri  potest),  pluri- 
mum  tamen  referre  arbitror,  quam  esse  in  hoc  loco 

2  quaestionem  velimus.      Nam  si  parti  utrilibet  omnino 
alteram  detrahas,  natura  etiam  sine  doctrina  multum 
valebit,  doctrina  nulla  esse  sine  natura  poterit.     Sin 
ex    pari    coeant,    in    mediocribus    quidem     utrisque 
maius  adhuc  credam  naturae  esse  momentum,  con- 
summates autem  plus  doctrinae  debere  quam  naturae 
putabo ;    sicut    terrae    nullam     fertilitatem     habenti 
nihil  optimus  agricola  profuerit,  e  terra  uberi  utile 
aliquid    etiam    nullo    colente    nascetur,    at    in    solo 
fecundo  plus  cultor  quam   ipsa    per    se    bonitas  soli 

3  efficiet.     Et,  si   Praxiteles  signum  aliquod  ex  molan 
lapide    conatus    esset    exsculpere,    Parium     marmor 
mallem    rude ;    at    si    illud    idem   artifex   expolisset, 
plus  in  manibus  fuisset  quam  in  marmore.     Denique 
natura  materia  doctrinae  est ;  haec  fingit,  ilia  fingi- 
tur.      Nihil  ars  sine  materia,  materiae  etiam  sine  arte 
pretium  est,  ars  summa  materia  optima  melior. 


BOOK    II.  xvin.  5— xix.  3 

practice  is  chiefly  and  most  frequently  concerned,  let 
us  call  it  an  active  or  administrative  art,  the  two 
terms  being  identical. 

XIX.  I  quite  realise  that  there  is  a  further  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  eloquence  derives  most  from 
nature  or  from  education.  This  question  really  lies 
outside  the  scope  of  our  inquiry,  since  the  ideal 
orator  must  necessarily  be  the  result  of  a  blend  of 
both.  But  1  do  regard  it  as  of  great  importance 
that  we  should  decide  how  far  there  is  any  real 
question  on  this  point.  For  if  we  make  an  absolute  2 
divorce  between  the  two,  nature  will  still  be  able  to 
accomplish  much  without  the  aid  of  education, 
while  the  latter  is  valueless  without  the  aid  of 
nature.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  blended  in 
equal  proportions,  I  think  we  shall  find  that  the 
average  .orator  owes  most  to  nature,  while  the  per- 
fect orator  owes  more  to  education.  We  may  take 
a  parallel  from  agriculture.  A  thoroughly  barren 
soil  will  not  be  improved  even  by  the  best  cultivation, 
while  good  land  will  yield  some  useful  produce 
without  any  cultivation  ;  but  in  the  case  of  really 
rich  land  cultivation  will  do  more  for  it  than  its  own 
natural  fertility.  Had  Praxiteles  attempted  to  carve  3 
a  statue  out  of  a  millstone,  I  should  have  preferred 
a  rough  block  of  Parian  marble  to  any  such  statue. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  same  artist  had  produced 
a  finished  statue  from  such  a  block  of  Parian  marble, 
its  artistic  value  would  owe  more  to  his  skill  than 
to  the  material.  To  conclude,  nature  is  the  raw 
material  for  education  :  the  one  forms,  the  other  is 
formed.  Without  material  art  can  do  nothing, 
material  without  art  does  possess  a  certain  value, 
while  the  perfection  of  art  is  better  than  the  best 




XX.  Jlla  quaestio  est  maior,  ex  mediis  artibus, 
quae  neque  laudari  per  se  nee  vituperari  possunt,  sed 
utiles  aut  secus  secundum  mores  utentium  fiunt, 
habenda  sit  rhetorice,  an  sit,  ut  compluribus  etiam 

2  philosophorum  placet,  virtus.      Equideru  illud,  quod 
in  studiis  dicendi  plerique  exercuerunt  et  exercent, 
aut    nullam    artem,    quae    dre^vta    nominatur,    puto, 
(multos  enim  video  sine  ratione,  sine  litteris,  qua  vel 
impudentia   vel    fames    duxit,    ruentes)    aut    malam 
quasi    artem,    quam    KCLKOT^VLOLV    dicimus.      Nam    et 
fuisse  multos  et  esse  nonnullos  existimo,  qui  facul- 
tatem  dicendi  ad  hominum  perniciem  converterint. 

3  MaratoTe^vm  quoque  est  quaedam,  id  est  supervacua 
artis  imitatio,  quae  nihil  sane  neque  boni  neque  mali 
habeat,   sed   vanum   laborem,   qualis   illius    fuit,   qui 
grana  ciceris  ex  spatio  distanti  missa  in  acum  con- 
tinuo  et  sine  frustratione  inserebat,  quern  cum  spec- 
tasset  Alexander,  donasse  dicitur  eiusdem  leguminis 
modio,  quod  quidem  praemium  fuit  illo  opere  dig- 

4  nissimum.       His   ego  comparandos   existimo,  qui   in 
declamationibus,     quas     esse     veritati     dissimillimas 
volunt,  aetatem  multo  studio  ac  labore  consumunt. 
Verum    haec,    quam    instituere    conamur    et    cuius 
imaginem  animo   concepimus,  quae   bono   viro   con- 

6  venit  quaeque  est  vere  rhetorice,  virtus  erit.     Quod 


BOOK    II.  xx.  1-5 

XX.  More  important  is  the  question  whether  rhe- 
toric is  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  indifferent  arts, 
which  in  themselves  deserve  neither  praise  nor  blame, 
but  are  useful  or  the  reverse  according  to  the  charac- 
ter of  the  artist ;  or  whether  it  should,  as  not  a  few 
even  among  philosophers  hold,  be  considered  as  a 
virtue.  For  my  own  part  I  regard  the  practice  of  rhe-  2 
toric  which  so  many  have  adopted  in  the  past  and  still 
follow  to-day,  as  either  no  art  at  all,  or,  as  the  Greeks 
call  it,  ar^via  (for  I  see  numbers  of  speakers  with- 
out the  least  pretension  to  method  or  literary  train- 
ing rushing  headlong  in  the  direction  in  which 
hunger  or  their  natural  shamelessness  calls  them) ; 
or  else  it  is  a  bad  art  such  as  is  styled  KaKore^rta. 
For  there  have,  I  think,  been  many  persons  and 
there  are  still  some  who  have  devoted  their  powers 
of  speaking  to  the  destruction  of  their  fellow-men. 
There  is  also  an  unprofitable  imitation  of  art,  a  kind  3 
of  /iaTcuoT€xl '«**  which  is  neither  good  nor  bad,  but 
merely  involves  a  useless  expenditure  of  labour,  re- 
minding one  of  the  man  who  shot  a  continuous 
stream  of  vetch-seeds  from  a  distance  through  the 
eye  of  a  needle,  without  ever  missing  his  aim,  and 
was  rewarded  by  Alexander,  who  was  a  witness  of 
the  display,  with  the  present  of  a  bushel  of  vetch- 
seeds,  a  most  appropriate  reward.  It  is  to  such  men  4 
that  I  would  compare  those  who  spend  their  whole 
time  at  the  expense  of  much  study  and  energy  in 
composing  declamations,  which  they  aim  at  making 
as  unreal  as  possible.  The  rhetoric  on  the  other 
hand,  which  I  am  endeavouring  to  establish  and  the 
ideal  of  which  I  have  in  my  mind's  eye,  that  rhetoric 
which  befits  a  good  man  and  is  in  a  word  the  only 
true  rhetoric,  will  be  a  virtue.  Philosophers  arrive  5 


philosophi  quidem  multis  et  acutis  conclusionibus 
colligunt,  mihi  vero  etiam  planiore  hac  proprieque 
nostra  probatione  videtur  esse  perspicuum. 

Ab  illis  haec  dicuntur.  Si  consonare  sibi  in  faci- 
endis  ac  non  faciendis  virtus  est,  quae  pars  eius 
prudentia  vocatur,  eadem  in  dicendis  ac  non  dicendis 

6  erit.      Et  si  virtutes  sunt,  ad  quas  nobis  etiam  ante 
quam    doceremur    initia    quaedam    ac    semina    sunt 
concessa  natura,  lit  ad  iustitiani,  cuius  rusticis  quo- 
que  ac  barbaris  apparet  aliqua  imago,  nos  certe  sic 
esse  ab  initio  formates,  ut  possemus  orare  pro  nobis, 
etiamsi  non  perfecte,  tamen  ut  inessent  quaedam  (ut 

7  dixi)  semina   eius   facultatis,  manifestum   est.      Non 
eadem  autem  natura  est  iis  artibus,  quae  a  virtute 
sunt  remotae.      Itaque  cum  duo  sint  genera  orationis, 
altera  perpetua,  quae  rhetorice  dicitur,  altera  con- 
cisa,   quae  dialectice  (quas  quidem  Zeno  adeo  con- 
iunxit,  ut  hanc  compressae  in  pugnum  manus,  illam 
explicatae  diceret  similem),  etiam  disputatrix  virtus 
erit.     Adeo  de  hac,  quae  speciosior   atque   apertior 
tanto  est,  nihil  dubitabitur. 

8  Sed  plenius   hoc  idem   atque   apertius   intueri  ex 
ipsis  operibus   volo.     Nam  quid   orator  in  laudando 
faciet  nisi   honestorum  et  turpium   peritus  ?    aut  in 


BOOK    II.  xx.  5-8 

at  this  conclusion  by  a  long  chain  of  ingenious 
arguments  ;  but  it  appears  to  me  to  be  perfectly 
clear  from  the  simpler  proof  of  my  own  invention 
which  I  will  now  proceed  to  set  forth. 

The  philosophers  state  the  case  as  follows.  If 
self-consistency  as  to  what  should  and  should  not 
be  done  is  an  element  of  virtue  (and  it  is  to  this 
quality  that  we  give  the  name  of  prudence),  the 
same  quality  will  be  revealed  as  regards  what  should 
be  said  and  what  should  not  be  said,  and  if  there  are  6 
virtues,  of  which  nature  has  given  us  some  rudimen- 
tary sparks,  even  before  we  were  taught  anything 
about  them,  as  for  instance  justice,  of  which  there  are 
some  traces  even  among  peasants  and  barbarians,  it 
is  clear  that  man  has  been  so  formed  from  the 
beginning  as  to  be  able  to  plead  on  his  own  behalf, 
not,  it  is  true,  with  perfection,  but  yet  sufficiently  to 
show  that  there  are  certain  sparks  of  eloquence 
implanted  in  us  by  nature.  The  same  nature,  how-  7 
ever,  is  not  to  be  found  in  those  arts  which  have  no 
connexion  with  virtue.  Consequently,  since  there  are 
two  kinds  of  speech,  the  continuous  which  is  called 
rhetoric,  and  the  concise  which  is  called  dialectic  (the 
relation  between  which  was  regarded  by  Zeno  as  being 
so  intimate  that  he  compared  the  latter  to  the  closed 
fist,  the  former  to  the  open  hand),  even  the  art  of 
disputation  will  be  a  virtue.  Consequently  there  can 
be  no  doubt  about  oratory  whose  nature  is  so  much 
fairer  and  franker. 

I    should  like,    however,    to    consider    the    point  8 
more     fully    and     explicitly    by    appealing    to    the 
actual  work   of    oratory.     For  how   will   the   orator 
succeed  in  panegyric  unless  he  can  distinguish  be- 
tween what  is  honourable  and   the  reverse  ?     How 



suadendo  nisi  utilitate  perspecta?  aut  in  iudiciis,  si 
iustitiae  sit  ignarus  ?  Quid  ?  non  fortitudinem  pos- 
tulat  res  eadem,  cum  saepe  contra  turbulentas  populi 
minas,  saepe  cum  periculosa  potentium  offensa,  non- 
nunquam,  ut  iudicio  Miloniano,  inter  circumfusa 
militum  arma  dicendum  sit;  ut,  si  virtus  non  est,  ne 

9  perfecta  quidem  esse  possit  oratio.  Quodsi  ea  in 
quoque  animalium  est  virtus,,  qua  praestat  cetera  vel 
pleraque,  ut  in  leoiie  impetus,  in  equo  velocitas, 
hominem  porro  ratione  atque  oratione  excellere 
ceteris  certum  est :  cur  non  tarn  in  eloquentia  quam 
in  ratione  virtutem  eius  esse  credamus,  recteque  hoc 
apud  Ciceronem  dixerit  Crassus  :  Est  enim  eloquentia 
una  quaedam  de  summis  virtutibus,  et  ipse  Cicero  sua 
persona  cum  ad  Brutum  in  epistulis,  turn  aliis  etiam 

10  locis  virtutem  earn  appellet  ?  At  prooemium  ali- 
quando  ac  narrationem  dicet  mains  homo  et  argu- 
menta,  sic  ut  nihil  sit  in  iis  requirendum.  Nam  et 
latro  pugnabit  acriter,  virtus  tamen  erit  fortitude ; 
et  tormenta  sine  gemitu  feret  malus  servus,  tole- 
rantia  tamen  doloris  laude  sua  non  carebit.  Multa 
fiunt  eadem  sed  aliter.  Sufficiant  igitur  haec,  quia 
de  utilitate  supra  tractavimus. 

1  de  Or.  in.  xiv.  55.  2  Lost. 


BOOK    II.  xx.  8-10 

can  he  urge  a  policy,  unless  he  has  a  clear  percep- 
tion of  what  is  expedient  ?  How  can  he  plead  in 
the  law-courts,  if  he  is  ignorant  of  the  nature  of 
justice  ?  Again,  does  not  oratory  call  for  courage, 
since  it  is  often  directed  against  the  threats  of 
popular  turbulence  and  frequently  runs  into  peril 
through  incurring  the  hatred  of  the  great,  while 
sometimes,  as  for  instance  in  the  trial  of  Milo,  the 
orator  may  have  to  speak  in  the  midst  of  a  crowd  of 
armed  soldiers?  Consequently,  if  oratory  be  not  a 
virtue,  perfection  is  beyond  its  grasp.  If,  on  the  9 
other  hand,  each  living  thing  has  its  own  peculiar 
virtue,  in  which  it  excels  the  rest  or,  at  any  rate,  the 
majority  (I  may  instance  the  courage  of  the  lion 
and  the  swiftness  of  the  horse),  it  may  be  regarded 
as  certain  that  the  qualities  in  which  man  excels 
the  rest  are,  above  all,  reason  and  powers  of  speech. 
Why,  therefore,  should  wre  not  consider  that  the 
special  virtue  of  man  lies  just  as  much  in  elo- 
quence as  in  reason?  It  will  be  with  justice  then 
that  Cicero  1  makes  Crassus  say  that  ' '  eloquence  is 
one  of  the  highest  virtues,"  and  that  Cicero  himself 
calls  it  a  virtue  in  his  letters  to  Brutus 2  and  in 
other  passages.  "But,"  it  maybe  urged,  "  a  bad  10 
man  will  at  times  produce  an  exordium  or  a  statement 
of  facts,  and  will  argue  a  case  in  a  manner  that 
leaves  nothing  to  be  desired."  No  doubt ;  even  a 
robber  may  fight  bravely  without  courage  ceasing  to 
be  a  virtue  ;  even  a  wicked  slave  may  bear  torture 
without  a  groan,  and  we  may  still  continue  to  regard 
endurance  of  pain  as  worthy  of  praise.  We  can 
point  to  many  acts  which  are  identical  with  those  of 
virtue,  but  spring  from  other  sources.  However, 
what  I  have  said  here  must  suffice,  as  I  have  already 
dealt  with  the  question  of  the  usefulness  of  oratory. 



XXI.  Materiam  rhetorices  quidam  dixerunt  esse 
orationem,  qua  in  sententia  ponitur  apud  Platonem 
Gorgias.  Quae  si  ita  accipitur,  ut  sermo  quacunque 
de  re  compositus  dicatur  oratio,  non  materia  sed  opus 
est,.  ut  statuarii  statua  ;  nam  et  oratio  efficitur  arte 
sicut  statua.  Sin  hac  appellatione  verba  ipsa  signi- 
ficari  putamus,  nihil  haec  sine  rerum  substantia 

2  faeiunt.      Quidam  argumenta   persuasibilia ;   quae  et 
ipsa  in    parte    sunt    operis   et   arte    fiunt    et   materia 
egent.      Quidam  civiles  quaestiones  ;  quorum  opinio 
non  qualitate  sed  modo  erravit,  est  enim  haec  materia 

3  rhetorices   sed   non   sola.      Quidam,   quia   virtus    sit 
rhetorice,  materiam   eius  totam  vitam  vocant.      Alii, 
quia  non  omnium  virtutum  materia  sit  tota  vita,  sed 
pleraeque  earurn  versentur  in  partibus,  sicut  iustitia, 
fortitude,  continentia  propriis  officiis   et  suo  fine  in- 
telliguntur,  rlietoricen  quoque   dicunt  in   una  aliqua 
parte  ponendam,  eique  locum  in  ethice  negotialem 
adsignant  id  est  Trpay/iarueov. 

4  Ego    (neque    id    sine    auctoribus)    materiam    esse 
rhetorices  iudico  omnes  res  quaecunque  ei  ad  dicen- 
dum  subiectae  erunt.      Xam  Socrates  apud  Platonem 
dicere  Gorgiae  videtur,  non  in  verbis  esse  materiam 

1  Garg.  449  E.  2  Gorg.  449  E. 


BOOK    II.  xxi.  1-4 

XXI.  As  to  the  material  of    oratory,   some   have 

»    * 

asserted  that  it  is  speech,  as  for  instance  Gorgias 1  in 
the  dialogue  of  Plato.  If  this  view  be  accepted  in 
the  sense  that  the  word  "  speech  '  is'usedof  a  dis- 
course composed  on  any  subject,  then  it  is  not  the 
material,  but  the  work,  just  as  a  statue  is  the  work 
of  the  sculptor.  For  speeches  like  statues  require 
art  for  their  production.  If  on  the  other  hand 
we  interpret  "  speech '  as  indicating  the  words 
themselves,  they  can  do  nothing  unless  they  are 
related  to  facts.  Some  again  hold  that  the  material 
consists  of  persuasive  arguments.  But  they  form 
part  of  the  work,  are  produced  by  art  and  require 
material  themselves.  Some  say  that  political  2 
questions  provide  the  material.  The  mistake  made 
by  these  lies  not  in  the  quality  of  their  opinion 
but  in  its  limitation.  For  political  questions  are 
material  for  eloquence  but  not  the  only  material. 
Some,  on  the  ground  that  rhetoric  is  a  virtue,  make  the  3 
material  with  which  it  deals  to  be  the  whole  of  life. 
Others,  on  the  ground  that  life  regarded  as  a  whole 
does  not  provide  material  for  every  virtue,  since 
most  of  them  are  concerned  only  with  departments 
of  life  (justice,  courage  and  self-control  each  having 
their  own  duties  and  their  own  end),  would  conse- 
quently restrict  oratory  to  one  particular  department 
of  life  and  place  it  in  the  practical  or  pragmatic 
department  of  ethics,  that  is  to  say  the  department 
of  morals  which  deals  with  the  business  of  life. 

For  my  own  part,  and  I  have  authority  to  support  4 
me,  I  hold  that  the  material  of  rhetoric  is  composed  of 
everything  that  may  be  placed  before  it  as  a  subject 
for    speech.      Plato,    if    I    read    him    aright,    makes 
Socrates 2  say  to  Gorgias   that   its  material  is  to  be 



sed  in  rebus.  Et  in  Phaedro  palam,  non  in  iudiciis 
modo  et  contionibus,  sed  in  rebus  etiam  privatis  ac 
domesticis  rhetoricen  esse  demonstrat.  Quo  mani- 

5  festum  est  hanc  opinionem  ipsius  Platonis  fuisse.      Et 
Cicero  quodam  loco  materiam   rlietorices  vocat  res, 
quae  subiectae  sint  ei,  sed  certas  demum  putat  esse 
subiectas.       Alio    vero    de    omnibus    rebus    oratori 
dicendum  arbitratur   his  quidem   verbis :    Quanquam 
vis  orator  is  professioque  ipsa  bene  dicendi  hoc  suscipere 
ac  polliceri  videtur,  ut  omni  de  re,  quaecunque  sit  pro- 

6  posita,  ornate  ab  eo  copioseque  dicatur.      Atque  adhuc 
alibi  :    Vero   cniin   oratori,   quae   sunt    in   hondnnm   vita, 
quandoquidem  in  ea  versatur  orator  atqut  ea  est  ei  sub- 
iecta   materies,  omnia   quaesita,  audita,   lecta,  disputata, 
tractata,  agitata  esse  debent. 

7  Hanc  autem,  quam  nos  materiam  vocamus,  id  est 
res    subiectas,    quidam    modo    infinitam    modo    non 
propriam    rlietorices    esse    dixerunt,    eamque    artem 
circumcurrentem  vocaverunt,  quod  in  omni  materia 

8  diceret,  cum  quibus  mihi  minima  pugna  est.      Nam 
de    omni    materia    dicere    earn    fatentur ;    propriam 
habere  materiam,  quia  multiplicem   habeat,  negant. 
Sed    neque    infinita    est,   etiamsi   est   multiplex ;    et 

1  Phaedr.  2G1  A.  2  de  Inv.  i.  5. 

8  de  Or.  I.  vi.  '21.      "I   will  not  demand  omniscience  from 
an  orator,  although  "  etc.  *  ib.  ill.  xiv.  54. 


BOOK    II.  xxi.  4-8 

found  in  things  not  words  ;  while  in  the  Phaedrus  l 
he  clearly  proves  that  rhetoric  is  concerned  not 
merely  with  law-courts  and  public  assemblies,  but  with 
private  and  domestic  affairs  as  well :  from  which  it  is 
obvious  that  this  was  the  view  of  Plato  himself.  Cicero  5 
also  in  a  passage  2  of  one  of  his  works,  states  that 
the  material  of  rhetoric  is  composed  of  the  things 
which  are  brought  before  it,  but  makes  certain  re- 
strictions as  to  the  nature  of  these  things.  In 
another  passage,3  however,  he  expresses  his  opinion 
that  the  orator  has  to  speak  about  all  kinds  ofthiiigs; 
I  will  quote  his  actual  words:  "although  the  very 
meaning  of  the  name  of  orator  and  the  fact  that 
he  professes  to  speak  well  seem  to  imply  a  promise 
and  undertaking  that  the  orator  will  speak  with 
elegance  and  fullness  on  any  subject  that  may  be 
put  before  him."  And  in  another  passage4  he  says,  6 
"  It  is  the  duty  of  the  true  orator  to  seek  out,  hear, 
read,  discuss,  handle  and  ponder  everything  that  be- 
falls in  the  life  of  man,  since  it  is  with  this  that  the 
orator  is  concerned  and  this  that  forms  the  material 
with  which  he  has  to  deal." 

But  this  material,  as  we  call  it,  that  is  to  say  7 
the  things  brought  before  it,  has  been  criticised  by 
some,  at  times  on  the  ground  that  it  is  limitless,  and 
sometimes  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not  peculiar  to 
oratory,  which  they  have  therefore  dubbed  a  dis- 
cursive art,  because  all  is  grist  that  comes  to  its  mill. 
I  have  no  serious  quarrel  with  these  critics,  for  they  8 
acknowledge  that  rhetoric  is  concerned  with  every 
kind  of  material,  though  they  deny  that  it  has  any 
peculiar  material  just  because  of  that  material's  mul- 
tiplicity. But  in  spite  of  this  multiplicity,  rhetoric 
is  not  unlimited  in  scope,  and  there  are  other  minor 



aliae  quoque  artes  minores  habent  multiplicem 
materiam,  velut  architectonice,  namque  ea  in  omni- 
bus, quae  sunt  aedificio  utilia,  versatur,  et  caelatura, 
9  quae  auro,  argento,  acre,  ferro  opera  efficit.  Nam 
sculptura  etiam  lignum,  ebur,  marmor,  vitrum, 
gemmas  praeter  ea  quae  supra  dixi  complectitur. 

10  Neque   protinus    non    est   materia    rhetorices,  si   in 
eadem  versatur  et  alius.      Nam  si  quaeram,  quae  sit 
materia  statuarii,  dicetur  aes ;   si  quaeram   quae  sit 
excusoris,  id  est  fabricae   eius  quam  Graeci  ^a\Kev- 
rLKrjv  vocant,  similiter  aes  esse  respondeant.     Atqui 

11  plurimum  statuis  differunt  vasa.      Nee  medicina  ideo 
non  erit  ars,  quia  unctio  et  exercitatio  cum   palae- 
strica,  ciborum  vero  qualitas  etiam  cum  cocorum  ei 

12  sit  arte  communis.     Quod  vero  de  bono,  utili,  iusto 
disserere    philosophiae    officium    esse    dicunt,    non 
obstat.     Nam   cum   philosophum  dicunt,  hoc  accipi 
voluiit  virum  bonum.     Quare  igitur  oratorem,  quern 
a   bono  viro   non  separo,   in   eadem   materia  versari 

13  mirer  ?  cum   praesertim  primo  libro  iam  ostenderim^ 
pliilosophos     omissam     hanc    ab    oratoribus    partem 
occupasse,  quae   rhetorices   propria    semper    fuisset, 
ut  illi  potius  in  nostra  materia  versentur.     Denique 
cum  sit  dialectices   materia  de  rebus   subiectis  dis- 
putare,  sit  autem  dialectice  oratio  concisa,  cur  non 
eadem  perpetuae  quoque  materia  videatur  ? 

1  Pref.  §  10  sqq. 

BOOK    II.  xxi.  8-13 

arts  whose  material  is  characterised  by  the  same 
multiplicity:  such  for  instance  is  architecture, which 
deals  with  everything  that  is  useful  for  the  purpose 
of  building  :  such  too  is  the  engraver's  art  which 
works  on  gold,  silver,  bronze,  iron.  As  for  sculpture,  9 
its  activity  extends  to  wood,  ivory,  marble,  glass  and 
precious  stones  in  addition  to  the  materials  already 
mentioned.  And  things  which  form  the  material  for  10 
other  artists,  do  not  for  that  reason  cease  forthwith 
to  be  material  for  rhetoric.  For  if  I  ask  what  is  the 
material  of  the  sculptor,  I  shall  be  told  bronze  ;  and 
if  I  ask  what  is  the  material  of  the  maker  of  vessels 
(I  refer  to  the  craft  styled  ^aA^em-iKr/  by  the  Greeks), 
the  answer  will  again  be  bronze :  and  yet  there  is 
all  the  difference  in  the  world  between  vessels  and 
statues.  Similarly  medicine  will  not  cease  to  be  an  11 
art,  because,  like  the  art  of  the  gymnast,  it  pre- 
scribes rubbing  with  oil  and  exercise,  or  because  it 
deals  with  diet  like  the  art  of  cookery.  Again,  the  12 
objection  that  to  discourse  of  what  is  good,  expedient 
or  just  is  the  duty  of  philosophy  presents  no  diffi- 
culty. For  when  such  critics  speak  of  a  philosopher, 
they  mean  a  good  man.  Why  then  should  I  feel 
surprised  to  find  that  the  orator  whom  I  identify  with 
the  good  man  deals  with  the  same  material  ?  There  13 
is  all  the  less  reason,  since  I  have  already  shown  in 
the  first  book  !  that  philosophers  only  usurped  this 
department  of  knowledge  after  it  had  been  aban- 
doned by  the  orators :  it  was  always  the  peculiar 
property  of  rhetoric  and  the  philosophers  are  really 
trespassers.  Finally,  since  the  discussion  of  what- 
ever is  brought  before  it  is  the  task  of  dialectic, 
which  is  really  a  concise  form  of  oratory,  why  should 
not  this  task  be  regarded  as  also  being  the  appro- 
priate material  for  continuous  oratory  ?  , 


14  Solet  a  quibusdam  et  illud  opponi :   Omnium  igitut 
artium  peritus  erit  orator,  si  de  omnibus  ei  dicendum  est. 
Possem  hie  Ciceronis  respondere  verbis,  apud  quern 
hoc  invenio  :   Mea  quid  em   sententia  nemo   esse  poterit 
omni  laude   cumulatus   orator,  nisi    erit    omnium    rerum 
magnarum  atque  artium  scientiam  consecutus ;  sed  mihi 
satis  est   eius   esse  oratorem   rei   de   qua  dicet   non 

15  inscium.     Neque  enim  omnes  causas  novit,  et  debet 
posse  de   omnibus  dicere.      De   quibus   ergo  dicet .' 
De  quibus  didicit.     Similiter  de  artibus  quoque,  de 
quibus  dicendum  erit,  interim  discet;  et  de  quibus 
didicerit   dicet. 

16  Quid     ergo?    non     faber    de    fabrica    melius    aut 
de   musice   musicus  ?      Si    nesciat    orator,    quid    sit, 
de  quo  quaeratur,   plane  melius.      Nam  et  litigator 
rusticus    illitteratusque    de   causa  sua    melius,   quam 
orator,   qui    nesciet   quid    in    lite  sit ;    sed     accepta 
a    musico,   a  fabro,   sicut   a   litigatore    melius  orator 

17  qnam    ipse  qui  docuerit.      Verum  et  faber,  cum  de 
fabrica,  et  musicus,  cum  de  musica,  si  quid  confirma- 
tionem  desideraverit,  dicet.      Non  quidem  erit  orator, 
sed  faciet  illud  quasi  orator,  sicut  cum  vulnus  impe- 

1  de  Or.  i.  vi.  20. 

BOOK    II.  xxi.  14-17 

There  is  a  further  objection  made  by  certain  14 
critics,  who  say  "  Well  then. if  an  orator  has  to  speak  on 
every  subject,  he  must  be  the  master  of  all  the  arts." 
I  might  answer  this  criticism  in  the  words  of  Cicero,1 
in  whom  I  find  the  following  passage  : — •"  In  my 
opinion  no  one  can  be  an  absolutely  perfect  orator 
unless  he  has  acquired  a  knowledge  of  all  important 
subjects  and  arts."  I  however  regard  it  as  suffi- 
cient that  an  orator  should  not  be  actually  ignorant 
of  the  subject  on  which  he  has  to  speak.  For  he  15 
cannot  have  a  knowledge  of  all  causes,  and  yet  he 
should  be  able  to  speak  on  all.  On  what  then 
will  he  speak  ?  On  those  which  he  has  studied. 
Similarly  as  regards  the  arts,  he  will  study  those 
concerning  which  he  has  to  speak,  as  occasion  may 
demand,  and  will  speak  on  those  which  he  has 

What  then  ? — I  am  asked — will  not  a  builder  16 
speak  better  on  the  subject  of  building  and  a  musi- 
cian on  music  ?  Certainly,  if  the  orator  does  not 
know  what  is  the  question  at  issue.  Even  an  illite- 
rate peasant  who  is  a  party  to  a  suit  will  speak 
better  on  behalf  of  his  case  than  an  orator  who  does 
not  know  what  the  subject  in  dispute  may  be.  But 
on  the  other  hand  if  the  orator  receive  instruction 
from  the  builder  or  the  musician,  he  will  put  for- 
ward what  he  has  thus  learned  better  than  either, 
just  as  he  will  plead  a  case  better  than  his  client, 
once  he  has  been  instructed  in  it.  The  builder  and  17 
the  musician  will,  however,  speak  on  the  subject  of 
their  respective  arts,  if  there  should  be  any  technical 
point  which  requires  to  be  established.  Neither  will 
be  an  orator,  but  he  will  perform  his  task  like  an 
orator,  just  as  when  an  untrained  person  binds  up  a 



ritus    deligabit,    non    erit    medicus,    sed     faciet    ut 

18  medicus.      An  huiusmodi  res  neque  in  laudem  rieque 
in  deliberationem  neque  in  iudicium  veniunt?      Ergo 
cum  de  faciendo  portu  Ostiensi  deliberatum  est,  non 
debuit   sententiam   dicere    orator?    atqui    opus    erat 

19  ratione  architectorum.      Livores  et  tumores  in  cor- 
pore    cruditatis    an   veneni    signa    sint,    non    tractat 
orator  ?  at  est  id  ex  ratione  medicinae.      Circa  men- 
suras    et    numeros    non    versabitur  ?    dicamus    has 
geometriae  esse  partes.      Equidern  omnia  fere  credo 
posse  casu  aliquo  venire  in  officium  oratoris  ;  quod  si 
non  accidet,  non  erunt  ei  subiecta. 

20  Ita  sic  quoque  recte  diximus,  materiam   rhetorices 
esse    omnes    res    ad    dicendum    ei    subiectas  ;    quod 
quidem   probat  etiam  sermo  communis.      Nam  cum 
aliquid,  de  quo   dicamus,   accepimus,  positam   nobis 
esse  materiam   frequenter   etiam    praefatione   testa- 

21  mur.      Gorgias  quidem  adeo  rhetori  de  omnibus  rebus 
putavit  esse  dicendum,  ut  se  in  auditoriis  interrogari 
pateretur,  qua  quisque   de   re   vellet.      Hermagoras 
quoque,  dicendo  materiam  esse  in  causa  et  in  quae- 

22  stionibus,  omnes  res  subiectas  erat  complexus.     Sed 
quaestiones  si  negat  ad  rhetoricen  pertinere,  dissentit 
a  nobis  ;  si  autem  ad   rhetoricen   pertinent,  ab  hoc 

1  See  in.  T. 

BOOK    II.  xxi.  17-22 

wound,  he  will  not  be  a  physician,  but  he  will  be 
acting  as  one.  Is  it  suggested  that  such  topics  18 
never  crop  up  in  panegyric,  deliberative  or  forensic 
oratory  ?  When  the  question  of  the  construction  of 
a  port  at  Ostia  came  up  for  discussion,  had  not  the 
orator  to  state  his  views?  And  yet  it  was  a  subject 
requiring  the  technical  knowledge  of  the  architect. 
Does  not  the  orator  discuss  the  question  whether  19 
livid  spots  and  swellings  on  the  body  are  sympto- 
matic of  ill-health  or  poison  ?  And  yet  that  is  a 
question  for  the  qualified  physician.  Will  he  not 
deal  with  measurements  and  figures?  And  yet  we 
must  admit  that  they  form  part  of  mathematics.  For 
my  part  I  hold  that  practically  all  subjects  are 
under  certain  circumstances  liable  to  come  up  for 
treatment  by  the  orator.  If  the  circumstances  do 
not  occur,  the  subjects  will  not  concern  him. 

We  were  therefore  right  in  asserting  that  the  20 
material  of  rhetoric  is  composed  of  everything  that 
comes  before  the  orator  for  treatment,  an  assertion 
which  is  confirmed  by  the  practice  of  everyday 
speech.  For  when  we  have  been  given  a  subject 
on  which  to  speak,  we  often  preface  our  remarks  by 
calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  matter  has 
been  laid  before  us.  Gorgias  indeed  felt  so  strongly  21 
that  it  was  the  orator's  duty  to  speak  on  every  sub- 
ject, that  he  used  to  allow  those  who  attended  his 
lectures  to  ask  him  questions  on  any  subject  they 
pleased.  Hermagoras  also  asserted  that  the  material 
of  oratory  lay  in  the  cause  and  the  questions  it 
involved,  thereby  including  every  subject  that  can 
be  brought  before  it.  If  he  denies  that  general  22 
questions  l  are  the  concern  of  oratory,  he  disagrees 
with  me :  but  if  they  do  concern  rhetoric,  that 



quoque  adiuvamur.      Nihil   est   enim,  quod    non  in 

23  causam    aut    quaestionem    cadat.       Aristoteles    tres 
faciendo  partes  orationis,  iudicialem,  deliberativam, 
demonstrativam,  paene  et  ipse  oratori  subiecit  omnia  ; 
nihil  enim  non  in  haec  cadit. 

24  Quaesitum   a  paucissimis   et  de   instrumento  est. 
Instrumentum  voco,  sine  quo  formari  materia  in  id 
quod  velimus  effici  opus  non  possit.      Verum  hoc  ego 
non  artem  credo  egere  sed  artificem.      Neque  enim 
scientia   desiderat   instrumentum,   quae    potest    esse 
consummata,    etiamsi    nihil    facial,   sed    ille   artifex, 
ut     caelator    caelum    et    pictor    penicilla.       Itaque 
haec  in   eum  locum,  quo  de  ovatore  dicturi  sumus^ 


BOOK    II.  xxi.  22-24 

supports  my  contention.  For  there  is  nothing  which 
may  not  crop  up  in  a  cause  or  appear  as  a  question 
for  discussion.  Aristotle  l  himself  also  by  his  tripartite  23 
division  of  oratory,  into  forensic,  deliberative  and 
demonstrative,  practically  brought  everything  into  the 
orator's  domain,  since  there  is  nothing  that  may  not 
come  up  for  treatment  by  one  of  these  three  kinds  of 

A  very  few  critics  have  raised  the  question  as  to  24 
what  may  be  the  instrument  of  oratory.  My  defini- 
tion of  an  instrument  is  that  without  which  the  material 
cannot  be  brought  into  the  shape  necessary  for  the  effect- 
ing of  our  object.  But  it  is  not  the  art  which  re- 
quires an  instrument,  but  the  artist.  Knowledge 
needs  no  instruments,  for  it  may  be  complete 
although  it  produces  nothing,  but  the  artist  must 
have  them.  The  engraver  cannot  work  without  his 
chisel  nor  the  painter  without  his  brush.  I  shall 
therefore  defer  this  question  until  I  come  to  treat  of 
the  orator  as  distinct  from  his  art. 

1  Rhet.  i.  iii.  3. 




I.  QLONIAM  in  libro  secundo  quaesitum  est,  quid 
esset  rhetorice  et  quis  finis  eius,  artem  quoque  esse 
earn  et  utilem  et  virtutem,  ut  vires  nostrae  tulerunt, 
ostendimus,  materiamque  ei  res  omnes,  de  quibus 
dicere  oporteret,  subiecimus  :  iam  hinc,  unde  coepe- 
rit,  quibus  constet,  quo  quaeque  in  ea  modo  inveni- 
enda  atque  tractanda  sint,  exsequar ;  intra  quern 
modum  plerique  scriptores  artium  constiterunt, 
adeo  ut  Apollodorus  contentus  solis  iudicialibus 

2  fuerit.      Nee  sum  ignarus,  hoc  a  me  praecipue,  quod 
hie  liber  inchoat,  opus  studiosos  eius  desiderasse,  ut 
inquisitione  opinionum,  quae  diversissimae    fuerunt, 
longe  difficillimum,  ita  nescio  an  minimae  legentibus 
futurum  voluptati,  quippe  quod  prope  nudam  prae- 

3  ceptorum   traditionem   desideret.      In    ceteris    enim 
admiseere  temptavimus  aliquid   nitoris,  non  iactandi 
ingenii   gratia    (namque    in  id  eligi   materia   poterat 
uberior),  sed  ut  hoc  ipso  adliceremus  magis  iuventu- 
tem  ad  cognitionem  eorum,  quae  necessaria  studiis 
arbitrabamur,   si    ducti    iucunditate    aliqua    lectionis 


BOOK   111 

1.  IN  the  second  book  the  subject  of  inquiry 
was  the  nature  and  the  end  of  rhetoric,  and  I  proved 
to  the  best  of  my  ability  that  it  was  an  art,  that  it 
was  useful,  that  it  was  a  virtue  and  that  its  material 
was  all  and  every  subject  that  might  come  up  for 
treatment.  I  shall  now  discuss  its  origin,  its  com- 
ponent parts,  and  the  method  to  be  adopted  in  hand- 
ling and  forming  our  conception  of  each.  For  most 
authors  of  text-books  have  stopped  short  of  this, 
indeed  Apollodorus  confines  himself  solely  to  forensic 
oratory.  I  know  that  those  who  asked  me  to  write  2 
this  \vork  were  specially  interested  in  that  portion  on 
which  I  am  now  entering,  and  which,  owing  to  the 
necessity  of  examining  a  great  diversity  of  opinions,  at 
once  forms  by  far  the  most  difficult  section  of  this  work, 
and  also,  I  fear,  may  be  the  least  attractive  to  my 
readers,  since  it  necessitates  a  dry  exposition  of  rules. 
In  other  portions  of  this  work  I  have  attempted  to  3 
introduce  a  certain  amount  of  ornateness,  not,  I  may 
say,  to  advertise  my  style  (if  I  had  wished  to  do  that,  I 
could  have  chosen  a  more  fertile  theme),  but  in  order 
that  I  might  thus  do  something  to  lure  our  young 
men  to  make  themselves  acquainted  with  those  prin- 
ciples which  I  regarded  as  necessary  to  the  study  of 
rhetoric  :  for  I  hoped  that  by  giving  them  something 
which  was  not  unpleasant  to  read  I  might  induce  a 
greater  readiness  to  learn  those  rules  which  I  feared 



libentius  discerent  ea,  quorum  ne  ieiuna  atque  arida 
traditio   averteret   animos  et   aures   praesertim    tarn 

4  delicatas  raderet  verebamur.      Qua  ratione  se  Lucre- 
tius dicit  praecepta  philosophiae  carmine  esse  com- 
plexum ;    namque    hac,   ut    est    notum,    similitudine 
utitur : 

Ac  veluti  pueris  absinthia  taeira  medentes 
Cum  dare  conantur,  prius  oras  pocula  circum 
Aspirant1  mellis  dulcijlavoque  (iquore, 

5  et  quae  sequuntur.     Sed  nos  veremur,  ne  parurn  hie 
liber   mellis   et    absinthii    multiim    babere   videatur, 
sitque   salubrior  studiis   quam   dulcior.      Quin   etiam 
hoc  timeo,  ne   ex   eo  minorem  gratiam  meat,  quod 
pleraque    non    inventa  per   me    sed    ab   aliis    tradita 
continebit,  habeat  etiam  quosdam,  qui  contra  sentiant 
et    adversentur,    propterea    quod     plurimi    auctores, 
quamvis     eodem    tenderent,    diversas     tamen    vias 
muniverunt  atque  in  suam  quisque  induxit  sequentes. 

6  Illi  autem   probant  qualecunque   ingressi  sunt   iter, 
nee  facile  inculcatas  pueris  persuasiones  mutaveris, 

7  quia  nemo  non  didicisse  mavult  quam  discere.     Est 
autem,  ut  procedente  libro  patebit,  infinita  dissensio 
auctorum,  primo  ad  ea,  quae  rudia  atque  imperfecta 
adhuc  erant,  adiicientibus  quod  invenissent  scripto- 

1  inspiraut,     A  :     adspirant,     B  :    contingunt,    MSS.     of 

1  iv.  11.     See  also  i.  936. 

ROOK   III.  i.  3-7 

might,  by  the  dryness  and  aridity  which  must  neces- 
sarily characterise  their  exposition,  revolt  their  minds 
and  offend  their  ears  which  are  nowadays  grown 

•-  O 

somewhat   over-sensitive.       Lucretius   has   the   same   4 
object  in  mind  when  he  states  that  he  has   set  forth 
his  philosophical  system   in  verse  ;  for  you   will  re- 
member the  well-known  simile  which  he  uses  l  : — 

"  And  as  physicians  when  they  seek  to  give 
A  draught  of  bitter  wormwood  to  a  child, 
First  smear  along  the  edge  that  rims  the  cup 
The  liquid  sweets  of  honey,  golden-hued," 

and  the  rest.  But  I  fear  that  this  book  will  have  6 
too  little  honey  and  too  much  wormwood,  and  that 
though  the  student  may  find  it  a  healthy  draught, 
it  will  be  far  from  agreeable.  I  am  also  haunted  by 
the  further  fear  that  it  will  be  all  the  less  attractive 
from  the  fact  that  most  of  the  precepts  which  it  con- 
tains are  not  original,  but  derived  from  others,  and 
because  it  is  likely  to  rouse  the  opposition  of  certain 
persons  who  do  not  share  my  views.  For  there  are 
a  large  number  of  writers,  who  though  they  are  all 
moving  toward  the  same  goal,  have  constructed 
different  roads  to  it  and  each  drawn  their  followers 
into  their  own.  The  latter,  however,  approve  of  6 
the  path  on  which  they  have  been  launched  what- 
ever its  nature,  and  it  is  difficult  to  change  the  con- 
victions implanted  in  boyhood,  for  the  excellent  reason 
that  evervbodv  prefers  to  have  learned  rather  than 

•/  +>        i 

to  be  in  process  of  learning.     But,  as  will  appear  in  7 
the  course  of  this  book,  there  is  an  infinite  diversity 
of  opinions  among  writers  on  this  subject,  since  some 
have   added  their  own  discoveries  to  those  portions 
of  the  art  which  were  still  shapeless  and  unformed, 



ribus,  mox,  ut  aliquid  sui  viderentur  adferre,  etiam 
recta  mutantibus. 

8  Nam    primus   post   eos,   quos   poetae   tradiderunt, 
movisse  aliqua  circa  rhetoricen  Empedocles  dicitur. 
Artium  autem  scriptores  antiquissimi  Corax  et  Tisias 
Siculi,  quos  insecutus  est  vir  eiusdem  insulae  Gorgias 

9  Leontinus,  Empedoclis,   ut    traditur,  discipulus.      Is 
beneficio  longissimae  aetatis  (nam  centum  et  novem 
vixit    annos)    cum    multis    simul   floruit,   ideoque    et 
illorum,  de  quibus  supra  dixi,  fuit  aemulus  et  ultra 

10  Socraten     usque    duravit.       Thrasymachus     Chalce- 
donius  cum  hoc  et  Prodicus  Cius  et  Abderites   Pro- 
tagoras, a  quo  decem  milibus   denariorum   didicisse 
artem,    quam    edidit,    Euathlus    dicitur,   et    Hippias 
Eleus  et,  quern  Palameden  Plato  appellat,  Alcidamas 

11  Elaites.       Antiphon    quoque    et    orationem    primus 
omnium  scripsit  et  nihilo  minus  et  artem  ipse  com- 
posuit  et  pro  se  dixisse  optime  est  creditus,  etiam 
Polycrates,  a  quo  scriptam  in  Socraten  diximus  ora- 
tionem, et  Theodorus  Byzantius  ex  iis  et  ipse,  quos 

12  Plato    appellat    AoyoStuSa/Xoi;?.      Horum    primi    com- 
munes locos  tractasse  dicuntur  Protagoras,  Gorgias, 
adfectus   Prodicus  et  Hippias  et  idem   Protagoras  et 
Thrasymachus.      Cicero  in  Bruto  negat  ante  Periclea 
scriptum  quidquam,  quod  ornatum  oratorium  habeat ; 
eius  aliqua   ferri.      Equidem   non   reperio  quidquam 

1  About  £312.  *  Phacdr.  261  D. 

8  Phacdr.  260  E.          «  vii.  27. 


BOOK    III.  i.  7-12 

and  subsequently  have  altered  even  what  was  per- 
fectly sound  in  order  to  establish  a  claim  to 

The  first  writer  after  those  recorded  by  the  poets  8 
who  is  said  to  have  taken  any  steps  in  the  direction 
of  rhetoric  is  Empedocles.  But  the  earliest  writers 
of  text-books  are  the  Sicilians,  Corax  and  Tisias, 
who  were  followed  by  another  from  the  same  island, 
namely  Gorgias  of  Leontini,  whom  tradition  asserts 
to  have  been  the  pupil  of  Empedocles.  He,  thanks  to  9 
his  length  of  days,  for  he  lived  to  a  hundred  and  nine, 
flourished  as  the  contemporary  of  many  rhetoricians, 
was  consequently  the  rival  of  those  whom  I  have 
just  mentioned,  and  lived  on  to  survive  Socrates. 
In  the  same  period  flourished  Thrasymachus  of  10 
Chalcedon,  Prodicus  of  Ceos,  Protagoras  of  Abdera, 
for  whose  instructions,  which  he  afterwards  published 
in  a  text-book,  Euathlus  is  said  to  have  paid  10,000  1 
denarii,  Hippias  of  Elis  and  Alcidamas  of  Elaea  whom 
Plato2  calls  Palamedes.  There  was  Antiphon  also,  11 
who  was  the  first  to  write  speeches  and  who  also  wrote 
a  text-book  and  is  said  to  have  spoken  most  elo- 
quently in  his  own  defence  ;  Polycrates,  who,  as  I 
have  already  said,  wrote  a  speech  against  Socrates, 
and  Theodorus  of  Byzantium.,  who  was  one  of  those 
called  "word-artificers"  by  Plato.3  Of  these  Pro-  12 
tagoras  and  Gorgias  are  said  to  have  been  the 
first  to  treat  commonplaces,  Prodicus,  Hippias, 
Protagoras  and  Thrasymachus  the  first  to  handle 
emotional  themes.  Cicero  in  the  Brutus*  states 
that  nothing  in  the  ornate  rhetorical  style  was 
ever  committed  to  writing  before  Pericles,  and  that 
certain  of  his  speeches  are  still  extant.  For  my 
part  I  have  been  unable  to  discover  anything  in 



tanta    eloquentiae    fama    dignum ;    ideoque    minus 
miror   esse,  qui   nihil   ab   eo  scriptum    putent,  hacc 

13  autem,  quae  feruntur,  ab  aliis  esse  composita.      His 
successere  multi^  sed  clarissimus  Gorgiae  auditorum 
Isocrates,  quanquam   de  praeceptore  eius  inter  auc- 
tores  non  convenit ;  nos  autem  Aristoteli  credimus. 

14  Hinc  velut  diversae  secari  coeperunt  viae.      Nam  et 
Isocratis    praestantissimi   discipuli   fuerunt    in    omni 
studiorum  genere,  eoque  iam  seniore  (octavum  enim 
et    nonagesimum    implevit    annum)    postrneridianis 
scholis  Aristoteles  praecipere  artem  oratoriam  coepit, 
noto  quidem  illo  (ut  traditur)  versu  ex  Philocteta  fre- 
quenter usus  :  Turpe  esse  tacere  et  hocralen  pati  dicere. 
Ars  est  utriusque,  sed  pluribus  earn  libris  Aristoteles 
complexus  est.     Eodem  tempore  Theodectes  fuit,  de 

15  cuius  opere  supra  dictum  est.     Theophrastus  quoque 
Aristotelis  discipulus  de  rhetorice  diligenter  scripsit, 
atque  hinc  vel  studiosius  philosophi  quam  rhetores 
praecipueque  Stoicorum  ac  Peripateticorum  principes. 

16  Fecit  deinde  velut  propriam  Hermagoras  viam,  quam 
plurimi  sunt  secuti ;  cui  maxime  par  atque  aemulus 

1  cp.  xn,  ii.  22  :    x.  49,  where  Quintilian  asserts  that  all 
the  writings  of  Pericles  have  been  lost. 

2  Aristotle   gave    his    esoteric    lectures    in    the    morning, 
reserving  the  afternoon  for  those  of  more  general  interest  : 
see  Aul.  Gell.  xx.  v. 


BOOK    III.  i.  12-16 

the  least  worthy  of  his  great  reputation  for  eloquence,1 
and  am  consequently  the  less  surprised  that  there 
should  be  some  who  hold  that  he  never  committed 
anything  to  writing,  and  that  the  writings  circula- 
ting under  his  name  are  the  works  of  others.  These  13 
rhetoricians  had  many  successors,  but  the  most 
famous  of  Gorgias'  pupils  was  Isocrates,  although 
our  authorities  are  not  agreed  as  to  who  was  his 
teacher  :  I  however  accept  the  statement  of  Aristotle 
on  the  subject.  From  this  point  the  roads  begin  to  14 
part.  The  pupils  of  Isocrates  were  eminent  in  every 
branch  of  study,  and  when  he  was  already  advanced 
in  years  (and  he  lived  to  the  age  of  ninety-eight), 
Aristotle  began  to  teach  the  art  of  rhetoric  in  his 
afternoon  lectures,2  in  which  he  frequently  quoted 
the  well-known  line  from  the  Philoctetes*  in  the  form 

"  Isocrates  still  speaks.   'Twere  shame  should  I 
Sit  silent." 

Both  Aristotle  and  Isocrates  left  text-books  on 
rhetoric,  but  that  by  Aristotle  is  the  larger  and  con- 
tains more  books.  Theodectes,  whose  work  I  men- 
tioned above,  also  lived  about  the  same  period  ;  while  15 
Theophrastus,  the  pupil  of  Aristotle,  produced  some 
careful  work  on  rhetoric.  After  him  we  may  note 
that  the  philosophers,  more  especially  the  leaders  of 
the  Stoic  and  Peripatetic  schools,  surpassed  even 
the  rhetoricians  in  the  zeal  which  they  devoted  to 
the  subject.  Hermagoras  next  carved  out  a  path  of  16 
his  own,  which  numbers  have  followed :  of  his  rivals 
Athenaeus  seems  to  have  approached  him  most 

8  Probably  the  Philoctetes  of  Euripides.  The  original  line 
was  cuVxpfc"  ffiuirav,  fiap&dpovs  5'  iav  \eyfiv,  which  Aristotle 
travestied  by  substituting  'IffOKpaTrjv  for  &ap@dpovs. 



videtur    Athenaeus   fuisse.       Multa   post   Apollonius 
Molon,  multa  Areus,  multa  Caecilius  et   Halicarnas- 

17  seus  Dionysius.      Praecipue  tamen  in  se  converterimt 
studia  Apollodorus  Pergamenus,  qui  praeceptor  Apol- 
loniae  Caesaris  August!  fuit,  et  Theodorus  Gadareus, 
qui  se  dici  maluit   Rhodium,  quern  studiose  audisse, 
cum    in    earn    insulam    secessisset,    dicitur    Tiberius 

18  Caesar.      Hi  diversas  opiniones  tradiderunt,  appella- 
tique  inde  Apollodorei  ac  Theodorei  ad  morem  certas 
in    philosophia    sectas    sequendi.      Sed    Apollodori 
praecepta     magis    ex    discipulis    cognoscas,    quorum 
diligentissimus  in  tradendo  fuit  Latine  Gaius  Valgius, 
Graece  Atticus.      Nam  ipsius  sola  videtur  Ars  edita 
ad  Matium,   quia  ceteras   missa  ad  Domitium   epis- 
tula  non   agnoscit.      Plura  scripsit  Theodorus,    cuius 
auditorem  Hermagoran  sunt  qui  viderint. 

19  Romanorum  primus  (quantum  ego  quidem  sciam) 
condidit  aliqua  in  hanc  materiam  M.  Cato  ille  cen- 
sorius,  post  M.  Antonius  inchoavit ;  nam  hoc  solum 
opus     eius    atque    id     ipsum     imperfectum    manet. 
Secuti  minus   celebres ;    quorum   memoriam,   si  quo 

20  loco   res    poscet,    non    omittam.       Praecipuum    vero 
lumen  sicut  eloquentiae  ita  praeceptis  quoque  eius 
dedit,  unicum  apud  nos  specimen  orandi  docendique 
oratorias  artes,  M.  Tullius ;  post  quern  tacere  mode- 

1  The  younger  Hermagoras,  a  rhetorician  of  the  Augustan 


BOOK    III.  i.  16-20 

nearly.  Later  still  much  work  was  done  by  Apol- 
lonius  Molon,  Areus,  Caecilius  and  Dionysius  of 
Halicarnassus.  But  the  rhetoricians  who  attracted  17 
the  most  enthusiastic  following  were  Apollodorus  of 
Pergamus,  who  was  the  instructor  of  Augustus  Caesar 
at  Apollonia,  and  Theodorus  of  Gadara,  who  preferred 
to  be  called  Theodorus  of  Rhodes  :  it  is  said  that 
Tiberius  Caesar  during  his  retirement  in  that  island 
was  a  constant  attendant  at  his  lectures.  These  18 
rhetoricians  taught  different  systems,  and  two  schools 
have  arisen  known  as  the  Apollodoreans  and  the 
Theodoreans,  these  names  being  modelled  on  the 
fashion  of  nomenclature  in  vogue  with  certain  schools 
of  philosophy.  The  doctrines  of  Apollodorus  are 
best  learned  from  his  pupils,  among  whom  Cains 
Valgius  was  the  best  interpreter  of  his  master's  views 
in  Latin,  Atticus  in  Greek.  The  only  text-book  by 
Apollodorus  himself  seems  to  be  that  addressed  to 
Matius,  as  his  letter  to  Domitius  does  not  acknow- 
ledge the  other  works  attributed  to  him.  The 
writings  of  Theodorus  were  more  numerous,  and 
there  are  some  still  living  who  have  seen  his  pupil 

The  first  Roman  to  handle  the  subject  was,  to  the  19 
best  of  my  belief,  Marcus  Cato,  the  famous  censor, 
while  after  him  Marcus  Antonius  began  a  treatise  on 
rhetoric  :  I  say  "  began,"  because  only  this  one  work  of 
his  survives,  and  that  is  incomplete.  He  was  followed 
by  others  of  less  note,  whose  names  I  will  not  omit  to 
mention,  should  occasion  demand.  But  it  was  Cicero  20 
who  shed  the  greatest  light  not  only  on  the  practice 
but  on  the  theory  of  oratory ;  for  he  stands  alone 
among  Romans  as  combining  the  gift  of  actual  elo- 
quence with  that  of  teaching  the  art.  With  him  for 



stissimum  foret,  nisi  et  rhetoricos  suos  ipse  adole- 
scent! sibi  elapsos  diceret,  et  in  oratoriis  haec 
minora,  quae  plerumque  desiderantur,  sciens  omi- 

21  sisset.     Scripsit  de  eadem  materia  non   pauca  Cor- 
nificius,    aliqua     Stertinius,    nonnihil    pater     Gallic ; 
accuratius  vero  priores  Gallione  Celsus  et  Laenas  et 
aetatis  nostrae  Verginius.,  Plinius,  Tutilius.     Stint  et 
hodie  clari   eiusdem   operis    auctores,   qui    si    omnia 
complexi  forent,  consuluissent  labori  meo ;  sed  parco 
nominibus    viventium ;    veniet    eorum    laudi    suum 
tempus,  ad  posteros  enim   virtus    durabit,  non  per- 
veniet  invidia. 

22  Non   tamen   post  tot  ac   tantos    auctores    pigebit 
meam  quibusdam  locis  posuisse  sententiam.      Neque 
enim  me   cuiusquam  sectae  velut  quadam  supersti- 
tione  imbutus  addixi,  et  electuris  quae  volent  faci- 
enda  copia  fuit,  sicut  ipse  plurium  in  unum  confero 
inventa,    ubicunque    ingenio    non    erit    locus,    curae 
testimonium  meruisse  contentus. 

II.  Nee  diu  nos  moretur  quaestio,  quae  rhetorices 
origo  sit.  Nam  cui  dubium  est,  quin  sermonem  ab 
ipsa  rerum  natura  geniti  protinus  homines  acceperint 
(quod  certe  principium  est  eius  rei),  huic  studium  et 
incrementum  dederit  utilitas,  summam  ratio  et  exer- 
2  citatio  ?  Nee  video,  quare  curam  dicendi  putent 

1  sc.  the  de  Inventione. 

BOOK    III.  i.  20-11.  2 

predecessor  it  would  be  more  modest  to  be  silent,  but 
for  the  fact  that  he  himself  describes  his  Rhetorica1 
as  a  youthful  indiscretion,  while  in  his  later  works  on 
oratory  he  deliberately  omitted  the  discussion  of 
certain  minor  points,  on  which  instruction  is  generally 
desired.  Cornificius  wrote  a  good  deal,  Stertinius  21 
something,  and  the  elder  Gallic  a  little  on  the  same 
subject.  But  Gallio's  predecessors,  Celsus  and  Laenas, 
and  in  our  own  day  Verginius,  Pliny  and  Tutilius, 
have  treated  rhetoric  with  greater  accuracy.  Even 
to-day  we  have  some  distinguished  writers  on  oratory 
who,  if  they  had  dealt  with  the  subject  more  com- 
prehensively, would  have  saved  me  the  trouble  of 
writing  this  book.  But  I  will  spare  the  names  of  the 
living.  The  time  will  come  when  they  will  reap  their 
meed  of  praise  ;  for  their  merits  will  endure  to  after 
generations,  while  the  calumnies  of  envy  will  perish 

Still,  although  so  many  writers  have  preceded  me,  22 
I  shall  not  shrink  from  expressing  my  own  opinion  on 
certain  points.  I  am  not  a  superstitious  adherent  of 
any  school,  and  as  this  book  will  contain  a  collection 
of  the  opinions  of  many  different  authors,  it  was  de- 
sirable to  leave  it  to  my  readers  to  select  what  they 
will.  I  shall  be  content  if  they  praise  me  for  my 
industry,  wherever  there  is  no  scope  for  originality. 

II.  The  question  as  to  the  origin  of  rhetoric  need 
not  keep  us  long.  For  who  can  doubt  that  mankind 
received  the  gift  of  speech  from  nature  at  its  birth 
(for  we  can  hardly  go  further  back  than  that),  while 
the  usefulness  of  speech  brought  improvement  and 
study,  and  finally  method  and  exercise  gave  per- 
fection ?  I  cannot  understand  why  some  hold  that  2 
the  elaboration  of  speech  originated  in  the  fact  that 


quidam  inde  coepisse,  quod  ii,  qui  in  discrimen 
aliquod  vocabantur,  accuratius  loqui  defendendi  sui 
gratia  instituerint.  Haec  enim  ut  honestior  causa, 
ita  non  utique  prior  est,  cum  praesertim  accusatio 
praecedat  defensionem;  nisi  quis  dicet,  etiam  gladium 
fabricatum  ab  eo  prius,  qui  ferrum  in  tutelam  sui 

3  quam  qui  in  perniciem  alterius  compararit.      Initium 
ergo  dicendi  dedit  natura,  initium  artis  observatio. 
Homines  enim,  sicuti  in  medicina,  cum  viderent  alia 
salubria,  alia  insalubria,  ex  observatione  eorum  effe- 
cerunt  artem,   ita,  cum   in  dicendo    alia   utilia,   alia 
inutilia  deprehenderent,  notarunt  ea  ad  imitandum 
vitandumque,  et  quaedam  secunduni  rationem  eorum 
adiecerunt  ipsi  quoque ;   haec   confirmata   sunt   usu, 

4  turn   quae   sciebat   quisque   docuit.      Cicero   quidem 
initium  orandi  conditoribus  urbium  ac  legum  latori- 
bus  dedit,  in  quibus  fuisse  vim  dicendi  necesse  est ; 
cur  tamen  hanc  primam  originem  putet,  non  video, 
cum  sint  adhuc  quaedam   vagae  et  sine  urbibus  ac 
sine  legibus  gentes,  et  tamen  qui  sunt  in  iis  nati  et 
legationibus     fungantur    et    accusent    aliqua    atque 
defendant    et     denique    alium     alio     melius    loqui 

III.  Omnis  autem  orandi  ratio,  ut  plurimi  maxi- 
mique  auctores  tradiderunt,  quinque  partibus  constat, 
inventione,  dispositione,  elocutione,  memoria,  pro- 
nuntiatione  sive  actione,  utroque  enim  modo  dicitur. 
Omnis  vero  sermo,  quo  quidem  voluntas  aliqua  enun- 
2  tiatur,  habeat  necesse  est  rem  et  verba.  Ac  si  est 


BOOK    III.  ii,  2-in.  2 

those  who  were  in  peril  owing  to  some  accusation 
being  made  against  them,  set  themselves  to  speak 
with  studied  care  for  the  purpose  of  their  own  de- 
fence. This,  however,  though  a  more  honour- 
able origin,  cannot  possibly  be  the  earlier,  for 
accusation  necessarily  precedes  defence.  You  might 
as  well  assert  that  the  sword  was  invented  for  the 
purpose  of  self-defence  and  not  for  aggression.  It  3 
was,  then,  nature  that  created  speech,  and  observa- 
tion that  originated  the  art  of  speaking.  Just  as  men 
discovered  the  art  of  medicine  by  observing  that  some 
things  were  healthy  and  some  the  reverse,  so  they 
observed  that  some  things  were  useful  and  some  use- 
less in  speaking,  and  noted  them  for  imitation  or 
avoidance,  while  they  added  certain  other  precepts 
according  as  their  nature  suggested.  These  observa- 
tions were  confirmed  by  experience  and  each  man 
proceeded  to  teach  what  he  knew.  Cicero,1  it  is  4 
true,  attributes  the  origin  of  oratory  to  the  founders 
of  cities  and  the  makers  of  laws,  who  must  needs 
have  possessed  the  gift  of  eloquence.  But  why  he 
thinks  this  the  actual  origin,  I  cannot  understand, 
since  there  still  exist  certain  nomad  peoples  without 
cities  or  laws,  and  yet  members  of  these  peoples  per- 
form the  duties  of  ambassadors,  accuse  and  defend, 
and  regard  one  man  as  a  better  speaker  than 

III.  The  art  of  oratory,  as  taught  by  most  authori- 
ties, and  those  the  best,  consists  of  five  parts : — 
invention,  arrangement,  expression,  memory,  and  delivery 
or  action  (the  two  latter  terms  being  used  synonym- 
ously). But  all  speech  expressive  of  purpose  involves 
also  a  subject  and  words.  If  such  expression  is  brief  2 

1  de  Inv.  i.  2. 



brevis  et  una  conclusione  finitus,  nihil  fortasse  ultra 
desideret ;  at  oratio  longior  plura  exigit.  Non  tan- 
turn  enim  refert,  quid  et  quo  modo  dicamus,  sed 
etiam  quo  loco ;  opus  ergo  est  et  dispositione.  Sed 
neque  omnia,  quae  res  postulat,  dicere  neque  suo 
quaeque  loco  poterimus  nisi  adiuvante  memoria ; 

3  quapropter  ea  quoque  pars  quarta  erit.     Verum  haec 
cuncta   corrumpit   ac    propemodum   perdit    indecora 
vel  voce  vel  gestu  pronuntiatlo.      Huic  quoque  igitur 
tribuendus  est  necessario  quintus  locus. 

4  Nee   audiendi  quidam,  quorum   est  Albutius,   qui 
tris  modo   primas   esse   partes  volunt,  quoniam  me- 
moria atque  actio  natura  non  arte  contingant  (quarum 
nos  praecepta  suo  loco  dabimus),  licet  Thrasymachus 

5  quoque  idem  de  actione  crediderit.      His  adiecerunt 
quidam  sextam   partem,   ita   ut   inventioni  iudicium 
subnecterent,   quia   primum    esset    invenire,   deinde 
iudicare.      Ego  porro  ne  invenisse  quidem  credo  eum, 
qui  non  iudicavit ;  neque  enim  contraria,  communia, 
stulta  invenisse  dicitur  quisquam,   sed    non   vitasse. 

6  Et   Cicero  quidem    in    Rhetoricis    iudicium    subiecit 
inventioni ;  mihi  autem  adeo  tribus  primis  partibus 
videtur  esse  permixtum  (nam  neque  dispositio  sine 
eo  neque  elocutio  fuerit),  ut  pronuntiationem  quoque 

7  vel    plurimum    ex    eo    mutuari    putem.      Quod    hoc 
audacius  dixerim,  quod  in   Partitionibus  oratoriis  ad 

Book  II.  chaps,  ii.  and  iii. 
2  No  such  statement  is  found  in  the  de  Inventions. 


BOOK    III.  in.  2-7 

and  contained  within  the  limits  of  one  sentence,  it 
may  demand  nothing  more,  but  longer  speeches 
require  much  more.  For  not  only  what  we  say 
and  how  we  say  it  is  of  importance,  but  also 
the  circumstances  under  which  wre  say  it.  It  is  here 
that  the  need  of  arrangement  comes  in.  But  it  will 
be  impossible  to  say  everything  demanded  by  the 
subject,  putting  each  thing  in  its  proper  place,  without 
the  aid  of  memory.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  memory  3 
forms  the  fourth  department.  But  a  delivery,  which 
is  rendered  unbecoming  either  by  voice  or  gesture, 
spoils  everything  and  almost  entirely  destroys  the 
effect  of  what  is  said.  Delivery  therefore  must  be 
assigned  the  fifth  place. 

Those  (and  Albutius  is  among  them),  who  maintain  4 
that  there  are  only  three  departments  on  the  ground 
that  memory  and  delivery   (for  which   I   shall  give 
instructions  in  their  proper  place  *)  are  given  us  by 
nature   not   by    art,   may    be   disregarded,   although 
Thrasymachus  held  the   same   views   as  regards  de- 
livery.    Some  have  added  a  sixth  department,  sub-  5 
joining  judgment  to  invention,  on  the  ground  that  it  is 
necessary  first  to  invent  and  then  to  exercise  our  judg- 
ment.  For  my  own  part  I  do  not  believe  that  invention 
can  exist  apart  from  judgment,since  we  do  not  say  that  a 
speaker  has  invented  inconsistent,  two-edged  or  foolish 
arguments,   but   merely  that  he   has  failed  to  avoid 
them.      It  is  true  that  Cicero  in  his  Rhetorica2  in-  6 
eludes  judgment  under  invention  ;    but  in  my  opinion 
judgment  is   so   inextricably  mingled   with    the    first 
three  departments  of  rhetoric  (for  without  judgment 
neither  expression  nor  arrangement  are  possible),  that 
I  think  that  even   delivery  owes   much   to  it.      I  say  7 
this  with  all  the  greater  confidence  because  Cicero  in 



easdem,  de  quibus  supra  dictum  est,  quinque  per- 
venit  partes.  Nam  cum  dupliciter  primum  divisisset 
in  inventionem  atque  elocutionem,  res  ac  disposi- 
tionem  invention!,  verba  et  pronuntiationem  elocu- 
tiuni  dedit  quintamque  constituit,  communem  ac 
velut  custodem  omnium,  memoriam.  Idem  in  l 
Oratore  quinque  rebus  constare  eloquentiam  dicit, 
in  quibus  postea  scriptis  certior  eius  sententia  est. 

8  Non   minus   mihi   cupidi   novitatis   alicuius   videntur 
fuisse,   qui    adiecerunt   ordinem,  cum   dispositionem 
dixissent,    quasi     aliud     sit    dispositio    quam     rerum 
ordine  quam   optimo   collocatio.      Dion    inventionem 
modo  et  dispositionem  tradidit  sed  utramque  dupli- 
cem,  rerum  et  verborum,  ut  sit  elocutio  inventionis, 
pronuntiatio  dispositions,  his  quinta  pars  memoriae, 
accedat.       Theodore!     fere    inventionem    duplicem, 
rerum  atque  elocutionis,  deinde  tris  ceteras  partes. 

9  Hermagoras   iudicium,   partitionem,   ordinem,    quae- 
que     sunt     elocutionis,     subiicit     occonomiae,    quae 
Graece  appellata  ex  cura  rerum  domesticarum  et  hie 
per  abusionem  posita  nomine  Latino  caret. 

10  Est  et  circa  hoc  quaestio,  quod  memoriam  in 
ordine  partium  quidam  inventioni,  quidam  disposi- 
tion! subiunxerunt ;  nobis  quartus  eius  locus  maxime 
placet.  Non  enim  tantum  inventa  tenere,  ut  dis- 

1  in  libris  de  Oratore,  Sp aiding  (sc.  I.  xxxi.  142). 

1  i.  3.  a  14-17. 


BOOK    III.    in.  7-10 

his  Partitiones  oratoriae1  arrives  at  the  same  five-fold 
division  of  which  I  have  just  spoken.  For  after  an 
initial  division  of  oratory  into  invention  and  expression, 
he  assigns  matter  and  arrangement  to  invention,  icords 

c^  O 

and  delivery  to  expression,  and  makes  memory  a  fifth 
department  common  to  them  all  and  acting  as  their 
guardian.  Again  in  the  Orator'1  he  states  that  elo- 

o  " 

quence  consists  of  five  things,  and  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  this  is  a  later  work  we  may  accept  this  as  his 
more  settled  opinion.  Others,  who  seem  to  me  to  8 
have  been  no  less  desirous  than  those  mentioned 
above  to  introduce  some  novelty,  have  added  order, 
although  they  had  already  mentioned  arrangement, 
as  though  arrangement  was  anything  else  than  the 
marshalling  of  arguments  in  the  best  possible  order. 
Dion  taught  that  oratory  consisted  only  of  invention 
and  arrangement,  but  added  that  each  of  these  depart- 
ments was  twofold  in  nature,  being  concerned  with 
words  and  things,  so  that  expression  comes  under 
invention,  and  delivery  under  arrangement,  while  memory 
must  be  added  as  a  fifth  department.  The  followers 
of  Theodorus  divide  invention  into  two  parts,  the  one 
concerned  with  matter  and  the  other  with  expression, 
and  then  add  the  three  remaining  departments. 
Hermagoras  places  judgment,  division,  order  and  9 
everything  relating  to  expression  under  the  heading 
of  economy,  a  Greek  word  meaning  the  management 
of  domestic  affairs  which  is  applied  metaphorically  to 
oratory  and  has  no  Latin  equivalent. 

A    further    question    arises    at    this    point,    since  10 
some   make  memory    follow   invention  in    the    list    of 
departments,  while  others  make  it  follow  arrangement. 
Personally  1  prefer  to  place  it  fourth.     For  we  ought 
not  merely  to  retain  in  our  minds  the  fruits  of  our 



ponamus,  nee  disposita,  ut  eloquamur,  sed  etiam 
verbis  formata  memoriae  mandare  debemus.  Hac 
enira  omnia,  quaecunque  in  orationem  collata  sunt, 

11  Fuerunt  etiam  in  hac  opinione  non  pauci,  ut  has 
non   rhetorices   partes    esse   existimarent   sed   opera 
oratoris  ;  eius  enim  esse  invenire,  disponere,  eloqui 

12  et  cetera.      Quod  si  accipimus,  nihil  arti  relinquimus. 
Nam  bene  dicere  est  oratoris,  rhetorice  tamen  erit 
bene  dicendi  scientia ;  vel,  ut  alii  putant,  artificis  est 
persuadere,  vis  autem  persuadendi  artis.      Ita  inve- 
nire quidem  et  disponere  oratoris,  inventio  autem  et 

13  dispositio  rhetorices    propria  videri   potest.      In    eo 
plures  dissenserunt,  utrumne  hae  partes  essent  rhe- 
torices an   eiusdem  opera  an,  ut  Atlienaeus  credit, 
elementa,  quae  vocant  crrotx^a.     Sed  neque  elementa 
recte   quis  dixerit,   alioqui   tantum    initia    erunt,   ut 
mundi  vel  umor  vel   ignis   vel   materia   vel   corpora 
insecabilia  ;  nee  operum  recte  nomen  accipient,  quae 
non  ab  aliis  perficiuntur,  sed  aliud  ipsa  perficiunt : 

14  partes  igitur.      Nam   cum  sit  ex   his  rhetorice,  fieri 
non  potest  ut,  cum  totum  ex  partibus  constet,  non 
sint    partes    totius    ex    quibus    constat.       Videntur 
autem    mihi,   qui    haec    opera    dixerunt,   eo    quoque 
moti,  quod  in  alia  rursus  divisione   nollent  in  idem 


BOOK    111.  HI.  10-14 

invention,  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to  arrange 
them,  or  to  remember  our  arrangement  in  order  that 
we  may  express  it,  but  we  must  also  commit  to 
memory  the  words  which  we  propose  to  use,  since 
memory  embraces  everything  that  goes  to  the  com- 
position of  a  speech. 

There  are  also  not  a  few  who  have  held  that  these  11 
are  not  parts  of  rhetoric,  but  rather  duties  to  be 
observed  by  the  orator.  For  it  is  his  business  to 
invent,  arrange,  express,  etcetera.  If,  however,  we 
accept  this  view,  we  leave  nothing  to  art.  For  12 
although  the  orator's  task  is  to  speak  well,  rhetoric 
is  the  science  of  speaking  well.  Or  if  we  adopt 
another  view,  the  task  of  the  artist  is  to  persuade, 
while  the  power  of  persuasion  resides  in  the  art. 
Consequently,  while  it  is  the  duty  of  the  orator  to 
invent  and  arrange,  invention  and  arrangement  may  be 
regarded  as  belonging  to  rhetoric.  At  this  point  13 
there  has  been  much  disagreement,  as  to  whether 
these  are  parts  or  duties  of  rhetoric,  or,  as  Athenaeus 
believes,  elements  of  rhetoric,  which  the  Greeks  call 
crroLx^ia.  But  they  cannot  correctly  be  called  ele- 
ments. For  in  that  case  we  should  have  to  regard 
them  merely  as  first-principles,  like  the  moisture,  fire, 
matter  or  atoms  of  which  the  universe  is  said  to  be 
composed.  Nor  is  it  correct  to  call  them  duties,  since 
they  are  not  performed  by  others,  but  perform  some- 
thing themselves.  We  must  therefore  conclude  that 
they  are  parts.  For  since  rhetoric  is  composed  of  14 
them,  it  follows  that,  since  a  whole  consists  of  parts, 
these  must  be  parts  of  the  whole  which  they  com- 
pose. Those  who  have  called  them  duties  seem  to 
me  lo  have  been  further  influenced  by  the  fact  that 
they  wished  to  reserve  the  name  of  parts  for  another 



nomen  incidere,  partes  enim  rhetorices  esse  dicebant 
laudativam,  deliberativam,,  iudicialem.  Quae  si  partes 
15  sunt,  materiae  sunt  potius  quarn  artis.  Namque  in 
his  singulis  rhetorice  tota  est,  quia  et  inventionem 
et  dispositionem  et  elocutionem  et  memoriam  et 
pronuntiationem  quaecunque  earum  desiderat.  Ita- 
que  quidam  genera  tria  rhetorices  dicere  maluerunt, 
optime  autem  ii,  quos  secutus  est  Cicero,  genera 

IV.  Sed  tria  an  plura  sint,  ambigitur.  Nee  dubie 
prope  omnes  utique  summae  apud  antiques  auctori- 
tatis  scriptores  Aristotelem  secuti,  qui  nomine  tan- 
turn  alio  contionalem  pro  deliberativa  appellat,  hac 

2  partitione  contenti  fuerunt.      Verum  et  turn   leviter 
est    temptatum,    cum    apud    Graecos    quosdam    turn 
apud  Ciceronem  in  libris  de  Oratore,  et  nunc  maximo 
temporum    nostrorum   auctore    prope    impulsum,   ut 
non  modo  plura  haec  genera,  sed  paene  innumera- 

3  bilia    videantur.      Nam    si    laudandi    ac  vituperandi 
officium    in    parte    tertia    ponimus,    in    quo    genere 
versari  videbimur,   cum  querimur,  consolamur,  miti- 
gamus,  concitamus,  terremus,  confirmamuSj  praecipi- 
mus,  obscure  dicta  interpretamur,  narramus,  depre- 
camur,     gratias     agimus,     gratulamur,    obiurgamus, 
maledicimus,  describimus,   mandamus,   renuntiamus, 

4  optamus,   opinamur,   plurima    alia  ?    ut    mihi   in    ilia 
vetere    persuasione    permanent!    velut    petenda    sit 
venia,    quaerendumque,   quo  moti    priores   rein    tam 

1  de  Or.  i.  xxxi.  J41  ;  Top.  xxiv.  91.          2  de  Or.  ii.  10  sq. 

BOOK    III.  in.  i4-iv.  4 

division  of  rhetoric  :  for  they  asserted  that  the  parts 
of  rhetoric  were,  panegyric,  deliberative  and  forensic 
oratory.  But  if  these  are  parts,  they  are  parts  rather 
of  the  material  than  of  the  art.  For  each  of  them  15 
contains  the  whole  of  rhetoric,  since  each  of  them 
requires  invention,  arrangement,  expression,  memory  and 
delivery.  Consequently  some  writers  have  thought 
it  better  to  say  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  oratory; 
those  whom  Cicero !  has  followed  seem  to  me  to 
have  taken  the  wisest  course  in  terming  them  kinds 

of  causes. 

IV.  There  is,  however,  a  dispute  as  to  whether 
there  are  three  kinds  or  more.  But  it  is  quite  cer- 
tain that  all  the  most  eminent  authorities  among 
ancient  writers,  following  Aristotle  who  merely  sub- 
stituted the  term  public  for  deliberative,  have  been 
content  with  the  threefold  division.  Still  a  feeble  2 
attempt  has  been  made  by  certain  Greeks  and  by 
Cicero  in  his  de  Oratore,2  to  prove  that  there  are  not 
merely  more  than  three,  but  that  the  number  of 
kinds  is  almost  past  calculation  :  and  this  view  has 
almost  been  thrust  down  our  throats  by  the  greatest 
authority3  of  our  own  times.  Indeed  if  we  place  the  3 
task  of  praise  and  denunciation  in  the  third  division, 
on  what  kind  of  oratory  are  we  to  consider  ourselves 
to  be  employed,  when  we  complain,  console,  pacify, 
excite,  terrify,  encourage,  instruct,  explain  obscurities, 
narrate,  plead  for  mercy,  thank,  congratulate,  re- 
proach, abuse,  describe,  command,  retract,  express 
our  desires  and  opinions,  to  mention  no  other  of  the 
many  possibilities  ?  As  an  adherent  of  the  older  view  4 
I  must  ask  for  indulgence  and  must  enquire  what  was 
the  reason  that  led  earlier  writers  to  restrict  a  subject 

5  Unknown.     Perhaps  the  elder  Pliny, 



late    fusam    tarn    breviter    astrinxerint.       Quos    qui 
errasse  putant,  hoc  sccutos  arbitrantur,  quod  in  his 

5  fere  versari  turn  oratores  videbant ;   nam  et   laudes 
ac  vituperationes  scribebantur,   et   eVira^'ovs  dicere 
erat   moris,    et   plurimum   in   consiliis  ac  iudiciis  in- 
sumebatur    operae,    ut    scriptores    artium    pro    solis 

6  comprehenderint   frequentissima.      Qui  vero  defen- 
dunt,  tria  faciunt  genera  auditorum,  unum,  quod  ad 
delectationem    conveniat,    alterum,    quod    consilium 
accipiat,    tertium,    quod    de     causis    iudicet.       Mihi 
cuncta  rimanti  et  talis  quaedam  ratio  succurrit,  quod 
omne  orationis  officium  aut  in  iudiciis  est  aut  extra 

7  iudicia.      Eorum,  de  quibus  iudicio  quaeritur,  mani- 
festurn  est  genus ;  ea,  quae  ad  iudicem  non  veniunt, 
aut  praeteritum  habent  tempus  aut  futurum  ;  prae- 
terita  laudamus  aut  vituperamus,  de  futuris  delibe- 

8  ramus.      Item  omnia,   de   quibus  dicendum   est_,  aut 
certa  sint  necesse  est  aut  dubia.      Certa,  ut  cuique 
est  animus,  laudat  aut  culpat ;  ex  dubiis  partim  nobis 
ipsis  ad  electionem  sunt  libera,  de  his  deliberatur ; 
partim    aliorum    sententiae    commissa,    de    his    lite 

9  Anaximenes  iudicialem  et  contionalem  generales 
partes  esse  voluit,  septem  autem  species  :  hortandi, 


BOOK   III.  iv.  4-9 

of  such  variety  to  such  narrow"  bounds.     Those  who 
think  such   authorities  in  error  hold  that  they  were 
influenced    by    the    fact   that   these    three    subjects 
practically  exhausted  the  range  of  ancient  oratory. 
For  it  was  customary  to  write  panegyrics  and  denun-  5 
ciations  and  to  deliver   funeral   orations,   while  the 
greater  part  of  their  activities  was  devoted  to  the 
law-courts  and  deliberative  assemblies ;  as  a  result, 
they  say,  the  old  writers  of  text-books  only  included 
those  kinds  of  oratory  which  were  most  in  vogue.  The  6 
defenders  of  antiquity  point  out  that  there  are  three 
kinds  of  audience  :  one  which  comes  simply  for  the 
sake  of  getting  pleasure,  a  second  which  meets  to  re- 
ceive advice,  a  third  to  give  judgement  on  causes. 
In  the  course  of  a  thorough  enquiry  into  the  question 
it  has  occurred  to  me  that  the  tasks  of  oratory  must 
either  be  concernedwith  the  law-courts  or  with  themes 
lying    outside    the    law-courts.      The  nature  of   the  7 
questions  into  which  enquiry  is  made  in  the  courts  is 
obvious.     As  regards  those   matters    which    do    not 
come  before  a  judge,   they  must  necessarily  be  con- 
cerned either  with  the  past  or  the  future.    We  praise 
or  denounce  past  actions,  we  deliberate  about  the 
future.      Again    everything   on    which    we    have    to  8 
speak  must  be  either  certain  or  doubtful.     We  praise 
or  blame  what  is  certain,  as  our  inclination  leads  us  : 
on  the  other  hand  where  doubt  exists,  in  some  cases 
we  are  free  to  form  our  own  views,  and  it  is  here  that 
deliberation  comes  in,  while  in  others,   we  leave  the 
problem  to  the  decision  of  others,  and  it  is  on  these 
that  litigation  takes  place. 

Anaximenes  regarded  forensic  and  public  oratory  9 
as  genera  but  held  that  there  were  seven  species : — 
exhortation,  dissuasion,  praise,  denunciation,  accusa- 



dehortandi,  laudandi,  vituperandi,  accusandi,  defen- 
dendi,  exquircndi,  quod  ^erao-TtKov  dicil ;  quarum 
duae  primae  deliberativi,  duae  sequentes  demon- 
strativi,  tres  ultimae  iudicialis  generis  sunt  partes. 

10  Protagoran   transeo,   qui   interrogandi,    respondendi, 
mandandi,  precandi,  quod   cu^oArji/  dixit,  partes  solas 
putat.      Plato  in  Sophiste  iudiciali  et  contionali  ter- 
tiam  adiecit  7rpocrofj.L\r]TLK^v)  quarn  sane  permittamus 
nobis  dicere  sermocinatricem  ;  quae  a  forensi  ratione 
diiungitur  et  est  accommodata  privatis  disputationi- 
bus,   cuius  vis  eadem  profecto  est  quae  dialecticae. 

11  Isocrates  in  omni  genere  inesse  laudem  ac  vitupera- 
tionem  existimavit. 

Nobis  et  tutissirnum  est  auctores  plurimos  sequi, 

12  et    ita   videtur    ratio    dictare.      Est    igitur,   ut   dixi, 
unum  genus,  quo  laus  ac  vituperatio  continetur,  sed 
est   appellatum   a   parte   meliore   laudativum  ;    idem 
alii  demonstrativum   vocant.      Utrumque   nomen   ex 
Graeco  creditur  fluxisse,  nam   eyKoo/xiao-riKov  aut  tTrt- 

13  SeiKTiKov    dicunt.       Sed    mihi    eViStiKTt/coi/    non    tarn 
demonstrations     vim     habere     quam     ostentationis 
videtur  et  multum  ab  illo  eyKoo/ucurn/co)  differre  ;  nam 
ut  continet  laudativum  in  se  genus,  ita  non  intra  hoc 

14  solum  consistit.      An  quisquam  negaverit  Panegyri- 
cos     cViScixriKous    esse  ?       Atqui     formam     suadendi 
habent  et  plerumque  de  utilitatibus  Graeciae  loquun- 
tur ;     ut  causarum  quidem  genera  tria  sint,  sed    ea 
turn   in  negotiis    turn   in  ostentatione    posita.      Nisi 

1  222  o.  a  Fr.  3  a. 


BOOK    III.  iv.  9-14 

tion,  defence,  inquiry,  or  as  he  called  it 
The  first  two,  however,  clearly  belong  to  delibera- 
tive, the  next  to  demonstrative,  the  three  last  to 
forensic  oratory.  I  say  nothing  of  Protagoras,  who  10 
held  that  oratory  was  to  be  divided  only  into  the 
following  heads  :  question  and  answer,  command  and 
entreaty,  or  as  he  calls  it  ev^ojX^.  Plato  in  his 
Sophist  A  in  addition  to  public  and  forensic  oratory 
introduces  a  third  kind  which  he  styles  7rpo<ro^.iX^rtKT;, 
which  I  will  permit  myself  to  translate  by  "conver- 
sational." This  is  distinct  from  forensic  oratory  and 
is  adapted  for  private  discussions,  and  we  may  regard 
it  as  identical  with  dialectic.  Isocrates2  held  that  11 
praise  and  blame  find  a  place  in  every  kind  of 

The  safest  and  most  rational  course  seems  to  be  to  1? 
follow  the  authority  of  the  majority.  There  is, 
then,  as  I  have  said,  one  kind  concerned  with  praise 
and  blame,  which,  however,  derives  its  name  from 
the  better  of  its  two  functions  and  is  called  lauda- 
tory ;  others  however  call  it  demonstrative.  Both 
names  are  believed  to  be  derived  from  the  Greek  in 
which  the  corresponding  terms  are  encomiastic,  and 
epideictic.  The  term  cpidcictic  seems  to  me  however  13 
to  imply  display  rather  than  demonstration,  and  to 
have  a  very  different  meaning  from  encomiastic.  For 
although  it  includes  laudatory  oratory,  it  does  not 
confine  itself  thereto.  Will  any  one  deny  the  title  14 
of  epideictic  to  panegyric  ?  But  yet  panegyrics  are  ad- 
visory in  form  and  frequently  discuss  the  interests 
of  Greece.  We  may  therefore  conclude  that,  while 
there  are  three  kinds  of  oratory,  all  three  devote 
themselves  in  part  to  the  matter  in  hand,  and  in 
part  to  display.  But  it  may  be  that  Romans  are  not 



forte    non    ex    Graeco    mutuantes     demonstrativum 
vocant,  verum  id  sequuntur,  quod  laus  ac  vituperatio 

15  quale   sit  quidque   demonstrat.      Alterum    est    deli- 
berativum,    tertium    iudiciale.      Ceterae    species    in 
haec  tria  incident  genera,  nee  invenietur  ex  his  ulla, 
in  qua  non  laudare  ac  vituperare,  suadere  ac  dissua- 
dere,  intendere  quid  vel  depellere  debeamus.      Ilia 
quoque  sunt  communia,  conciliare,  narrare,  docere, 
augere,  minuere,  concitandis  componendisve  adfecti- 

16  bus  animos  audientium  fingere.   Ne  iis  quidem  acces- 
serim,  qui  laudativam  materiam  honestorum,  delibe- 
rativam     utilium,     iudicialem     iustorum     quaestione 
contineri  putant,  celeri  magis  ac  rotunda  usi  distri- 
butione  quam  vera.      Stant  enim  quodammodo  mutuis 
auxiliis  omnia.      Nam  et  in  laude  iustitia  utilitasque 
tractatur  et  in  consiliis  honestas,  et  raro  iudicialem 
inveneris  causam,  in  cuius  non  parte  aliquid  eorum, 
quae  supra  diximus,  rej>eriatur. 

V.  Omnis  autem  oratio  constat  aut  ex  iis_,  quae 
significantur,  aut  et  iis,  quae  significant,  id  est  rebus 
et  verbis.  Facultas  orandi  consummatur  natura, 
arte,  exercitatione,  cui  partem  quartam  adiiciunt 
2  quidam  imitationis,  quam  nos  arti  subiicimus.  Tria 
sunt  item,  quae  praestare  debeat  orator,  ut  doceat, 
moveat,  delectet.  Haec  enim  clarior  divisio  quam 
eorum,  qui  totum  opus  in  res  et  in  adfectus  par- 

BOOK    III.  iv.  i4-v.  2 

borrowing  from  Greek  when  they  apply  the  title 
demonstrative,  but  are  merely  led  to  do  so  because 
praise  and  blame  demonstrate  the  nature  of  the 
object  with  which  they  are  concerned.  The  second  15 
kind  is  deliberative,  the  third  forensic  oratory.  All 
other  species  fall  under  these  three  genera  :  you  will 
not  find  one  in  which  we  have  not  to  praise  or 
blame,  to  advise  or  dissuade,  to  drive  home  or  refute 
a  charge,  while  conciliation,  narration,  proof,  exag- 
geration, extenuation,  and  the  moulding  of  the  minds 
of  the  audience  by  exciting  or  alh'.ving  their  pas- 
sions, are  common  to  all  three  kinds  of  oratory.  1  16 
cannot  even  agree  with  those  who  hold  that  lauda- 
tory subjects  are  concerned  with  the  question  of 
what  is  honourable,  deliberative  with  the  question  of 
what  is  expedient,  and  forensic  with  the  question  of 
what  is  just :  the  division  thus  made  is  easy  and 
neat  rather  than  true  :  for  all  three  kinds  rely  on 
the  mutual  assistance  of  the  other.  For  we  deal 
with  justice  and  expediency  in  panegyric  and  with 
honour  in  deliberations,  while  you  will  rarely  find  a 
forensic  case,  in  part  of  which  at  any  rate  something 
of  those  questions  just  mentioned  is  not  to  be  found. 
V.  Every  speech  however  consists  at  once  of  that 
which  is  expressed  and  that  which  expresses,  that  is 
to  say  of  matter  and  words.  Skill  in  speaking  is 
perfected  by  nature,  art  and  practice,  to  which  some 
add  a  fourth  department,  namely  imitation,  which  I 
however  prefer  to  include  under  art.  There  are  also  2 
three  aims  which  the  orator  must  always  have  in 
view  ;  he  must  instruct,  move  and  charm  his  hearers. 
This  is  a  clearer  division  than  that  made  by  those 


who  divide  the  task  of  oratory  into  that  which  relates 
to  things  and    that  which   concerns  the  emotions, 



tiuntur.  Non  semper  autem  omnia  in  earn  quae 
tractabitur  matcriain  cadent.  Erunt  enim  quaedam 
remotae  ab  adfectibus,  qui  ut  non  ubique  habent 
locum,  ita  quocunque  irruperunt,  plurimum  valent. 

3  Praestantissimis  auctoribus   placet  alia  in    rhetorice 
esse,  quae    probationem   desiderent,   alia   quae    non 
desiderent,    cum    quibus     ipse    consentio.       Quidam 
vero,  ut  Celsus,  de  nulla  re  dicturum  oratorem,  nisi 
de  qua  quaeratur,  existimant,  cui  cum  maxima  pars 
scriptorum   repugnat   turn   etiam  ipsa   partitio ;    nisi 
forte  laudare,  quae  constet  esse  honesta,  et  vitupe- 
rare,  quae  ex  confesso  sint  turpia,  non  est  oratoris 

4  lllud  iam  omnes  fatentur,  esse  quaestiones  aut  in 
scripto  aut  in  non  scripto;  in  scripto  de  hire,  in  non 
scripto    de    re.       lllud    rationale    hoc    legale    genus 
Hermagoras  atque  eum  secuti  vocant,  id  est  VOJUKOV 

5  et  AoyiKoV.      Idem  sentiunt,  qui  omnem  quaestionem 
ponunt  in  rebus  et  in  verbis. 

Item  coiivenit,  quaestiones  esse  aut  infinitas  aut 
finitas.  Infinitae  sunt,  quae  remotis  personis  et 
temporibus  et  locis  ceterisque  similibus  in  utramque 
partem  tractantur,  quod  Graeci  Qkuw  dicunt,  Cicero 
propositum,  alii  quaestiones  universales  civiles,  alii 
quaestiones  philosopho  convenientes,  Athenaeus 
G  partem  causae  appellat.  Hoc  genus  Cicero  scientia 
et  actione  distinguit,  ut  sit  scientiae,  An  providenlia 

1  Top.  xxi.  79. 

*  Top.  81  ;  Part.  Or.  xviii.  62. 


BOOK    III.  v.  2-6 

since  both  of  these  will  not  always  be  present  in  the 
subjects  which  we  shall  have  to  treat.  For  some 
themes  are  far  from  calling  for  any  appeal  to  the 
emotions,  which,  although  room  cannot  always  be 
found  for  them,  produce  a  most  powerful  effect 
wherever  they  do  succeed  in  forcing  their  way.  The  3 
best  authorities  hold  that  there  are  some  things  in 
oratory  which  require  proof  and  others  which  do  not, 
a  view  with  which  I  agree.  Some  on  the  other  hand, 
as  for  instance  Celsus,  think  that  the  orator  will  not 
speak  on  any  subject  unless  there  is  some  question 
involved  in  it ;  but  the  majority  of  writers  on  rhetoric 
are  against  him,  as  is  also  the  threefold  division  of 

O  * 

oratory,  unless  indeed  to  praise  what  is  allowed  to  be 
honourable  and  to  denounce  what  is  admittedly  dis- 
graceful are  no  part  of  an  orator's  duty. 

It  is,  however,  universally  agreed  that  all  questions  4 
must  be    concerned   either  with   something  that  is 
written  or  something  that  is  not.   Those  concerned  with 
what  is  written  are  questions  of  law,  those  which  con- 
cern what  is  not  written  are  questions  of  fact.   Herma- 
goras  calls  the   latter  rational   questions,  the  former 
legal  questions,  for  so  we  may  translate  AoytKoV  and 
vofMtKov.     Those  who  hold   that  every  question   con-  5 
cerns  either  things  or  words,  mean  much  the  same. 

It  is  also  agreed  that  questions  are  either  definite 
or  indefinite.  Inde/initec[uest\OTis  are  those  which  may 
be  maintained  or  impugned  without  reference  to 
persons,  time  or  place  and  the  like.  The  Greeks  call 
them  theses,  Cicero1  propositions,  others  general  questions 
relating  to  civil  life,  others  again  questions  suited  for 
philosophical  discussion,  while  Athenaeus  calls  them 
parts  of  a  cause.  Cicero 2  distinguishes  two  kinds,  6 
the  one  concerned  with  knowledge,  the  other  with 
action.  Thus  "  Is  the  world  governed  by  pro- 



mundus  regalur ;  actionis,  An  accedendum  ad  rempub- 
licam  administrandam.  Priiis  trium  generum,  an  sit  r 
quid  sit?  quale  sit?  omnia  enim  haec  ignorari 
possunt ;  sequens  duorum,  quo  modo  adipiscamur? 

7  quo    modo    utamur?      Finitae    autem    sunt   ex   com- 
plexu  rerum,  personarum,  temporum,  ceterorumque  ; 
hae  a   Graecis   dicuntur,  causae   a   nostris. 
In  his  omnis  quaestio  videtur  circa  res  personasque 

8  consistere.      Amplior  est  semper  infinita,  inde  enim 
finita  descendit.      Quod  ut  exemplo  pateat,  infinita 
est,    An    uxor   ducenda  ?   finita,    An   Catoni    ducenda  ? 
ideoque  esse  suasoria  potest.     Sed  etiam  remotae  a 
personis  propriis  ad  aliquid  referri  solent.      Est  enim 
simplex,    An    respublica    administranda  ?    refertur    ad 

9  aliquid,    An    in    tyrannide    administranda  ?      Sed     hie 
quoque  subest  velut  latens  persona ;  tyrannus  enim 
geminat    quaestionem,    subestque    et    temporis    et 
qualitatis    tacita    vis ;     nondum    tamen    lioc    proprie 
dixeris  causam.      Hae  autem,  quas  infinitas  voco,  et 
generales   appellantur ;    quod    si    est   verum,   finitae 
speciales    erunt.       In     oinni    autem    speciali    utique 

10  inest  generalis,  ut  quae  sit  prior.      Ac  nescio  an  in 
causis  quoque,  quidquid  in  quaestionem   venit  quali- 


BOOK    III.  v.  6-10 

vidence  ?  "  is  a  question  of  knowledge,  while  "  Should 
we  enter  politics  ? '  is  a  question  of  action.  The 
first  involves  three  questions,  whether  a  thing 
is,  what  it  is,  and  of  what  nature  :  for  all  these 
things  may  be  unknown  :  the  second  involves  two, 
how  to  obtain  power  and  how  to  use  it.  Definite  1 
questions  involve  facts,  persons,  time  and  the  like. 
The  Greeks  call  them  hypotheses,  while  we  call  them 
causes.  In  these  the  whole  question  turns  on  per- 
sons and  facts.  An  indefinite  question  is  always  the  8 
more  comprehensive,  since  it  is  from  the  indefinite 
question  that  the  definite  is  derived.  I  will  illustrate 
what  I  mean  by  an  example.  The  question  "  Should 
a  man  marry?"  is  indefinite;  the  question  "Should 
Cato  marry  ?  "  is  definite,  and  consequently  may  be 
regarded  as  a  subject  for  a  deliberative  theme.  But 
even  those  which  have  no  connexion  with  particular 
persons  are  generally  given  a  specific  reference. 
For  instance  the  question  "  Ought  we  to  take  a  share 
in  the  government  of  our  country  ? '  is  abstract, 
whereas  "  Ought  we  to  take  part  in  the  government 
of  our  country  under  the  sway  of  a  tyrant  ?  '  has  a 
specific  reference.  But  in  this  latter  case  we  may  9 
say  that  a  person  is  tacitly  implied.  For  the 
mention  of  a  tyrant  doubles  the  question,  and 
there  is  an  implicit  admission  of  time  and  quality  ; 
but  all  the  same  you  would  scarcely  be  justified  in 
calling  it  a  cause  or  definite  question.  Those  ques- 
tions which  I  have  styled  indefinite  are  also  called 
general :  if  this  is  correct,  we  shall  have  to  call  definite 
questions  special  questions.  But  in  every  special 
question  the  general  question  is  implicit,  since  the 
genus  is  logically  prior  to  the  species.  And  perhaps  10 
even  in  actual  causes  wherever  the  notion  of  quality 
comes  into  question,  there  is  a  certain  intrusion  of 



tatis,  generale  sit.  Milo  Clodium  occidit,  hire  occidit 
insidiatorem  ;  nonne  hoc  quaeritur,  An  sit  ins  insid/a- 
torern  occidendi  ?  Quid  in  coiiiecturis  ?  non  ilia 
generalia,  An  causa  sceleris  odium  ?  cupidilas  ?  An 
tormentis  credendum  ?  Teslibus  an  argumentis  maior 
fides  habenda  ?  Nam  finitione  quidem  comprehend i 

1 1  nihil  non  in  universum  certum  ei  it.      Quidam  putant 
etiam    eas    thesis    posse    aliquando     nominari,    quae 
personis  causisque  contineantur,  aliter  tantummodo 
positas  :  ut  causa  sit,  cum    Orestes  accusatur :  thesis, 
An   Orestes  rede  sit  absolutus ;  cuius  generis  est,  An 
Cato  rede  Marciam  Hortensio  tradideriL     Hi  thesin  a 
causa  sic  distinguuntj   ut  ilia  sit  spectativae   partis, 
haec  activae  ;  illic  enim  veritatis  tantum  gratia  dis- 
putari,  hie  negotium  a^i. 

12  Quanquam  inutiles  quidam  oratori  putant  univei- 
sales    quaestiones,    quia    nihil    prosit,   quod    constet 
ducendam  esse  uxorein  vel  administrandam  rempub- 
licam,  si  quis  vel  aetate  vel  valetudine  impediatur. 
Sed  non  omnibus  eiusmodi  quaestionibus  sic  occurri 
potest,   ut   illis,   sitne   virtus   finis  ?    regaturne   provi- 

13  dentia  mundus  ?     Quin   etiam   in  iis,  quae   ad   per- 

BOOK    III.  v.  10-13 

the  abstract.  "  Milo  killed  Clodius  :  he  was  justified 
in  killing  one  who  lay  in  wait  for  him."  Does  not 
this  raise  the  general  question  as  to  whether  we 
have  the  rig-lit  to  kill  a  man  who  lies  in  wait  for  us? 


What  again  of  conjectures?  May  not  they  be  of  a 
general  character,  as  for  instance,  "  What  was  the 
motive  for  the  crime  ?  hatred  ?  covetousness  ?  '  or 
"  Are  we  justified  in  believing  confessions  made  under 
torture  ?  '  or  "  Which  should  carry  greater  weight, 
evidence  or  argument  ?  '  As  for  definitions,  every- 
thing that  they  contain  is  undoubtedly  of  a  general 
nature.  There  are  some  who  hold  that  even  those  11 
questions  which  have  reference  to  persons  and  par- 
ticular cases  may  at  times  be  called  theses,  provided 
only  they  are  put  slightly  differently  :  for  instance, 
if  Orestes  be  accused,  we  shall  have  a  cause  :  whereas 
if  it  is  put  as  question,  namely  "  Was  Orestes  rightly 
acquitted?"  it  will  be  a  thesis.  To  the  same  class 
as  this  last  belongs  the  question  "  Was  Cato  right 
in  transferring  Marcia  to  Hortensius?"  These  per- 
sons distinguish  a  thesis  from  a  cause  as  follows  :  a 
thesis  is  theoretical  in  character,  while  a  cause  has 
relation  to  actual  facts,  since  in  the  former  case  we 
argue  merely  with  a  view  to  abstract  truth,  while  in 
the  latter  we  have  to  deal  with  some  particular  act. 

Some,  however,  think  that  general  questions  are  12 
useless  to  an  orator,  since  no  profit  is  to  be  derived 
from  proving  that  we  ought  to  marry  or  to  take 
part  in  politics,  if  we  are  prevented  from  so  doing 
by  age  or  ill  health.  But  not  all  general  questions 
are  liable  to  this  kind  of  objection.  For  instance 
questions  such  as  "  Is  virtue  an  end  in  itself?'  or 
"  Is  the  world  governed  by  providence  ?  '  cannot 
be  countered  in  this  way.  Further  in  questions  13 



sonam  referuntur,  ut  non  est  satis  generalem  tractasse 
quaestionem,  ita  perveniri  ad  speciem  nisi  ilia  prius 
excussa  non  potest.  Nam  quomodo,  an  sibi  uxor 
ducenda  sit,  deliberabit  Cato,  nisi  constiterit,  uxores 
esse  ducendas?  Et  quomodo,  an  ducere  debeat 
Marciam,  quaeretur,  nisi  Catoni  ducenda  uxor  est? 

14  Sunt  tamen  inscripti  nomine  Hermagorae  libri,  qui 
confirmant    illam    opinionem,   sive    falsus   est  titulus 
sive  alius  hie  Hermagoras  fuit.      Nam  eiusdem  esse 
quomodo  possunt,  qui  de  hac  arte  mirabiliter  multa 
composuit,  cum,  sicut  ex  Ciceronis  quoque  rhetorico 
primo  manifestum  est,  materiam  rhetorices  in  thesis 
et   causas   diviserit  ?      Quod    reprehendit    Cicero   ac 
thesin  nihil  ad  oratorem  pertinere  contendit  totum- 
que    hoc    genus   quaestionis    ad    philosophos    refert. 

15  Sed  me  liberavit   respondendi  verecundia,  et  quod 
ipse   hos  libros  improbat,  et  quod  in   Oratore  atque 
his,  quos  de  Oratore  scripsit,  et  Topicis  praecipit,  ut 
a  propriis  personis  atque  temporibus  avocemus  con- 
troversiam  :  quia  latius  dicere  liceat  de  genere  quam 
de  specie,  et,  quod  in  universe  probatum  sit,  in  parte 

16  probatum  esse   necesse   sit.      Status    autem   in    hoc 
omne  genus  materiae  iidem,  qui  in  causas,  cadunt. 
Adhuc  adiicitur,  alias  esse  quaestiones  in  rebus  ipsis, 

1  de  Inv.  i.  6.  2  Orator  xiv.  45. 

»  deOr.  iii.  30;   Top,  21. 


BOOK   III.  v.  13-16 

which  have  reference  to  a  particular  person,  although 
it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  handle  the  general 
question,  we  cannot  arrive  at  any  conclusion  on 
the  special  point  until  we  have  first  discussed  the 
general  question.  For  how  is  Cato  to  deliberate 
"whether  he  personally  is  to  marry,"  unless  the 
general  question  "whether  marriage  is  desirable' 
is  first  settled  ?  And  how  is  he  to  deliberate 
"  whether  he  should  marry  Marcia,"  unless  it  is 
proved  that  it  is  the  duty  of  Cato  to  marry?  There  14 
are,  however,  certain  books  attributed  to  Herma- 
goras  which  support  this  erroneous  opinion,  though 
whether  the  attribution  is  spurious  or  whether  they 
were  written  by  another  Hermagoras  is  an  open 
question.  For  they  cannot  possibly  be  by  the 
famous  Hermagoras,  who  wrote  so  much  that  was 
admirable  on  the  art  of  rhetoric,  since,  as  is  clear 
from  the  first  book  of  the  Rhetorica  of  Cicero,1  he 
divided  the  material  of  rhetoric  into  theses  and  causes. 
Cicero  objects  to  this  division,  contends  that  theses 
have  nothing1  to  do  with  an  orator,  and  refers  all 

O  ' 

this  class  of  questions  to  the  philosophers.  But  15 
Cicero  has  relieved  me  of  any  feeling  of  shame 
that  I  might  have  in  controverting  his  opinion,  since 
he  has  not  only  expressed  his  disapproval  of  his  Rhe- 
torica, but  in  the  Orator?  the  de  Oratore  and  the 
Topica3  instructs  us  to  abstract  such  discussions 
from  particular  persons  and  occasions,  "  because 
we  can  speak  more  fully  on  general  than  on  special 
themes,  and  because  what  is  proved  of  the  whole 
must  also  be  proved  of  the  part."  In  all  general  16 
questions,  however,  the  essential  basis  is  the  same  as 
in  a  cause  or  definite  question.  It  is  further 
pointed  out  that  there  are  some  questions  which 



alias  quae  ad  aliquid  referantur :  illud,  An  uxor 
diicenda  ?  hoc,  An  scni  duccnda  ?  illud,  An  fords  ? 
hoc,  Anjbrtior?  et  similia. 

17  Causam  finit  Apollodorus,  ut  interpretatione  Vnlgi 
discipuli   eius    utar,    ita :   Causa   est   negotium   omnibus 
suis  partibus  spectans  ad  qunestionem ;  aut :   Causa  est 
negotium,   cuius  Jlnis   est   controversia.      Ipsum   deinde 
neffotium  sic   finit:    Negotium   est  co?igregaiio  person- 

O  O  O        O  i 

arum,  locorum,  teniporum,  causarum}  modorum,  casuum, 
fact  or  urn  f  instrumentorum,  sermonum,  scriptorum  et  non 

18  scriptonim.       Causam     nunc     intelligamus    v-n-oOco-iv, 
negotium  TTf/uVratrtv.      Sed  et  ipsam  causam  quidam 
similiter   finicrunt,  ut    Apollodorus   negotium.      Iso- 
crates  autem    causam    esse   ait   quaestionem   finitam 
civilem    aut    rein    controversam  in  personarum   fini- 
tarum    complexu  ;     Cicero    his    verbis :     Causa    cert  is 
personis,    locis,  temporibus,  aclionibus,  negotiis  cernilur, 
aut  in  omnibus  aut  in  plerisque  eorum. 

VI.   Ergo     cum    omnis    causa    contineatur    aliquo 
statu,  priusquam  dicere  aggredior,  quo  modo  genus 

Fr.  13  Shcehan.  2  Top.  xxi.  80. 

3  This  chapter  is  highl}'  technical  and  of  little  interest  for 
the  most  part  to  any  save  professed  students  of  the  technique 
of  the  ancient  schools  of  rhetoric.  Its  apparent  obscurity  will, 
however,  be  found  to  disappear  on  careful  analysis.  The  one 
passage  of  general  interest  it  contains  is  to  be  found  in  the 
extremely  ingenious  fictitious  theme  discussed  in  sections 
96  sqq. 


BOOK    III.  v.  i6-vi.  i 

concern  "  things  in  themselves,"  while  others  have 
a  particular  reference  ;  an  example  of  the  former 
will  be  the  question  "  Should  a  man  marry  ?  "  of  the 
latter  "  Should  an  old  man  marry  ?  "  ;  or  again  the 
question  whether  a  man  is  brave  will  illustrate  the 
first,  while  the  question  whether  lie  is  braver  than 
another  will  exemplify  the  second. 

Apollodorus  defines  a  cause  in  the  following  terms  17 
(I  quote  the  translation  of  his  pupil  Valgius)  : — "A 
cause  is  a  matter  which  in  all  its  parts  bears  on  the 
question  at  issue,"  or  again  "a  cause  is  a  matter  of 
which  the  question  in  dispute  is  the  object." 
He  then  defines  a  matter  in  the  following  terms  :— 
"A  matter  is  a  combination  of  persons,  circumstances 
of  place  and  time,  motives,  means,  incidents,  acts, 
instruments,  speeches,  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
law.  Let  us  then  understand  a  cause  in  the  sense  of  18 
the  Greek  hypothesis  or  subject,  and  a  matter  in  the 
sense  of  the  Greek  peristasis  or  collection  of  circum- 
stances. But  some,  however,  have  defined  a  cause  in 
the  same  way  that  Apollodorus  defines  a  matter. 
Isocrates  l  on  the  other  hand  defines  a  cause  as  some 
definite  question  concerned  with  some  point  of  civil  affairs, 
or  a  dispute  in  whicli  definite  persons  are  involved  ;  while 
Cicero'2  uses  the  following  words  : — "A  cause  may  be 
known  by  its  being  concerned  with  certain  definite 
persons,  circumstances  of  time  and  place,  actions,  and 
business,  and  will  relate  either  to  all  or  at  any  rate  to 
most  of  these." 

VI.3  Since  every  cause,  then,  has  a  certain  essential 
basis  4  on  which  it  rests,  before  I  proceed  to  set  forth 
how  each  kind  of  cause  should  be  handled,  I  think  I 

4  There  is  no  exact  English  equivalent  for  status.    Basis  or 
ground  are  perhaps  the  nearest  equivalents. 



quodque  causae  sit  tractandum,  id  quod  est  com- 
mune omnibus,  quid  sit  status  et  unde  ducatur  et 
quot  et  qui  sint,  intuendum  puto.  Quanquam  id 
nonnulli  ad  iudiciales  tantum  pertinere  materias 
putaverunt,  quorum  inscitiam,  cum  omnia  tria  genera 

2  fuero  exsecutus,  res   ipsa  deprehendet.     Quod  nos 
statum,  id  quidam  constitutionem  vocant,  alii  quae- 
stionem,  alii  quod  ex  quaestione  appareat,  Theodorus 
caput  id  est  /<e<£aAcuov  yeriKamrroK,  ad  quod  referantur 
omnia.    Quorum   diversa  appellatio,  vis   eadem    est; 
nee  interest  discentium,  quibus  quidque  nominibus 

3  appelletur,    dum    res    ipsa    manifesta    sit.       Statum 
Graeci  O-TO.O-IV  vocant,  quod  nomen  non  primum  ab 
Hermagora  traditum  putant,  sed  alii   ab   Naucrate, 
Isocratis  discipulo,  alii  a  Zopyro  Clazomenio  ;  quan- 
quam  videtur  Aeschines  quoque  in  oratione  contra 
Ctesiphontem   uti  hoc  verbo,  cum  a  iudicibus  petit, 
ne   Demostheni  permittant  evagari,  sed  eum  dicere 

4  de  ipso  causae  statu  cogant.      Quae  appellatio  dicitur 
ducta  vel  ex  eo,  quod  ibi  sit  primus  causae  congressus, 
vel  quod  in  hoc  causa  consistat.      Et  nominis  quidem 
haec  origo  ;  nunc  quid  sit.      Statum  quidam  dixerunt 
primam  causarum  conflictionem  ;  quos  recte  sensisse, 

6  parum    elocutos    puto.      Non   enim  est  status   prima 
conflictio,  fecisti,  non  fed ;  sed  quod  ex  prima  con- 

1  §  206. 

BOOK    III.  vi.  1-5 

should  first  examine  a  question  that  is  common  to  all 
of  them,  namely,  what  is  meant  by  basis,  whence  it 
is  derived  and  how  many  and  of  what  nature  such 
bases  may  be.  Some,  it  is  true,  have  thought  that 
they  were  peculiar  merely  to  forensic  themes,  but 
their  ignorance  will  stand  revealed  when  I  have 
treated  of  all  three  kinds  of  oratory.  That  which  I  2 
call  the  basis  some  style  the  constitution,  others  the 
question,  and  others  again  that  which  may  be  inferred 
from  the  question,  while  Theodorus  calls  it  the  most  gen- 
eral head,  K€<£a\cuov  yeviKamrrov,  to  which  everything 
must  be  referred.  These  different  names,  however,  all 
mean  the  same  thing,  nor  is  it  of  the  least  importance 
to  students  by  what  special  name  things  are  called, 
as  long  as  the  thing  itself  is  perfectly  clear.  The  3 
Greeks  call  this  essential  basis  (rrcum,  a  name  which 
they  hold  was  not  invented  by  Hermagoras,  but 
according  to  some  was  introduced  by  Naucrates,  the 
pupil  of  Isocrates,  according  to  others  by  Zopyrus  of 
Clazomenae,  although  Aeschines  in  his  speech  against 
Ctesiphon1  seems  to  employ  the  word,  when  he  asks 
the  jury  not  to  allow  Demosthenes  to  be  irrelevant 
but  to  keep  him  to  the  stasis  or  basis  of  the  case. 
The  term  seems  to  be  derived  from  the  fact  that  it  4 
is  on  it  that  the  first  collision  between  the  parties  to 
the  dispute  takes  place,  or  that  it  forms  the  basis  or 
standing  of  the  whole  case.  So  much  for  the  origin  of 
the  name.  Now  for  its  nature.  Some  have  defined 
the  basis  as  being  \\\e  first  conflict  of  the  causes.  The 
idea  is  correct,  but  the  expression  is  faulty.  For  the  6 
essential  basis  is  not  the  first  conflict,  which  we  may 
represent  by  the  clauses  "  You  did  such  and  such 
a  thing"  and  "I  did  not  do  it."  It  is  rather  the 
kind  of  question  which  arises  from  the  first  conflict, 



flictione  nascitur,  id  est  genus  quaestionis,  fccisti,  non 

fed,  an  fecerit  ?     Hoc  fecisti,  non  hoc  fed,  quid  fecerit  ? 

Quia  ex  his  apparet,  illud  coniectura,  hoc  finitione 

quaerendum,  atque  in  eo  pars  utraque  insistit,  erit 

6  quaestio    coniecturalis    vel    finitivi    status.      Quid    si 
enim  dicat  quis,  sonits   est  duorum   inter  se  corporum 
conjlictio  :  erret,  ut  opinor,  non  enim  sonus  est  con- 
flictio  sed  ex  conflictione.     Sed  hoc  levius ;  intelli- 
gitur    enim    utcunque    dictum.      Inde    vero    ingens 
male   interpretantibus    innatus    est    error,   qui,   quia 
primam    conflictionem   legerant,  crcdiderunt  statum 
semper    ex   prima  quaestione   ducendum ;   quod   est 

7  vitiosissimum.      Nam  quaestio  nulla  non  habet  utique 
statum,  constat  enim   ex  intentione   et  depulsione; 
sed  aliae  sunt  propriae  causarum,  de  quibus  ferenda 
sententia     est,    aliae    adductae    extrinsecus,    aliquid 
tamen  ad  summam  causae  conferentes,  velut  auxilia 
quaedam,  quo  fit  ut  in  controversia  una  plures  quae- 

8  stiones    esse    dicantur.       Harum    porro    plerumque 
levissima  quaeque  primo  loco  fungitur.      Namque  et 
illud  frequens  est,  ut  ea,  quibus  minus  confidimus, 
cum  tractata  sunt,  omittamus,  interim  sponte  nostra 

BOOK    III.  vi.  5-8 

which  we  may  represent  as  follows.  "  You  did  it," 
"I  did  not,"  "Did  he  do  it?,"  or  "You  did  this,"  "I 
did  not  do  this,"  "  What  did  he  do  ? '  It  is  clear 
from  these  examples,  that  the  first  sort  of  question 
depends  on  conjecture,  the  second  on  definition,  and 
that  the  contending  parties  rest  their  respective  cases 
on  these  points  :  the  bases  of  these  questions  will 
therefore  be  of  a  conjectural  or  definitive  character 
respectively.  Suppose  it  should  be  asserted  that  6 
sound  is  the  conflict  between  two  bodies,  the  state- 
ment would  in  my  opinion  be  erroneous.  For  sound 
is  not  the  actual  conflict,  but  a  result  of  the  conflict. 
The  error  is,  however,  of  small  importance  :  for  the 
sense  is  clear,  whatever  the  expression.  But  this 
trivial  mistake  has  given  rise  to  a  very  serious  error 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  have  not  understood  what 
was  meant :  for  on  reading  that  the  essential  basis  was 
the  first  conflict,  they  immediately  concluded  that  the 
basis  was  always  to  be  taken  from  the  first  question, 
which  is  a  grave  mistake.  For  every  question  has  7 
its  basis,  since  every  question  is  based  on  assertion  by 
one  party  and  denial  by  another.  But  there  are  some 
questions  which  form  an  essential  part  of  causes,  and 
it  is  on  these  that  we  have  to  express  an  opinion ; 
while  others  are  introduced  from  without  and  are, 
strictly  speaking,  irrelevant,  although  they  may 
contribute  something  of  a  subsidiary  nature  to  the 
general  contention.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  there 
are  said  to  be  several  questions  in  one  matter  of 
dispute.  Of  these  questions  it  is  often  the  most  8 
trivial  which  occupies  the  first  place.  For  it  is  a 
frequent  artifice  to  drop  those  points  in  which  we 
place  least  confidence,  as  soon  as  we  have  dealt  with 
them  ;  sometimes  we  make  a  free  gift  of  them  to  our 



velut  donantes,  interim  ad  ea  quae  sunt  potentiora 
9  gradum  ex  iis  fecisse  contenti.  Simplex  autem 
causa  etiamsi  varie  defenditur,  non  potest  habere 
plus  uno,  de  quo  pronuntietur,  atque  inde  erit  status 
causae,  quod  et  orator  praecipue  sibi  obtinendum  et 
iudex  spectandum  maxime  intelligit ;  in  hoc  enim 
causa  consistet.  Ceterum  quaestionum  possunt  esse 

10  diversi.     Quod  ut  brevissimo  pateat  exemplo  :  cum 
dicit  reus,   Etiamsi  fed,   recte  fed,  qualitatis    utitur 
statu  ;  cum  adiicit,  sed  non  fed,  coniecturam  movet. 
Semper  autem   firmius  est  non   fecisse,   ideoque    in 
eo  statum  esse  iudicabo,  quod  dicerem,  si  mihi  plus 

11  quam   unum  dicere   non  liceret.       Recte   igitur    est 
appellata  causarum  prima  conflictio  non  quaestionum. 
Nam  et  pro   Rabirio    Postumo    Cicero    prima   parte 
orationis  in  hec  intendit,  ut  actionem  competere  in 
equitem   Romanum  neget ;  secunda,  nullam  ad  eum 
pecuniam   pervenisse  confirmat.      Statum   tamen   in 

12  eo  dicam  fuisse,  quod  est  potentius.      Nee  in  causa 
Milonis  circa  primas  quaestiones1  iudicabo  conflixisse 
causam,sed  ubi  totis  viribus  insidiator  Clodius  ideoque 
iure  interfectus  ostenditur.      Et  hoc  est,  quod  ante 
omnia  constituere  in  animo  suo  debeat  orator,  etiamsi 

1  After  quaestiones  the  MSS.  continue  quae  sunt  ante 
prooemium  positae.  The  words  as  they  stand  are  absurd. 
Halm  therefore  brackets  the  whole  sentence  as  interpolated. 
The  alternative  is  to  read  post  (Regius)  or  ant'j,  pro  prooemio 
(Baden),  for  which  cp.  iv.  ii  25  sq.,  where  Quintilian  states 
that  these  primae  quaestiones  have  the  "  force  of  an 
exordium  "  (vim  prooemii). 


BOOK    III.  vi.  8-12 

opponents,  while  sometimes  we  are  content  to  use 
them  as  a  step  to  arguments  which  are  of  greater 
importance.  A  simple  cause,  however,  although  it  9 
may  be  defended  in  various  ways,  cannot  have  more 
than  one  point  on  which  a  decision  has  to  be  given, 
and  consequently  the  basis  of  the  cause  will  be  that 
point  which  the  orator  sees  to  be  the  most  important 
for  him  to  make  and  on  which  the  judge  sees  that  he 
must  fix  all  his  attention.  For  it  is  on  this  that  the 
cause  will  stand  or  fall.  On  the  other  hand  questions 
may  have  more  bases  than  one.1  A  brief  example  10 
will  show  what  I  mean.  When  the  accused  says 
"Admitting  that  I  did  it,  I  was  right  to  do  it,"  he 
makes  the  basis  one  of  quality  ;  but  when  he  adds  "  but 
I  did  not  do  it,"  he  introduces  an  element  of 
conjecture.2  But  denial  of  the  facts  is  always  the 
stronger  line  of  defence,  and  therefore  I  conceive  the 
basis  to  reside  in  that  which  I  should  say,  if  I  were 
confined  to  one  single  line  of  argument.  We  are  11 
right  therefore  in  speaking  of  the  first  conflict  of 
causes  in  contradistinction  to  the  conflict  of  questions. 
For  instance  in  the  first  portion  of  his  speech  on 
behalf  of  Rabirius  Postumus  Cicero  contends  that  the 
action  cannot  lie  against  a  Roman  knight,  while  in 
the  second  he  asserts  that  no  money  ever  came  into 
his  client's  hands.  Still  I  should  say  that  the  basis 
was  to  be  found  in  the  latter  as  being  the  stronger  of 
the  two.  Again  in  the  case  of  Milo  I  do  not  consider  12 
that  the  conflict  is  raised  by  the  opening  questions,  but 
only  when  the  orator  devotes  all  his  powers  to  prove  that 
Clodius  lay  in  wait  for  Milo  and  was  therefore  rightly 
killed.  The  point  on  which  above  all  the  orator  must 
make  up  his  mind,  even  although  he  may  be  going  to 

1  See  §  21.  «  See  §  30  sqq. 



pro  causa  plura  dicturus  est,  quid  maxime  liquere 
iudicivelit.  Quod  tamen  ut  primum  cogitandunij  ita 
non  utique  primum  dicendum  erit. 

13  Alii  statum  crediderunt  primam  eius,  cum  quo 
ageretur,  deprecation  era.  Quam  sententiam  his 
verbis  Cicero  complectitur :  in  quo  primum  insistit 
quasi  ad  repugnandum  congrcssa  defcnsio.  Unde  rursus 
alia  quaestio,  an  eum  semper  is  faciat  qui  respondet. 
Cui  rei  praecipue  repugnat  Cornelius  Celsus  dicens 
non  a  depulsione  stimi,  sed  ab  eo  qui  propositionem 
suam  confirm et ;  ut,  si  hominem  occisum  reus  negat, 
status  ab  accusatore  nascatur,  quia  is  velit  probare  ; 
si  iure  occisum  reus  dicit,  translata  probationis  ne- 

!4  cessitate  idem  a  reo  fiat,  et  sit  eius  intentio.  Cui 
non  accedo  equidem ;  nam  est  vero  propius  quod 
contra  dicitur,  nullam  esse  litem,  si  is,  cum  quo 
agatur,  nihil  respondeat,  ideoque  fieri  statum  a  re- 

15  spondente.  Mea  tamen  sententia  varium  id  est,  et 
accidit  pro  condicione  causarum,  quia  et  videri  potest 
propositio  aliquando  statum  faccre,  ut  in  coniectura- 
libus  causis  ;  utitur  enim  coniectura  magis  qui  agit, 
(quo  moti  quidam  eundem  a  reo  infitialem  esse 
dixerunt)  et  in  syllogismo  tota  ratiocinatio  ab  eo  est 

1  Top.  xxv.  93. 

2  i.e.    where  the  law  forms  the  major  premiss,  while  the 
minor  premiss  is  the  act  which  is  brought  under  the  law. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  12-15 

take  up  various  lines  of  argument  in  support  of  his 
case,  is  this:  what  is  it  that  he  wishes  most  to  impress 
upon  the  mind  of  the  judge  ?  But  although  this 
should  be  the  first  point  for  his  consideration,  it  does 
not  follow  that  it  should  be  the  first  that  he  will  make 
in  his  actual  speech. 

Others  have  thought  that  the  basis  lay  in  the  first  13 
point  raised  by  the  other  side  in  its  defence.  Cicero  l 
expresses  this  view  in  the  following  words: — "the 
argument  on  which  the  defence  first  takes  its  stand 
with  a  view  to  rebutting  the  charge."  This  involves 
a  further  question  as  to  whether  the  basis  can  only  be 
determined  by  the  defence.  Cornelius  Celsus  is 
strongly  against  this  view,  and  asserts  that  the  basis 
is  derived  not  from  the  denial  of  the  charge,  but  from 

O       * 

him  who  affirms  his  proposition.  Thus  if  the  accused 
denies  that  anyone  has  been  killed,  the  basis  will 
originate  with  the  accuser,  because  it  is  the  latter 
who  desires  to  prove  :  if  on  the  other  hand  the 
accused  asserts  that  the  homicide  was  justifiable,  the 
burden  of  proof  has  been  transferred  and  the  basis 
will  proceed  from  the  accused  and  be  affirmed  by  him. 
I  do  not,  however,  agree.  For  the  contrary  is  nearer  14 
to  the  truth,  that  there  is  no  point  of  dispute  if  the 
defendant  makes  no  reply,  and  that  consequently  the 
basis  originates  with  the  defendant.  But  in  my  15 
opinion  the  origin  of  the  basis  varies  and  depends  on 
the  circumstances  of  the  individual  case.  For  instance 
in  conjectural  causes  the  affirmation  may  be  regarded 
as  determining  the  basis,  since  conjecture  is  employed 
by  the  plaintiff  rather  than  the  defendant,  and  con- 
sequently some  have  styled  the  basis  originated 
by  the  latter  Jiegative.  Again  in  any  syllogism'2 
the  whole  of  the  reasoning  proceeds  from  him  who 



16  qui  intendit.     Sed  quia  videtur  illic  quoque  necessi- 
tatem   hos   status    exsequendi   facere  qui   negat,  (is 
enim  si  dicat,  non  fed,  coget  adversarium  coniectura 
uti ;  et  si  dicat,  non  habes  legem,  syllogismo)  conce- 
damus    ex    depulsione    nasci    statum.      Nihilominus 
enim  res  eo  revertetur,  ut  modo  is  qui  agit,  raodo  is 

17  cum  quo  agitur,  statum  faciat.      Sit  enim  accusatoris 
intentio,   Hominem    occidisti.      Si    negat  reus,    faciat 
statum  qui  negat.     Quid  si  confitetur,  sed  iure  a  se 
adulterum  dicit  occisum  ?  nempe  legem  esse  certum 
est  quae  permittat.      Nisi  aliquid  accusator  respondet, 
nulla  lis  est.      Nonfuit,  inquit,  adult er  ;  ergo  depulsio 
incipit    esse    actoris,    ille    statum    faciet.       Ita     erit 
quidem  status  ex  prima  depulsione,  sed   ea  fiet  ah 

18  accusatore  non  a  reo.      Quid?  quod  eadem  quaestio 
potest   eundem   vel    accusatorem    facere   vel    reum : 
Qui  artem  ludicram  exercuerit,  in  quattuordecim  primis 
ordinibus  ne  sedeat ;  qui  se  praetori  in  hortis  osten- 
derat  neque  erat  productus,  sedit  in  quattuordecim 

19  ordinibus.       Nempe     intentio    est:     Artem    ludicram 
exercuisti ;    depulsio :     Non    exercui    artem    ludicram ; 

1  Conjectural  causes  and  the  syllogism. 
3  Reserved  for  equites. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  15-19 

affirms.  But  on  the  other  hand  he  who  in  such  cases  l  16 
denies  appears  to  impose  the  burden  of  dealing  with 
such  bases  upon  his  opponent.  For  if  he  says  "  I  did  not 
do  it,"  he  will  force  his  opponent  to  make  use  of  con- 
jecture, and  again,  if  he  says  "  The  law  is  against  you," 
he  will  force  him  to  employ  the  syllogism.  Therefore 
we  must  admit  that  a  basis  can  originate  in  denial. 
All  the  same  we  are  left  with  our  previous  conclusion 
that  the  basis  is  determined  in  some  cases  by  the 
plaintiff,  in  some  by  the  defendant.  Suppose  the  17 
accuser  to  affirm  that  the  accused  is  guilty  of  homi- 
cide :  if  the  accused  denies  the  charge,  it  is  he  who 
will  determine  the  basis.  Or  again,,  if  he  admits  that 
he  has  killed  a  man,  but  states  that  the  victim  was 
an  adulterer  and  justifiably  killed  (and  we  know  that 
the  law  permits  homicide  under  these  circumstances), 
there  is  no  matter  in  dispute,  unless  the  accuser  has 
some  answer  to  make.  Suppose  the  accuser  does 
answer  however  and  deny  that  the  victim  was  guilty 
of  adultery,  it  will  be  the  accuser  that  denies,  and  it 
is  by  him  that  the  basis  is  determined.  The  basis, 
then,  will  originate  in  the  first  denial  of  facts,  but 
that  denial  is  made  by  the  accuser  and  not  the 
accused.  Again  the  same  question  may  make  the  18 
same  person  either  accuser  or  accused.  "  He  who  has 
exercised  the  profession  of  an  actor,  is  under  no  circum- 
stances to  be  allowed  a  seat  in  the  first  fourteen 
rows  of  the  theatre."2  An  individual  who  had  per- 
formed before  the  praetor  in  his  private  gardens,  but 
had  never  been  presented  on  the  public  stage,  has 
taken  his  seat  in  one  of  the  fourteen  rows.  The  19 
accuser  of  course  affirms  that  he  has  exercised  the 
profession  of  an  actor  :  the  accused  denies  that  he  has 
exercised  the  profession.  The  question  then  arises 



quaestio  :  Quid  sit  artem  ludicram  exercerc  ?  Si  accu- 
sabitur  theatrali  lege,  depulsio  erit  rei ;  si  excitatus 
fuerit  de  spectaculis  et  aget  iniuriarum,  depulsio  erit 

20  accusatoris.      Frequentius  tanien   illud  accidet,  quod 
est  a  plurimis  traditum.      Effugerunt  has  quaestiones 
qui  dixerunt,  statum  esse  id,  quod  appareat  ex  in- 
tentione  et  depulsione,  ut  Fecisti,  Xon  fed  aut  Rede 

21  fed.      Viderimus  tamen,  utrum  id  sit  status  an  in  eo 
status.      Hermagoras  statum  vocat,  per  quern  suhiecta 
res  intelligatur  et  ad  quern  probationes  etiain  partium 
referantur.      Nostra    opinio  semper   haec   fait :    cum 
essent  frequenter  in  causa  diversi  quaestionum  status, 
in  eo  credere  statum  causae,  quod  esset  in  ea  poten- 
tissimum   et   in   quo   maxime    res   verteretur.      Id   si 
quis  generalem  qtiaestionem  vel  caput  generale  dicere 
malet  cum  lioc  milii  non  erit  pugna,  non  magis,  quam 
si  aliud  adhuc,  quo  idem  intelligatur,  eius  rei  nomen 
invenerit,  quanquam  tota  volumina  in  hanc  disputa- 
tionem  impendisse  multos  sciam  ;  nobis  statum  dici 

22  placet.      Sed   cum   in    aliis  omnibus   inter   scriptores 
summa  dissensio  est,  turn  in  hoc   praecipue  videtur 
mihi  studium  quoque  diversa  tradendi  fuisse  ;  adeo, 
nee    qui    sit    numerus    nee    quae    nomina    nee    qui 
generales  quive  speciales  sint  status,  convenit. 

1  i.e.  that  the  defendant  makes  the  basis  or  status.     Sec 


BOOK    III.  vi.  19-22 

as  to  the  meaning  of  the  "  exercise  of  the  profession 
of  actor."  If  he  is  accused  under  the  law  regarding 
the  seats  in  the  theatre,  the  denial  will  proceed  from 
the  accused  ;  if  on  the  other  hand  he  is  turned  out 
of  the  theatre  and  demands  compensation  for  assault, 
the  denial  will  be  made  by  the  accuser.  The  view  20 
of  the  majority  of  writers1  on  this  subject  will, 
however,  hold  good  in  most  cases.  Some  have  evaded 
these  problems  by  saying  that  a  basis  is  that  which 
emerges  from  affirmations  and  denials,  such  as  "  You 
did  it,"  "I  did  not  do  it,"  or  "I  was  justified  in 
doing  it."  But  let  us  see  whether  this  is  the  basis  21 
itself  or  rather  that  in  which  the  basis  is  to  be  found. 
Hermagoras  calls  a  basis  that  which  enables  the 
matter  in  question  to  be  understood  and  to  which  the 
proofs  of  the  parties  concerned  will  also  be  directed. 
My  own  opinion  has  always  been  that,  whereas  there 
are  frequently  different  bases  of  questions  in  connexion 
with  a  cause,  the  basis  of  the  cause  itself  is  its  most 
important  point  on  which  the  whole  matter  turns. 
If  anyone  prefers  to  call  that  the  general  question  or 
general  head  of  the  cause,  I  shall  not  quarrel  with  him, 
any  more  than  I  have  done  hitherto  if  he  produced 
a  different  technical  term  to  express  the  same  thing, 
although  I  know  that  whole  volumes  have  been 


written  on  such  disputes.  I  prefer  however  to  call 
it  the  basis.  There  is  the  greatest  possible  disagree-  22 
ment  among  writers  about  this  as  about  everything 
else,  but  in  this  case  as  elsewhere  they  seem  to  me  to 
have  been  misled  by  a  passion  for  saying  something 
different  from  their  fellow-teachers.  As  a  result 
there  is  still  no  agreement  as  to  the  number  and 
names  of  bases,  nor  as  to  which  are  general  and  which 



23  Ac  primum  Aristoteles  elementa  decem  constituit, 
circa  quae  versari  videatur  omnis  quaestio.      Ovo-iav, 
quara  Plautus  essentiam  vocat,  neque  sane  aliud  est 
eius     nomen    Latinum ;    sed    ea    quaeritur,    an    sit. 
Qualitatem,   cuius  apertus  intellectus  est.      Quanti- 
tatem,    quae    dupliciter    a    posterioribus    divisa    est, 
quam   magnum   et  quam  multum  sit?     Ad  aliquid, 

24  unde  ducta  est  translatio  et  comparatio.      Post  haec 
Ubi  et  Quando ;  deinde  Facere,  Pati,  Habere,  quod 
est  quasi  armatum  esse,  vestitum  esse.      Novissime 
Kelo-Oai,  quod  est  compositum  esse  quodam  modo,  ut 
calere,  stare,  irasci.     Sed  ex  iis  omnibus  prima  quat- 
tuor  ad   status   pertinere,  cetera  ad  quosdam   locos 

25  argumentorum     videntur.        Alii     novem     elementa 
posuerunt,  Personam,  in  qua  de  animo,  corpore,  extra 
positis  quaeratur,  quod  pertinere  ad  coniecturae  et 
qualitatis  instrumenta  video.     Tempus,  quod  ^poVov 
vocant,  ex  quo   quaestio,  an   is  quern,  dum   addicta 
est,  mater  peperit,  servus  sit  natus.      Locum,  unde 
controversia    videtur,    an    fas    fuerit    tyrannum    in 
templo   occidere.      An   exulaverit,   qui  domi  latuit 

26  Tempus  iterum,  quod  Kaipo'v  appellant ;  hanc  autem 
videri   volunt   speciem   illius   temporis,   ut   aestatem 

1  Categ.  ii.  7. 

2  See  §§  52,  68  sqq.,  84-86,  which  make  the  meaning  of 
translatio  fairly  clear.     No  exact  rendering  is  satisfactory. 
Literally  it  means  "transference  of  the  charge"  :  the  sense 
is  virtually  the  same  as  that  of   exceptio   (a   plea  made  by 
defendant   in   bar    of   plaintiffs   action).       "Exception"  is 


BOOK    III.  vi.  23-26 

To  begin  with  Aristotle  l  lays  down  that  there  are  23 
ten  categories  on  which  every  question  seems  to  turn. 
First  there  is  ovo-i'a,  which  Plautus  calls  essence,  the 
only  available  translation :  under  this  category  we  in- 
quire whether  a  thing  is.  Secondly  there  is  quality, 
the  meaning  of  which  is  self-evident.  Third  comes 
quantity,  which  was  subdivided  by  later  philosophers 
as  dealing  with  two  questions  as  to  magnitude  and 
number.  Next  relation,  involving  questions  of  com- 
petence 2  and  comparison.  This  is  followed  by  when 
and  where.  Then  come  doing,  suffering  and  possessing,  24 
which  for  example  are  concerned  with  a  person's  being 
armed  or  clothed.  Lastly  comes  KCUT&U  or  position, 
which  means  to  be  in  a  certain  position,  such  for  in- 
stance as  being  warm,,  standing  or  angry.  Of  these 
categories  the  first  four  concern  bases,  the  remainder 
concern  only  certain  topics  for  argument.  Others  25 
make  the  number  of  categories  to  be  nine.  Person, 
involving  questions  concerning  the  mind,  body  or 
external  circumstances,  which  clearly  has  reference 
to  the  means  by  which  we  establish  conjecture  or 
quality.  Time,  or  ^povog,  from  which  we  get  questions 
such  as  whether  a  child  is  born  a  slave,  if  his  mother 
is  delivered  of  him  while  assigned3  to  her  creditors. 
Place,  from  which  we  get  such  disputes  as  to  whether 
it  is  permissible  to  kill  a  tyrant  in  a  temple,  or 
whether  one  who  has  hidden  himself  at  home  can  be 
regarded  as  an  exile.  Then  comes  time  in  another  26 
sense,  called  Kcupos  by  the  Greeks,  by  which  they 
refer  to  a  period  of  time,  such  as  summer  or  winter ; 

too  unfamiliar  and  technical  a  term.   "  Competence,"  despite 
its  vagueness,  is  perhaps  the  least  unsatisfactory  rendering. 

5  addicti  were  not  technically  servi,  though  in  a  virtual 
condition  of  servitude,  being  the  bondsmen  of  their  creditors 
till  their  debt  was  paid. 



vel  hiemem ;  huic  subiicitur  ille  in  pestilentia  comis- 
sator.  Actum,  id  est  Trpa^w,  quod  eo  referunt,  scicns 
commiserit  an  insciens  ?  necessitate  an  casu  ?  et  talia. 
Numerum,  qui  cadit  in  speciem  quantitatis,  an  Thra- 
sybulo  triginta  praemia  debeantur,  quia  tot  tyrannos 

27  sustulerit?       Causam,   cui    plurimae   subiacent   lites, 
quotiens  factum  non  negating  sed  quia  iusta  ratione 
sit  factum,    defenditur.      TpoVov,  cum    id,   quod  alio 
modo  fieri  licet,  alio  dicitur  factum;   bine  est  adulter 
loris  caesus  vel  fame  necatus.      Occasionem  factorum, 
quod  est  apertius,  quam  ut  vel   iiiterpretandum  vel 
exemplo    sit  demonstrandum,   tamen  d^op/x,as  €/>ywv 

28  vocant.      Hi  quoque  nullam  quaestionem   extra  haec 
putant.      Quidam   detrahunt  duas   partes,   numerum 
et  occasionem,  et  pro  illo  quod  dixi  actum  subiiciunt 
res,  id  est  Trpay/xara.      Quae  ne  praeterisse  viderer, 
satis  habui  attingere.      Ceterum  his  nee  status  satis 
ostendi  nee  omnes  contineri  locos  credo,  quod  appa- 
rebit    diligentius    legentibus,    quae    de    utraque    re 
dicam.      Erunt    enim   plura    multo,    quam   quae    his 
elementis  comprehend untur. 

29  Apud   plu res  auctores  legi,    plaeuisse   quibusdam, 
ununi    omnino    statum     esse     coniecturalem.       Sed 

1  There  is  no  oilier  reference  to  tin's  theme. 

2  An  adulterer  caught  fla»jrantc  dclicto  might  be  killed  l>y 
the  husband  or  beaten.     But  to  starve  him  to  death  in  culd 
blood  would  be  illegal. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  26-29 

under  this  heading  come  problems  such  as  that  about 
the  man  who  held  high  revel  in  a  time  of  pestilence.1 
Action  or  7rpa£i?,  to  which  they  refer  questions  as  to 
whether  an  act  was  committed  wittingly  or  unwit- 
tingly, by  accident  or  under  compulsion  and  the  like. 
Number,  which  falls  under  the  category  of  quantity, 
under  which  come  questions  such  as  whether  the 
state  owes  Thrasybulus  thirty  talents  for  ridding  it  of 
the  same  number  of  tyrants.  Cause,  under  which  27 
heading  come  a  large  number  of  disputes,  whenever 
a  fact  is  not  denied,  but  the  defence  pleads  that  the 
act  was  just  and  reasonable.  TpoTro?  or  manner,  which 
is  involved  when  a  thing  is  said  to  have  been  done  in 
one  way  when  it  might  have  been  done  in  another : 
under  this  category  come  cases  of  such  as  that  of  the 
adulterer  who  is  scourged  with  thongs  or  starved  to 
death.2  Opportunity  for  action,  the  meaning  of  which 
is  too  obvious  to  need  explanation  or  illustration  : 
the  Greeks  however  call  it  Ipywv  d<£op/Aou.  These  28 
authorities  like  Aristotle  hold  that  no  question  can 
arise  which  does  not  come  under  one  of  these  heads. 
Some  subtract  two  of  them,  namely  number  and  op- 
portunity, and  substitute  for  what  I  have  called  action, 
things,  or  in  Greek  Trpay/uara.  I  have  thought  it  suffi- 
cient to  notice  these  doctrines,  for  fear  someone  might 
complain  of  their  omission.  Still  I  do  not  consider 
that  bases  are  sufficiently  determined  by  these  cate- 
gories, nor  that  the  latter  cover  every  possible  kind 
of  topic,  as  will  be  clear  to  any  that  read  carefully 
what  I  have  to  say  on  both  points.  For  there  will  be 
found  to  be  many  topics  that  are  not  covered  by 
these  categories. 

I  find  it  stated  in  many  authors  that  some   rhe-  29 
toricians  only  recognise   one   kind   of  basis,  the  con- 



quibus  placuerit,  neque  illi  tradiderunt  neque  ego 
usquam  reperire  potui.  Rationem  tamen  hanc  secuti 
dicuntur,  quod  res  omnis  signis  colligeretur.  Quo 
modo  licet  qualitatis  quoque  solum  statum  faciant, 
quia  ubique,  qualis  sit  cuiusque  rei  natura,  quaeri 
potest.  Sed  utrocunque  modo  sequetur  summa  con- 

30  fusio.      Neque  interest,  unum  quis  statum  faciat  an 
nullum,  si  omnes  causae  sunt  condicionis   eiusdem. 
Coniectura   dicta   est   a   coniectu,   id    est   directione 
quadam   rationis  ad  veritatem,  unde   etiam   somnio- 
rum  atque  ominum  interpretes  coniectores  vocantur. 
Appellatum  tamen  est  hoc  genus  varie,  sicut  sequen- 
tibus  apparebit. 

31  Fuerunt,   qui  duos   status   facerent :    Archedemus 
coniecturalem    et   finitivum,   exclusa   qualitate,  quia 
sic    de    ea  quaeri  existimabat,  quid    esset  iniquum, 
quid    iniustum,    quid    dicto    audientem    non     esse ; 

32  quod  vocat  de  eodem  et  olio.      Huic  di versa  sententia 
eorum  fuit,  qui  duos  quidem  status  esse  voluerunt, 
sed  unum  infitialem,  alterum  iuridicialem.      Infitialis 
est,  quern  dicimus   coniecturalem,  cui  ab  infitiando 
nomen  alii  in  totum  dederunt,  alii  in  partem,  quia 
accusatorem  coniectura,  reum   infitiatione  uti  puta- 

33  verunt.      luridicialis  est  qui  Graece  dicitur  8iKcuo\o- 
yiKo's.     Sed  quemadmodum   ab   Arcbedemo   qualitas 
exclusa  est,  sic  ab  his  repudiata  finitio.      Nam  subii- 

1  Fr.  11,  Arnim. 

2  i.e.   the  question   may  be  stated    "Does  it  conform    to 
our  conception  of   injustice   or   is  it  something  different  ?  " 
Questions  of  quality  are  regarded  as  questions  of  definition. 


BOOK   III.  vi.  29-33 

jectural.  But  they  have  not  mentioned  who  these 
rhetoricians  are  nor  have  I  been  able  to  discover. 
They  are  however  stated  to  have  taken  this  view  on 
the  ground  that  all  our  knowledge  is  a  matter  of 
inference  from  indications.  On  this  line  of  reason- 
ing they  might  regard  all  bases  as  qualitative,  because 
we  inquire  into  the  nature  of  the  subject  in  every 
case.  But  the  adoption  of  either  view  leads  to  inex- 
tricable confusion.  Nor  does  it  matter  whether  one  30 
recognises  only  one  kind  of  basis  or  none  at  all,  if 
all  causes  are  of  the  same  nature.  Conieclura  is  de- 
rived from  conicere  "  to  throw  together/'  because  it 
implies  the  concentration  of  the  reason  on  the  truth. 
For  this  reason  interpreters  of  dreams  and  all  other 
phenomena  are  called  coniectores  "conjecturers."  But 
the  conjectural  basis  has  received  more  names  than 
one,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel. 

Some  have  recognised  only  two  bases.  Arche-  31 
demus  J  for  instance  admits  only  the  conjectural  and 
definitive  and  refuses  to  admit  the  qualitative,  since 
he  held  that  questions  of  quality  take  the  form  of 
"  What  is  unfair?  what  is  unjust?  what  is  disobedi- 
ence?" which  he  terms  questions  about  identity  and 
difference.11  A  different  view  was  held  by  those  who  32 
likewise  only  admitted  two  bases,  but  made  them 
the  negative  and  juridical.  The  negative  basis  is 
identical  with  that  which  we  call  the  conjectural,  to 
which  some  give  the  name  of  negative  absolutely, 
others  only  in  part,  these  latter  holding  that  conjec- 
ture is  employed  by  the  accuser,  denial  only  by  the 
accused.  The  juridical  is  that  known  in  Greek  as  33 
Si/ccuoAoyiKo<?.  But  just  as  Archedemus  would  not 
recognise  the  qualitative  basis,  so  these  reject  the 
definitive  which  they  include  in  the  juridical,  holding 



ciunt    earn    iuridiciali,    quaerendurnque    arbitrantur 

iustumne  sit,  sacrilegium   appellari   quod   obiiciatur 

34  vel   furtum   vel   amentiam.      Qua  in   opinione   Pam- 
philus    fuit,    sed   qualitatem    in    plura    partitus    est ; 
plurimi  deinceps,  mutatis  tantum  nominibus,  in  rem 
de  qua  constet,  et  in  rem  de  qua  non  constet.     Nam 
est     verum     nee    aliter    fieri    potest,    quam     ut    aut 
certum  sit  factum  esse  quid  aut  non  sit ;  si  non  est 
certum,  coniectura  sit,  si  certum   est,  reliqui  status. 

35  Nam  idem  dicit  Apollodorus,  cum  quaestionem  aut 
in  rebus  extra  positis,  quibus  coniectura  explicatur, 
aut  in  nostris  opinionibus  existimat  positam,  quorum 
illud   TrpayfjLaTiKor,   ^oc  Trepl   evrotas  vocat ;   idem,   qui 
dirp6\r)7TTov  et  TrpoXrjTTTLKov  dicurit,  id  est  dubium  et 

36  praesumptum,  quo  significatur  de  quo  liquet.      Idem 
Theodorus,  qui  de  eo,  An  sit,   et  de  accidentibus  ei 
quod  esse  constat,  id  est  Trept  ovo-cas  KCU  crv/j-fttpyKOTuv, 
existimat  quaeri.      Nam  in  his  omnibus  prius  genus 
coniecturam  habet,  sequens  reliqua.      Sed  haec  reli- 
qua    Apollodorus   duo   vult    esse,   qualitatem    et    de 
nomine,    id    est   finitivam ;    Theodorus,    quid,   quale, 

37  quantum,  ad  aliquid.      Sunt  et  qui  de  eodem  et  de 
alio   modo  qualitatem    esse    modo   finitionem   velint. 

1  e.g.  circumstantial  evidence. 
8  airpo\7]iTr6s  lit.  =  unpresumed. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  33-37 

that  in  these  questions  we  have  to  enquire  whether 
it  is  just    that    the    act  with  which  the  accused  is 
charged  should  be  called  sacrilege  or  theft  or  mad- 
ness.    Paxnphilus  held  this   opinion  but  subdivided   34 
quality  into  several  different  species.     The  majority 
of  later  writers  have  classified  bases  as  follows,  in- 
volving however  no  more  than  a  change  of  names  : — 
those    dealing    with     ascertained    facts    and    those 
dealing  with  matters  where  there  is  a  doubt.      For 
a    thing    must    either    be    certain    or    uncertain :    if 
it    is     uncertain,  the    basis    will    be    conjectural;    if 
certain,  it    will    be  some    one    of    the  other    bases. 
Apollodorussays  the  same  thing  when  he  states  that  35 
a  question  must  either  lie  in  things  external,1  which  give 
play  to  conjecture,  or  in  our  own  opinions  :  the  former 
he  calls  Trpay/xariKo?,  the  latter  Trepi  cvi/ot'as.  The  same 
is  said  by  those  who  employ  the  terms  aTrpoA^Tn-os  2 
and  7rpoA.r/7rT(A-o<;,  that  is  to  say  doubtful  and  presump- 
tive, by  this  latter  term  meaning  those  facts  which 
are  beyond  a  doubt.     Theodorus  agrees  with  them,  36 
for  he  holds  that  the  question  is  either  as  to  whether 
such   and  such  a  thing  is  really  so,  or  is  concerned 
with  the  accidents  of  someting  which  is  an  admitted 
fact :  that    is    to    say     it     is    either    Trepi  ovo-t'as    or 
Trepi  o-u/x/?e/5^Korcov.      For  in  all  these  cases  the  first 
basis  is  conjectural,  while  the  second  belongs  to  one 
of  the   other  classes.     As  for  these  other  classes  of 
basis,  Apollodorus  holds  that  there  are  two,  one  con- 
cerned with  quality  and  the  other  with  the  names  of 
things,  that  is  to  say  a   definitive  basis.     Theodorus 
makes  them  four,   concerned  with    existence,  quality, 
quantity  and  relation.     There  are  some  too  who  make  37 
questions   of  identity  and  difference  come   under  the 
head  of  quality,  others  who  place  it  under  the  head 



In  duo  et  Posidonius  dividit,  vocem  et  res.  In  voce 
quaeri  putat  an  significet,  quid,  quam  multa,  quo 
modo  ?  in  rebus  coniecturam,  quod  KO.T  aio-Orjo-Lv  vocat, 
et  qualitatem,  et  finitionem,  cui  nomen  dat  KO.T  cwoiav, 
et  ad  aliquid.  Unde  et  ilia  divisio  est,  alia  esse 

38  scripta,  alia  inscripta.      Celsus  Cornelius  duos  et  ipse 
fecit    status    generales,   an    sit?    quale    sit?      Priori 
subiecit    finitionem,    quia    aeq'ie    quaeratur    an    sit 
sacrilegus,  qui  nihil  se  sustulisse  de  templo  dicit  et 
qui  privatam  pecuniara  confitetur  sustulisse.     Quali- 
tatem  in  rem  et  scriptum  dividit.      Scripto  quattuor 
partes  legales,  exclusa  translatione ;  quantitatem  et 

39  mentis  quaestionera  coniecturae  subiecit.      Est  etiam 
alia  in  duos  dividendi  status  ratio,  quae  docet,  aut 
de  substantia  controversiam  esse,  aut  de  qualitate  ; 
ipsam  porro   qualitatem  aut  in  summo  genere  con- 

40  sistere    aut    in    succedentibus.      De    substantia    est 
coniectura.      Quaestio  enini  tractatur    rei,  an    facta 
sit  ?  an  fiat  ?  an  futura  sit  ?   interdum  etiam  mentis  ; 
idque    melius,   quam    quod    iis    placuit,    qui    statum 
eundem  facti  nominaverunt,  tanquam  de  praeterito 

1  Fr.  p.  232,  Bake. 

8  cp.  §  23 ;  translatio  and  exceptio  are  virtually  identical. 
The  four  classes  are  Intention,  Ambiguity,  Contradictory 
Laws,  Syllogism. 

1  i.e.  the  conjectural  basis  concerned  with  questions  of  fact. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  37-40 

of  definition.  Posidonius l  divides  them  into  two 
classes,  those  concerned  with  words  and  those  con- 
cerned with  things.  In  the  first  case  he  thinks  that 
the  question  is  whether  a  word  has  any  meaning ;  if 
so,  what  is  its  meaning,  how  many  meanings  has  it, 
and  how  does  it  come  to  mean  what  it  means  ?  In 
the  latter  case,  we  employ  conjecture,  which  he  calls 
KO.T'  aivOrjo-iv,  or  inference  from  perception,  quality, 
definition  which  he  calls  KO.-T  IVVQIOV  or  rational  in- 
ference, and  relation.  Hence  also  comes  the  division 
into  things  written  and  unwritten.  Even  Cornelius  38 
Celsus  stated  that  there  were  two  general  bases,  one 
concerned  with  the  question  whether  a  thing  is,  the 
other  with  the  question  of  what  kind  it  is.  He  in- 
cluded definition  under  the  first  of  these,  because 
enquiry  may  equally  be  made  as  to  whether  sacrilege 
has  been  committed,  when  a  man  denies  that  he 
has  stolen  anything  from  a  temple,  and  when  he 
admits  that  he  has  stolen  private  money  from  a 
temple.  He  divides  quality  into  fact  and  the  letter 
of  the  law.  Under  the  head  of  the  letter  of  the  law  he 
places  four  classes,  excluding  questions  of  compe- 
tence'*: quantity  and  intention  he  places  under  the 
head  of  conjecture*  There  is  also  another  method  of  39 
dividing  bases  into  two  classes :  according  to  this 
disputes  are  either  about  substance  or  quality,  while 
quality  is  treated  either  in  its  most  general  sense  or 
in  its  special  senses.  Substance  is  dealt  with  by  con-  40 
jecture :  for  in  enquiring  into  anything,  we  ask 
whether  it  has  been  done,  is  being  done,  or  is  likely 
to  be  done,  and  sometimes  also  consider  itsintention  : 
this  method  is  preferable  to  that  adopted  by  those 
who  style  the  conjectural  basis  a  basis  of  fact,  as 
though  we  only  enquired  into  the  past  and  what  has 



41  tantum     et    tantum    de     facto    quaereretur.       Pars 
qualitatis,  quae  est  de  summo  genere,  raro  in  indi- 
cium venit,  quale  est,  idne  sit  honestum,  quod  vulgo 
laudatur ;    succedentium    autem    aliae    de    communi 
appellatione,  ut  sitne  sacrilegus,   qui  pecuniam  pri- 
vatam  ex  templo  furatus  est ;  aut  de  re  denominata, 
ubi  et  factum  esse  certum  est  nee  dubitatur,  quid  sit 
quod  factum  est.      Cui  subiacent  omnes  de  honestis, 

42  iustis,  utilibus  quaestiones.      His  etiam   ceteri  status 
contineri    dicuntur,  quia  et  quantitas  modo  ad   con- 
iecturam  referatur,  ut  maiorne  sol  quam  terra?  modo 
ad    qualitatem,   quanta    poena    quempiam    quantove 
praemio  sit  affici  iustum  ?  et  translatio  versetur  circa 

43  qualitatem,  et  definitio  pars  sit  translationis ;  quin  et 
contrariae  leges  et  ratiocinativus  status,  id  est  svllo- 
gismos,    et    plerumque    scripti    et    voluntatis    aequo 
nitantur     (nisi    quod    hie    tertius   aliquando    coniec- 
turam  accipit,  quid  senserit  legis  constitutor)  ;  ambi- 
guitatem  vero  semper   coniectura   explicari   necesse 
sit,,  quia,  cum  sit  manifestum,  verborum  intellectum 
esse  duplicem,  de  sola  quaeritur  voluntate. 

44  A  plurimis  tres  sunt  facti  generales  status,  quibus 
et  Cicero  in   Oratore  utitur,  et  omnia,  quae  aut  in 
controversiam  aut  in  contentionem  veniant,  contineri 

1  See  §  11  and  the  case  cited  in  38,  where  the  accused 
would  argue  that  he  was  guilty  not  of  sacrilege,  but  of 
simple  theft. 

1  When  we  argue  that  a  certain  case  comes  under  a  cer- 
tain law.  cp.  §  15.  z  Or.  xiv.  45. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  40-44 

actually  been  done.  The  consideration  of  quality  41 
under  its  most  general  aspect  rarely  comes  up  in 
the  courts  ;  I  refer  to  questions  such  as  "  whether 
that  is  honourable  which  is  generally  praised."  With 
regard  to  the  special  aspects  of  quality,  questions 
sometimes  occur  about  some  common  term,  such  as 
whether  sacrilege  has  been  committed  when  a  man 
lias  stolen  private  money  from  a  temple,  or  about 
some  act  with  a  definite  name,  when  there  is  no 
doubt  either  as  to  the  commission  or  the  nature  of 
the  act.  Under  this  heading  come  all  questions 
about  what  is  honourable,  just  or  expedient.  These  42 
bases  are  said  to  contain  others  as  well,  because 
quantity  is  sometimes  concerned  with  conjectural  bases, 
as  in  the  question  whether  the  sun  is  bigger  than 
the  earth,  and  sometimes  with  qualitative  bases,  as  in 
the  question  what  reward  or  punishment  it  would 
be  just  to  assign  to  some  particular  person,  while 
questions  of  competence  undoubtedly  are  concerned 
with  quality,  and  definition  with  questions  of  compe- 
tence.* Further  contradicto^  laws  and  the  ratiocinoiive  43 
basis  or  syllogism*  and  the  majority  of  questions  deal- 
ing with  the  letter  of  the  law  and  intention  are  based 
on  equity,  with  the  exception  that  this  last  question 
sometimes  admits  of  conjecture  as,  for  instance,  con- 
cerning the  intentions  of  the  legislator  :  ambiguity, 
however,  must  always  be  explained  by  conjecture, 
because  as  it  is  clear  that  the  words  admit  of  two 
interpretations  the  only  question  is  as  to  the 

A  large  number  of  writers  recognise  general  bases  ;  44 
Cicero    adopts  them  in  his   Orator,3  and  holds  that 
everything  that  can  form  the   subject  of  dispute  or 
discussion  is  covered  by  the  three  questions,  whether 


putat,  >itne .'   Quid  sit  ?   Quale  sit  ?   quorum  nomina 

45  apertiora  sunt,   quam  ut  dicenda   sint.       Idem1   Pa- 
trocles  sentit.     Tres  fecit  et  M.  Antonius  his  quidem 
verbis  :  Paucae  res  sunt,  quibus  ex  rebus  omnes  orationes 
nascuntur,  factum  non  factum,  ius  iniuria,  bonum  malum. 
Sed   quoniam.  quod   iure  dicimur  fecisse,  non   hunc 
solum  intellectum  habet,  ut  lege,  sed  ilium  quoque, 
ut  iuste  fecisse  videamur,   secuti  Antonium  apertius 
voluerunt  eosdem  status  distinguere.      Itaque  dixe- 
runt    coniecturalem,    legalem,    iuridicialem ;    qui    et 

46  Verginio  placent.      Horum  deinde  fecerunt  species, 
ita  ut  legali   subiicerent  finitionem   et  alios,  qui  ex 
scripto  ducuntur,.  legum  contrariarum,,  quae  diri.vofj.La. 
dicitur,  et  scripti  et  sententiae  vel  voluntatis,  id  est 
Kara  p-qrov  Kal  buivoiav,   et  LLfrdXfj^Lr,  quam  nos  varie 
translativam^    transumptivam,    transpositivam     voca- 
muSj    a-vXXoyuFfjLoVj    quern     accipirnus    ratiocinativum 
vel  collectivum^  ambignitatiSj  quae  o^^t/5o/\t'a  nomi- 
natur ;    quos   posui,    quia   et    ipsi    a   plerisque    status 
appellantur,    cum    quibusdam    legales    potius    quae- 
stiones  eas  dici  placuerit. 

47  Quattuor  fecit  Athenaeus,  -porpt-TLKTji'  crraVu'  vel 
Trapop/j.-r]-iKijv,  id   est   exhortativum^,  qui  suasoriae  est 
proprius ;     crivreAtK/n ;     qua     coniecturam     significari 
magis   ex  his,  quae  sequuntur,  quam  ex  ipso  nomine 

1  latroclea.  B. 

1  Conjectural,  definitive,  and  qualitative. 
3  Concerned  with  questions  of  competence. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  44-47 

it  is,  n-hat  it  is,  and  of  jvhat  kind  il  is.  The  names 
of  these  three  bases  are  too  obvious  for  mention.1 
The  same  view  is  asserted  by  Patrocles.  Marcus  43 
Antonius  stated  that  there  were  three  bases 
in  the  following  words  : — "The  things  which  form 
the  ground  of  every  speech  are  few  and  are  as 
follows  : — '  Was  a  thing  done  or  not  done  ? '  '  Was  it 
just  or  unjust  ? '  '  Was  it  good  or  bad  ?  '  But  since, 
when  we  are  said  to  have  been  justified  in  doing 
anything,  this  does  not  merely  mean  that  our  action 
was  legal,  but  further  implies  that  it  was  just,  those 
who  follow  Antonius  attempt  to  differentiate  these 
bases  with  greater  exactness.  They  therefore  called 
them  conjectural,  legal  and  juridical,  a  division  which 
meets  with  the  approval  of  Verginius  as  well.  These  46 
they  then  subdivided  into  species,  placing  definition 
under  the  head  of  the  legal  basis,  together  with  all 
others  which  are  concerned  with  the  letter  of  the  law  : 
such  as  that  of  contradictory  larvs,  or  cuTtvoyLua,  that 
which  rests  on  the  letter  of  the  la?v  and  on  meaning 
or  intention  (which  the  Greeks  call  Kara  prjrov  Kal 
Stavotav)  and  /^era/X^i/as  to  which  latter  we  give  various 
names,  styling  it  the  translatiie,  transumptive  or  trans- 
positiie  basis-;  the  syllogis?n,  which  we  call  the 
ratiocinatiie  or  deductive  basis  ;  and  those  which  turn 
on  ambiguity  or  a^L^oXia.  I  mention  these  because 
they  are  called  bases  by  most  writers,  though  some 
prefer  to  call  them  legal  questions. 

Athenaeus  laid  down  that  there  were  four  bases  :  47 

the     TTpOTptTTTlKJl     O"TaCT(5      Or     TTapOpfJLTJTLKlj,      that      is,    tllC 

hortative,  which  is  peculiar  to  deliberative  themes ; 
the  o-uvTtXtKr;,3  which  is  shown  to  be  the  conjectural,  not 
so  much  from  the  name  itself,  but  from  what 

lit.  =  contributory. 



apparet ;  TU7mAA.a/<TtK-/^',  ea  finitio  est,  mutatione  eriim 
nominis  constat ;  iuridicialem,  eadem  appellatione 
Graeca  qua  ceteri  usus.  Nam  est,  ut  dixi,  multa  in 

48  nominibus  differentia.      Sunt  qui  vTraAAa/cTiK^v  trans- 
lationem    esse    existiment,    secuti     lianc    mutationis 
significationem.      Fecerunt   alii    totidem    status,  sed 
alios,     An     sit  ?    Quid    sit  ?    Quale     sit  ?     Quantum 

49  sit  ?    ut   Caecilius   et   Theon.      Aristoteles   in   rheto- 
ricis,  An  sit,  Quale,  Quantum,  et  Quam  multum  sit? 
quaerendum   putat.       Quodam   tamen  loco   iinitionis 
quoque  vim  intelligit,  quo  dicit  quaedam  sic  defendi, 
Sustuli,  sed  non  furtum  fed  ;  Percussi,  scd  non  iniunam 

60  fed,  Posuerat  et  Cicero  in  libris  rhetoricis,  facti, 
nominis,  generis,  actionis  ;  ut  in  facto  coniectura,  in 
nomine  finitio,  in  genere  qualitas,  in  actione  ius  in- 
telligeretur.  luri  subiecerat  translationem.  Verum 
hie  legales  quoque  quaestiones  alio  loco  tractat  ut 
species  actionis. 

51  Fuerunt  qui  facerent  quinque,  coniecturam,  finitio- 
nem,  qualitatem,  quantitatem,  ad  aliquid.  Theodo- 
rus  quoque,  ut  dixi,  iisdem  generalibus  capitibus 
utitur,  An  sit?  Quid  sit?  Quale  sit?  Quantum 
sit  ?  Ad  aliquid.  Hoc  ultimum  maxime  in  com- 
parative genere  versari  putat,  quoniam  melius  ac 

1  The   defendant  admits  the  act,  but  gives  it  a  different 
name,  e.g.  theft,  not  3acrilege.      vna\\aKTiK-h  -=  changing. 
7  SiKatoXuytKos.  3  dice.  fr.  49,  Burkh. 

4  Ar.  Rhet.  14166:  1374  a.         6  de  Inv.  i.  viii.  10. 
6  Part.  Or.  31  and  38.  7  §  3G. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  47-51 

follows  ;  the  v7ra\\a.KTtKr)  or  definitive,  for  it  consists 
in  a  change  of  terms  l ;  and  the  juridical  to  which 
he  gives  the  name  employed  by  other  Greek  writers.2 
For,  as  I  have  said,  there  is  a  great  variety  in  the 
names  employed.  There  are  some  who,  arguing  from  48 
its  meaning  of  change,  hold  that  { TroAAaKTt/o;  is  the 
translative  basis,  which  is  concerned  with  competence. 
Others,  Caecilius  3  and  Theon  for  instance,  hold 
that  there  are  the  same  number  of  bases,  but  make 
them  of  a  different  kind,  namely,  those  covered  by 
the  questions  whether  a  thing  is,  what  it  is,  of  what 
kind  it  is  and  how  great  it  is.  Aristotle 4  in  his  49 
Rhetoric  states  that  all  enquiry  turns  on  the  ques- 
tions whether  a  thing  is,  of  what  kind  it  is,  how  great 
it  is,  and  of  how  many  parts  it  consists.  In  one 
place  however  he  recognises  the  force  of  definition 
as  well,  saying  that  certain  points  are  defended 
on  the  following  lines  : — "  I  took  it,  but  did  not 
steal  it."  "I  struck  him,  but  did  not  commit  an 
assault."  Cicero  5  again  in  his  Rhetorica  makes  the  50 
number  of  bases  to  be  four,  namely  those  concerned 
with  fact,  names,  kinds,  and  Legal  action,  that  is  to  say 
conjecture  is  concerned  with  fact,  definition  with 
names,  quality  with  kinds,  and  lam  with  action : 
under  this  latter  head  of  law  he  included  ques- 
tions of  competence.  But  in  another  passage  he 
treats  c  legal  questions  as  a  species  of  action. 

Some  writers  have  held  that  there  arejive  bases  :  51 
the  conjectural,  definitive,  qualitative,  quantitative  and 
relative.  Theodorus,  also,  as  I  have  said,7  adopts  the 
same  number  of  general  heads,  whether  a  thing  is,  what 
it  is,  of  what  kind  it  is,  how  great  it  is,  and  to  what  it  refers. 
The  last  he  considers  to  be  chiefly  concerned  with 
comparison,  since  better  and  worse,  greater  and  less 



peius,  maius  et  minus  nisi  alio  relata  non  intelligun- 

52  tur.     Sed  in  illas  quoque  translativas,  ut  supra  sig- 
nificavi,  quaestiones  incidit,  An  huic  ius  agendi  sit? 
vel,    facere    aliquid     ccnveniat  ?     An    contra    hunc? 
An  hoc  tempore  ?     An  sic  ?  omnia  enim  ista  referri 

53  ad  aliquid  necesse  est.     Alii  sex  status  putant,  con- 
iecturam,    quam    yeWo-iv    vocant,    et    qualitatem,    et 
proprietatern,  id  est  t'Stor^ra,  quo  verbo  finitio  osten- 
ditur,  et   quantitatem,   quam   d£iW  dicunt,   et   com- 
parationem,   et    translationem,    cuius    adhuc    novum 
nomen  inventum  est  /xcrao-rao-is  ;  novum,  inquam,  in 
statu,  alioqui  ab  Hermagora  inter  species  iuridiciales 

54  usitatum.     Aliis  septem  esse  placuit ;  a  quibus  nee 
translatio  nee  quantitas  nee  comparatio  recepta  est, 
sed  in  horum  trium  locum  subditae  quattuor  legales 

55  adiectaeque  tribus  illis  rationalibus.     Alii   pervene- 
runt  usque  ad  octo,  translatione  ad  septem  superiores 
adiecta.     A   quibusdam   deinde   divisa   ratio   est,  ut 
status    rationales   appellarent,    quaestiones   (quemad- 
modum  supra  dixi)  legales,  ut  in  illis  de  re,  in  his  de 
scripto  quaereretur.     Quidam  in  diversum  hos  status 

56  esse,  illas  quaestiones  maluerunt.      Sed  alii  rationales 
tres    putaverunt,    An     sit  ?    Quid     sit  ?    Quale     sit  ? 
Hermagoras  solus  quattuor,  coniecturam,  proprieta- 
tem,  translationem,  qualitatem,  quam  per  accideritia, 

1  See  §46. 

2  Conjectural,  definitive,  qualitative. 

3  §46. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  51-56 

are  meaningless  terms  unless  referred  to  some 
standard.  But  questions  of  relation,  as  I  have  already  52 
pointed  out,  enter  also  into  translative  questions,  that 
is,  questions  of  competence)  since  in  cases  such  as 
"  Has  this  man  a  right  to  bring  an  action?  "  or  "  Is 
it  fitting  that  he  should  do  such  and  such  a  thing, 
or  against  this  man,  or  at  this  time,  or  in  this 
manner  ?  '  For  all  these  questions  must  be  referred 
to  a  certain  standard.  Others  hold  that  there  are  53 
six  bases  :  conjecture  or  yeVecris,  quality,  particularity  or 
tSiorr/s,  by  which  word  they  mean  definition,  quantity 
or  a£i'a,  comparison  and  competence,  for  which  a  new 
term  has  been  found  in  /xeTatrracris ;  I  call  it  new 
when  applied  to  a  basis,  for  Hermagoras  employs  it 
to  describe  a  species  of  juridical  question.  Others  54 
think  there  are  seven,  while  refusing  to  recognise 
competence,  quantity  or  comparison,  in  place  of  which 
they  substitute  four  legal  bases,1  completing  the 
seven  by  the  addition  of  those  three  which  they  call 
rational?  Others  again  make  eight  by  the  addition  65 
of  competence  to  the  above-mentioned  seven.  Some 
on  the  other  hand  have  introduced  a  fresh  method 
of  division,  reserving  the  name  of  bases  for  the 
rational,  and  giving  the  name  of  questions  to  the  legal, 
as  I  mentioned  above,3  since  in  the  former  the 
problem  is  concerned  with  facts,  in  the  latter  with 
the  letter  of  the  law.  Some  on  the  contrary  reverse 
this  nomenclature  calling  the  legal  questions  bases 
and  the  rational  grounds  questions.  But  others  have  56 
thought  that  there  are  only  three  rational  bases, 
covered  by  the  questions  whether  a  thing  is,  what  it  is, 
and  of  what  kind  it  is  ?  Hermagoras  is  alone  in 
thinking  that  there  are  four,  namely  conjecture,  par- 
ticularity, competence,  and  quality  :  to  the  latter  he 



id  est  Kara  tru/AjSe/^KoSj  vocat,  hac  interpretatione, 
an  illi  accidat  viro  bono  esse,  vel  malo.  Hanc  ita 
dividit,  de  appetendis  et  fugiendis,  quac  est  pars 
51  deliberative  ;  de  persona,  ea  ostenditur  laudativa  ; 
negotialeni;  quam  Trpay/xaTt/o^  vocat,  in  qua  de  rebus 
ipsis  quaeritur,  remoto  personarum  complexu,  ut, 
Sitne  liber  qui  est  in  assertione,  an  divitiae  super- 
biam  pariant,  an  iustum  quid,  an  bonum  sit. 
luridicialem,  in  qua  fere  eadeni  sed  certis  destina- 
tisque  personis  quaerantur  :  an  ille  iuste  hoc  fecerit, 

58  vel  bene.       Nee  me  fall  it,  in  prinio  Ciceronis  rheto- 
rico  aliam  esse  loci  negotialis  interpretationem,  cum 
ita  scriptum   sit  :  Negotialis  est,  in  qua,  quid  iuris  ex 
chili  more  et  aequitate  sit,  consideratur  ;  cui  diligentiae 

59  praeesse  apud  nos  iurisconsulti  existimantur.     Sed  quod 
ipsius  de  his  libris  indicium  fuerit,  supra  dixi.      Sunt 
enim  velut  regestae  in  hos  commentaries,  quos  ado- 
lescens  deduxerat,  scholae,  et  si  qua  est  in  his  culpa, 
tradentis  est,  sive  eum  movit  id,  quod   Hermagoras 
prima  in  hoc  loco  posuit  exempla  ex   quaestionibus 
iuris,  sive  quod   Gra-eci  —  pay/xariKovs  vacant  iuris  in- 

60  terpretes.     Sed  Cicero  quidem  his  pulcherrimos  illos 

1  asscrtio  =  a  trial   in   which   the    question   of   a  person's 
liberty    is    involved.      Wlien    waiting    trial,    this    person  is 

described  as  in  assert ionc. 

2  de  Inv.  i.  xi.   14.  3  ISee  in.  v.  15. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  56-60 

appends  the  phrase  Kara.  a-v/j./StfiyKos,  "  according  to 
its  accidents,"  illustrating  his  meaning  by  putting  a 
case  where  it  is  enquired  whether  a  man  happen  to 
be  good  or  bad.  Pie  then  subdivides  qualify  into 
four  species  :  first  that  which  is  concerned  with 
things  to  be  sought  or  avoided,  which  belongs  to  de- 
liberative oratory  :  secondly  those  concerned  nith  57 
persons,  by  which  he  indicates  panegyric  :  thirdly  the 
practical  or  pragmatic,  which  is  concerned  with  things 
in  general  without  reference  to  persons,  and  may  be 
illustrated  by  questions  such  as  whether  he  is  free 
who  is  claimed  as  a  slave  and  waiting  the  trial  of  his 
case/  whether  riches  beget  insolence,  and  whether  a 
thing  is  just  or  good  ;  lastly  there  is  the  juridical 
species,  under  which  practically  the  same  questions 
arise,  but  in  relation  to  certain  definite  persons,  as  for 
instance  when  it  is  asked  whether  that  particular  man 
has  done  well  or  ill.  I  am  aware  that  another  explana-  58 
tion  is  given  by  Cicero  in  the  first  book  of  his 
Rhetorica2  of  the  species  known  as  practical, 
where  he  says  that  it  is  "the  department  under 
which  we  consider  what  is  right  according  to  civil 
usage  and  equity  :  this  department  is  regarded  by 
us  as  the  special  sphere  of  the  lawyer."  But  I  have  59 
already  mentioned3  what  his  opinion  was  about  this 
particular  work.  The  Rhetorica  are  simply  a  collec- 
tion of  school-notes  on  rhetoric  which  he  worked 
up  into  this  treatise  while  quite  a  young  man.  Such 
faults  as  they  possess  are  due  to  his  instructor.  In  the 
present  instance  he  may  have  been  influenced  by  the 
fact  that  the  first  examples  given  by  Hermagoras  of 
this  species  are  drawn  from  legal  questions,  or  by  the 
fact  that  the  Greeks  call  interpreters  of  the  law 

But  for  these  early  efforts  Cicero  substi-  60 



de  Oratore  substituit,  ideoque  culpari,  tanquam  falsa 
praecipiat,  non  potest.      Nos  ad  Hermagoran.     Trans 
lationem     hie    primus    omnium    tradidit,    quanquam 
semina  eius  quaedam  citra  nomen  ipsum  apud  Aris- 

61  totelen  reperiuntur.      Legales  autem  quaestiones  has 
fecit,  scripti  et  voluntatis  (quam  ipse  vocat  Kara  p-rjrov 
Kal  v7re£aipe<r«',  id  est  dictum  et  exceptionem,  quorum 
prius    ei    cum    omnibus    commune     est,    exceptionis 
nomen  minus  usitatum),  ratiocinativum,ambiguitatis, 

62  legum  contrariarum.      Albutius  eadem  divisione  usus 
detrahit    translationem,    subiiciens    earn    iuridiciali. 
In  legalibus  quoque  quaestionibus  nullum  putat  esse, 
qui    dicatur    ratiocinativus.      Scio    plura    inventuros 
adhuc,  qui  legere  antiquos  studiosius  volent,  sed  ne 
haec  quoque  excesserint  modum  vereor. 

63  Ipse   me   paulum    in  alia,  quam   prius    habuerim, 
opinione  nunc  esse  confiteor.      Et  fortasse   tutissi- 
mum  erat  famae  modo  studenti  nihil  ex  eo  mutare, 
quod  multis  annis  non  sensissem  modo,  verum  etiam 

64  approbassem.      Sed  non  sustineo  esse  conscius  mihi 
dissimulati  (in  eo  praesertim  opere,  quod  ad  bonorum 
iuvenum    aliquam    utilitatem    componimus)    in    ulla 
parte  iudicii  mei.     Nam  et  Hippocrates,  clarus  arte 
medicinae,  videtur  honestissime  fecisse,quod  quosdam 

1  RheL  n.  xv.  8.  a  Epidem.  v.  14. 


BOOK  III.  vi.  60-64 

tuted  his  splendid  de  Oratore  and  therefore  cannot  be 
blamed  for  giving  false  instruction.  I  will  now 
return  to  Hermagoras.  He  was  the  first  rhetorician 
to  teach  that  there  was  a  basis  concerned  with  com- 
petence, although  the  elements  of  this  doctrine  are 
found  in  Aristotle,1  without  however  any  mention  of 
the  name.  The  legal  questions  were  according  to  61 
Hermagoras  of  five  kinds.  First  the  letter  of  the 
law  and  its  intention  ;  the  names  which  he  gives  to 
these  are  Kara  prjrov  and  U7re£ai'pecrts,  that  is  to  say 
the  letter  of  the  law  and  the  exceptions  thereto :  the 
first  of  these  classes  is  found  in  all  writers,  but  the 
term  exception  is  less  in  use.  The  number  is 
completed  by  the  ratiocinative  basis  and  those 
dealing  with  ambiguity  and  contradictory  laws.  Albutius  62 
adopts  this  classification,  but  eliminates  competence, 
including  it  under  the  juridical  basis.  Further  he 
holds  that  in  legal  questions  there  is  no  ratiocinative 
basis.  I  know  that  those  who  are  prepared  to 
read  ancient  writers  on  rhetoric  more  carefully  than 
I  have,  will  be  able  to  discover  yet  more  on  this 
subject,  but  I  fear  that  I  may  have  been  too  lengthy 
even  in  saying  what  I  have  said. 

I  must  admit  that  I  am  now  inclined  to  take  a  63 
different  view  from  that  which  I  once  held.  It  would 
perhaps  be  safer  for  my  reputation  if  I  were  to  make 
no  modification  in  views  which  I  not  only  held  for  so 
many  years,  but  of  which  I  expressed  my  open  appro- 
bation. But  I  cannot  bear  to  be  thought  guilty  of  64 
concealment  of  the  truth  as  regards  any  portion  of 
my  views,  more  especially  in  a  work  designed  for  the 
profit  of  young  men  of  sound  disposition.  For  Hippo- 
crates,2 the  great  physician,  in  my  opinion  took  the 
most  honourable  course  in  acknowledging  some  of 



errores  suos,  ne  poster!  errarent,  confessus  est ;  et 
M.  Tullius  non  dabitavit  aliquos  iam  editos  libros 
aliis  postea  scriptis  ipse  damnare,  sicut  Catulum 
atque  Lucullum  et  hos  ipsos,  de  quibus  niodo  sum 

65  locutus,  artis  rhetoricae.      Etenim  supervacuus  foret 
in  studiis  longior  labor,  si  nihil  liceret  melius  invenire 
praeteritis.       Neque   tamen  quidquam    ex    iis,  quae 
turn   praecepi,  supervacuum   fuit ;   ad   easdem    enim 
particulas  liaec  quoque,  quae   mine   praecipiam,   re- 
vertentur  ;  ita  neminem  didicisse  poeniteat,  colligere 
tantum  eadem  ac  disponere  paulo  significantius  conor. 
Omnibus  autem  satisfaetum  volo,  non  me  hoc  serius 

66  demonstrare  aliis,  quam  mihi   ipse  persuaserim.      Se- 
cundum  plurimos  auctores    servabam  tris  rationales 
status,  .  coniecturam,    qualitatem,    finitionem,    unum 
legalem.      Hi  mihi  status  generales  erant.      Legalem 
in   quinque   species    partiebar,   script!    et  voluntatis, 
legum  contrariarum,  collectivuin,  ambiguitatis,  trans- 

67  lationis.       Nunc    quartum    ex    generalibus    intelligo 
posse    removed ;     sufficit    enim     prima    divisio,    qua 
diximus  alios  rationales,  alios  legales  esse  ;   ita  non 
erit  status,  sed  quaestionuin  genus ;  alioqui  et  ratio- 

68  nalis    status    esset.       Ex    iis    etiam,    quos    speciales 
vocabam,  removi   translationem,  frequenter   quidem 
(sicut  omnes  qui  me  secuti  sunt  memiiiisse  possunt) 
testatus  et  in  ipsis  etiam  illis  sermonibus  me  nolente 

1  The  two  books  of  tlie  first  edition  of  the  Academica. 
3  i.e.  the  Rhetorica,  better  known  as  de  Inventione. 
3  See  m.  v.  4.  *  See  I.  Proem.  7. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  64-68 

his  errors  to  prevent  those  who  came  after  from 
being  led  astray,  while  Cicero  had  no  hesitation  about 
condemning  some  of  his  earlier  works  in  books  which 
he  published  later  :  I  refer  to  his  condemnation  of 
his  Lucullus  and  Catulus  l  and  the  books  '2  on  rhetoric 
which  I  have  already  mentioned.  Indeed  we  should  65 
have  no  justification  for  protracting  our  studies  if  we 
were  forbidden  to  improve  upon  our  original  views. 
Still  none  of  my  past  teaching  was  superfluous  :  for 
the  views  which  I  am  now  going  to  produce  will  be 
found  to  be  based  on  the  same  principles,  and  conse- 
quently no  one  need  be  sorry  to  have  attended  my 
lectures,  since  all  that  I  am  now  attempting  to  do  is  to 
collect  and  rearrange  my  original  views  so  that  they 
may  be  somewhat  more  instructive.  But  I  wish  to 
satisfy  everybody  and  not  to  lay  myself  open  to  the 
accusation  that  I  have  allowed  a  long  time  to  elapse 
between  the  formation  and  publication  of  my  views. 
I  used  to  follow  the  majority  of  authorities  in  ad-  66 
hering  to  three  rational  bases,  the  conjectural,  qualita- 
tive and  definitive,  and  to  one  legal  basis.3  These  were 
my  general  bases.  The  legal  basis  I  divided  into  five 
species,  dealing  with  the  letter  of  the  law  and  intention, 
contradictory  laws,  the  syllogism,  ambiguity  and  compe- 
tence. It  is  now  clear  to  me  that  the  fourth  of  the  67 
general  bases  may  be  removed,  since  the  original 
division  which  I  made  into  rational  and  legal  bases  is 
sufficient.  The  fourth  therefore  will  not  be  a  basis, 
but  a  kind  of  question  ;  if  it  were  not,  it  would  form 
one  of  the  rational  bases.  Further  I  have  removed  68 
competence  from  those  which  I  called  species.  For  I 
often  asserted,  as  all  who  have  attended  my  lectures 
will  remember,  and  even  those  discourses  which 
were  published  against  my  will  4  included  the  state- 



vulgatis  hoc  tamen  complexus,  vix  in  ulla  contro- 
versia  translationis  statum  posse  reperiri,  ut  non  et 
alius  in  eadern  recte  dici  videretur,  ideoque  a  qui- 

69  busdam  eum  exclusum.      Neque  ignore  multa  trans- 
ferri,  cum  in  omnibus  fere  causis,  in  quibus  cecidisse 
quis  formula  dicitur,  hae  sint  quaestiones,  an  huic, 
an  cum  hoc,  an  hac  lege,  an  apud  hunc,  an  hoc  tem- 

70  pore  liceat  agere  ?   et  si  qua  sunt  talia.     Sed  per- 
sonae,  tempora,  actiones  ceteraque  propter  aliquam 
causam    transferuntur ;    ita   non    est  in  translatione 
quaestio  sed  in  eo,  propter  quod  transferuntur :   Non 
debes  apud  praetorem  petere  Jidei  commissum,  sed  apud 
consules,    maior   enim   praetoria  cognitione   summa    est. 
Quaeritur,  an  maior    summa   sit,    facti   controversia 

71  est.     Non  licet  tibi  agere  niecum,  cognitor  enim  fieri  non 
potuisli :  iudicatio,  an  potuerit.      Non  debuisli  interdi- 
cere  sed  petere  :  an  recte  interdictum  sit,  ambigitur. 

72  Quae  omnia  succedunt  legitimis  quaestionibus.     An 
non  praescriptiones  (etiam  in  quibus  maxime  videtur 
manifesta  translatio)  easdem  omnes  species  habent, 

8C.  by  getting  an  order  for  restitution. 

BOOK    III.  vi.  68-72 

ment,   that   the  basis   concerned  with    competence 
hardly  ever  occurs  in  any  dispute  under  such  circum- 
stances that  it  cannot  more  correctly  be  given  some 
other  name,  and  that  consequently  some  rhetoricians 
exclude  it  from  their  list  of  bases.     I  am,  however,  69 
well  aware  that  the  point  of  competence  is  raised  in 
many  cases,  since  in  practically  every  case  in  which 
a  party  is  said  to  have  been  ruled  out  of  court  through 
some  error  of  form,  questions  such  as  the  following 
arise  :  whether  it  was  lawful  for  this  person  to  bring 
an    action,  or    to    bring  it    against    some   particular 
person,  or  under  a  given  law,  or  in  such  a  court,  or 
at  such  a  time,  and  so  on.      But  the  question  of  com-  70 
petence  as  regards  persons,  times,  legal  actions  and 
the    rest    originates    in    some    pre-existent    cause  : 
the    question    turns    therefore    not    on    competence 
itself,  but  on    the   cause  with  which   the    point    of 
competence  originates.     "  You  ought  to  demand  the 
return  of  a  deposit  not  before  the  praetor  but  before 
the  consuls,  as  the  sum  is  too  large  to  come  under 
the  praetor's  jurisdiction."    The  question  then  arises 
whether  the  sum  is  too  large,  and  the  dispute  is  one 
of  fact.  "  You  have  no  right  to  bring  an  action  against  71 
me,  as  it  is  impossible  for  you  to  have  been  appointed 
to  represent  the  actual  plaintiff."     It  then  has  to  be 
decided  whether  he  could  have  been  so  appointed. 
"  You  ought  not  to  have  proceeded  by  interdict,1  but 
to  have  put  in  a  plea  for  possession."     The    point 
in  doubt  is  whether  the  interdict  is  legal.    All  these 
points  fall  under  the  head  of  legal  questions.     For  do  72 
not  even  those  special  pleas,  in  which  questions  of 
competence  make  themselves  most  evident,  give  rise  to 
the  same  species   of    question  as  those   laws  under 
which  the  action  is  brought,   so  that  the   enquiry  is 



quas  eae  leges,  quibus  agitur,  ut  aut  de  nomine  aut 
scripto  et  sententia  vel  ratiociiiatione  quaeratur? 
Deinde  status  ex  quaestione  oritur ;  translatio  non 
habet  quaestionem,  de  qua  contendit  orator,  sed 

73  propter    quam    contendit.       Hoc    apertius,    Occidisti 
hominein,   Non    occidi ;    quaestio,  an  occiderit,  status 
coniectura.      Non   est   tale,   Hdbeo  ius  actionis,   Non 
habes,   ut   sit  quaestio,  an    habeat,    et   inde    status. 
Accipiat  enim  actionern  necne,  ad  eventum  pertinet, 
non  ad  causam,  et  ad  id,  quod  pronuntiat  index,  non 

74  id,   propter  quod    pronuntiat.       Hoc   illi    simile  est, 
Puniendus  es,  Xon  sum  ;  videbit  iudex,  an  puniendus 
sit.      Sed  non  hie  erit  quaestio  nee  hie  status.       LJbi 
ergo  ?     Puniendus   es,  hominem   occidisti  ;    Non  occidi  : 
An  occiderit.      Honorandus  sum,  Non  es  ;  num  statum 
habet?  non,  ut  puto.      Honorandus  sum,  tjida  tyrannum 

75  occidi;    Non   occidisti ;  quaestio   et  status.      Similiter, 
Non  recte  agis,  Rccte  ago  non  habet  statum.      Ubi  est 
ergo?      Non   recte   agis   ignominiosus.       Quaeritur,  an 

1  e.g.   murder  or  manslaughter  :  sacrilege  or  theft. 

-  See  §  70. 

8  sc.   the  conjectural. 


BOOK    III.   vi.  72-75 

really  concerned  with  the  name  of  a  given  act,1  with 
the  letter  of  the  law  and  its  meaning,  or  with  some- 
thing that  requires  to  be  settled  by  argument  ?  The 
basis  originates  from  the  question,  and  in  cases  of 
competence  it  is  not  the  question  concerning  which 
the  advocate  argues  that  is  involved,  but  the  question 
on  account  of  which  lie  argues.2  An  examplewill  make  73 
this  clearer.  "  You  have  killed  a  man."  "  I  did  not  kill 
him."  The  question  is  whether  he  has  killed  him  ; 
the  basis  is  the  conjectural.  But  the  following  case  is 
very  different.  "  I  have  the  right  to  bring  this  action." 
"  You  have  not  the  right."  The  question  is  whether  he 
has  the  right,and  it  is  from  this  thatwe  derive  the  basis. 
For  whether  he  is  allowed  the  right  or  not  depends 
on  the  event,  not  on  the  cause  itself,  and  on  the  de- 
cision of  the  judge,  not  on  that  on  account  of  which 
he  gives  such  a  decision.  The  following  is  a  similar  74 
example.  "  You  ought  to  be  punished."  "  I  ought 
not."  The  judge  will  decide  whether  he  should  be 
punished,  but  it  is  not  with  this  that  the  question  or 
the  basis  is  concerned.  Where  then  does  the  question 
lie  ?  "  You  ought  to  be  punished,  for  you  have  killed 
a  man."  "1  did  not  kill  him."  The  question  is 
whether  he  killed  him.  "  I  ought  to  receive  some 
honour."  "You  ought  not."  Does  this  involve  a 
basis  ?  I  think  not.  "  I  ought  to  receive  some  honour 
for  killino-  a  tyrant."  "You  did  not  kill  him.'  Here 

o  » 

there  is  a  question  and  a  basis3  as  well.  So,  too,  "  You  75 
are  not  entitled  to  bring  this  action,"  "I  have,"  in- 
volves no  basis.  Where  then  is  it  to  be  found  ?  "  You 
have  no  right  to  bring  this  action,  because  you  have 
been  deprived  of  civil  rights."  In  this  case  the 
question  is  whether  he  has  been  so  deprived,  or 
whether  loss  of  civil  rights  debars  a  person  from 



ignominiosus  sit ;  aut,  an  agere  ignominioso  liceat ; 
quaestiones    et    status.       Ergo    translativum    genus 

76  causae  ut  comparativum  et  mutuae  accusationis.      At 
enim  simile  est  illi"  Habeo  ius,  Non  habes,"  "  Occidisti, 
Recte  occidi."     Non  nego,  sed  nee  haec  res  statum 
facit.        Non    enim    sunt   hae   propositiones   (alioqui 
causa    non    explicabitur),  sed,  cum    suis    rationibus. 
Scelus  commisit   Horalius,  soj'orem   enim   occidit.     Non 
commisit,  debuit  enim  occidere  earn,  quae  hostis  mortem 
maerebal.       Quaestio,  an  haec  iusta  causa  ;    ita  qua- 

77  litas.      Et    similiter    in    translatione,   Non   habes   ins 
abdicandij  quiet  ignominioso  non  est  actio.      Habeo  ius, 
quia  abdicatio  actio  non  est.      Quaeritur,  quid  sit  actio  : 
finiemus  Non  licet  abdicare  /ilium  syllogismo.       Item 
cetera    per    onmes    et    rationales   et    legales    status. 

78  Nee    ignore    fuisse    quosdam,   qui    translationem    in 
rationali  quoque  genere  ponerent  hoc  modo,  Homi- 
nem  occidi,  iussus  ab  imperatorc.      Dona  templi  cogenti 
tyranno  dcdi.      Deserui  tempestatibiiSyJiuminibus,  valetu- 
dine  impeditus.  Id  est^  non  per  me  stetit,  sed  per  illud. 

79  A  quibus  etiam  liberius  dissentio.      Non  enim  actio 
transfertur  sed  causa  facti,  quod  accidit  paene  in  omni 

1  sc.  the  conjectural  or  definitive  basis  and  the  qualitative. 

2  See  in.  x.  3  and  4. 

8  Disinheritance  could  only  be  effected  by  legal  action. 
4  See  §  15. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  75-79 

bringing  an  action.  Here  on  the  other  hand  we  find 
both  questions  and  bases.1  It  is  therefore  to  kinds  of 
causes,  not  to  bases  that  the  term  competence  applies  : 
other  kinds  of  cause  are  the  comparative  and  the  recri- 
minatory.^ "But/'  it  is  urged,  "the  case  '  I  have  a  70 
right/  '  You  have  not/  is  similar  to  '  You  have  killed 
a  man/  '  I  was  justified  in  so  doing.'  I  do  not  deny 
it,  but  this  does  not  make  it  a  basis.  For  these  state- 
ments are  not  propositions  until  the  reasons  for  them 
are  added.  If  they  were  propositions  as  they  stand, 
the  case  could  not  proceed.  "  Horatius  has  committed 
a  crime,  for  he  has  killed  his  sister."  "  He  has  not 
committed  a  crime,  since  it  was  his  duty  to  kill  her 
for  mourning  the  death  of  an  enemy."  The  question 
is  whether  this  was  a  justifiable  reason,  and  the  basis 
is  one  of  quality.  So  too  as  regards  competence.  "You  77 
have  no  right  to  disinherit,  since  a  person  who  has 
been  deprived  of  civil  rights  is  not  allowed  to  take 
legal  action."  3  "I  have  the  right,  since  disinheriting 
is  not  legal  action."  The  question  here  is  what  is  legal 
action.  And  we  shall  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the 
son's  disinheritance  is  unlawful,  by  use  of  the  syllogism.* 
The  case  will  be  similar  with  all  the  rational  and  legal 
bases.  I  am  aware  that  there  have  been  some  who  78 
placed  competence  among  rational  bases,  using  as 
illustrations  cases  such  as,  "I  killed  a  man  under 
orders  from  my  general,"  "  I  gave  the  votive  offerings 
in  a  temple  to  a  tyrant  under  compulsion,"  "  I  de- 
serted owing  to  the  fact  that  storms  or  floods  or  ill- 
health  prevented  me  from  rejoining."  That  is  to  say 
it  was  not  due  to  me,  but  some  external  cause.  From  79 
these  writers  I  differ  even  more  widely :  for  it  is  not 


the  nature  of  the  legal  action  itself  which  is  involved 
in  the  question  of  competence^  but  the  cause  of  the  act ; 



defensione.  Delude  is,  qui  tali  utitur  patrocinio, 
non  recedit  a  forma  qualitatis,  dicit  enim,  se  culpa 
vacare  ;  ut  magis  qualitatis  duplex  ratio  facienda  sit, 
altera  qua  et  factum  defenditur,  altera  qua  tantum 

80  Credendum    est  igitur    his,  quorum   auctoritatem 
secutus  est  Cicero,  tria  esse,  quae  in  omni  disputa- 
tione   quaerantur,  an  sit,   quid  sit,  quale  sit?   quod 
ipsa  nobis  etiam  natura   praescribit.      Nam  primum 
oportet   subesse    aliquid,   de   quo    ambigitur ;    quod, 
quid  sit  et  quale  sit,  certe  non  potest  aestimari,  nisi 
prius    esse    constiterit,   ideoque    ea    prima   quaestio. 

81  Sed  non   statim,  quod    esse   manifestum   est,   etiam 
quid  sit,  apparet.      Hoc  quoque  constitute  novissima 
qualitas  superest,  neque  his  exploratis  aliud  est  ultra. 
His    infinitae    quaestiones,   his    finitae    continentur; 
horum  aliqua  in  demonstrativa,  deliberativa,  iudiciali 

82  materia    utique    tractatur.      Haec    rursus    iudiciales 
causas  et  rationali  parte  et  legali  continent ;  neque 
enim   ulla  iuris  disceptatio    nisi    finitione,   qualitate, 

83  coniectura  potest  explicari.     Sed  instituentibus  rudes 
non   erit  inutilis  latius   primo  fusa   ratio   et,  si  non 
statim  rectissima  linea  tensa,  facilior  tamen  et  aper- 
tior  via.      Discant  igitur  ante  omnia  quad riperti tarn 

Absolute,  when  the  deed  is  shown  to  be  right.      (B) 
Relative,   when  the  act   is   not  defended,   but   the  agent  is 
cleared  ut"  the  guilt  of  the  act. 
2  See  §  44. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  79-83 

and  this  is  the  case  in  almost  every  defence.  Finally 
he  who  adopts  this  line  of  defence,  does  not  thereby 
abandon  the  qualitative  basis  ;  for  he  states  that  he  him- 
self is  free  from  blame,  so  that  we  really  should 
differentiate  between  two  kinds  of  quality,1  one  of 
which  comes  into  play  when  both  the  accused  person 
and  his  act  are  defended,  and  the  other  when  the 
accused  person  alone  is  defended. 

We  must  therefore  accept  the  view  of  the  author!-  80 
ties  followed  by  Cicero/2  to  the  effect  that  there  are 
three  things  on  which  enquiry  is  made  in  every  case  : 
we  ask  whether  a  thing  is,  what  it  is,  and  of  what  kind  it 
is.  Nature  herself  imposes  this  upon  us.  For  first  of  all 
there  must  be  some  subject  for  the  question,  since  we 
cannot  possibly  determine  what  a  thing  is,  or  of  what 
kind  it  is,  until  we  have  first  ascertained  whether  it  is, 
and  therefore  the  first  question  raised  is  whether  it  is. 
But  even  when  it  is  clear  that  a  thing  is,  it  is  not  81 
immediately  obvious  what  it  is.  And  when  we  have 
decided  what  it  is,  there  remains  the  question  of  its 
quality.  These  three  points  once  ascertained,  there 
is  no  further  question  to  ask.  These  heads  cover  both 
definite  and  indefinite  questions.  One  or  more  of  them 
is  discussed  in  every  demonstrative,  deliberative  or 
forensic  theme.  These  heads  again  cover  all  cases  in  82 
the  courts,  whether  we  regard  them  from  the  point 
of  view  of  rational  or  legal  questions.  For  no  legal 
problem  can  be  settled  save  by  the  aid  of  definition, 
quality  and  conjecture.  Those,  however,  who  are  83 
engaged  in  instructing  the  ignorant  will  find  it  useful 
at  first  to  adopt  a  slightly  less  rigid  method  :  the  road 
will  not  be  absolutely  straight  to  begin  with,  but  it 
will  be  more  open  and  will  provide  easier  going.  I 
would  have  them  therefore  learn  above  all  things 


in  omnibus  causis  esse  rationem,  quam  primam  in- 
tueri  debeat  qui  acturus  est.  Nam,  ut  a  defensore 
potissimum  incipiam,  longe  fortissima  tuendi  se  ratio 
est,  si  quod  obiicitur  negari  potest ;  proxima,  si  non 
id,  quod  obiicitur,  fact  uiu  esse  dicitur ;  tertia  hones- 
tissima,  qua  recte  factum  defenditur.  Quibus  si 
deficiamur,  ultima  quidem  sed  iam  sola  superest 
salus  aliquo  iuris  adiutorio  elabendi  ex  crimine,  quod 
neque  negari  neque  defendi  potest,  ut  non  videatur 

84  iure    actio    intendi.       Hinc    illae    quaestiones    sive 
actiones    sive    translationes.      Sunt    enim    quaedam 
non  laudabilia  non  natura  sed  iure  concessa,  ut  in 
XII   tabulis  debitoris   corpus  inter  creditores  dividi 
licuit,    quam    legem    mos    publicus    repudiavit ;    et 
aliquid  aequum  sed  prohibitum  iure,  ut  libertas  tes- 

85  tamentorum.      Accusatori  nihilo  plura  intuenda  sunt, 
ut  probet  factum  esse,  hoc  esse  factum,  non   recte 
factum,  iure  se  intendere.      Ita  circa  species  easdem 
Us  omnis  versabitur  translatis  tantum  aliquando  par- 
tibus,  ut  in  causis,  quibus  de  praemio  agitur,  recte 
factum  petitor  probat. 

86  Haec  quattuor  velut  proposita  formaeque  actionis, 
quae    turn    generales    status    vocabam,    in    duo    (ut 

1  e.g.  that  the  legal  heir  must  receive  at  least  a  quarter  of 
the  property. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  83-86 

that  there  are  four  different  methods  which  may  be 
employed  in  every  case,  and  lie  who  is  going  to  plead 
should  study  them  as  first  essentials.  For,  to  begin 
with  the  defendant,  far  the  strongest  method  of  self- 
defence  is,  if  possible,  to  deny  the  charge.  The 
second  best  is  when  it  is  possible  to  reply  that  the 
particular  act  with  which  you  are  charged  was  never 
committed.  The  third  and  most  honourable  is  to 
maintain  that  the  act  was  justifiable.  If  none  of 
these  lines  of  defence  are  feasible,  there  remains  the 
last  and  only  hope  of  safety  :  if  it  is  impossible  either 
to  deny  the  charge  or  justify  the  act,  we  must  evade 
the  charge  with  the  aid  of  some  point  of  law,  making 
it  appear  that  the  action  has  been  brought  against  us 
illegally.  Hence  arise  those  questions  of  legal  action  84 
or  competence.  For  there  are  some  things,  which, 
although  not  laudable  in  themselves,  are  yet  permit- 
ted by  law  ;  witness  the  passage  in  the  Twelve  Tables 
authorising  creditors  to  divide  up  a  debtor's  body 
amongst  themselves,  a  law  which  is  repudiated  by 
public  custom.  There  are  also  certain  things  which 
although  equitable  are  prohibited  by  law  ;  witness  the 
restrictions  placed  on  testamentary  disposition.1  The  85 
accuser  likewise  has  four  things  which  he  must  keep 
in  mind  :  he  must  prove  that  something  was  done, 
that  a  particular  act  was  done,  that  it  was  wrongly 
done,  and  that  he  brings  his  charge  according  to  law. 
Thus  every  cause  will  turn  on  the  same  sorts  of 
questions,  though  the  parts  of  plaintiff  and  defendant 
will  sometimes  be  interchanged  :  for  instance  in  the 
case  of  a  claim  for  a  reward,  it  will  be  the  plaintiffs 
task  to  show  that  what  was  done  was  right. 

These  four  schemes  or  forms  of  action  which  I  then  86 
called  general  bases  fall  into  two  classes  as  I  have 



ostendi)  genera  discedunt  rationale  et  legale.  Ra- 
tionale simplicius  est,  quia  ipsius  tan  turn  naturae 
contemplatione  constat.  Itaque  in  eo  satis  est  os- 

87  tendisse  coniecturam,  rinitionem,  qualitatem.      Lega- 
lium  pi  tires  sint  species  necesse  est.  propterea  quod 
multae  sunt  leges  et  varias  habent  formas.      Alia  est 
cuius  verbis  nitimur,  alia  cuius  voluntate,  alias  nobis, 
cum  ipsi  nullam  habeamuSj  aditingimus,  alias  inter  se 

88  comparamus,  alias  in  diversum   interpretamur.      Sic 
naseuntur  haec  velut  simulacra  ex  illis  tribus,  interim 
simplicia,  interim   et  mixta,  propriam  tamen  faciem 
ostendentia,  tit  scripti  et  voluntatis,  qtiae  sine  dubio 
aut   qualitate  aut  coniectura  continetur,  et  syllogis- 
mos_,  qui   est  maxima  qualitatis,  et  leges  contrariae, 
quae  iisdem,  quibus  scri])tum  et  voluntas,  constant, 
et    dfji<f)i/3o\La,    quae    semj)er    coniectura    explicatur. 

89  Finitio  quoque  utrique  generi,  quodqtie  rerum  quod- 
que  scripti   contemplatione    constat,   communis    est. 
Haec    omnia,    etiavnsi    in    illos    tres   status   veniunt, 
tamen,  quia  (ut  dixi)  habent  aliquid  velut  proprium, 
videntur  demonstranda  discentibus,  et  permittendum 
ea  dicere  vel  status  legales  vel  quaestiones  vel  capita 
quaedam  minora,  dum  sciant,  nihil  ne  in  his  quidem 

90  praeter   tria,  quae   praediximuSj  quaeri.     At   Quan- 
tum ?   et  Quam  multum  ?   et  Ad  aliquid   et,  ut  iion- 

1  §  67,  and  nr.  v.  4. 

2  §  37.          8  §  SO, 


BOOK    III.  vi.  86-90 

shown,1  namely,  the  rational  and  the  legal.  The 
rational  is  the  simpler,  as  it  involves  nothing  more 
than  the  consideration  of  the  nature  of  things.  In 
this  connection,  therefore,  a  mere  mention  of  conjec- 
ture, definition  and  quality  will  suffice.  Legal  questions  87 
necessarily  have  a  larger  number  of  species,  since 
there  are  many  laws  and  a  variety  of  forms.  In  the 
case  of  one  law  we  rely  on  the  letter,  in  others  on  the 
spirit.  Some  laws  we  force  to  serve  our  turn,  when 
we  can  find  no  law  to  support  our  case,  others  we 
compare  with  one  another,  and  on  others  we  put  some 
novel  interpretation.  Thus  from  these  three  bases  we  88 
get  three  resemblances  of  bases:  sometimes  simple, 
sometimes  complex,  but  all  having  a  character  of  their 
own,  as,  for  instance,  when  questions  of  the  letter  of 
i he  law  and  its  intention  are  involved,  for  these  clearly 
come  under  conjecture  or  quality ;  or  again  where  the 
syllogism  is  involved,  for  this  is  specially  connected 
with  quality  ;  or  where  contradictory  laws  are  involved, 
for  these  are  on  the  same  footing  as  the  letter  of  the 
law  and  intention  ;  or  yet  again  in  cases  of  ambiguity, 
which  is  always  resolved  by  conjecture  Definition  also  89 
belongs  to  both  classes  of  question,  namely  those 
concerned  with  the  consideration  of  facts  and  those 
concerned  with  the  letter  of  the  law.  All  these 
questions,  although  they  come  under  the  three  bases, 
yet  since,  as  I  have  mentioned,2  they  have  certain 
characteristic  features  of  their  own,  require  to  be 
pointed  out  to  learners  ;  and  we  must  allow  them 
to  be  called  legal  bases  or  questions  or  minor  heads,  as 
long  as  it  is  clearly  understood  that  none  of  them 
involve  any  other  questions  than  the  three  I  have 
mentioned.3  As  regards  questions  of  quantity,  number,  90 
relation,  and,  as  some  have  thought,  comparison,  the 



nulli  putarunt,  comparativus  non  eandem  rationem 
habent ;  sunt  enini  haec  non  ad  varietatem  iuris  sed 
ad  solam  rationem  referenda,  ideoque  semper  in 
parte  aut  coniecturae  aut  qualitatis  ponenda  sunt,  ut 
Qua  mente  ?  et  Quo  tempore  ?  et  Quo  loco  ? 

91  Sed  de  singulis  dicemus  quaestionibus,  cum  trac- 
tare    praecepta    divisionis    coeperimus.      Hoc    inter 
omnes  convenit,  in  causis  simplicibus  singulos  status 
esse  causarum,  quaestionum  autem,  quae  velut  sub- 
iacent  his  et  ad  illud,  quo  iudicium  continetur,  refe- 

92  runtur,  saepe  in   unam   cadere  plures  posse ;   etiam 
credo  aliquando  dubitari,  quo  statu  sit  utendum,  cum 
adversus   unam   intentionem    plura  opponuntur ;    et 
sicut  in  colore  dicitur  narrationis,  eum  esse  optimum, 
quern  actor  optime  tueatur,  ita  hie  quoque  posse  dici, 
eum  statum  esse  faciendum,  in  quo  tuendo  plurimum 

93  adhibere  virium  possit  orator ;   ideoque  pro  Milone 
aliud  Ciceroni  agenti  placuit  aliud  Bruto,  cum  exer- 
citationis  gratia  componeret  orationem,  cum  ille  iure 
tanquam  insidiatorem  occisum  et  tamen  non  Milonis 
consilio  dixerit,  ille  etiam  gloriatus  sit  occiso  malo 

94  cive  :  in  coniunctis  vero  posse  duos  et  tris  inveniri 
vel  diversos,  ut  si  quis  aliud   se   non  fecisse,  aliud 
recte   fecisse    defendat,   vel   generis   eiusdem,   ut  si 

95  quis  duo  crimina  neget.     Quod  accidit  etiam,  si  de 
una  re  quaeratur  aliqua  sed  earn  plures  petant,  vel 

»  Book  VII. 

BOOK    III.  vi.  90-95 

case  is  different.  For  these  have  no  connexion  with 
the  complexities  of  the  law,  but  are  concerned  with 
reason  only.  Consequently  they  must  always  be 
regarded  as  coming  under  conjecture  or  quality,  as,  for 
instance,  when  we  ask  with  what  purpose,  or  at  what 
time,  or  place  something  was  done. 

But  I  will  speak  of  individual  questions  when  I  91 
come  to  handle  the  rules  for  division.1  This  much  is 
agreed  to  by  all  writers,  that  one  cause  possesses  one 
basis,  but  that  as  regards  secondary  questions  related 
to  the  main  issue  of  the  trial,  there  may  frequently 
be  a  number  in  one  single  cause.  I  also  think  there  92 
is  at  times  some  doubt  as  to  which  basis  should  be 
adopted,  when  many  different  lines  of  defence  are 
brought  to  meet  a  single  charge  ;  and,  just  as  in  re- 
gard to  the  complexion  to  be  given  to  the  statement 
of  the  facts  of  the  case,  that  complexion  is  said  to  be 
the  best  which  the  speaker  can  best  maintain,  so  in 
the  present  connexion  I  may  say  that  the  best  basis 
to  choose  is  that  which  will  permit  the  orator  to  de- 
velop a  maximum  of  force.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  93 
we  find  Cicero  and  Brutus  taking  up  different  lines 
in  defence  of  Milo.  Cicero  says  that  Clodius  was 
justifiably  killed  because  he  sought  to  waylay  Milo, 
but  that  Milo  had  not  designed  to  kill  him  ;  while 
Brutus,  who  wrote  his  speech  merely  as  a  rhetorical 
exercise,  also  exults  that  Milo  has  killed  a  bad  citizen. 
In  complicated  causes,  however,two  or  three  bases  may  94 
be  found,  or  different  bases :  for  instance  a  man  may 
plead  that  he  did  not  do  one  thing,  and  that  he  was 
justified  in  doing  another,  or  to  take  another  similar 
class  of  case,  a  man  may  deny  two  of  the  charges. 
The  same  thing  occurs  when  there  is  a  question  95 
about  some  one  thing  which  is  claimed  by  a  number 



eodem  iure  ut  proximitatis  vel  diverse,  ut  cum  hie 
testamento,  ille  proximitate  nitetur.  Quotiens 
autem  aliud  alii  petitori  opponitur,  dissimiles  esse 

96  status  neccsse  est,  ut  in  ilia  controversia :   Testamenta 
Icgibns   facia    rata  sint.      Intestatorum  parentium    liberi 
heredes  sint.      Abdicatm  ne  quid  de  bonis  patris  capiat. 
Xothus    ante.    Icgitiimtm   natus    legit'nnus   fdius   sit,   post 
legitimum  natns  tanluni  civis.      In  adoplionem  dare  liceal. 
In   adoptionem  dato   rcdire  in  familiam  liceat,  si  paler 

97  natiiralis  sine   liberis  deccsserit.      Qm  ex  duobus  legiti- 
?fiis    alterum    in    adoptionevi    dcderat,    alterum    abdica- 
rcrat,     susluiit      iiolJinm ;      institufo      hcrcde      abdicate 
decessit.       Tres     omncs     de     bonis     contendunt.       No- 
thum,  qui  non  sit  legitimus,  Graeci  vocant ;  Latinum 
rei  nomen^  ut  Cato  quoque  in  oratione  quadam  tes- 
tatus   est,  non    habemus   ideoque   utimur   peregrine. 

98  Sed  ad  propositum.      Heredi  scripto  opponitur  lex, 
Abdicalus   ne   quid   de   bonis   patris   capiat;    fit    status 
scripti  et  voluntatis,  an  ullo  modo  capere  possit,    an 
ex    voluntate     patris,      an    hcres     scriptus.       Notho 
duplex  fit  quaestio,  quod   post  legitiinos  natus  sit  et 


BOOK    III.   vi.  95-98 

of  persons,  who  may  all  of  them  rely  on  the  same 
kind  of  plea  (for  instance,  on  the  right  of  the  next  of 
kin),  or  may  put  in  different  claims,  one  urging  that 
the  property  was  left  him  by  will,  another  that  he  is 
next  of  kin.  Now  whenever  a  different  defence  has 
to  be  made  against  different  claimants,  there  must  be 
different  bases,  as  for  example  the  well-known  con- 
troversial theme  :  "  Wills  that  are  made  in  accordance  96 
with  law  shall  be  valid.  When  parents  die  intestate, 
their  children  shall  be  the  heirs.  A  disinherited  son 
shall  receive  none  of  his  father's  property.  A  bastard, 
if  born  before  a  legitimate  son,  shall  be  treated  as 
legitimate,  but  if  born  after  a  legitimate  son  shall  be 
treated  merely  as  a  citizen.  It  shall  be  lawful  to  give 
a  son  in  adoption.  Every  son  given  in  adoption  shall 
have  the  right  to  re-enter  his  own  family  if  his  natural 
father  has  died  childless.  A  father  of  two  legitimate  97 


sons  gave  one  in  adoption,  disinherited  the  other, 
and  acknowledged  a  bastard,  who  was  born  to  him 
later.  Finally  after  making  the  disinherited  son  his 
heir  he  died.  All  three  sons  lay  claim  to  the 
property."  Nothus  is  the  Greek  word  for  a  bastard  ; 
Latin,  as  Cato  emphasized  in  one  of  his  speeches,  has 
no  word  of  its  own  and  therefore  borrows  the  foreign 
term.  But  I  am  straying  from  the  point.  The  son  98 
who  w^as  made  heir  by  the  will  finds  his  way  barred 
by  the  law  "  A  disinherited  son  shall  receive  none  of 
his  father's  property."  The  basis  is  one  resting  on 
the  letter  of  the  law  and  intention,  and  the  problem  is 
whether  he  can  inherit  bv  any  means  at  all  ?  can  he 

•/  •/ 

do  so  in  accordance  with  the  intention  of  his  father? 
or  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  he  was  made  heir  by  the 
will  ?  The  problem  confronting  the  bastard  is  two- 
fold, since  he  was  born  after  the  two  legitimate  sons 



99  quod  non  sit  ante  legitimum  natus.  Prior  syllogismon 
habet,  an  pro  non  natis  sint  habendi,  qui  a  familia 
sunt  alienati.  Altera  et  scripti  et  voluntatis.  Non 
esse  enim  hunc  natum  ante  legitimum  convenit,  sed 
voluritate  legis  se  tuebitur,  quam  dicet  talem  fuisse, 
ut  legitirnus  esset  nothus  tune  natus,  cum  alius  legi- 

100  timus  in  domo  non  esset.      Scriptum  quoque   legis 
excludet    dicens,    non    utique,    si    postea    legitimus 
natus  non   sit;  notho  nocere ;   uteturque   hoc   argu- 
mento :    Fingc   solum   natum   nothum,  cuius  condicio7iis 
erit  ?      Tantum    civis  ?    atqui    non    erii    post    legitimum 
natus.      An  Jilius  ?    atqui  non  erii  ante  legitimos  natus. 
Quare  si  verbis  legis  start  non  potest,  voluntate  standum 

101  est.     Nee  quemquam  turbet,  quod  ex  una  lege  duo 
status    fiant ;    duplex    est,    ita    vim    duarum    habet 
Redire  in  familiam  volenti  dicitur  ab  altero  primum, 
Ut  tibi  redire  liceat,  heres  sum.     Idem  status,  qui  in 
petitione    abdicati ;    quaeritur   enim,  an   possit   esse 

102  heres    abdicatus.      Obiicitur   communiter   a  duobus, 
Redire  tibi  in  familiam  non  licet,  non  enim  pater  sine 
liberis  decessit.     Sed   in  hoc   propria  quisque   eorum 
quaestione    nitetur.      Alter    enim    dicet    abdicatum 

1  The  law  is  twofold  as  containing  two  separate,  though 
complementary,  enactments  on  the  position  of  bastards : 
(a)  nothus  ....  filius  sit,  (b)  post ....  civis  (§  96). 


BOOK    III.  vi.  98-102 

and  was  not  born  before  a  legitimate  son.      The  first    99 
problem  involves  a  syllogism  :    are  those  sons  \vho 
have   been  cast  out  from  their  own  family  to  be  re- 
garded as  though  they  had  never  been   born  ?     The 
second  is  concerned  with  the  letter  of  the  law  and 
intention.     For  it  is  admitted  that  he  was  not  born 
before  any  legitimate  son,  but  he  will  defend    his 
claim  by  appealing  to  the  intention  of  the  law,  which 
he  will  maintain  to  imply  that  the  bastard,  born  when 
there  was  no  legitimate  son  in  the  family,  should 
rank  as  legitimate.     He  will  dismiss  the  letter  of  the  100 
law,  pointing  out  that  in  any  case  the  position  of  a 
bastard  is  not  prejudiced  by  the  fact  that  no  legitimate 
son  was  born  after  him,  and  arguing  as  follows  :— 
"  Suppose  that  the  only  son  is  a  bastard,  what  will 
his  position  be  ?    Merely  that  of  a   citizen  ?  and  yet 
he    was    not    born    after    any    legitimate    son.     Or 
will   he  rank    as    a    son    in    all    respects  ?     But    he 
was   not  born  before  the  legitimate  sons.     As  it  is 
impossible   to   stand   by  the   letter  of  the   law  we 
must  stand  by  its  intentions."     It  need  disturb  no  one  101 
that  one  law  should  originate  two  bases.     The  law  is 
twofold,  and  therefore  has  the   force  of  two  laws.1 
To  the  son  who  desires  to  re-enter  the  family,  the 
disinherited's  first   reply  is,    "Even  though  you  are 
allowed  to  re-enter  the  family,   I   am  still  the  heir." 
The  basis  will  be  the  same  as  in  the  claim  put  forward 
by  the  disinherited  son,  since  the  question  at  issue  is 
whether  a  disinherited  son   can  inherit.     Both  the  102 
disinherited  and  the  bastard  will  object,  "  You  cannot 
re-enter  the  family,  for  our  father  did  not  die  child- 
less."     But    in   this    connexion    each    will    rely    on 
his  own  particular  question.    For  the  disinherited  son 
will  say  that  even  a  disinherited  man  does  not  cease 



quoque  inter  liberos  esse,  et  argumentum  ducet  ex 
ipsa,  qua  repellitur,  lege  ;  supervacuuin  enim  fuisse 
prohiberi  patris  bonis  abdicatum,  si  esset  numero 
alienorum  ;  iiuric  quia  filii  iure  futurus  fuerit  intes- 
tati  heres,  oppositam  esse  legem,  quae  tamen  non 
id  eflieiat,  ne  films  sit,  sed  ne  heres  sit.  Status 

103  fmitivus,    quid    sit    tilius.        Rursus     notlms    eisdein 
colligit  argumentis,   non  sine   liberis  patrem   deces- 
sisse,   quibus  in  petitioiie  usus  est,  lit  probaret  esse 
se    filium.      Nisi    forte   et    hie   finitionem    movet,  an 
liberi    sint    etiani    non    legitimi.       Cadent    ergo    in 
unain     controversiam    vel     specialiter    duo     legitimi 
status  scripti    et    voluntatis    et  syllogismos   et  prae- 
terea  fmitio,  vel   tres  illi,  qui  natura  soli  sunt,  con- 
iectura  in  scripto  et  voluntate,  qualitas  in  syllogismo, 
et,  quae  per  se  est  aj>erta,  finitio. 

104  Causa  quoque  et  iudicatio  et  continens  est  in  omni 
genere  causarum.      Niliil  enim  dicitur,  cui  non   insit 
ratio  et  quo  iudicium  referatur  et  quod  rem  maxinie 
contineat.      Sed  quia  magis   haec  variantur  in  litibus 
et  fere  tradita  sunt  ab  iis,  qui  de  iudicialibus  causis 
aliqua    composuerunt,    in    ill  am    port  em   difTerantur. 
Nunc,    quia    in    tria    genera    causas   divisi,    ordinem 


1  See  §  82.  2  See  §  88. 

8  Fur  discussion  of  these  technical  terms  see  chap.  xi. 

'  Chaps,  iii.  and  iv. 


BOOK    III.  vi.  102    104 

to  be  a  son,  and  will  derive  an  argument  from  that 
very  law  which  denies  his  claim  to  the  inheritance  ; 
namely  that  it  was  unnecessary  for  a  disinherited  son 
to  be  excluded  from  possession  of  his  father's  property 
if  he  had  ceased  to  be  one  of  the  family;  but  now, 
since  in  virtue  of  his  rights  as  son  he  would  have 
been  his  father's  heir  if  he  had  died  intestate,  the 
law  is  brought  to  bar  his  claim  ;  and  vet  the  law  does 

O  * 

not  deprive  him  of  his  position  as  son,  but  only  of  his 
position  as  heir.  Here  the  basis  is  definitive,  as  turning 
on  the  definition  of  a  son.  Again  the  bastard  in  his  103 
turn  will  urge  that  his  father  did  not  die  childless, 
employing  the  same  arguments  that  he  had  used  in 
putting  forward  his  claim  that  lie  ranked  as  a  son  ; 
unless  indeed  he  too  has  recourse  to  definition,  and 
raises  the  question  whether  even  bastards  are  not  sons. 
Thus  in  one  case  we  shall  have  either  two  special 
leoal  bases,  namely  the  letter  of  tlie  law  and  intention, 
with  the  syllogism  and  also  definition,  or  those  three  l 
which  are  really  the  only  bases  strictly  so  called,  con- 
jecture as  regards  the  letter  of  the  law  and  intention, 
quality  in  the  syllogism?  and  definition,  which  needs  no 

Further  every  kind  of  case  will  contain  a  cause,  a  104 
point  for  the  decision  of  the  judge,  and  a  central  argument.3 
For  nothing  can  be  said  which  does  not  contain  a 
reason,  something  to  which  the  decision  of  the  judge 
is  directed,  and  finally  something  which,  more  than 
alight  else,  contains  the  substance  of  the  matter  at 

f3  ' 

issue.  But  as  these  vary  in  different  cases  and  are  as 
a  rule  explained  bv  writers  on  judicial  causes,  I  will 
postpone  them  to  the  appropriate  portion  of  my  work. 
For  the  present  I  shall  follow  the  order  which  I 
prescribed  by  my  division 4  of  causes  into  three  classes. 



VII.  Ac  potissimum  incipiam  ab  ea,  quae  constat 
laucle  ac  vituperatione.  Quod  genus  videtur  Aris- 
toteles  atque  eum  secutus  Theophrastus  a  parte 
negotiali,  hoc  est  Trpay/xartK^,  removisse  totamque 
ad  solos  auditores  relegasse,  et  id  eius  nominis,  quod 

2  ab    ostentatione    ducitur,   proprium    est.      Sed    mos 
Romanus  etiam  negotiis  hoc   munus  inseruit.      Nam 
et  funebres  laudationes  pendent  frequenter  ex  aliquo 
publico   officio  atque   ex  senatus  consulto  magistra- 
tibus  saepe  mandantur,  et  laudare  testem  vel  contra 
pertinet  ad   momentum   iudiciorum,   et   ipsis    etiam 
reis  dare  laudatores  licet,  et  editi  in  Competitores,  in 
L.  Pisonem,,  in  Clodium  et  Curionem  libri  vitupera- 
tionem    continent    et    tamen    in    Senatu    loco    sunt 

3  habiti  sententiae.     Neque  infitias  eo,  quasdam  esse 
ex  hoc  genere  materias  ad  solam  compositas  ostenta- 
tionem,  ut   laudes  deorum   virorumque,  quos  priora 
tempora    tulerunt.        Quo    solvitur    quaestio    supra 
tractata,  manifestumque  est  errare  eos,  qui  nunquam 

4  oratorem  dicturum  nisi  de  re  dubia  putaverunt.     An 
laudes    Capitolini    lovis,    perpetua    sacri    certaminis 
materia,  vel    dubiae    sunt  vel   non   oratorio    genere 
tractantur  ? 

Rhet.  1358  b.  2.  a  sc.  . 

8  The  speech  was  known  as  in  Toga  Candida.  Only  frag- 
ments survive. 

4  The  in  Pisonem  survives,  the  in  Clodium  et  Curionem, 
to  which  he  refers  again  (v.  x.  92),  is  lost. 

•  IIL  v.  3. 


BOOK    III.  vii.  1-4 

VII.  I  will  begin  with  the  class  of  causes  which  are 
concerned  with  praise  and  blame.  This  class  appears 
to  have  been  entirely  divorced  by  Aristotle,1  and 
following  him  by  Theophrastus,  from  the  practical 
side  of  oratory  (which  they  call  Trpay/xaruo;)  and  to 
have  been  reserved  solely  for  the  delectation  of 
audiences,  which  indeed  is  shown  to  be  its  peculiar 
function  by  its  name,  which  implies  display.2  Roman  2 
usage  on  the  other  hand  has  given  it  a  place  in  the 
practical  tasks  of  life.  For  funeral  orations  are 
often  imposed  as  a  duty  on  persons  holding  public 
office,  or  entrusted  to  magistrates  by  decree  of  the 
senate.  Again  the  award  of  praise  or  blame  to  a 
witness  may  carry  weight  in  the  courts,  while  it  is 
also  a  recognised  practice  to  produce  persons  to 
praise  the  character  of  the  accused.  Further  the 
published  speeches  of  Cicero  directed  against  his 
rivals  in  the  election  to  the  consulship,3  and 
against  Lucius  Piso,  Clodius  and  Curio,4  are  full  of 
denunciation,  and  were  notwithstanding  delivered  in 
the  senate  as  formal  expressions  of  opinion  in  the 
course  of  debate.  1  do  not  deny  that  some  compo-  3 
sitions  of  this  kind  are  composed  solely  with  a  view 
to  display,  as,  for  instance,  panegyrics  of  gods  and 
heroes  of  the  past,  a  consideration  which  provides 
the  solution  of  a  question  which  I  discussed  a  little 
while  back,5  and  proves  that  those  are  wrong  who 
hold  that  an  orator  will  never  speak  on  a  subject 
unless  it  involves  some  problem.  But  what  problem  4 
is  involved  by  the  praise  of  Jupiter  Capitolinus,  a 
stock  theme  of  the  sacred  Capitoline  contest,6  which 
is  undoubtedly  treated  in  regular  rhetorical  form  ? 

*  Tho     quinquennial      contest     in     honour     of     Jupiter 
Capitolinus,  founded  by  Domitian  in  86. 



Ut  desiderat  autem  laus,  quae  negotiis  adhibetur, 
probatioriem,  sic  etiain  ilia,  quae  ostentation!  com- 
ponitur,  habet  interim  aliquam  speciem  probationis ; 

5  ut  qui   Rornulum   Martis  filium  educatumque  a  hi  pa 
dicat,  in  argumentum  caelestis  ortus  utatur  his,  quod 
abiectus  in  proflueiitem  non  potuerit  exstingui,  quod 
omnia  sic  egerit,  ut  geiiitum  praeside  bellorum  deo 
incredibile  non  esset,  quod  ipsum  quoque  caelo  re- 
eeptum    temporis    eius    homines    non    dtibitaverint. 

6  Quaedam  vero  etiam  in  deferisionis  speciem   cadent, 
ut    si    in    laude    Herculis    permutatum   cum    regina 
Lydiae  habitum  et  imperata,  tit  traditur,  pensa  orator 
excuset.     Sed  proprium  laudis  est  res  amplificare  et 

Quae  materia  praecipue  quidem  in  deos  et  homines 
cadit,  est  tamen  et  aliorum  animalium,  etiam  caren- 

7  tium    anima.       Verum    in    deis    generaliter    primum 
maiestatem   ipsius   eorum   naturae  venerabimur,  de- 
inde    proprie    vim    cuiusque    et   inventa,   quae    utile 

8  aliquid  hominibus  attulerint.      Vis  ostenditur,  ut  in 
love  regendorum   omnium,   in   Marte   belli,  in   Nep- 
tuno  maris  ;   inventa,  ut  artium  in  Minerva,  Mercuric 
litterarum,  medicinae   Apolline,  Cerere  frugum,  Li- 


BOOK    III.  vii.  4-8 

However,  just  as  panegyric  applied  to  practical 
matters  requires  proof,  so  too  a  certain  semblance  of 
proof  is  at  times  required  by  speeches  composed 
entirely  for  display.  For  instance,  a  speaker  who  tells  5 
how  Romulus  was  the  son  of  Mars  and  reared  by  the 
she-wolf,  will  offer  as  proofs  of  his  divine  origin  the 
facts  that  when  thrown  into  a  running  stream  he 
escaped  drowning, that  all  his  achievements  were  such 
as  to  make  it  credible  that  he  was  the  offspring  of  the 
god  of  battles,  and  that  his  contemporaries  unques- 
tionably believed  that  he  was  translated  to  heaven. 
Some  arguments  will  even  wear  a  certain  semblance  6 
of  defence  :  for  example,  if  the  orator  is  speaking 
in  praise  of  Hercules,  he  will  find  excuses  for  his 
hero  having  changed  raiment  with  the  Queen  of 
Lydia  and  submitted  to  the  tasks  which  legend  tells 
us  she  imposed  upon  him.  The  proper  function 
however  of  panegyric  is  to  amplify  and  embellish  its 

This  form  of  oratory  is  directed  in   the  main   to 
the  praise  of  gods  and  men,  but  may  occasionally  be 
applied  to  the   praise   of  animals  or  even  of  inani- 
mate objects.      In  praising  the  gods  our  first  step   1 
will  be  to  express  our  veneration  of  the  majesty  of 
their  nature  in  general  terms  .  next  we  shall  proceed 
to  praise  the  special  power  of  the  individual  god  and 
the  discoveries  whereby  he  has  benefited  the  human 
race.     For  example,  in  the  case  of  Jupiter,  we  shall   h 
extol  his  power  as  manifested  in  the  governance  of 
all  things,  with  Mars  we  shall  praise  his  power  in  war, 
with   Neptune  his  power  over    the  sea;  as  regards 
inventions  we  shall  celebrate  Minerva's  discovery  of 
the  arts,  Mercury's  discovery  of  letters,  Apollo's  of 
medicine,  Ceres'  of  the  fruits  of  the  earth,  Bacchus' 



bero  vini.  Turn  si  qua  ab  iis  acta  vetustas  tradidit, 
comrnemoranda.  Addunt  etiam  dis  honorem  pa- 
rentes^  ut  si  quis  sit  filius  lovis  ;  addit  antiquitas,  ut 
iis,  qui  sunt  ex  Chao  ;  progenies  quoque,  ut  Apollo 
9  ac  Diana  Latonae.  Laudandum  in  quibusdam  quod 
geniti  immortales,  quibusdam  quod  immortalitatem 
virtute  sint  consecuti ;  quod  pietas  principis  nostri 
praesentium  quoque  temporum  decus  fecit. 

10  Magis    est    varia    laus    hominum.       Nam    primum 
dividitur  in  tempora,  quodque  ante  eos  fuit  quoque 
ipsi   vixerunt ;    in    iis  autem,   qui   fato    sunt    functi, 
etiam  quod   est   insecutum.      Ante   hominem  patria 
ac  parentes  maioresque  erunt,  quorum  duplex  trac- 
tatus  est :  aut  enim  respondisse  nobilitati  pulchrum 

11  erit  aut  humilius  genus  illustrasse  factis.     Ilia  quo- 
que interim  ex  eo,  quod   ante  ipsum  fuit,  tempore 
trahentur,  quae  responsis  vel  auguriis  futuram  clari- 
tatem    promiserint,    ut   eum,   qui   ex    Thetide    natus 
esset,  maiorem  patre  suo  futurum  cecinisse  dicuntur 

12  oracula.      Ipsius  vero  laus  hominis  ex  animo  et  cor- 
pore  et  extra  positis  peti  debet.      Et  corporis  quidem 
fortuitorumque  cum  levior,  turn  non  uno  modo  trac- 
tanda  est.     Nam  et  pulchritudmem  interim  roburque 

1  sc.  by  Donntian's  deification  of  his  father  Vespasian  and 
his  brother  Titus. 


BOOK    III.  vii.  8-12 

of  wine.  Next  we  must  record  their  exploits  as 
handed  down  from  antiquity.  Even  gods  may  de- 
rive honour  from  their  descent,  as  for  instance  is 
the  case  with  the  sons  of  Jupiter,  or  from  their 
antiquity,  as  in  the  case  of  the  children  of  Chaos,  or 
from  their  offspring,  as  in  the  case  of  Latona,  the 
mother  of  Apollo  and  Diana.  Some  again  may  be  9 
praised  because  they  were  born  immortal,  others 
because  they  won  immortality  by  their  valour,  a  theme 
which  the  piety  of  our  sovereign  has  made  the  glory 
even  of  these  present  times.1 

There  is  greater  variety  required  in  the  praise  of  10 
men.  In  the  first  place  there  is  a  distinction  to  be 
made  as  regards  time  between  the  period  in  which 
the  objects  of  our  praise  lived  and  the  time  pre- 
ceding their  birth  ;  and  further,  in  the  case  of  the 
dead,  we  must  also  distinguish  the  period  following 
their  death.  With  regard  to  things  preceding  a 
man's  birth,  there  are  his  country,  his  parents  and  his 
ancestors,  a  theme  which  may  be  handled  in  two 
ways.  For  either  it  will  be  creditable  to  the  objects  of 
our  praise  not  to  have  fallen  short  of  the  fair  fame  of 
their  country  and  of  their  sires  or  to  have  ennobled 
a  humble  origin  by  the  glory  of  their  achievements. 
Other  topics  to  be  drawn  from  the  period  preceding  11 
their  birth  will  have  reference  to  omens  or  prophe- 
cies foretelling  their  future  greatness,  such  as  the 
oracle  which  is  said  to  have  foretold  that  the  son  of 
Thetis  would  be  greater  than  his  father.  The  praise  12 
of  the  individual  himself  will  be  based  on  his 
character,  his  physical  endowments  and  external 
circumstances.  Physical  and  accidental  advantages 
provide  a  comparatively  unimportant  theme,  which 
requires  variety  of  treatment.  At  times  for  instance 



prosequimur  honore  verborum,  ut  Homerus  in  Aga- 
memnone  atque  Achilla,  et  interim  confert  admira- 
tioni  multum  etiam  infirmitas,  ut  cum  idem  Tydea 

13  parvum   sed  bellatorem   dicit   fuisse.      Fortuna  vero 
turn  dignitatem  adfert,  ut  in  regibus  principibusque 
(namque    est    haec    materia     ostendendae    virtutis 
uberior),   turn  quo    minores    opes    fuerunt,   maiorem 
bene   factis   gloriam   parit.      Sed  oinnia,   quae  extra 
nos   bona  sunt  quaeque  bominibus  forte  obtigerunt, 
non  ideo  laudantur,  quod  habuerit  quis  ea,  sed  quod 

14  iis   honeste  sit  usus.      Nam   divitiae   et  potentia  et 
gratia,    cum     plurimum    virium    dent,  in    utramque 
partem  certissimum  faciunt    morum  experimentum, 
aut  enim  meliores  sumus  propter  haec  aut  peiores. 

15  Animi  semper  vera  laus,  sed  lion  una  per  hoc  opus 
via  ducitur.      Namque  alias  aetatis  gradus  gestarum- 
que  rerum  ordinem  sequi  speciosius  fuit,  ut  in  primis 
annis  laudaretur  indoles,  turn  disciplinae,  post  hoc 
operum  id  est  factorum  dictorumque  contextus  ;  alias 
in    species    virtutum    dividere    laudem,    fortitudinis, 
iustitiae,  continentiae  ceterarumque,  ac  singulis  ad- 
signare,  quae  secundum  quamque  earum  gesta  erunt. 

16  Utra  sit  autem  harum  via  utilior,  cum  materia  deli- 
berabiinus,   dum   sciamus   gratiora  esse   audientibus, 
quae   solus  quis  aut  primus    aut    certe    cum   paucis 
fecisse   dicetur,  si   quid   praeterea    supra    spem    aut 

1  Iliad,  ii.  477.  2  Iliad,  ii.  180. 

3  Iliad,  v.  801. 


BOOK    III.  vii.  12-16 

we  extol  beauty  and   strength  in  honorific  terms,  as 
Homer    does    in    the    case    of   Agamemnon 1    and 
Achilles2  ;    at  times  again  weakness  may  contribute 
largely  to  our  admiration,  as  when  Homer  says3  that 
Tydeus  was    small    of    stature    but  a   good  fighter. 
Fortune  too  may  confer   dignity  as   in   the   case   of  13 
kings  and  princes  (for  they  have   a  fairer   field   for 
the  display  of  their   excellences)  but  on  the  other 
hand  the  glory  of  good  deeds  may  be  enhanced   by 
the    smallness    of    their    resources.       Moreover  the 
praise  awarded  to  external  and  accidental  advantages 
is  given,  not  to  their  possession,  but  to  their  honour- 
able employment.      For  wealth  and  power  and  influ-   14 
ence,  since  they  are  the  sources  of  strength,  are  the 
surest  test  of  character  for  good  or  evil ;  they  make  us 
better  or  they  make  us  wrorse.      Praise  awarded  to  15 
character  is  always  just,  but  may  be  given  in  various 
ways.     It  'has  sometimes  proved  the  more  effective 
course  to  trace  a  man's  life  and  deeds  in  due  chrono- 
logical order,  praising  his  natural  gifts  as  a  child,  then 
his  progress  at  school,  and  finally  the  whole  course  of 
his  life,  including  words  as  well  as  deeds.     At  times 
on  the  other  hand  it  is  well  to  divide  our  praises, 
dealing    separately  with    the    various  virtues,  forti- 
tude, justice,  self-control  and  the   rest  of  them  and 
to  assign  to  each  virtue  the  deeds  performed  under 
its  influence.      We  shall   have    to    decide  which    of  16 
these    two    methods   will  be  the  more  serviceable, 
according    to    the    nature    of   the  subject;    but  we 
must  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  what  most  pleases 
an  audience  is  the  celebration  of  deeds  which  our 
hero  was  the  first  or  only  man  or  at  any  rate  one  of 
the  very  few  to  perform  :  and  to  these  we  must  add 
any  other  achievements  which    surpassed    hope    or 



exspectationem,  praecipue  quod  aliena  potius  causa 

17  quam  sua.      Tempus,  quod  finem  hominis  insequitur, 
non    semper    tractare    contingit ;    non     solum    quod 
viventes    aliquando    laudamus,   sed   quod    rara    haec 
occasio    est,    ut    referri    possint    divini    honores    et 

18  decreta  et  publice  statuae  constitutae.     Inter  quae 
numeraverim   ingeniorura  monumenta,  quae  saeculis 
probarentur.      Nam  quidam,  sicut  Menander,  iustiora 
posterorum  quam  suae  aetatis  iudicia  sunt  consecuti. 
Adferunt  laudem  liberi  parentibus,  urbes  conditori- 
bus,  leges  latoribus,  artes  inventoribus  nee  non  in- 
stituta  quoque  auctoribus,  ut  a  Numa  traditum  deos 
colere,  a  Publicola  fasces  populo  summittere. 

19  Qui  omnis  etiam  in  vituperatione  ordo  constabit, 
tantum    in    diversum.       Nam    et    turpitudo    generis 
opprobrio  multis  fuit,  et  quosdam  claritas  ipsa  noti- 
ores  circa  vitia  et  invisos  magis  fecit,  et  in  quibus 
dam,  ut  in   Paride  traditum  est,  praedicta  pernicies, 
et  corporis  ac  fortunae  quibusdam  mala  contemptum, 
sicut  Thersitae  atque  Iro,  quibusdam  bona  vitiis  cor- 
rupta    odium    attulemnt,   ut    Nirea    imbellem,    Plis- 

20  thenen   impudicum  a  poetis   accepimus.      Et  animo 

The  handsomest  warrior  among  the  Greeks  of  Troy. 
2  Son  of  Atreus  :  the  allusion  is  not  known. 


BOOK    III.  vn.  16-20 

expectation,  emphasising  what  was  done  for  the  sake 
of  others  rather  than  what  lie  performed  on  his 
own  behalf.  It  is  not  always  possible  to  deal  with  17 
the  time  subsequent  to  our  hero's  death  :  this  is 
due  not  merely  to  the  fact  that  we  sometimes  praise 
him,  while  still  alive,  but  also  that  there  are  but  few 
occasions  when  we  have  a  chance  to  celebrate  the 
award  of  divine  honours,  posthumous  votes  of  thanks, 
or  statues  erected  at  the  public  expense.  Among  18 
such  themes  of  panegyric  I  would  mention  monu- 
ments of  genius  that  have  stood  the  test  of  time. 
For  some  great  men  like  Menander  have  received 
ampler  justice  from  the  verdict  of  posterity  than 
from  that  of  their  own  age.  Children  reflect  glory 
on  their  parents,  cities  on  their  founders,  laws  on 
those  who  made  them,  arts  on  their  inventors  and 
institutions  on  those  that  first  introduced  them  ;  for 
instance  Numa  first  laid  down  rules  for  the  worship 
of  the  gods,  and  Publicola  first  ordered  that  the 
lictors'  rods  should  be  lowered  in  salutation  to  the 

The  same  method  will  be  applied  to  denunciations  19 
as  well, but  with  a  viewto  opposite  effects.  For  humble 
origin  has  been  a  reproach  to  many,  while  in  some 
cases  distinction  has  merely  served  to  increase  the 
notoriety  and  unpopularity  of  vices.  In  regard  to 
some  persons,  as  in  the  story  of  Paris,  it  has  been 
predicted  that  they  would  be  the  cause  of  destruction 
to  many,  some  like  Thersites  and  Irus  have  been 
despised  for  their  poverty  and  mean  appearance, 
others  have  been  loathed  because  their  natural  ad- 
vantages were  nullified  by  their  vices  :  the  poets  for 
instance  tell  us  that  Nireus ]  was  a  coward  and 
Pleisthenes 2  a  debauchee.  The  mind  too  has  as  20 



totidem  vitia,  quot  virtutes  sunt,  nee  minus  quam  in 
laudibus  duplici  ratione  tractantur.  Et  post  mortem 
adieeta  quibusdam  ignominia  est,  ut  Maelio,  cuius 
domus  solo  aequata,  Mareoque  Manlio,  cuius  prae- 

21  nomen   e   familia  in   posterum    exemptum    est ;     et 
parentes    malorum     odimus ;     et     est    conditoribus 
urbium     infame     contraxisse     aliquam     periiiciosain 
ceteris  gentem,  qualis  est  primus   ludaicae  supersti- 
tionis   auetor ;    et   Gracchorum   leges    invisae ;    et  si 
quod  est  exemplum  deforme  posteris  traditum,  quale 
libidinis  vir  Perses  in  muliere  Samia  instituere  ausus 

22  dieitur   primus.      Sed   in    viventibus   quoque    indicia 
hominum    velut    argumenta   sunt  morum,    et   honos 
aut  ignominia  veram  esse  laudem  vel  vituperationem 
pro  bat. 

23  Interesse    tamen    Aristoteles   putat,    ubi    quidque 
iaudetur    aut    vituperetur.      Nam    plurimum   refert, 
qui    sint    audientium    mores,    quae    publice    recepta 
persuasio,  ut  ilia  maxime  quae  probant  esse  in  eo, 
qui    laudabitur,    credantj    aut    in    eo,    contra    quein 
dicemus,    ea   quae    oderunt.       Ita   non    dubium    erit 

24  indicium,    (juod     orationem     praecesserit.       Ipsorum 
etiam    permiscenda   laus  semper,   iiam    id   benevolos 
facit ;    quotiens    autem    fieri    poterit,    cum    materiae 
utilitate     iungcnda.       Minus      Lacedaemone     studia 

1  Moses.          2  Rhtt.  i.  9. 

BOOK    III.  vii.  20-24 

many  vices  as  virtues,  and  vice  may  be  denounced, 
as  virtue  may  be  praised,  in  two  different  ways. 
Some  have  been  branded  with  infamy  after  death 
like  Maelius,  whose  house  was  levelled  with  the 

ground,  or   Marcus    Manlius,  whose  first   name  was 


banished  from  his  family  for  all  generations  to 
come.  The  vices  of  the  children  bring  hatred  on  21 
their  parents;  founders  of  cities  are  detested  for 
concentrating  a  race  which  is  a  curse  to  others,  as 
for  example  the  founder  of  the  Jewish  super- 
stition ; l  the  laws  of  Gracchus  are  hated,  and  we 
abhor  any  loathsome  example  of  vice  that  has  been 
handed  down  to  posterity,  such  as  the  criminal  form  of 
lust  which  a  Persian  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  to 
practise  on  a  woman  of  Samos.  And  even  in  the  22 
case  of  the  living  the  judgment  of  mankind  serves 
as  a  proof  of  their  character,  and  the  fairness  or 
foulness  of  their  fame  proves  the  orator's  praise  or 
blame  to  be  true. 

Aristotle  2  however  thinks  that  the  place  and  sub-  23 
ject  of  panegyrics  or  denunciations  make  a  very  con- 
siderable difference.  For  much  depends  on  the 
character  of  the  audience  and  the  generally  received 
opinion,  if  they  are  to  believe  that  the  virtues  of 
which  they  approve  are  pre-eminently  characteristic 
of  the  person  praised  and  the  vices  which  they  hate 
of  the  person  denounced.  For  there  can  be 
little  doubt  as  to  the  attitude  of  the  audience, 
if  that  attitude  is  already  determined  prior  to 
the  delivery  of  the  speech.  It  will  be  wise  24 
too  for  him  to  insert  some  words  of  praise  for 
his  audience,  since  this  will  secure  their  good 
will,  and  wherever  it  is  possible  this  should  be  done 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  advance  his  case.  Literature 



litterarum  quam  Athenis  honores  merebimtur,  plus 
patientia  ac  fortitudo.  Rapto  vivere  quibusdam 
honestum,  aliis  cura  legum.  Frugalitas  apud  Sybari- 
tas  forsitan  odio  foret,  veteribus  Ronianis  summum 
luxuria  crimen.  Eadem  in  singulis  differentia. 

25  Maxima    favet     iudex,    qui    sibi    dicentem    assentiri 
putat.       Idem     praecipit    illud    quoque    (quod    mox 
Cornelius  Celsus  prope  supra  modum  invasit),  quia 
sit    quaedam  virtutibus   ac  vitiis  vicinitas,  utendum 
proxima    derivatione     verborum,    ut    pro    ternerario 
fortem,    pro    prodigo    liberalem,   pro    avaro    parcum 
vocemus  ;  quae  eadem   etiam    contra  valent.      Quod 
quidem  orator,  id  est  vir  bonus,  nunquam  faciet,  nisi 
forte  communi  utilitate  ducetur. 

26  Laudantur  autem   urbes  similiter  atque  homines. 
Nam  pro  parente  est  conditor,  et  multum  auctori- 
tatis  adfert  vetustas,  ut  iis,  qui  terra  dicuntur  orti ; 
et  virtutes  ac  vitia  circa  res  gestas  eadem  quae  in 
singulis,  ilia  propria  quae  ex  loci  positione  ac  muni- 
tione  sunt.      Gives  illis  ut  hominibus  liberi  decori. 

27  Est    laus    et   operum,    in    quibus    honor,    utilitas, 
pulchritudo,    auctor    spectari    solet.      Honor     ut    in 

templis,  utilitas  ut  in  muris,  pulchritudo  vel  auctor 

BOOK    III.  vn.  24-27 

will  win  less  praise  at  Sparta  than  at  Athens,  endur- 
ance and  courage  more.  Among  some  races  the  life 
of  a  freebooter  is  accounted  honourable,  while  others 
regard  it  as  a  duty  to  respect  the  laws.  Frugality 
might  perhaps  be  unpopular  with  the  Sybarites, 
whilst  luxury  was  regarded  as  a  crime  by  the  an- 
cient Romans.  Similar  differences  of  opinion  are 
found  in  individuals.  A  judge  is  most  favourable  to  25 
the  orator  whose  views  he  thinks  identical  with  his 
own.  Aristotle  also  urges  a  point,  which  at  a  later 
date  Cornelius  Celsus  emphasised  almost  to  excess, 
to  the  effect  that,  since  the  boundary  between  vice 
and  virtue  is  often  ill-defined,  it  is  desirable  to  use 
words  that  swerve  a  little  from  the  actual  truth, 
calling  a  rash  man  brave,  a  prodigal  generous,  a  mean 
man  thrifty;  or  the  process  may,  if  necessary,  be  re- 
versed. But  this  the  ideal  orator,  that  is  to  say  a 
good  man,  will  never  do,  unless  perhaps  he  is  led  to 
do  so  by  consideration  for  the  public  interest. 

Cities  are  praised  after  the  same  fashion  as  men.  26 
The  founder  takes  the  place  of  the  parent,  and  an- 
tiquity carries  great  authority,  as  for  instance  in  the 
case  of  those  whose  inhabitants  are  said  to  be  sprung 
from  the  soil.  The  virtues  and  vices  revealed  by 
their  deeds  are  the  same  as  in  private  individuals. 
The  advantages  arising  from  site  or  fortifications  are 
however  peculiar  to  cities.  Their  citizens  enhance 
their  fame  just  as  children  bring  honour  to  their 

Praise     too    may    be   awarded    to    public    works,  27 
in     connexion     with     which     their     magnificence, 
utility,    beauty    and    the    architect    or    artist    must 
be   given  due  consideration.     Temples  for  instance 
will    be    praised   for    their    magnificence,  walls   for 



utrobique.  Est  et  locorum,  qualis  Siciliae  apud 
Ciceronem,  in  quibus  similiter  speciem  et  utilitatem 
intueniur ;  speciem  in  maritimis,  plain's,  amoenis ; 
utilitatem  in  salubribus_,  fertilibus.  Erit  et  dictorum 
honestorum  factorumque  laus  generalis,  erit  et  rerum 
28  omnis  modi.  Nam  et  somni  et  mortis  scriptae 
laudes  et  quorundam  a  medicis  ciborum. 

Itaque,  ut  non  consensi  hoc  laudativum  genus 
circa  solam  versari  honesti  quaestionem,  sic  quali- 
tate  maxime  contineri  puto  ;  quanquain  tres  status 
omnes  cad  ere  in  hoc  opus  possint,  iisque  usum 
C.  Caesarem  in  vituperando  Catone  notaverit  Cicero, 
fotum  autem  habct  aliquid  simile  suasoriis,  (juia 
plerumque  eadein  illic  suaderi,  hie  laudari  solent. 

VIII.  Deliberativas  quoque  miror  a  quibusdam 
sola  utilitate  finitas.  Ac  si  quid  in  his  uiium  se(]iii 
oporteret,  potior  fuisset  apud  me  Ciceronis  sententia, 
qui  hoc  materiae  genus  dignitate  maxime  contineri 
putat.  Nee  dubito,  quin  ii,  qui  sunt  in  ilia  priore 
sententia,  secundum  opinionem  pulcherrimam  ne 
utile  quidem,  nisi  quod  honestum  esset,  existimarint. 
2  Et  est  haec  ratio  verissima,  si  consilium  contingat 
semper  bonorum  atque  sapientium.  Veruin  apud 
imperitos,  apud  quos  frequenter  dicenda  sententia 
est,  populumque  praecipue,  qui  ex  pluribus  constat 

1  in  Verr.  ii.  1  sqq.,  iv.  48. 

2  Quality,  conjecture,  definition,    bee  chap.  vi.  forexplana- 
tion  of  this  term.  8  Top.  xxv.  94. 

4  de  Or.  ii.  Ixxxii.  334. 


BOOK    III.  vn.  27-vm.  2 

their  utility,  and  both  for  their  beauty  or  the  skill  of 
the  architect.  Places  may  also  be  praised,  witness 
the  praise  of  Sicily  in  Cicero.1  In  such  cases 
\ve  consider  their  beauty  and  utility  :  beauty  calls  for 
notice  in  places  by  the  sea,  in  open  plains  and 
pleasant  situations,  utility  in  healthy  or  fertile 
localities.  Again  praise  in  general  terms  may  be 
awarded  to  noble  sayings  or  deeds.  Finally  things 
of  every  kind  may  be  praised.  Panegyrics  have  28 
been  composed  on  sleep  and  death,  and  physicians 
have  written  eulogies  on  certain  kinds  of  food. 

While  therefore  I  do  not  agree  that  panegyric 
concerns  only  questions  regarding  what  is  honour- 
able, I  do  think  that  it  comes  as  a  rule  under 
the  heading  of  quality,  although  all  three  bases  2  may 
be  involved  in  Panegyric  and  it  was  observed  by 
Cicero3  that  all  were  actually  used  by  Gaius  Caesar 
in  his  denunciation  of  Cato.  But  panegyric  is  akin 
to  deliberative  oratory  inasmuch  as  the  same  things 
are  usually  praised  in  the  former  as  are  advised 
in  the  latter. 

VIII.  I  am  surprised  that  deliberative  oratory  also 
has  been  restricted  by  some  authorities  to  questions 
of  expediency.  If  it  should  be  necessary  to  assign 
one  single  aim  to  deliberative  I  should  prefer 
Cicero's4  view  that  this  kind  of  oratory  is  primarily 
concerned  with  what  is  honourable.  I  do  not  doubt 
that  those  who  maintain  the  opinion  first  mentioned 
adopt  the  lofty  view  that  nothing  can  be  expedient 
which  is  not  good.  That  opinion  is  perfectly  sound  2 
so  long  as  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  have  wise  and 
good  men  for  counsellors.  But  as  we  most  often 
express  our  views  before  an  ignorant  audience,  and 
more  especially  before  popular  assemblies,  of  which 



indoctis,   discernenda  sunt  haec  et  secumlum  com- 

3  munes     magis    intellectus    loquendum.      Sunt    enim 
multi,  qui  etiam,  quae  credunt  honesta,  non  tamen 
satis  eadem  utilia  quoque  existiment,  et  quae  turpia 
esse    dubitare    non    possunt,    utilitatis    specie    ducti 
probent,    ut    foedus     Nuinantinum     iuginnque    Cau- 

4  dinum.      Ne     qualitatis     quidem     statu,    in     quo    et 
honestorum   et    utilium    quaestio  est,  complecti  eas 
satis  est.     Nam  frequenter  in  his  etiam   coniecturae 
locus   est,   nonnunquam  tractatur  aliqua   rinitio,  ali- 
quando  etiam   legales  possunt  incidere  tractatus,  in 
privata    maxime    consilia,  si    quando    ambigetur    an 

5  liceat.      De  coniectura  paulo  post  pluribus.      Interim 
est    finitio    apud    Demosthenen,    Det    Halonnesum 
PhilippuSj  an  reddat  ?  apud  Ciceronem  in  Philippicis, 
Quid  sit  tumultus  ?      Quid?  non  ilia  similis  iudicia- 
lium  quaestio  de  statua  Servi  Sulpici,  an  iis  demum 
ponenda  sit,  qui  in  legatione  ferro  sunt  interempti? 

6  Ergo  pars  deliberative,  quae  eadem  suasoria  dicitur, 

1  Mancinua  was  surrounded  on  retreat  from  Numantia  in 
137  B.C.,   while  the  surrender  at  the  Caudine  Forks  took 
place  in  321  B.C.     In  both  cases  the  Senate  refused  to  ratify 
the  humiliating  treaties  which  had  been  made  the  price  of 
the  release  of  the  Roman  armies. 

2  For  conjecture  see  in.  vi.  30  sqq. 

8  Halonnesus  had  belonged  to  Athens,  but  had  been  seized 
by  pirates.  Philip  ejected  the  pirates.  The  Athenians  asked 
him  to  restore  it  ;  he  replied  that  it  belonged  to  him  and 
that  there  could  be  no  question  of  restoration,  but  if  they 
asked  for  it  as  a  gift  he  promised  to  give  it  them. 


BOOK    III.  vin.  2-6 

the  majority  is  usually  uneducated,  we  must  distin- 
guish between  what  is   honourable  and  what  is  ex- 
pedient and  conform  our  utterances  to  suit  ordinary 
understandings.      For  there   are  many  who   do  not  3 
admit  that  what  they  really  believe  to  be  the  honour- 
able   course    is    sufficiently   advantageous,   and    are 
misled  by  the  prospect  of  advantage  into  approving 
courses  of  the  dishonourable  nature  of  which  there 
can  be  no  question:  witness  the   Numantine  treaty 
and  the  surrender  of  the  Caudine  Forks.1     Nor  does  4 
it  suffice  to  restrict  deliberative  oratory  to  the  basis 
of    quality    which    is  concerned    with    questions     of 
honour  and  expediency.      For  there   is   often  room 
for  conjecture  as  well.     Sometimes   again  definition 
is  necessary  or  legal  problems  require  handling  ;  this 
is  especially  the  case  when  advice  has  to   be  given 
on   private   matters,  where  there   is  some  doubt   of 
the  legality  of  the  course  under  consideration.     Of 
conjecture2    I    shall    speak  more   fully  a  little  later 
on.      Returning    to   dejiniiion   for    the    moment,    we   5 
find     it    in   the   question    raised    by   Demosthenes, 
"  whether  Philip  should  give  or  restore  Halonnesus,"  3 
and  to  that  discussed  by  Cicero  in  the  Philippics  4  as 
to  the  nature  of  a  tumultus.     Again    does    not  the 
question    raised    in    connection   with   the    statue  of 
Servius  Sulpicius  5  as  to  "  whether  statues  should  be 
erected  only  in  honour    of  those  ambassadors   who 
perish  by  the  sword  "  bear  a  strong  resemblance  to 
the  questions  that  are  raised  in  the  law  courts  ?    The   6 
deliberative  department  of  oratory   (also  called  the 

4  vni.  i.  2,  where  the  question  is  discussed  as  to 
whether  the  war  with  Antony  is  bellum  or  tumultus,  the 
latter  being  the  technical  name  for  any  grave  national 
emergency  such  as  civil  war  or  a  Gallic  invasion  within  the 
bounds  of  Italy.  6  Phil.  ix.  1. 



de  tempore  future  consultans  quaerit  etiam  de 
praeterito.  Ofticiis  constat  duobus  suadendi  ac 

Prooemio,  quale  est  in  iudicialibus,  non  ubique 
eget,  quia  conciliatus  est  ei  quisque,  quern  consulit. 
Initium  tamen  quodcunque  debet  habere  aliquam 
prooemii  speciem ;  neque  enim  abrupte  nee  unde 
libuit  incipiendum,  quia  est  aliquid  in  omni  materia 

7  naturaliter    primum.      In    senatu   et  utique   in  con- 
tionibus  eadem  ratio  quae  apud  iudices,  adquirendae 
sibi    plerumque    eorum,    apud    quos    dicendum    sit, 
benevolentiae.      Nee    minim,    cum    etiam    in    pane- 
gvricis  petatur  audientium  favor,  ubi  emolumentum 
non  in  utilitate  aliqua,   sed   in  sola  laude  consistit. 

8  Aristoteles  quidein  nee  sine  causa  putat  et  a  nostra 
et  ab  eius,  qui  dissentiet,  persona  duci  frequenter  in 
consiliis    exordium,   quasi  mutuantibus   hoc  nobis   a 
iudiciali  genere,  nonnunquam   etiam,   ut  minor  res 
maiorve  videatur ;  in   demonstratives  vero  prooemia 

9  esse    maxime    libera    existimat.       Nam    et    longe    a 
materia  duci,  ut  in  Helenae  laude   Isocrates  fecerit ; 
et  ex  aliqua  rei  vicinia,  ut  idem   in   Panegyrico,  cum 
queritur    plus     honoris    corporum    quam    animorum 
virtutibus  dari ;  et  Gorgias  in  Olympico  laudans  eos, 
qui  primi  tales  instituerint  conventus.     Quos  secutus 

1  Rhet.  iii.  14. 

3  Tlie  speech  opens  with  a  disquisition  on  the  absurd  and 
trivial  nature  of  much  that  is  contained  in  the  speeches  of 
sophists  and  rhetoricians. 


BOOK    III.  vin.  6-9 

advisory  department),  while  it  deliberates  about  the 
future,  also  enquires  about  the  past,  while  its  func- 
tions are  twofold  and  consist  in  advising  and 

Deliberative  oratory  does  not  always  require  an 
exordium,  such  as  is  necessary  in  forensic  speeches, 
since  he  who  asks  an  orator  for  his  opinion  is  naturally 
well  disposed  to  him.  But  the  commencement,  what- 
ever be  its  nature,  must  have  some  resemblance  to  an 
exordium.  For  we  must  not  begin  abruptly  or  just  at 
the  point  where  the  fancy  takes  us,  since  in  every 
subject  there  is  something  which  naturally  comes  first. 
In  addressing  the  senate  or  the  people  the  same  7 
methods  apply  as  in  the  law  courts,  and  we  must  aim 
as  a  rule  at  acquiring  the  goodwill  of  our  audience. 
This  need  cause  no  surprise,  since  even  in  panegyric 
we  seek  to  win  the  favour  of  our  hearers  when  our 
aim  is  praise  pure  and  simple,  and  not  the  acquisition 
of  any  advantage.  Aristotle,1  it  is  true,  holds,  not  8 
without  reason,  that  in  deliberative  speeches  we  may 
often  begin  with  a  reference  either  to  ourselves  or  to 
our  opponent,  borrowing  this  practice  from  forensic 
oratory,  and  sometimes  producing  the  impression  that 
the  subject  is  of  greater  or  less  importance  than  it 
actually  is.  On  the  other  hand  he  thinks  that  in 
demonstrative  oratory  the  exordium  may  be  treated  with 
the  utmost  freedom,  since  it  is  sometimes  drawn  from  9 
irrelevant  material,  as  for  example  in  Isocrates'  Praise 
of  Helen,2  or  from  something  akin  to  the  subject, 
as  for  instance  in  the  Panegyricus  of  the  same  author, 
when  he  complains  that  more  honour  is  given  to  phy- 
sical than  to  moral  excellence,  or  as  Gorgias  in  his 
speech  delivered  at  the  Olympic  games  praises  the 
founders  of  the  great  national  games.  Sallust  seems 



videlicet  C.  Sallustius  in  bello  lugurthino  et  Catili- 
nae  nihil  ad  historiam  pertinentibus  principiis  orsus 

10  Sed  nunc  ad  suasoriam,  in  qua,  etiam  cum   pro- 
oemio    utemur,    breviore    tamen    et    velut    quodam 
capite   tantum    et    initio    debcbimus    esse    contenti. 
Narrationem  vero  nunquam  exigit  privata  delibera- 
tio,  eius  duntaxat  rei,  de  qua  dicenda  sententia  est; 

11  quia  nemo  ignorat  id  de  quo  consulit.      Extrinsecus 
possunt  pertinentia  ad  deliberationem  multa  narrari. 
In   contionibus    saepe    est  etiam  ilia,  quae  ordinem 

12  rei    docet,    necessaria.      Adfectus    ut    quae    maxime 
postulat.     Nam  et  concitanda  et  lenienda  frequenter 
est  ira,  et  ad  metum,  cupiditatem,  odium,  concilia- 
tionem     impellendi     animi.        Nonnunquam     etiam 
movenda  miseratio,  sive,  ut  auxilium  obsessis  feratur, 
suadere    oportebit    sive    sociae    civitatis    eversionem 
deflebimus.      Valet    autem    in     consiliis    auctoritas 

13  plurimum.      Nam  et  prudentissimus  esse   haberique 
et   optinius    debet,  qui    sententiae  suae  de  utilibus 
atque  honestis  credere  omnes  velit.     In  iudiciis  enim 
vulgo    fas    habetur    indulgere    aliquid    studio    suo  ; 

consilia  nemo  est  qui  neget  secundum  mores  dari. 

BOOK    III.  vin.  9-13 

to  have  imitated  these  authors  in  his  Jugurthine  War 
and  in  the  introduction  to  his  Catiline,  which  has  no 
connection  with  his  narrative. 

But  it  is  time  for  me  to  return  to  deliberative  oratory  10 
in  which,  even  when  we  introduce  an  exordium,  we 
must  content  ourselves  with  a  brief  prelude,  which 
may  amount  to  no  more  than  a  mere  heading.  As 
regards  the  statement  of  facts,  this  is  never  required  in 
speeches  on  private  subjects,  at  least  as  regards  the 
subject  on  wrhich  an  opinion  has  to  be  given,  because 
everyone  is  acquainted  with  the  question  at  issue. 
Statements  as  to  external  matters  which  are  relevant  1 1 
to  the  discussion  may  however  frequently  be  intro- 
duced. In  addressing  public  assemblies  it  will  often 
be  necessary  to  set  forth  the  order  of  the  points 
which  have  to  be  treated.  As  regards  appeals  to  the  12 
emotions,  these  are  especially  necessary  in  deliberative 
oratory.  Anger  has  frequently  to  be  excited  or 
assuaged  and  the  minds  of  the  audience  have  to  be 
swayed  to  fear,  ambition,  hatred,  reconciliation.  At 
times  again  it  is  necessary  to  awaken  pity,  whether  it 
is  required,  for  instance,  to  urge  that  relief  should  be 
sent  to  a  besieged  city,  or  we  are  engaged  in  deplor- 
ing the  overthrow  of  an  allied  state.  But  what  really 
carries  greatest  weight  in  deliberative  speeches  is  the 
authority  of  the  speaker.  For  he,  who  would  have  13 
all  men  trust  his  judgment  as  to  what  is  expedient 
and  honourable,  should  both  possess  and  be  re- 
garded as  possessing  genuine  wisdom  and  excellence 
of  character.  In  forensic  speeches  the  orator  may, 
according  to  the  generally  received  opinion,  indulge 
his  passion  to  some  extent.  But  all  will  agree  that 
the  advice  given  by  a  speaker  should  be  in  keeping 
with  his  moral  character. 



14  Graecorum  quidem  plnrirai  omne  hoc  oflicium 
contionale  esse  iudicaverunt  et  in  sola  reipublicae 
administratione  posuerunt.  Quin  et  Cicero  in  hac 
maxime  parte  versatur.  Ideoque  suasuris  de  pace, 
bello,  copiis,  operibus,  vectigalibus  haec  duo  esse 
praecipue  nota  voluit,  vires  civitatis  et  mores,  ut  ex 
natura  cum  ipsarum  rerum  turn  audientium  ratio 

ID  suadendi  duceretur.  Nobis  maior  in  re  videtur 
varietas,  nam  et  consultantium  et  consiliorum  plu- 
rima  sunt  genera. 

Quare    in    suadendo   et   dissuadendo  tria  primum 
spectanda    erunt,   quid    sit  de   quo  deliberetur,  qui 

16  sint   qui   deliberent,  qui  sit  qui   suadeat.      Rem,  de 
qua     deliberatur,    aut    certum     est    posse    fieri    aut 
incertum.      Si   incerturn,  haec  erit  quaestio  sola  aut 
potentissima ;  saepe  enim  accidet,  ut  prius  dicamus, 
ne    si    possit    quidem   fieri,   esse   faciendum,   deinde 
fieri     non     posse.       Cum    autem    de    hoc    quaeritur, 
coniectura    est,    an     Isthmos     intercidi,    an     siccari 
palus    Pomptina,    an    portus    fieri    Ostiae    possit,  an 
Alexander    terras    ultra     Oceanum     sit    inventurus. 

17  Sed    in    iis    quoque   quae   constabit    posse   fieri,  con- 
iectura    aliquando     erit,    si     quaeretur,     an     utique 
futurum   sit,    ut   Carthaginem   superent   Romani  ;   ut 

1  dc  Orat.  ii.  82 

The  theme  of  a  suasoria  of  the  elder  Seneca  (Suas.  i.). 
Alexander  deliberates  whether  to  sail  forth  into  the  ocean." 


BOOK    III.   vni.  14-17 

The  majority  of  Greek  writers  have  held  that  this  14 
kind  of  oratory  is  entirely  concerned  with  addressing 
public  assemblies  and  have  restricted  it  to  politics. 
Even  Cicero  l  himself  deals  chiefly  with  this  depart- 
ment. Consequently  those  who  propose  to  offer  advice 
upon  peace,  war,  troops,  public  works  or  revenue  must 
thoroughly  acquaint  themselves  with  two  things,  the 
resources  of  the  state  and  the  character  of  its  people, 
so  that  the  method  employed  in  tendering  their  ad- 
vice may  be  based  at  once  on  political  realities  and 
the  nature  of  their  hearers.  This  type  of  oratory  15 
seems  to  me  to  offer  a  more  varied  field  for  eloquence, 
since  both  those  who  ask  for  advice  and  the  answers 
given  to  them  may  easily  present  the  greatest  diversity. 

Consequently  there  are  three  points  which  must 
be  specially  borne  in  mind  in  advice  or  dissuasion  : 
first  the  nature  of  the  subject  under  discussion, 
secondly  the  nature  of  those  who  are  engaged  in  the 
discussion,  and  thirdly  the  nature  of  the  speaker  who 
offers  them  advice.  As  to  the  subject  under  discussion  16 
its  practicability  is  either  certain  or  uncertain.  In 
the  latter  case  this  will  be  the  chief,  if  not 
the  only  point  for  consideration  ;  for  it  will  often 
happen  that  we  shall  assert  first  that  something 
ought  not  to  be  done,  even  if  it  can  be  done,  and 
secondly,  that  it  cannot  be  done.  Now  when 
the  question  turns  on  such  points  as  to  whether  the 
Isthmus  can  be  cut  through,  the  Pontine  Marshes 
drained,  or  a  harbour  constructed  at  Ostia,  or  whether 
Alexander  is  likely  to  find  land  beyond  the  Ocean,2 
we  make  use  of  conjecture.  But  even  in  connection  17 
with  things  that  are  undoubtedly  feasible,  there  may 
at  times  be  room  for  conjecture,  as  for  instance  in 
questions  such  as  whether  Rome  is  ever  likely  to 



redeat  Hannibal,  si  Scipio  exercitum  in  Africam 
transtulerit  ;  ut  servant  fidem  Samnites,  si  Romani 
arma  deposuerint.  Quaedam  et  fieri  posse  et  futura 
esse  credibile  est,  sed  aut  alio  tempore  aut  alio  loco 
aut  alio  modo. 

18  Ubi  coniecturae  non  erit  locus,  alia  sunt  intuenda. 
Et  primum  aut  propter  ipsam  rem,  de  qua  senten- 
tiae  rogantur,  consultabitur  aut  propter  alias  inter- 
venientes    extrinsecus    causas.       Propter    ipsam    de- 
liberant    Patres     conscripti,    an    stipendium    militi 

19  constituant  ?    Haec  materia  simplex  erit.     Accedunt 
causae  aut  faciendi,  ut  deliberant   patres  conscripti, 
an   Fabios  dedant  Gallis  belluin  minitantibus  ;    aut 
non  faciendi,  ut  deliberat  C.   Caesar,  an  perseveret 
in   Germaniam    ire,  cum   milites   passim  testamenta 

20  facerent.       Hae    suasoriae    duplices    sunt.      Nam    et 
illic  causa  deliberandi  est,  quod   bellum   Galli  mini- 
tentur ;     esse     tamen     potest    quaestio,     dedendine 
fuerint  etiam  citra  hanc  denuntiationem,  qui  contra 
fas,    cum    legati    missi    essent,    proelium    inierint, 
regemque,     ad    quern    mandata    acceperant,    truci- 

21  darint.     Et  hie    nihil  Caesar  sine  dubio  deliberaret 
nisi    propter    hanc    militum    perturbationem ;     est 
tamen  locus  quaerendi,  an  citra  hunc  quoque  casum 

1  sc.  at  the  Caudine  Forks  :  see  above,  §  3. 

2  See  Livy,  v.  36. 

3  See   Caesar,  Gallic  War,    i.    39,    where    this    detail    is 
recorded,  also  40  where  the  speech  made  to  his    troops  is 


BOOK    III.  vin.  17-21 

conquer  Carthage,  whether  Hannibal  will  return  to 
Africa  if  Scipio  transports  his  army  thither,  or  whether 
the  Samnites  are  likely  to  keep  faith  if  the  Romans 
lay  down  their  arms.1  There  are  some  things  too 
which  we  may  believe  to  be  both  feasible  and  likely 
to  be  carried  into  effect,  but  at  another  time  or  place 
or  in  another  way. 

When  there  is  no  scope  for  conjecture,  our  atten-  18 
tion  will  be  fixed  on  other  points.  In  the  first  place 
advice  will  be  asked  either  on  account  of  the  actual 
thing  on  which  the  orator  is  required  to  express  his 
views,  or  on  account  of  other  causes  which  affect  it 
from  without.  It  is  on  the  actual  thing  that  the 
senate  for  instance  debates,  when  it  discusses  such 
questions  as  whether  it  is  to  vote  pay  for  the  troops. 
In  this  case  the  material  is  simple.  To  this  however  19 
may  be  added  reasons  for  taking  action  or  the  reverse, 
as  for  example  if  the  senate  should  discuss  whether 
it  should  deliver  the  Fabii  to  the  Gauls  when  the 
latter  threaten  war,2  or  Gaius  Caesar  should  deliberate 
whether  he  should  persist  in  the  invasion  of  Germany, 
when  his  soldiers  on  all  sides  are  making  their  wills.3 
These  deliberative  themes  are  of  a  twofold  nature.  20 
In  the  first  case  the  reason  for  deliberation  is  the 
Gallic  threat  of  war,  but  there  may  still  be  a  further 
question  as  to  whether  even  without  such  threat  of 
war  they  should  surrender  those  who,  contrary  to  the 
law  of  nations,  took  part  in  a  battle  when  they  had 
been  sent  out  as  ambassadors  and  killed  the  king 
with  whom  they  had  received  instructions  to  treat. 
In  the  second  case  Caesar  would  doubtless  never  deli-  21 
berate  on  the  question  at  all,  but  for  the  perturbation 
shown  by  his  soldiers ;  but  there  is  still  room  for 
enquiry  whether  quite  apart  from  this  occurrence  it 



penetrandum  in  Germaniara  fuerit.  Semper  autem 
de  eo  prius  loquemur,  de  quo  deliberari  etiam 
detractis  sequentibus  possit. 

Partes  suadendi  quidam  putaverunt  honestum, 
utile,  necessarium.  Ego  non  invenio  huic  tertiae 
locum.  Quantalibet  enini  vis  ingruat,  aliquid  for- 
tasse  pati  necesse  sit,  nihil  facere  ;  de  faciendo 

23  autem  deliberatur.     Quodsi   hanc  vocant  necessita- 
tem,   in    quam    homines   graviorum    metu   coguntur, 
utilitatis   erit  quaestio  ;  ut   si  obsessi  et  impares  et 
aqua   ciboque   defecti  de  facienda  ad   hostem  dedi- 
tione    deliberent    et    dicatur,    necesse    est ;    nempe 
sequitur,   ut   hoc   subiiciatur,   alioqui  pereundum   est : 
ita  propter   id   ipsum  non   est   necesse,   quia   perire 
potius  licet.      Denique  non   fecerunt   Saguntini  nee 

24  in  rate  Opitergina  circumvent!.      Igitur  in  his  quo- 
que  causis  aut  de  sola  utilitate  ambigetur  aut  quae- 
stio inter  utile  atque  honestum  consistet.     At  enim 
si  quis  liberos  procreare  volet,  necesse  habet  ducere 
uxorem.     Quis  dubitat?  sed  ei,  qui  pater  vult  fieri, 

25  liqueat  necesse  est  uxorem  esse  ducendam.      Itaque 
mihi  ne  consilium  quidem  videtur,  ubi  necessitas  est, 
non  magis  quam  ubi  constat,  quid  fieri  non  possit. 

1  In  218  B.C.,  when  besieged  by  Hannibal.  See  Livy, 
xxi.  14. 

i  C.  Antonius  was  blockaded  in  an  island  off  the  Dalmatian 
coast  which  he  held  for  Caesar  49  B.C.  Reinforcements  on 
rafts  were  sent  to  his  rescue.  Most  were  captured  ;  but  in 
one  case,  of  a  raft  carrying  1,000  men  from  Opitergium  in 


BOOK    III.  vin.  21-25 

would  be  wise  to  penetrate  into  Germany.  But  it 
must  be  remembered  that  we  shall  always  speak  first 
on  that  subject  winch  is  capable  of  discussion  quite 
apart  from  the  consequences. 

Some  have  held  that  the  three  main  considerations  22 
in  an  advisory  speech  are  honour,  expediency  and 
necessity.  1  can  find  no  place  for  the  last.  For  how- 
ever great  the  violence  which  may  threaten  us,  it  may 
be  necessary  for  us  to  suffer  something,  but  we  are  not 
compelled  to  do  anything ;  whereas  the  subject  of 
deliberation  is  primarily  whether  we  shall  do  any  thing. 
Or  if  by  necessity  they  mean  that  into  which  we  are  23 
driven  by  fear  of  worse  things,  the  question  will  be  one 
of  expediency.  For  example,  if  a  garrison  is  besieged 
by  overwhelmingly  superior  forces  and,  owing  to  the 
failure  of  food  and  water  supplies,  discusses  surrender 
to  the  enemy,  and  it  is  urged  that  it  is  a  matter  of 

**   * 

necessity,  the  words  "  otherwise  we  shall  perish  "  must 
needs  be  added  :  consequently  there  is  no  necessity 
arising  out  of  the  circumstances  themselves,  for  death 
is  a  possible  alternative.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact  the 
Saguntines1  did  not  surrender,  nor  did  those  who  were 
surrounded  on  the  raft  from  Opitcrgium.2  It  follows  24 
that  in  such  cases  also  the  question  will  be  either  one 
of  expediency  alone  or  of  a  choice  betwreen  expedi- 
ency and  honour.  "  But,"  it  will  be  urged,  "  if  a  man 
would  beget  children,  he  is  under  the  necessity  of 
taking  a  wife."  Certainly.  But  he  who  wishes  to 

O  ^ 

become  a  father  must  needs  be  quite  clear  that  he 
must  take  a  wife.      It  appears  to  me,  therefore,  that  25 
where  necessity  exists,  there  is  no  room  for  delibera- 
tion, any  more  than  where  it  is  clear  that  a  thing  is 

Venetia,  surrender  was  scorned  and  the  men  slew  each  other 
rather  than  yield.  See  Lucan,  iv.  462;  Florus,  ii.  33. 



Omnis  enim  deliberatio  de  dubiis  est.  Melius  igitur, 
qui  tertiam  partem  dixerunt  Swarov,  quod  nostri 
possibile  nominant,  quae  ut  dura  videatur  appellatio, 

26  tamen  sola  est.     Quas  partes  non  omnes  in  omnem 
cadere  suasoriam  manifestius  est,  quara  ut  docendum 
sit.     Tamen  apud  plerosque  eavum  numerus  augetur, 
a  quibus  ponuntur  ut  partes,  quae  superiorum  species 
sunt    partium.      Nam    fas,    iustum,    pium,    aequum, 
mansuetum   quoque  (sic   enim   sunt    interpretati   TO 
r/jufpov)  et  si  qua  adhuc  adiicere  quis  eiusdem  generis 

27  velit,  subiici  possunt  honestati.     An  sit  autem  facile, 
magnum,  iucundum,  sine   periculo,  ad   quaestionem 
pertinet  utilitatis.     Qui  loci   oriuntur  ex  contradic- 
tione  :   Est  quidem  utile   sed  difficile,  panwm,  iniucun- 

28  dum,  periculosum.      Tamen    quibusdam    videtur   csse 
nonnunquam   de   iucunditate  sola  consultatio,  ut   si 
de  aedificando  theatro,  instituendis  ludis  deliberetur. 
Sed  neminem  adeo  solutum   luxu  puto,   ut  nihil  in 

29  causa  suadendi  sequatur  praeter  voluptatem.     Prae- 
cedat  enim  semper  aliquid  necesse  est,  ut  in  ludis 
honor  deorum,  in   theatro   non  inutilis  laborum  re- 
missio,  deformis  et  incommoda  turbae,  si  id  non  sit, 

BOOK    III.  vin.  25-29 

not  feasible.  For  deliberation  is  always  concerned 
with  questions  where  some  doubt  exists.  Those 
therefore  are  wiser  who  make  the  third  consideration 
for  deliberative  oratory  to  be  TO  Swarov  or  "possibility" 
as  we  translate  it ;  the  translation  may  seem  clumsy, 
but  it  is  the  only  word  available.  That  all  these  26 
considerations  need  not  necessarily  obtrude  them- 
selves in  every  case  is  too  obvious  to  need  explanation. 
Most  writers,  however,  say  that  there  are  more  than 
three.  But  the  further  considerations  which  they 
would  add  are  really  but  species  of  the  three  general 
considerations  just  mentioned.  For  right,  justice, 
piety,  equity  and  mercy  (for  thus  they  translate  TO 
rjp.(pov],  with  any  other  virtues  that  anyone  may  be 
pleased  to  add,  all  come  under  the  heading  of  that 
which  is  honourable.  On  theother  hand, if  the  question  27 
be  whether  a  thing  is  easy,  great,  pleasant  or  free  from 
danger,  it  comes  under  questions  of  expediency.  Such 
topics  arise  from  some  contradiction  ;  for  example  a 
thing  is  expedient,  but  difficult,  or  trivial,  or  un- 
pleasant, or  dangerous.  Some  however  hold  that  at  28 
timesdeliberationis  concerned  solely  with  thequestion 
whether  a  thing  is  pleasant,  as  for  instance  when  dis- 
cussion arises  as  to  whether  a  theatre  should  be  built  or 
games  instituted.  But  in  my  opinion  you  will  never 
find  any  man  such  a  slave  to  luxury  as  not  to  consider 
anything  but  pleasure  when  he  delivers  an  advisory 
speech.  For  there  must  needs  be  something  on  every  29 
occasion  that  takes  precedence  of  pleasure  :  in  propos- 
ing the  institution  of  public  games  there  is  the  honour 
due  to  the  gods ;  in  proposing  the  erection  of  a 
theatre  the  orator  will  consider  the  advantages  to  be 
derived  from  relaxation  f^om  toil,  and  the  unbecoming 
and  undesirable  struggle  for  places  which  will  arise  if 



conHictatio,  et  nihilominus  eadem   ilia   religio,  cum 
theatrum  veluti  quoddam  illius  sacri  templum  voca- 

30  bimus.     Saepe  vero  et  utilitatem  despiciendam  esse 
dicimus,  ut   honesta   faciamus,  ut   cum  illis  Opiter- 
ginis  damns  consilium,  ne  se  hostibus  dedant,  quan- 
quam  perituri  sint,  nisi  fecerint;   et  utilia  honestis 
praeferimus,  ut  cum  suademus,  ut  bello  Punico  servi 

31  armentur.     Sed  neque  hie  plane   concedendum   est 
esse  id  inhonestum,   liberos   enim  natura  omnes  et 
eisdem  constare  elementis  et  fortasse  antiquis  etiam 
nobilibus  ortos  dici  potest ;  et  illic,  ubi  manifestum 
periculum   est,  opponenda   alia,  ut    crudelius   etiam 
perituros  adfirmemus,  si  se  dediderint,  sive  hostisnon 
servaverit  fidem,  sive  Caesar  vicerit,  quod  est  vero 

32  similius.      Haec  autem,   quae  tantum  inter   se  pug- 
nant,   plerumque    nominibus  deflecti    solent.      Nam 
et   utilitas  ipsa   expugnatur  ab   iis,   qui  dicunt,  non 
solum  potiora  esse  honesta  quam  utilia,  sed  ne  utilia 
quidem  esse,  quae  non  sint  honesta ;  et  contra,  quod 
nos    honestum,    illi    vanum,    ambitiosum,    stolid  urn, 

33  verbis    quam    re    probabilius   vocant.       Nee    tantum 
inutilibus  comparantur   utilia,   sed   inter  se   quoque 
ipsa,   ut  si   ex    duobus   eligamus,  in   altero   quid   sit 
magis,  in  altero  quid  sit  minus.      Crescit  hoc  adhuc. 
Nam  interim  triplices  etiam  suasoriae  incidunt :  ut 
cum   Pompeius  deliberabat,   Parthos  an   Africam  an 
Aegyptum  peteret.      Ita  non  tantum,  utrum  melius 

1  After  the  battle  of  Cannae  :   Livy,  xxii.  57. 
8  After  his  defeat  at  Pharsalus. 


BOOK    III.  viii.  29-33 

there  is  no  proper  accommodation  ;  religion,  too,  has 
its  place  in  the  discussion,  for  we  shall  describe  the 
theatre  as  a  kind  of  temple  for  the  solemnization  of  a 
sacred  feast.  Often  again  we  shall  urge  that  honour  30 
must  come  before  expediency ;  as  for  instance  when 
we  advise  the  men  of  Opitergium  not  to  surrender  to 
the  enemy,  even  though  refusal  to  do  so  means 
certain  death.  At  times  on  the  other  hand  we  prefer 
expediency  to  honour,  as  when  we  advise  the  arming 
of  slaves  in  the  Punic  War.1  But  even  in  this  case  we  31 
must  not  openly  admit  that  such  a  course  is  dishon- 
ourable :  we  can  point  out  that  all  men  are  free  by 
nature  and  composed  of  the  same  elements,  while 
the  slaves  in  question  may  perhaps  be  sprung 
from  some  ancient  and  noble  stock ;  and  in  the 
former  case  when  the  danger  is  so  evident, 
we  may  add  other  arguments,  such  as  that  they 
would  perish  even  more  cruelly  if  they  surrendered, 
should  the  enemy  fail  to  keep  faith,  or  Caesar  (a 
more  probable  supposition)  prove  victorious.  But  32 
in  such  a  conflict  of  principles  it  is  usual  to  modify 
the  names  which  we  give  them.  For  expediency  is 
often  ruled  out  by  those  who  assert  not  merely  that 
honour  comes  before  expediency,  but  that  nothing 
can  be  expedient  that  is  not  honourable,  while  others 
say  that  what  we  call  honour  is  vanity,  ambition  and 
folly,  as  contemptible  in  substance  as  it  is  fair  in 
sound.  Nor  is  expediency  compared  merely  with  33 
inexpediency.  At  times  we  have  to  choose  between 
two  advantageous  courses  after  comparison  of  their 
respective  advantages.  The  problem  may  be  still 
more  complicated,  as  for  instance  when  Pompey 
deliberated  whether  to  go  to  Parthia,  Africa  or 
Egypt.2  In  such  a  case  the  enquiry  is  not  which  of 



sed    quid    sit    optimum>   quaeritur,   itemque    contra. 

34  Nee  unquam  incidet  in  hoc  genere  materiae  dubi- 
tatio  rei,  quae  undique  sccundum  nos  sit.      Nam  ubi 
contradiction!  locus  non  est,  quae  potest  esse  causa 
dubitandi  ?     Ita  fere  omnis  suasoria  nihil  est  aliud 
quam    comparatio,    videndumque,    quid    consecuturi 
simus  et  per   quid,   ut   aestimari   possit,   plus  in   eo 
quod  petimus  sit  comiiiodi,  an  vero  in  eo  per  quod 

35  petimus    incommodi.       Est    utilitatis   et   in    tempore 
quaestio,  expedit  sed  non  nunc ;   ct  in   loco,  non  hie; 
et  in  persona,  non  nobis,  non  contra  hos  ;  et  in  genere 
agendi,  non  sic  ;  et  in  modo,  non  in  tantum. 

Sed    personam    saepius    decoris    gratia    intuemur, 
quae  et  in  nobis  et  in  iis,  qui  deliberant,  spectanda 

36  est.      Itaque  quamvis  exempla  plurimum  in  consiliis 
possint,   quia    facillime    ad   consentiendum    homines 
ducuntur  experiments,   refert  tamen,  quorum    auc- 
toritas    et    quibus    adhibeatur.       Diversi    sunt    enim 

37  deliberantium    animi,  duplex   condicio.       Nam   con- 
sultant aut  plures  aut  singuli ;  sed  in  utrisque  diffe- 
rentia, quia  et  in  pluribus  multum  interest,  senatus 


BOOK    III.   vni.  33-37 

two  courses  is  better  or  worse,  but  which  of  three  or 
more.  On  the  other  hand  in  deliberative  oratory  there  34 
will  never  be  any  doubt  about  circumstances  wholly 
in  our  favour.  For  there  can  clearly  be  no  doubt  about 
points  against  which  there  is  nothing  to  be  said. 
Consequently  as  a  rule  all  deliberative  speeches  are 
based  simply  on  comparison,  and  we  must  consider 
what  we  shall  gain  and  by  what  means,  that  it  may  be 

o  •/  »/ 

possible  to  form  an  estimate  whether  there  is  more 
advantage  in  the  aims  we  pursue  or  greater  disadvan- 
tage in  the  means  we  employ  to  that  end.  A  35 
question  of  expediency  may  also  be  concerned  with 
time  (for  example,  "it  is  expedient,  but  not  now") 
or  with  place  ("  it  is  expedient,  but  not  here  ")  or 
with  particular  persons  ("it  is  expedient,  but  not  for 
us  "  or  "  not  as  against  these  ")  or  with  our  method  of 
action  ("  it  is  expedient,  but  not  thus")  or  with 
degree  ("it  is  expedient,  but  not  to  this  extent  "). 

But  we  have  still  more  often  to  consider  per- 
sonality with  reference  to  what  is  becoming,  and  we 
must  consider  our  own  as  well  as  that  of  those 
before  whom  the  question  is  laid.  Consequently,  30 
though  examples  are  of  the  greatest  value  in 
deliberative  speeches,  because  reference  to  his- 
torical parallels  is  the  quickest  method  of  secur- 
ing assent,  it  matters  a  great  deal  whose  authority 
is  adduced  and  to  whom  it  is  commended.  For 
the  minds  of  those  who  deliberate  on  any  sub- 
ject differ  from  one  another  and  our  audience  may 
be  of  two  kinds.  For  those  who  ask  us  for  ad-  3"? 
vice  are  either  single  individuals  or  a  number,  and 
in  both  cases  the  factors  may  be  different.  For 
when  advice  is  asked  by  a  number  of  persons  it 
makes  a  considerable  difference  whether  they  are 



sic  an  popuius,  llomani  an  Fidenates,  Gracci  an 
barbari,  et  in  singulis,  Catoni  petendos  honores  stia- 
deamus  an  C.  Mario,  de  ratione  belli  Scipio  prior  an 

:^S  Fabi;is  deliberet.  Froinde  intuenda  sexus,  dignitas, 
aetas.  Sed  mores  praceipue  discrimen  dabunt.  Et 
honesta  quidem  honestis  snadere  facillimum  est;  si 
vero  apud  turpes  recta  obtinere  conabimur,  ne  vide- 
amur  exprobrare  diversam  vitae  seetam,  cavendum. 

:i9  Et  animus  dcliberantis  non  ipsa  honesti  natura,  quam 
lile  non  respicit,  perniovendiiSj  sed  laude,  vul^i 
opinione,  et  si  parum  proiiciet  haec  vanitas,  secutura 
ex  his  utilitate,  aliquanto  vero  magis  obiiciendo 

40  aliquos,  si  diversa  fecerint,  metus.      Nanujue  praeter 
id  (juod   liis  levissimi  cuiiisqiic  animus  fucillime   ter- 
retur,  nescio  an  etiam  naturaliter  apiul  plurimos  plus 
valcat    malorum    timor    quam    spes    bonorum,    sicut 
facilior  eisdem  turpium  quam  honestorum  intellectus 

41  est.      Aliquando  b'onis  quoque  suadentur  parum  de- 
cora, dantur  parum  bonis  consilia,  in  quibus  ipsorum 
qui  corisulunt  spectatur  utilitas.      Nee  me  fallit,  quae 
statim   co^itatio  sulnre   possit    legentem  :    Hoc    ergo 

42  prarripis  ?   et   hoc   fas    putas  ?       Poterat  me    lil>erare 
Cicero,  qui  ita  scribit  acl  Brutum,  praepositis  plurimis, 

1  Th"  1'ticr  is  lost.  The  argument  of  the  quotation  is  as 
follows.  The  policy  which  I  advise-  is  honourable,  but  it 
\vould  be  wroni;  for  me  to  urge  Caesar  to  follow  it,  since  it  is 
contrary  to  his  interests. 


BOOK    III.  vin.  37-42 

the  senate  or  the  people,  the  citizens  of  Rome  or 
Fidenae,  Greeks  or  barbarians,  and  in  the  case  of 
single  individuals,  whether  we  are  urging  Cato  or 

o  ci        o 

Gains  Marius  to  stand  for  office,  whether  it  is  the 
elder  Scipio  or  Fabius  who  is  deliberating  on  his  plan 
of  campaign.  Further  sex,  rank, and  age,  must  be  38 
taken  into  account,  though  it  is  character  that  will 
make  the  chief  difference.  It  is  an  easy  task  to 
recommend  an  honourable  course  to  honourable 
men,  but  if  we  are  attempting  to  keep  men  of  bad 
character  to  the  paths  of  virtue,  we  must  take  care 
not  to  seem  to  upbraid  a  way  of  life  unlike  our  own. 
The  minds  of  such  an  audience  are  not  to  be  moved  39 
by  discoursing  on  the  nature  of  virtue,  which  they 
ignore,  but  by  praise,  by  appeals  to  popular  opinion, 
and  if  such  vanities  are  of  no  avail,  by  demonstration 


of  the  advantage  that  will  accrue  from  such  a  policy, 
or  more  effectively  perhaps  by  pointing  out  the 
appalling  consequences  that  will  follow  the  opposite 
policy.  For  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  minds  40 
of  unprincipled  men  are  easily  swayed  by  terror,  I 
am  not  sure  that  most  men's  minds  are  not  more 
easily  influenced  by  fear  of  evil  than  by  hope  of 
good,  for  they  find  it  easier  to  understand  what  is 
evil  than  what  is  good.  Sometimes  again  we  urge  41 
good  men  to  adopt  a  somewhat  unseemly  course, 
while  we  advise  men  of  poor  character  to  take  a 
course  in  which  the  object  is  the  advantage  of 
those  who  seek  our  advice.  I  realise  the  thought 
that  will  immediately  occur  to  my  reader  :  "  Do  you 
then  teach  that  this  should  be  done  or  think  it 
right?'  Cicero1  might  clear  me  from  blame  in  the 
matter  ;  for  he  writes  to  Brutus  in  the  following 
terms,  after  setting  forth  a  number  of  things  that 



quae  honeste  suaderi  Caesari  possint :  Simne  bonus 
rir,  si  haec  suadeam  ?  Wmime.  Stiasoris  enim  finis  est 
utilitas  cius,  cui  qmsque  suadct.  At  recta  sunt.  Quis 
ncgat  ?  sed  non  est  semper  rectis  in  suadendo  locus. 
Sed  quia  est  altior  quaestio  nee  tantum  ad  suasorias 
pertinet,  destinatus  est  mihi  hie  locus  duodecimo, 

43  qui  summus  futurus  est,  libro.      Xec   ego  quidquam 
fieri    turpiter   velim.       Verum    interim    haec    vel    ad 
scholarum    exercitationes    pertinere    credantur,   nam 
et   iniquorum    ratio    noscenda    est,    ut   melius    aequa 

44  tueamur.      Interim  si  quis   hono  inhonesta  suadebit. 
meminerit  non   suadere   tanquam  inhonesta,  ut  qui- 
dam   declamatores    Sextum    Pompeium   ad  ])iraticam 
propter  hoc  ipsum  quod  turpis  et  crudelis  sit,  iinpel- 
lunt;   sed  dandus  illis  deformibus   color   idque  etiam 
apud   malos.      Neque   enim  quisquam  est  tarn   mains, 

A5  ut  videri  vel  it.  Sic  Catilina  apud  Sallustium  loqui- 
tur, ut  rem  sceleratissimam  non  malitia,  sed  indig- 
natione  videatur  audere.  Sic  Atreus  apud  Varium  : 
—  lam  fero  (inquit)  infandissima,  lam  facer e  co^or. 
Quanto  ma^is  eis,  quibus  cura  famae  fuit,  conser- 

46  vandus  est  hie  velut  ambitus  ?  Quare  et,  cum 
Ciceroni  dabimus  consilium,  ut  Antonium  roget,  vel 
etiam  ut  Philippicas  (ita  vitam  j)ollicente  eo)  exurat, 
non  cupiditatem  lucis  allegabimus  (haec  enim  si 

1  Chap.  xii.  2  Cat.  xx. 

8  For  examples  of  this  theme  see  the  elder  Seneca  (Siias. 
vi.  and  vii.). 


BOOK    III.  viii.  42-46 

might  honourably  be  urged  on  Caesar  :  "  Should  I  be 
a  good  man  to  advise  this  ?      No.      For  the  end  of  him 
who   gives  advice  is  the  advantage   of  the   man   to 
whom  he  gives  it.      But,  you  say,  your  advice  is  right. 
Certainly,   but  there   is    not  always   room    for  what 
is     right    in    giving    advice."       However,  this    is    a 
somewhat  abstruse    question,  and  does  not  concern 
deliberative  oratory  alone.      I  shall  therefore  reserve 
it  for  my  twelfth  and  concluding  book.1    For  my  part  43 
I  would  not  have  anything  done  dishonourably.     But 
for  the  meantime  let  us  regard  these  questions  as  at 
least  belonging  to    the   rhetorical   exercises   of   the 
schools  :  for  knowledge  of  evil  is  necessary  to  enable 
us  the  better    to    defend    what   is    right.      For  the  44 
present  I  will  only  say  that  if  anyone  is  going  to  urge 
a  dishonourable   course    on   an   honourable  man,  he 
should  remember  not  to  urge  it  as  being  dishonour- 
able, and  should  avoid   the   practice  of  certain  de- 
claimers  who  urge   Sextus   Pompeius   to   piracy  just 
because  it  is  dishonourable  and  cruel.    Even  when  we 
address  bad  men,  we  should  gloss  over  what  is  un- 
sightly.     For  there  is  no  man  so  evil  as  to  wish  to 
seem  so.      Thus  Sallust  makes  Catiline  2  speak  as  one  45 
who  is  driven  to  crime  not  by  wickedness  but  by  in- 
dignation, and  Varius  makes  Atreus  say  : 

"  My  wrongs  are  past  all  speech, 
And  such  shall  be  the  deeds  they  force  me  to." 

How  much  more  has  this  pretence  of  honour  to  be 
kept  up  by  those  who  have  a  real  regard  for  their 
own  good  name  !  Therefore  when  we  advise  Cicero  46 
to  beg  Antonius  for  mercy  or  even  to  burn  the 
Philippics  if  Antonius  promises  to  spare  him  on  that 
condition,3  we  shall  not  emphasise  the  love  of  life  in 
our  advice  (for  if  that  passion  has  any  force  with 


valet  in  animo  eius,  tacentibus  quoque  nobis  valet), 

47  seel    ut   reipublicae  se  servet   hortabiraur.      Hac  illi 
opus  est  occasione,  ne  eum   tali um   precum   pudeat. 
Et  C.  Caesari  suadentes  regnum  adfirmabimus  stare 
iam  rempublicam  nisi  uno  regente  non  posse.      Nam 
qui  de   re  nefaria  deliberat,   id   solum  quaerit,  quo- 
modo  quam  minimum  peccare  videatur. 

48  Multum  refert  etiam,  quae  sit  persona  suadentis; 
quia  anteacta  vita  si  illustris  fuit  aut  clarius  genus 
aut  aetas  aut  fortuna  adfert   expectationem,   provi- 
dendum  est,  ne  quae   dicuntur  ab   eo  (jui   dicit  dis- 
sentiant.      At  his  contraria  summissiorem  quendam 
modum  postulant.      Nam  quae  in  aliis  libertas  est,  in 
aliis  licentia  vocatur,  et  quibusdam  sufficit  auctoritas, 
quosdam  ratio  ipsa  aegre  tuetur. 

49  Ideoque  longe  mihi  difficillimae  videntur  prosopo- 
poeiae,    in    quibus    ad    reliquum    suasoriae    laborem 
accedit    etiam    personae   difficultas.       Namque    idem 
illud  aliter  Caesar,  aiiter  Cicero,  aliter  Cato  suadere 
debebit.      Utilissima  vero  haec  exercitatio,  vel  quod 
duplicis    est    operis,    vel    quod    poetis    quoque     aut 
histoiiarum    futuris    scriptoribus    plurimum    confert 

60  Verum  et  oratoribus  necessaria.  Nam  sunt  multae 
a  Graecis  Latinisque  compositae  orationes,  quibus 
alii  uterentur,  ad  quorum  condicionem  vitarnque 

1  Julius  Caesar. 

BOOK    III.  viii.  46-50 

him,  it  will  have  it  none  the  less  if  we  are  silent), 
but  we  shall  exhort  him  to  save  himself  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  state.  For  he  needs  some  such  reason  47 
as  that  to  preserve  him  from,  feeling  shame  at  en- 
treating such  a  one  as  Antony.  Again  if  we  urge 
Gaius  Caesar  l  to  accept  the  crown  we  shall  assert 
that  the  state  is  doomed  to  destruction  unless  con- 
trolled by  a  monarchy.  For  the  sole  aim  of  the  man 
who  is  deliberating  about  committing  a  criminal  act 
is  to  make  his  act  appear  as  little  wicked  as  possible. 

It  also  makes  a  great  deal  of  difference  who  it  is  48 
that  is  offering  the  advice  :  for  if  his  past  has  been 
illustrious,  or  if  his  distinguished  birth  or  age  or 
fortune  excite  high  expectations,  care  must  be  taken 
that  his  words  are  not  unworthy  of  him.  If  on  the 
other  hand  he  has  none  of  these  advantages  he  will 
have  to  adopt  a  humbler  tone.  For  what  is  regarded 
as  liberty  in  some  is  called  licence  in  others.  Some 
receive  sufficient  support  from  their  personal 
authority,  while  others  find  that  the  force  of  reason 
itself  is  scarce  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  maintain 
their  position. 

Consequently  I  regard  impersonation  as  the  most  49 
difficult  of  tasks,  imposed  as  it  is  in  addition  to  the 
other  work  involved  by  a  deliberative  theme.  For 
the  same  speaker  has  on  one  occasion  to  impersonate 
Caesar,  on  another  Cicero  or  Cato.  But  it  is  a  most 
useful  exercise  because  it  demands  a  double  effort 
and  is  also  of  the  greatest  use  to  future  poets  and 
historians,  while  for  orators  of  course  it  is  absolutely 
necessary.  For  there  are  many  speeches  composed  50 
by  Greek  and  Latin  orators  for  others  to  deliver,  the 
words  of  which  had  to  be  adapted  to  suit  the  posi- 
tion and  character  of  those  for  whom  they  were 



aptanda  quae  dicebantur  fuerunt.  An  eodem  modo 
cogitavit  aut  eandem  personam  induit  Cicero,  cum 
scriberet  Cn.  Pompeio  et  cum  T.  Ampio  ceterisve  ; 
ac  non  uniuscuiusque  eorum  fortunam,  dignitatem, 
res  gestas  intuitus  omnium,  quibus  vocem  dabat, 
etiam  imaginem  expressit?  ut  melius  quidem  sed 

51  tamen   ipsi  dicere  viderentur.      Neque  enim   minus 
vitiosa  est  oratio,  si  ab  homine  quam  si  ab  re,  cui 
accommodari  debuit,  dissidet ;  ideoque  Lysias  optime 
videtur  in   iis,  quae  scribebat  indoctis,  servasse  veri- 
tatis     fidem.       Enimvero     praecipue    declamatoribus 
considerandum  est,  quid  cuique  personae  conveniat, 
qui  paucissimas  controversias  ita  dicunt  ut  advocati, 
plerumque  filii,  parentes,  divites,  senes,  aspen,  lenes, 
avari,  denique    superstitiosi,  timidi,  derisores    fiunt ; 
ut  vix  comoediarum  actoribus  plures  habitus  in  pro- 
nuntiando    concipiendi    sint    quam    his    in    dicendo. 

52  Quae  omnia  possunt  videri  prosopopoeiae,  quam  ego 
suasoriis    subieci,  quia   nullo    alio  ab   iis   quam    per- 
sona  distat.       Quanquam    haec   aliquando   etiam    in 
controversias   ducitur,   quae    ex    historiis  compositae 

53  certis    agentium     nominibus     continentur.       Neque 
ignore     plerumque     exercitationis     gratia     poni     et 
poeticas  et  historicas,  ut  Priami  verba  apud  Achillem 

1  Nothing  is  known  of  these  speeches. 

BOOK    III.  vm.  50-53 

written.  Do  you  suppose  that  Cicero  thought  in  the 
same  way  or  assumed  the  same  character  when  he 
wrote  for  Gnaeus  Pompeius  and  when  he  wrote  for 
Titus  Ampius  and  the  rest  ? l  Did  he  not  rather  bear 
in  mind  the  fortune,  rank  and  achievements  of  each 
single  individual  and  represent  the  character  of  all 
to  whom  he  gave  a  voice  so  that  though  they  spoke 
better  than  they  could  by  nature,  they  still  might 
seem  to  speak  in  their  own  persons  ?  For  a  speech  51 
which  is  out  of  keeping  with  the  man  who  delivers 
it  is  just  as  faultv  as  the  speech  which  fails  to  suit 
the  subject  to  which  it  should  conform.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  Lysias  is  regarded  as  having  shown 
the  highest  art  in  the  speeches  which  he  wrote  for 
uneducated  persons,  on  account  of  their  extraordin- 
ary realism.  In  the  case  of  declaimers  indeed  it  is 
of  the  first  importance  that  they  should  consider 
what  best  suits  each  character  :  for  they  rarely  play 
the  role  of  advocates  in  their  declamations.  As  a 
rule  they  impersonate  sons,  parents,  rich  men,  old 
men,  gentle  or  harsh  of  temper,  misers,  superstiti- 
ous persons,  cowards  and  mockers,  so  that  hardly 
even  comic  actors  have  to  assume  more  numerous 
roles  in  their  performances  on  the  stage  than 
these  in  their  declamations.  All  these  roles  may  52 
be  regarded  as  forming  part  of  impersonation, 
which  I  have  included  under  deliberative  themes, 
from  which  it  differs  merely  in  that  it  involves  the 
assumption  of  a  role.  It  is  sometimes  introduced 
even  with  controversial  themes,  which  are  drawn 
from  history  and  involve  the  appearance  of  definite 
historical  characters  as  pleaders.  I  am  aware  also  53 
that  historical  and  poetical  themes  are  often  set  for 
the  sake  of  practice,  such  as  Priam's  speech  to 



aut  Sullae  dictaturam  deponentis  in  contione.  Seel 
haec  in  partem  cedent  trium  generum,  in  quae 
causas  divisimus.  Nam  et  rogare,  indicare,  rationem 
reddere  et  alia,  de  quibus  supra  dictum  est,  varie 
atque  ut  res  tulit  in  materia  iudiciali,  deliberativa, 

54  demons  trativa,  solemus.      Frequentissime  vero  in  iis 
utimur    ficta     personarum,    quas    ipsi    substituimus, 
oratione,  ut  apud  Ciceronem   pro  Caelio  Clodiam  et 
Caecus    Appius    et    Clodius    frater,   ille    in    castiga- 
tionem,  hie   in   exhortationem    vitiorum    compositus, 

55  Solent  in   scholis  fingi  materiae  ad  deliberandum 
similiores  controversiis   et  ex   utroque  genere    com- 
mixtne,    ut    cum    apud    C.    Caesarem    consultatio  de 
poena  Theodoti  ponitui.      Constat  enim  accusatione 
et  defensione  causa  eius,  quod  est  iudicialium  pro- 

56  prium.      Permixta  tamen    est  et    utilitatis   ratio,  an 
pro   Caesare  fuerit  occidi    Pompeium,  an    timendum 
a    rege    bellum,   si    Theodotus     sit     occisus,    an    id 
minime  opportunum  hoc  tempore  et  periculosum  et 

67  certe  longum  sitfuturum.  Quaeritur  et  de  honesto, 
deceatne  Caesarem  ultio  Pompeii,  an  sit  veren- 
dum,  ne  peiorem  faciat  suarum  partium  causam,  si 

58  Pompeiurn  indignum  morte  fateatur.  Quod  genus 
accidere  etiam  veritati  potest. 

1  xiv.  sqg 


BOOK    III.  vin.  53-58 

Achilles  or  Sulla's  address  to  the  people  on  his 
resignation  of  the  dictatorship.  But  these  will  fall 
under  one  or  other  of  the  three  classes  into  which 
I  have  divided  causes.  For  entreaty,  statement, 

•/  -  * 

and  argument,  with  other  themes  already  mentioned, 
are  all  of  frequent  occurrence  in  forensic,  deliberative 
or  demonstrative  subjects,  according  as  circumstances 
demand,  and  we  often  introduce  fictitious  speeches  54 
of  historical  persons,  whom  we  select  ourselves. 
Cicero  for  instance  in  the  pro  Caclio  l  makes  both 
Appius  Caecus  and  her  brother  Clodius  address 
Clodia,  the  former  rebuking  her  for  her  immorality, 
the  latter  exhorting  her  thereto. 

In  scholastic  declamations  the  fictitious  themes  for  55 
deliberative  speeches  are  often  not  unlike  those  of 
controversial  speeches  and  are  a  compromise  between 
the  two  forms,  as  for  instance  when  the  theme  set  is 
a  discussion  in  the  presence  of  Gaius  Caesar  of  the 
punishment  to  be  meted  out  to  Theodotus  ;  for  it  con- 
sists of  accusation  and  defence,  both  of  them  peculiar 
to  forensic  oratory.  But  the  topic  of  expediency  also  56 
enters  into  the  case,  in  such  questions  as  whether  it 
was  to  Caesar's  advantage  that  Pompeius  should  be 
slain ;  whether  the  execution  of  Theodotus  would 
involve  the  risk  of  a  war  with  the  king  of  Egypt; 
whether  such  a  war  would  be  highly  inopportune  at 
such  a  critical  moment,  would  prove  dangerous  and 
be  certain  to  last  a  long  time.  There  is  also  a  question  57 
of  honour.  Does  it  befit  Caesar  to  avenge  Pompeius' 
death  ?  or  is  it  to  be  feared  that  an  admission  that 
Pompeius  did  not  deserve  death  will  injure  the  cause 
of  the  Caesarian  party  ?  It  may  be  noted  that  dis-  58 
cussions  of  such  a  kind  may  well  occur  in  actual 



Non  simplex  autem  circa  suasorias  error  in  pleris- 
que  declamatoribus  fuit,  qui  dicendi  genus  in  iis 
diversum  atque  in  totum  illi  iudiciali  contrarium  esse 
existimaverunt.  Nam  et  principia  abrupta  et  con- 
citatam  semper  orationem  et  in  verbis  effusiorem,  ut 
ipsi  vocant,  cultum  adfectaverunt,  et  earum  breviores 
utique  commentarios  quam  legalis  materiae  facere 
50  laborarunt.  Ego  porro  ut  prooemio  video  non  utique 
opus  esse  suasoriis,  propter  quas  dixi  supra  causas, 
ita  cur  initio  furioso  sit  exclamandum,  non  intelligo  ; 
cum  proposita  consultatione  rogatus  sententiam,  si 
modo  est  sanus,  non  quintet,  sed  quam  maxime 
potest  civili  et  humano  ingressu  mereri  adsensum 

60  deliberantis    velit.       Cur    autem    torrens    et    utique 
aequaliter  concitata  sit  in  ea  dicentis  oratio,  cum  vel 
praeeipue  moderationem  consilia  desiderent  ?     Neque 
ego    negaverim,    saepius    subsidere    in    controversiis 
impetum  dicendi   prooemio,  narratione,  argumentis  ; 
quae    si   detrahas,   id    fere    supererit,    quo    suasoriae 
constant,  verum  id  quoque  aequalius  erit  non  tumul- 

61  tuosius  atque  turbidius.      Verborum  autem  magnifi- 
centia   non    validius  est  adfectanda  suasorias   decla- 
mantibus,    sed    contingit    magis ;    nam    et    personae 
fere  magnae  fmgentibus  placent,  regum,  principum, 


BOOK    III.  vin    58-61 

Declaimers  have  however  often  been  guilty  of  an 
error  as  regards  deliberative  themes  which  has  in- 
volved a  series  of  consequences.  They  have  con- 
sidered deliberative  themes  to  be  different  and 
absolutely  opposed  to  forensic  themes.  For  they  have 
always  affected  abrupt  openings,  an  impetuous  style 
and  a  generous  embellishment, as  they  call  it,  in  their 
language,  and  have  been  especially  careful  to  make 
shorter  notes  for  deliberative  than  for  forensic  themes. 


For  my  part  while  I  realise  that  deliberative  themes  69 
do  not  require  an  exordium,  for  reasons  which  I  have 
already  stated,  I  do  not,  however,  understand  why 
they  should  open  in  such  a  wild  and  exclamatory 
manner.  When  a  man  is  asked  to  express  his  opinion 
on  any  subject,  he  does  not,  if  he  is  sane,  begin  to 
shriek,  but  endeavours  as  far  as  possible  to  win  the 
assent  of  the  man  who  is  considering  the  question  by 
a  courteous  and  natural  opening.  Why,  I  ask,  in  60 
view  of  the  fact  that  deliberations  require  moderation 
above  all  else,  should  the  speaker  on  such  themes  in- 
dulge in  a  torrential  style  of  eloquence  kept  at  one 
high  level  of  violence  ?  I  acknowledge  that  in  con- 
troversial speeches  the  tone  is  often  lowered  in  the 
exordium,  the  statement  of  facts  and  the  argument,  and 
that  if  you  subtract  these  three  portions,  the  re- 
mainder is  more  or  less  of  the  deliberative  type  of 
speech,  but  what  remains  must  likewise  be  of  a  more 
even  flow,  avoiding  all  violence  and  fury.  With  61 
regard  to  magnificence  of  language,  deliberative  de- 
claimers  should  avoid  straining  after  it  more  than 
others,  but  it  comes  to  them  more  naturally.  For 
there  is  a  preference  among  those  who  invent  such 
themes  for  selecting  great  personages,  such  as  kings, 
princes,  senators  and  peoples,  while  the  theme  itself 



senatus,  populi  et  res  ampliores  ;  ita  cum  verba  rebus 
G2  apU-nlur,  ipso  materiae  nitore  clarescunt.  Alia 
veris  consiliis  ratio  est,  ideoque  Theophrastus  quam 
maxime  remotum  ab  omni  adfectione  in  deliberative 
genere  voluit  esse  sermonem,  secutus  in  hoc  aucto- 
ritatem  praeceptoris  sui,  quanquam  dissentire  ab  eo 

63  non     timide    solet.       Namque    Aristoteles    idoneam 
maxime  ad    scribendum  demonstrativam   proxirnam- 
que  ab  ea  iudicialem  putavit,  videlicet  quoniam  prior 
ilia    tota    esset    ostentationis,    haec    secunda    egeret 
artis,   vel    ad    fallendum,   si    ita   poposcisset   utilitas, 

64  consilia    fide    prudentiaque    constarent.       Quibus    in 
demonstrativa   consentio,   nam   et   omnes    alii    scrip- 
tores  idem  tradiderunt  ;  in  iudiciis  autem  consiliisque 
secundum  condicionem   ipsius,  quae   tractabitur,  rei 

65  accommodandam  dicendi   credo   rationem.      Nam  et 
Phiiippicas    Demosthenis    iisdem    quibus    habitas    in 
iudiciis  orationes  video  eminere  virtutibus,  et  Cice- 
ronis    sententiae    et    contiones    non    minus    clarum, 
quam    est    in    accusationibus   ac  defensionibus,   elo- 
quentiae    lumen    ostendunt.      Dicit   tamen    idem   de 
suasoria  hoc  modo  :  Tota  autem  oratio  simplex  et  grams 

66  et    xen(c?iliis  debet    omalior   esse   quam    verbis.       Usum 
exemplorum  nulli   materiae  magis  convenire  merito 
fere  omnes   conseiitiunt,   cum   plerumque   videantur 

1  Rhet.  iii.  12.  2  Pa;^.  or.  xxvii.  97. 

BOOK    III.   viii.  61-66 

is  generally  on  a  grander  scale.  Consequently  since 
the  words  are  suited  to  the  theme,  they  acquire 
additional  splendour  from  the  magnificence  of  the 
matter.  In  actual  deliberations  the  case  is  different,  62 
and  consequently  Theophrastus  laid  it  down  that  in 
the  deliberative  class  of  oratory  the  language  should 
as  far  as  possible  be  free  from  all  affectation  :  in 
stating  this  view  he  followed  the  authority  of  his  in- 
structor, although  as  a  rule  he  is  not  afraid  to  differ 
from  him.  For  Aristotle  l  held  that  the  demonstrative  63 
type  of  oratory  was  the  best  suited  for  writing  and 
that  the  next  best  was  forensic  oratory  :  his  reason  for 
this  view  was  that  the  first  type  is  entirely  concerned 
with  display,  while  the  second  requires  art,  which 
will  even  be  employed  to  deceive  the  audience,  if 
expedience  should  so  demand,  whereas  advice  requires 
only  truth  and  prudence.  I  agree  with  this  view  as  64 
regards  demonstrative  oratory  (in  fact  all  writers  are 
agreed  on  this  point),  but  as  regards  forensic  and  deli- 
berative themes  I  think  that  the  style  must  be  suited  to 
the  requirements  of  the  subject  which  has  to  be  treated. 
For  I  notice  that  the  Philippics  of  Demosthenes  65 
are  pre-eminent  for  the  same  merits  as  his  forensic 
speeches,  and  that  the  opinions  expressed  by  Cicero 
before  the  senate  or  the  people  are  as  remarkable  for 
the  splendour  of  their  eloquence  as  the  speeches 
which  he  delivered  in  accusing  or  defending  persons 
before  the  courts.  And  yet  Cicero2  says  of  delibera- 
tive oratory  that  the  whole  speech  should  be  simple 
and  dignified,  and  should  derive  its  ornament  rather 
from  the  sentiments  expressed  than  the  actual  words. 
As  regards  the  use  of  examples  practically  all  authori-  66 
ties  are  with  good  reason  agreed  that  there  is  no 
subject  to  which  they  are  better  suited,  since  as  a 



respond  ere    futura    praeteritis,   habeaturque    experi- 

67  mentum  velut  quoddam  rationis  testimonium.      Bre- 
vitas  quoque  aut  copia  non  materiae  genere  sed  modo 
constat.      Nam   ut   in  consiliis  plerumque  simplicior 
quaestio  est,  ita  saepe  in  causis  minor. 

Quae  omnia  vera  esse  sciet,  si  quis  non  orationes 
modo,,  sed  historias  etiam  (namque  in  iis  contiones 
atque  sententiae  plerumque  suadendi  ac  dissuadendi 
funguntur  officio),  legere  maluerit  quam  in  commen- 

68  tariis    rhetorura    consenescere.       Inveniet   enim    nee 
in    consiliis    abrupta    initia    et    concitatius   saepe    in 
iudiciis  dictum  et  verba  aptata  rebus  in  utroque  genere 
et  breviores  aliquando  causarum  orationes  quam  sen- 

69  tentiarum.       Ne  ilia  quidem  in  iis  vitia  deprehendet, 
quibus  quidam  declamatores  laborant,  quod  et  contra 
sentientibus  inhumane  conviciantur  et  ita  plerumque 
dicunt,  tanquam  ab   iis  qui   deliberant  utique  dissen- 
tiant,    ideoque    obiurgantibus    similiores    sunt   quam 

TO  suadentibus.  Haec  adolescentes  sibi  scripta  sciant, 
ne  aliter  quam  dicturi  sunt  exerceri  velint  et  in 
desuescendis  morentur.  Ceterum,  cum  advocari 

coeperint  in  consilia  amicorum,  dicere  sententiam  in 

BOOK    III.  vin.  66-70 

rule  history  seems  to  repeat  itself  and  the  experience 
of  the  past  is  a  valuable  support  to  reason.  Brevity  07 
and  copiousness  are  determined  not  so  much  by  the 
nature  as  by  the  compass  of  the  subject.  For,  just  as 
in  deliberations  the  question  is  generally  less  com- 
plicated, so  in  forensic  cases  it  is  often  of  less 

Anyone  who  is  content  to  read  not  merelv  speeches, 
but  history  as  well,  in  preference  to  growing  grey  over 
the  notebooks  of  the  rhetoricians,  will  realise  the 
truth  of  what  I  say  :  for  in  the  historians  the  speeches 
delivered  to  the  people  and  the  opinions  expressed 
in  the  senate  often  provide  examples  of  advice  and 
dissuasion.  He  will  find  an  avoidance  of  abrupt  68 
openings  in  deliberative  speeches  and  will  note  that 
the  forensic  style  is  often  the  more  impetuous  of  the 
two,  while  in  both  cases  the  words  are  suited  to  the 
matter  and  forensic  speeches  are  often  shorter  than 
deliberative.  Nor  will  he  find  in  them  those  faults  into  69 
which  some  of  our  declaimers  fall,  namely  a  coarse 
abuse  of  those  who  hold  opposite  opinions  and  a 
general  tendency  to  speak  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
it  seem  that  the  speaker's  views  are  in  opposition  to 
those  of  the  persons  who  ask  his  advice.  Consequently 
their  aim  seems  to  be  invective  rather  than  persuasion. 
I  would  have  my  younger  readers  realise  that  these  70 
words  are  penned  for  their  special  benefit  that  they 
may  not  desire  to  adopt  a  different  style  in  their 
exercises  from  that  in  which  they  will  be  required  to 
speak,  and  may  not  be  hampered  by  having  to  un- 
learn what  they  have  acquired.  For  the  rest  if  they 
are  ever  summoned  to  take  part  in  the  counsels  of 
their  friends,  or  to  speak  their  opinions  in  the  senate, 
or  advise  the  emperor  on  some  point  on  which  he 


senatu,    suadere    si    quid     consulet    princeps,     quod 
praeceptis  fortasse  non  credunt,  usu  docebuntur. 

IX.  Xunc  de  iudiciali  genere,  quod  est  praecipue 
multiplex,  sed  ofiiciis  constat  duobus  intentionis  ac 
depulsionis.  Cuius  partes,  ut  plurimis  auctoribus 
placuit,  quinque  sunt  :  prooemium,  narralio,  pro- 
batio,  refutatio,  peroratio.  His  adiecerunt  quidam 
partitionem,  propositionem,  exccssum  ;  quarum  pri- 

2  ores    duae    probation!    succedunt.       Nam    proponere 
quidem,    quae    sis    probaturus,   necesse    est,   sed    et 
concludere  ;  cur  igitur  si  ilia  pars  causae  est,  non  et 
liaec    sit?      Partitio   vero    dispositionis    est    species, 
ipsa  dispositio  pars  rhetorices  et  per  oinnes  materias 
tottnnque    earum    corpus    aequaliter    fusa,  sicut    in- 

3  ventio,  elocutio.      Ideoque   earn  non   orationis  totius 
partem  unam   esse  credendum  est  sed  quaestionum 
etiam  singularum.      Quae   est  eniin  (|uaestio,,  in  qua 
non     promittere     possit     orator,     quid     primo,    quid 
secundo,    quid    tertio    sit    loco    dicturus?    quod    est 
proprium    partitionis.       Quam    ergo    ridiculum     est, 
quaestionem   quidem   speciem  esse  probationis,   par- 
titionem  autem,  quae  sit  species  quaestionis,  partem 

4  totius  orationis  vocari  ?      Egressio  vero  vel,  quod  usi- 
tatius  esse   coepit,  excessus,  sive   est  extra   causam, 
non  potest  esse  pars  causae,  sive  est  in  causa,  adiu- 
torium  vel  ornamentum  partium  est  earum,  ex  quibus 
egreditur.        Nam    si,    quidquid    in    causa    est,    pars 
causae    vocabitur,   cur   non  argumentum,  similitudo, 

BOOK    III.   vni.  yo-ix.  4 

may  consult  them,  they  will  learn  from  practice 
what  they  cannot  perhaps  put  to  the  credit  of  the 

IX.  I  now  come  to  the  forensic  kind  of  oratory, 
which  presents  the  utmost  variety,  but  whose  duties 
are  no  more  than  two,  the  bringing  and  rebutting 
of  charges.  Most  authorities  divide  the  forensic 
speech  into  five  parts  :  the  exordium,  the  statement  of 
facts,  the  proof,  the  refutation,  and  the  peroration. 
To  these  some  have  added  the  partition  into  heads, 
proposition  and  digression,  the  two  first  of  which 
form  part  of  the  proof.  For  it  is  obviouslv  '2 
necessary  to  propound  what  you  are  going  to  prove 
as  well  as  to  conclude.  Why  then,  if  proposition  is  a 
part  of  a  speech,  should  not  conclusion  be  also  ?  Par- 
tition on  the  other  hand  is  merely  one  aspect  of 
arrangement,  and  arrangement  is  a  part  of  rhetoric 
itself,  and  is  equally  distributed  through  every  theme 
of  oratory  and  their  whole  body,  just  as  are  invention 
and  style.  Consequently  we  must  regard  partition  3 
not  as  one  part  of  a  whole  speech,  but  as  a  part  of 
each  individual  question  that  may  be  involved.  For 
what  question  is  there  in  which  an  orator  cannot 
set  forth  the  order  in  which  he  is  going  to  make 
his  points  ?  And  this  of  course  is  the  function  of  par- 
tition. Bat  how  ridiculous  it  is  to  make  each  ques- 
tion an  aspect  of  proof,  but  partition  which  is  an 
aspect  of  a  question  a  part  of  the  whole  speech.  As  4 
for  digression  (egressio,  now  more  usually  styled 
excessus],  if  it  lie  outside  the  case,  it  cannot  be  part 
of  it,  while,  if  it  lie  within  it.  it  is  merely  an  acces- 
sory or  ornament  of  that  portion  of  the  case  from 
which  digression  is  made.  For  if  anything  that  lies 


within  the  case  is  to  be   called  part  of  it,  why  not 


locus  communis,  adfectus,  exempla  partes  vocentur  ? 

5  Tamen  nee  iis  adsentior,  qui  detraliunt  refutationem 
tanquam  probation!  subiectam,  ut  Aristoteles  ;  haec 
enim  est,  quae  constituat,  ilia,  quae  destruat.      Hoc 
quoque  idem  aliquatenus  novat,  quod  prooemio  non 
narrationem    subiungit   sed    propositionem.       Verum 
id    facit,   quia  propositio   ei    genus,   narratio   species 
videtur,  et  hac  non  semper,  ilia   semper   et  ubique 
credit  opus  esse. 

6  Verum    ex    his    quas    constitui    partibus    non,    ut 
quidque   primum  dicendum,  ita  primum   cogitandum 
est ;  sed   ante  omnia  intueri  oportet,  quod  sit  genus 
causae,    quid    in    ea    quaeratur,    quae    prosint,    quae 
noceant,  deinde  quid  confirmandum  sit  ac  refellen- 

7  dum,  turn   quo   modo   narrandum.      Expositio   enim 
probationum  est  praeparatio,  nee  esse  utilis  potest, 
nisi    priiis    constiterit,    quid    debeat    de    probatione 
promittere.      Postremo    intuendum,    quemadmodum 
index  sit  conciliandus.      Neque  enim  nisi  totius  causae 
partibus  diligenter  inspectis  scire  possumus,  qualem 
nobis  facere  animum  cognoscentis  expediat,  severum 
an  mitem.  concitatum  an  remissum,  adversum  ffratiae 

'  O 

an  obnoxium. 

8  Neque  ideo  tamen  eos  probaverim,  qui  scribendum 

1  Ithet.  ii.  26.  8  Rhet.  iii.  13. 


BOOK    III.  ix.  4-8 

call  argument,  comparison,  commonplace,  pathos,  illus- 
tration parts  of  the  case?  On  the  other  hand  I  5 
disagree  with  those  who,  like  Aristotle/  would  re- 
move refutation  from  the  list  on  the  ground  that  it 
forms  part  of  the  proof :  for  the  proof  is  construc- 
tive, and  the  refutation  destructive.  Aristotle  2  also 
introduces  another  slight  novelty  in  making  proposi- 
tion, not  statement  of  facts,  follow  the  exordium.  This 
however  he  does  because  lie  regards  proposition  as 
the  genus  and  statement  of  j  acts  as  the  species,  with 
the  result  that  he  holds  that,  whereas  the  former  is 
always  and  everywhere  necessary,  the  latter  may 
sometimes  be  dispensed  with. 

It  is  however  necessary  to  point  out  as  regards  6 
these  five  parts  which  I  have  established,,  that  that 
which  has  to  be  spoken  first  is  not  necessarily  that 
which  requires  our  first  consideration.  But  above 
all  we  must  consider  the  nature  of  the  case, 
the  question  at  issue  and  the  arguments  for  and 
against.  Next  we  must  consider  what  points  are 
to  be  made,  and  what  refuted,  and  then  how  the 
facts  are  to  be  stated.  For  the  statement  of  facts  is  7 
designed  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  proof's  and  must 
needs  be  unprofitable,  unless  we  have  first  deter- 
mined what  proofs  are  to  be  promised  in  the  state- 
ment. Finally  we  must  consider  how  best  to  win  the 
judge  to  take  our  view.  For  we  cannot  be  sure  until 
we  have  subjected  all  the  parts  of  the  case  to  careful 
scrutiny,  what  sort  of  impression  we  wish  to  make 
upon  the  judge  :  are  we  to  mollify  him  or  increase 
his  severity,  to  excite  or  relax  his  interest  in  the 
case,  to  render  him  susceptible  to  influence  or  the 
reverse  ? 

I  cannot  however  approve  the  view  of  those  who  8 


quoque  prooeniium  novisMine   putant.      Nam  ut  con 
ferri  materiam  omnem  et,  quid  quoque  loco  l  sit  opus, 
constare  decet,   antequam    dicere   aut    scribere   ordi- 

'.»  amur,  ita  incipiendum  ab  iis,  quae  prima  sunt.  Nam 
nee  pingere  quisquam  aut  fingere  coepit  a  pedibus, 
nee  denique  ars  ulla  consummatur  ibi,  unde  ordien- 
dum  est.  Quid  fiet  alioqui.  si  spatium  componendi 
orationem  stilo  non  fuerit  ?  nonne  nos  liaee  inversa 
consuetude  deceperit?  Inspicienda  igitur  materia 
est,  quo  praeeepimus  ordine,  scribenda,  quo  dieemus. 
X.  C'eterinn  causa  omnis,  in  qua  pars  altera  agentis 
est,  altera  recusantis,  aut  unius  rei  controversia  con- 
stat  aut  plurium.  Haec  simplex  dicitur,  ilia  con- 
iuneta.  Una  controversia  est  per  se  furti,  per  se 
adulterii.  Plures  aut  eiusdern  generis,  ut  in  pecuniis 
repetundis,,  aut  diversi,  ut  si  quis  sacrilegii  et  homi- 
cidii  simul  accusetur.  Quod  mine  in  publicis  iudiciis 
non  accidit,  quoniam  praetor  certa  lege  sortitur, 
prineipum  autem  et  seiiatus  cognitionibus  freqtiens 
est  et  populi  f'uit  ;  privata  quoque  indicia  saepe  unum 
iudieem  habere  multis  et  diversis  formulis  solent. 

2   Nee  aliae  species  erunt,  etiamsi  unus  a  duobus  dum- 
taxat  e.-uidem   rem  atque  ex  eadem  causa  }>etet  aut 

1  quoque  loco,  Rcyius  :  (JIKMJUC,  MSS. 

1  In  the  permanent  courts  (r/uaesliones  perpetuae).  There 
\vci-c  separate  courts  for  diffyrent  offences.  In  cases  brought 
before  the  Senate  or  the  Emperor  a  number  of  different 
charges  might  be  dealt  with  at  once. 


BOOK    III.  ix.  8-x.  2 

think  th